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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation has two goals: (A) to better explicate the conditional theory of micro (individual level) legislative behavior that seems to underlie this recent work and (B) to test it among three hundred and sixty one interview protocols gathered from members of the U.S. House of Representatives during a four month period (March-July 1977) of the first session of the 95th Congress.

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**CONTEXTS OF CONGRESSIONAL DECISION BEHAVIOR**

**By**

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**Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
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of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

**University of Pittsburgh**

**1979**

**817 28030**

This work is dedicated to the Honorable Jim Lloyd (D., Calif.),  
Jackie Lloyd, and the Lloyd staff (Brigid, Don, Ginger, Lisa, Lola,  
Jerry, Marsaleete, and Theresa). Without their help, interest,  
concern, and, most important, friendship, this research could not  
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## CHAPTER I

### THE "CONTEXTUAL" APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: INTRODUCTION, PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS

The Congressman as a "decision-making actor" with regard to recorded, roll call floor votes has persistently been a topic of interest among congressional scholars. A steady effort has been made to identify the various forces, factors, actors, and decision rules that influence congressional decision-making.

Students of Congress recently have engaged in developing what might best be called "contextual" or "conditional" or "metronomic" perspectives on legislative decision-making. This research constitutes a new emphasis and a new direction in the study of Congress. In contrast to the conventional practice of formulating general propositions with which to explain legislative decision-making, the newer vein of research has sought to identify different contextual patterns of the legislative process.

This dissertation has two purposes: 1) to better explicate the conditional theory of micro (individual level) legislative behavior that seems to underlie this recent work and 2) to test it among three hundred and sixty-one interview protocols gathered from members of the U.S. House of Representatives during a four month period (March--July, 1977) of the first session of the 95th Congress.

This chapter will review literature that is distinctive in its conditional approach and identify both the benefits and problems of the approach.

### A. Introduction: The New Contextual Emphasis in the Study of Congressional Decision-Making

The study of legislative behavior seems to have evolved in the fashion of intellectual advancement as described by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolution.<sup>1</sup> Kuhn contends that knowledge of a particular topic advances through the dialectical development and refinement of paradigms. With regard to the post World War II empirical study of legislative decision-making, three major phases or stages of paradigmatic advancement can be detected: (1) the legislator as "participant," (2) the legislator as a "determined actor," and (3) the legislator as a "contextual decision-maker."<sup>2</sup> Each stage offers a distinctive construct for viewing the legislator as a decision-making actor. Each succeeding stage aspires to a higher level of generalization, and attempts to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the preceding stage.

Before proceeding, two points of clarification should be made. First, common to any classification scheme, the problem here is that not all works on congressional decision-making neatly fit into one or the other of the three categories. In classifying decision-making literature, however, an attempt will be made to do so on the basis of a work's major thrust. In other words, it is assumed here that major works concerning congressional decision-making can be categorized on the basis of the paradigmatic construct that, in the main, they seem to offer. Second, there is no neat separation among the levels on the basis of a time chronology. Although each succeeding stage in many ways was developed from reactions to the preceding one, the contemporary period finds examples of all three.

The first, and most rudimentary, stage views the legislator as a "participant" in political combat. It is the approach notably developed in Bertram Gross's The Legislative Struggle<sup>3</sup> and in case studies such as

Bailey's Congress Makes a Law and Berman's A Bill Becomes a Law.<sup>4</sup> The crux of this model is a focus on the legislator as one of several competitors in the legislative process. It focuses attention on the role of external actors—President, Bureaucrats, interest groups, constituents, courts—in legislative decision-making. Although a number of important contributions have been made by this view—most notably the notions that the legislative process is a tremendously complex labyrinth and that all competitors engage in various strategies and tactics—the case study approach was strongly criticized for its limited generality and applicability. Scholars became aware that the findings of a case study do not necessarily transcend the specifics of the case at hand.

In reaction to the criticism of limited generality, coupled with a desire to become more scientific, legislative process scholars began to intensely study roll-call data and to collect attitudinal data from the legislators themselves. This work constitutes the second major stage of paradigmatic development where the legislator is depicted as a "determined" actor.

Two major characteristics are present in this second approach. The first is the notion that legislative decision-makers are determined or predisposed to vote in a given way because of either certain characteristics of demography, party, constituency and region, or a common, universal decision process. The second is an attempt to construct a general model with which to analyze the totality of legislative decision-making. Almost all of the major research efforts of the last two decades seem to posit this kind of "general," "determined actor" paradigm in that they seem to be searching for the primary determinant of "typical" legislative behavior. In this category are Turner and Schneier's Party

and Constituency,<sup>6</sup> Truman's The Congressional Party,<sup>7</sup> Davidson's The Role of the Congressman,<sup>8</sup> Kingdon's Congressmen's Voting Decisions,<sup>9</sup> Matthews and Stimson's Yea and Nays,<sup>10</sup> Cherryholmes and Shapiro's Representatives and Roll Calls,<sup>11</sup> Jackson's Constituencies and Leaders in Congress,<sup>12</sup> and Mayhew's Congress: the Electoral Connection:<sup>13</sup> Each employs congressional decision-making as a dependent variable and then seeks to discover various independent variables that best explain the dependent variable of decision-making. More significantly, each provides an overall model--implicitly, perhaps, a "grand theory"--with which to explain congressional decision-making. For the roll call studies of Turner and Truman, the model is one of party loyalty with deviations based on constituency. For Davidson, it is persistent role orientations. Kingdon offers two models: (a) a "consensus decision mode" whereby Congressmen follow the path of least resistance and (b) a rank ordering of the relative influence of various internal and external actors on congressional decision-making. For Matthews and Stimson, the norm of congressional decision-making is "cue-taking"--i.e., an expertise-based short-cut by which a member "follows" the lead of another Congressman, usually a member of the decision-maker's state delegation who serves on the relevant committee. For Cherryholmes and Shapiro, ideological predisposition and communications best explain congressional voting. Jackson offers a weighted, multiple actor input model. Mayhew presents an "economic incentives" model that stresses the member's drive for reelection.

To reiterate, literature classified at this stage of paradigmatic development (a) views the Congressman as a determined actor and thus

(b) attempts to provide a "general" construct which best explains that determination. Throughout, there is an emphasis on general propositions.

Major findings are expressed in the following general form:

- party affiliation is the factor most strongly related to congressional voting
- members base most votes on ideology
- most members have a "politico" style of representation and a district focus
- Congressmen generally are not well informed when voting
- members hear from few actors when making a decision
- fellow members are the most consistently consulted information source.

The third level of development holds the legislative decision-maker to be a "contextual" actor. This stage of paradigmatic thinking is a reaction to the plethora of competing models and generalizations. It rejects the notion that any one model of the legislative decision process can have a monopoly on truth. It emphasizes different decision tracks or modes within the Congress.

The distinguishing characteristics of the third level of paradigmatic construction are (a) the identification of different contexts and conditions of legislative decision-making, (b) the formulation of classification schemes or typologies that attempt to capture the essence of issue-based behavioral variations within the Congress, and (c) the utilization of contextually qualified generalizations.

The conditional approach has gained prominence in the works of Lowi.<sup>15</sup> Lowi provides a framework within which various case studies can be integrated. His basic premise is that the U.S. policy process is comprised of different policy arenas. Different areas of governmental activity constitute different arenas of power. In his words, "Each arena tends to

develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations."<sup>16</sup> He then distinguishes among "distributive," "regulatory," and "redistributive" policy arenas. Table 1.1 is Lowi's summary of the major patterns found in these different arenas.

Other works that can be classified at the third level of paradigmatic thinking include Clausen's How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus,<sup>17</sup> Cobb and Elder's Participation in American Politics,<sup>18</sup> Froman and Ripley's "Conditions for Party Leadership,"<sup>19</sup> C. O. Jones's "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-Making,"<sup>20</sup> Miller and Stokes's "Constituency Influence in Congress,"<sup>21</sup> Price's "Policy-Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of Environmental Factors,"<sup>22</sup> Presthus' Public Administration,<sup>23</sup> Ripley's American National Government and Public Policy,<sup>24</sup> Congress: Process and Policy,<sup>25</sup> and "Congressional Party Leaders and Standing Committees,"<sup>26</sup> Ripley and Franklin's Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy,<sup>27</sup> Wilson's Political Organizations,<sup>28</sup> and Vogler's The Politics of Congress.<sup>29</sup> Like Lowi, each stresses conditional patterns of influence and decision-making in Congress.

Some conditional studies merely call attention to legislative process variations and patterns. Miller and Stokes identify "several distinct patterns of representation" that "vary according to the type of policy at hand": civil rights, government regulation, and foreign affairs. In their words, ". . . no single tradition of representation fully accords with the reality of American legislative politics."<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Clausen searches for differential influence in certain "policy domains." In his investigation of five such "domains" or issue areas--government management, social welfare, international involvement, civil liberties, and agricultural assistance--he discovers various "patterns of influence." For government

**Table 1.1**  
**Arenas and Political Relationships: A Diagrammatic Survey\***

<u>Arena</u>	<u>Primary Political Unit</u>	<u>Relation Among Units</u>	<u>Power Structure</u>	<u>Stability of Structure</u>	<u>Primary Decisional Locus</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
Distribution	Individual firm, corporation	Log-rolling, mutual-non-interference, uncommon interests	Non-conflictual elite with support groups	Stable	Congressional committee and/or agency	Agency centralized to primary functional unit ("bureau")
Regulation	Group	"The coalition," shared subject-matter interest, bargaining	Pluralistic, multi-centered, "theory of balance"	Unstable	Congress, in classic role	Agency decentralized from center by "delegation," mixed control
Redistribution Association		The "peak association," class ideology	Conflictual elite, i.e., elite and counterelite	Stable	Executive and peak associations	Agency centralized toward top (above "bureau"), elaborate standards

\*Source: Theodore J. Lowi, "Distribution, Regulation, and Redistribution: the Functions of Government," Public Policies and their Politics, ed. by Randall B. Ripley (N.Y.: Norton, 1966), p. 39.

management, he finds a party influence. For social welfare and agricultural assistance, he identifies a "party-constituency" influence. A constituency influence dominates legislation involving civil liberties, while both constituency and presidential influences are salient for international involvement.<sup>31</sup> Froman and Ripley emphasize the variability of party leadership influence. According to them, "the extent of party leadership . . . is itself variable."<sup>32</sup> Specifically, they contend that party leadership is most likely to influence legislative outcomes when the following conditions are present: (a) low visibility, (b) procedural question and (c) the absence of counter pressure from constituencies and state delegations.<sup>33</sup> Ripley also emphasizes the conditional nature of the influence exerted by various actors. The visibility of an issue, he finds, will determine the relative influence of outside actors (constituency, interest groups, bureaucrats, and the President) on congressional decisions.<sup>34</sup> Concerning inside actors, he stipulates varying conditions under which party leaders will be influential vis-a-vis committee leaders.<sup>35</sup> Price makes the distinction between "clientele-centered" issues and those that are "publicly salient." He suggests that legislative decision-making varies according to the degree of conflict, public salience, and presidential involvement on a given issue.<sup>36</sup>

Other conditional studies make use of the Lowi typology to highlight variations in the legislative process and legislative behavior. Vogler uses the Lowi scheme to illustrate the variable influence of lobbyists, the President, and public opinion in the Congress. In Vogler's words,

On some types of issues pressure groups do seem to be able to influence the votes of legislators and the eventual policy outcome; on others, special interests, pressure groups and lobbyists are relatively ineffective. The same sort of discrepancies that we find in the literature on lobbies exist in studies of the influence of the President and the executive branch, and other outside actors on legislative policy-making. Consideration of the different types of policies is useful for

some understanding of the role of the President in legislative policy-making.<sup>37</sup>

Ripley and Franklin focus on policy relationships. Utilizing the Lowi typology, they argue that ". . . different relationships have varying degrees of importance in determining final policy actions. . . ."<sup>38</sup>

Table 1.2 is their summary of the different policy relationships and influence patterns that appear to follow different "policy types." Also utilizing the Lowi classification, Presthus calls attention to variable demand patterns and decision costs.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, some conditional studies posit distinctive typological schemes for classifying various conditions and contexts of legislative decision-making.

In a variation of Braybrooke and Lindblom, Jones identifies "four quadrants of decision-making," each involving a different kind of decision process, decision style and analytical method, and each varying from the others in terms of both the degree of understanding and the degree of change involved in the decision.<sup>40</sup> Wilson notes the variable nature of interest group involvement in the legislative process. He argues that ". . . the substance of a policy influences the role of organizations in its adoption . . .".<sup>41</sup>

To him, "The extent and nature of organizational activity in an issue area will also depend on the incidence of costs and benefits."<sup>42</sup> He then identifies four mixes of costs and benefits that affect group involvement: distributed benefits and distributed costs, concentrated benefits and concentrated costs, concentrated benefits and distributed costs, and distributed benefits and concentrated costs. Finally, Cobb and Elder

argue that the scope of political conflict varies according to a host of certain issue characteristics. They suggest that variations in legislative behavior will follow variations in the following issue characteristics: (a) the degree of specificity, (b) the scope of social significance,

Table 1.2  
Characteristics of Different Policy Types\*

Policy Type	Main Feature	Primary Actors	Relationship among Actors	Stability or Relationship	Main Decision-Maker	Visibility of Decisions	Influence of		
							Congressional Committee	Lobbies	Congress
Distributive, domestic	Short run, disaggregated decisions, no losers	Congressional subcommittees and committees; executives; executive bureaus; small interest groups	Logrolling	Stable	Congressional subcommittee or committee	Very low	High	Determinative	Supports Committee
Regulatory, domestic	Application of a general rule; some win, some lose	Full House and Senate; executive agencies; trade associations	Competition; bargaining	Unstable	Congress	Moderate	High	Creative	Determinative
Redistributive, domestic	Long run reallocation of resources among classes; winners and losers	President and his appointees; committees and/or Congress; Congress; peak associations; "liberals" and conservatives"	Ideological and class conflict	Stable	Executive	High	Moderate	Low or important promises	Obstructive until winning coalition present

\*Source: Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1976), p. 17.

- (c) the extent of temporal relevance, (d) the degree of complexity, and  
(e) the degree of categorical precedence.<sup>43</sup>

Although there is variation in jargon, focus, and the level of conceptualization of different works that can be classified at this third level of paradigmatic development, each work makes the same basic assumption: the legislative process is highly conditional. Each calls attention to patterned, issue-based variability in Congress.

Given the conditional/contextual/variability orientation of these recent works and their use of typologies, a "metronomic" metaphor or analogy is most appropriate for illustrating the characteristics and the unique contributions of this newer orientation. As all "aspired" child music prodigies know, a metronome is "a clockwork device with an inverted pendulum that beats time at a rate determined by the position of a sliding weight on the pendulum."<sup>44</sup> Although some may be struck by the variable speed of the metronome, most would agree that its distinctive characteristic is variable, repetitive regularity. Due to the sliding pendulum, the metronome functions with conditional regularity. It beats at a very rapid or very slow rate and has numerous moderate gradations, depending on the sliding weight. As such, the metronome is helpful in distinguishing the third level of paradigmatic thinking from the first two. In fact, the major difference between third and second level thinking is best captured with the distinction between "metronomic" and "static" designs. As noted above, those works which can be classified at the second level are distinctively static in that they offer parsimonious theories concerning what are perceived to be the dominant characteristics or modes of legislative behavior. Third Level literature, on the other hand, assumes that the legislative process is very much like the metronome: highly variable,

highly contextual, conditional, repetitive regularity. It emphasizes multiple-patterned dynamics of decision-making.

According to the newer approach, research that attempts to generalize about the legislative process or to identify its defining or "most typical" characteristics, although making a contribution, overlooks and oversimplifies contextual variations in congressional decision-making. To the proponents of this new emphasis in the study of the Congress, congressional decision-making is best understood, not with a series of static propositions that purport to summarize a process "in general,", but, rather, through the identification of recurring variations and the constructions of typologies which like the metronome acquaint the student with the nuances of a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. As the metronome illustrates to the student of music the various kinds of repetitive variations that characterize his subject, so too third level paradigmatic constructs sensitize the student of congressional decision-making to the notion of conditional regularity--i.e. that there are different decision contexts in Congress and that Congressmen behave differently in different contexts. Congressional decision-making is best understood with a number of different models rather than with one model, with the appropriateness of each of the various models depending on the presence of certain conditions.

By way of summary, Table 1.3 contrasts the three levels of paradigmatic development of congressional decision-making theory. As has been noted throughout this chapter (and as shown in the figure), contextual work is distinctive in that it presupposes a construct that emphasizes variable, dynamic patterns of legislative behavior. Although some second level literature implies variations in legislative behavior at the "actor" level (for example, it is assumed that meaningful differences occur between

**Table 1.3**  
**A Comparison of Three Paradigmatic Levels of**  
**Congressional Decision-Making Theory**

<u>Contrasts</u>	<u>Level</u>	I	II	III
Decision-maker seen as:		Participant	Determined actor	Contextual decision-maker
Data sources:		Case studies	Roll calls/ attitudinal	Case studies (to date)
Examples:		Bailey, Gross	Truman, Kingdon	Lowi
Emphasis:		Legislative process as "political struggle"	General Propositions/ general model of "typicalness"	Variable Contextual patterns
Generalize to:		Process	Actors	Issues

Republicans and Democrats or between "junior" and "senior" legislators), third level literature presumes that a meaningful differential primarily exists at the "issue" level (i.e., distinctive patterns are based on the kind of policy issue and type of decision at hand). In metronomic literature, there is a strong assumption that legislative decision-making is best understood in terms of issue variations, not actor variations, though to be sure actor differences are acknowledged as important.

It is perhaps simplistic to argue that only those works we have classified at the third stage take an issue-based contextual approach. Truman, for example, acknowledges the conditional nature of the legislative process with his introductory statement that "no study that is limited to a single two year period and is focused upon one set of primary data can produce unqualified conclusions."<sup>45</sup> Turner, as revised by Schneier, employ a contextual approach of sorts by noting that different substantive issues produce variable patterns of partisan voting in Congress.<sup>36</sup> Both Kingdon, and Matthews and Stimson employ a loose metronomic scheme. Kingdon examines the variable influence of constituency and interest groups under different conditions of issue salience.<sup>47</sup> Matthews and Stimson stipulate the conditions under which members are likely to engage in "cue-taking" and contend that "cue-taking" applies mainly to "normal decisions."<sup>48</sup> But as noted above, these works, as well as the others in level two, attempt in the main to provide a general model at the actor level. When they deal with "issue contexts," they do so in an incidental fashion. What is unique about the most recent body of literature (and why it must be considered a new emphasis in the study of legislative behavior) is the explicitness, formality, sophistication, primacy of purpose, and research orientation with which it attempts to discern

different contextual patterns and to utilize them as the basis for formulating conditional theory of the legislative process. In the remainder of this chapter, we will seek to identify (a) the advantages such a theory offers legislative process scholars and (b) the limitations of contextual literature given the current state of its development.

### B. The Advantages of a "Developed" Contextual Theory

The development of a contextual theory of the legislative process offers congressional scholars several distinct pay-offs. First, contextual theory affords the opportunity for the integration of contending models of the legislative process. Second, it provides the potential for transcending "static" research designs. Third, it offers the opportunity for the integration of contending theories of American democracy. Fourth, it provides the basis for constructing an analytical theory of the legislative process. Fifth, it provides the basis for formulating sophisticated "policy-oriented" manipulation of the legislative process. Although some overlap seems to exist among these, each merits a separate emphasis.

#### 1. The Integration of Contending Models of the Legislative Process

Presently, legislative process studies are plagued by numerous competing models. On both the macro and the micro level, there are various contending perspectives or explanations. Each offers an "in general" view of the legislative process and legislative behavior, that, as most students of Congress would be quick to note, is neither totally right nor totally wrong. In Kingdon's words, "If we were to be able somehow to arrive at a way to fit important aspects of these models together, our theoretical thinking about legislative behavior might be advanced considerably."<sup>49</sup>

At the macro or "organizational" level, one finds three very prominent perspectives on how Congress processes issues. They are: (1) the "subgovernment" (whirlpool/triangle/subsystem) approach, (2) the "Mayhew thesis," and (3) the "traditional" model.

The subgovernment approach has been made popular by Griffith's Congress: Its Contemporary Role,<sup>50</sup> Cater's Power in Washington,<sup>51</sup> and Freeman's The Political Process.<sup>52</sup> The essence of this perspective, as Schneier notes, is that "The legislature, executive and private institutions that are immediately concerned with a given policy-set make policy in this arena."<sup>53</sup> In other words, most congressional policy decisions are thrashed out among "proximate policy-makers": relevant congressional subcommittees, the bureau with assigned administrative responsibility, and an "affected public."

The Mayhew thesis, classically expressed in Congress: the Electoral Connection, argues that congressional policy-making, as the result of the micro motives of members for reelection, reflects "assembly coherence"--delay, particularism, servicing of the organized, and symbolism.<sup>54</sup>

The traditional perspective, which is best expressed in Polsby's Congress and the Presidency, argues that Congress functions as the "forge" or "anvil" of democracy--i.e., it is the place where accommodations are fashioned and hammered out, and where bargains are struck and interests are brokered.<sup>55</sup>

At the micro level, as emphasized above, there is no dearth of alternative schemes for explaining the behavior of individual legislators. Jackson<sup>56</sup> and Matthews and Stimson<sup>57</sup> attempt to summarize the major micro theories of legislative behavior. Combining the efforts of both works results in a list of four different theories purporting to explain why

Congressmen vote as they do. They are: (a) a "trustee" or "public-interest-statesman" model, (b) an "instructed delegate" or "representational" model, (c) an "ideologist" or "policy predispositions" theory and (d) a cue-taking or "organizational" explanation.

An obvious advantage of the metronomic construct is that it acknowledges the conditional appropriateness of various models. For example, the Lowi scheme, although significantly flawed as we shall subsequently argue, does integrate several models of legislative decision-making: distributive issues are "subgovernment" decisions; regulatory issues are decided on the basis of "policy coalitions" and reflect Congress in its "traditional" sense; redistributive issues invoke "ideological" responses. Thus, there is every reason to expect that developed contextual theory would afford students of Congress the opportunity to specify the conditions under which each major macro and micro perspective is likely to be valid. The metronomic line of reasoning alerts us to the probability that there is no one "best" explanation of legislative outcomes; there are several.

## 2. The Transcendence of "Static" Research Designs

This second advantage is closely related to the first, but relates more directly to the manner in which legislative behavior research is undertaken. Specifically, by developing a conditional/contextual framework, legislative process scholars will be able to overcome the problem of "staticness" that many consider to be the major limitation of role theory, the policy predispositions approach and cue-taking research.

Students of legislative behavior have expended enormous effort in order to ascertain various conceptions and orientations of legislative role.

These are most notably contained in Wahlke, et al's The Legislative System,<sup>58</sup> Daydson's The Role of the Congressman,<sup>59</sup> and numerous spinoffs from them. Although these studies have been most useful in providing data on how legislators view and define their job, they have been faulted for failing to take into account the contextual nature of role orientations. When gathering answers to the question "How do you define the job of a legislator," there is a strong presumption on the researcher's part that role is a basic decision premise that directs, guides, and structures the legislator's behavior. As Jewell and Patterson state,

A specific role orientation means a predisposition or inclination to act in a particular way. ...With enough information about the legislator's role orientations, it should be possible to predict more accurately how he will respond to demands, that is, how he will vote or otherwise act as a representative.<sup>60</sup>

True, different kinds of orientations are acknowledged, but it is presumed that an actor is primarily one type or the other. Thus, trustees are considered to be oriented to the public interest and to make decisions on the basis of self judgment; delegates or tribunes are held to follow constituency sentiment in making decisions; and politicos are thought to be constantly balancing self judgment against constituency sentiment. For researchers, the task has been to determine if different "kinds" of legislators adhere to different orientations.

As Jones argues, however, a legislator's representative role definition is not a static orientation that is universally applied. It is, rather, a conception that varies from issue to issue and, in addition, varies according to the legislative process stage involved. In Jones's words,

If a representative has a multiplicity of conflicting demands upon him in any series of actions on policy, he can satisfy many of them, over a period of time, because of the multiplicity of action points at successive stages in the legislative process.<sup>61</sup>

The newer policy predispositions/domains literature, pioneered by Cherryholmes and Shapiro<sup>62</sup> and Clausen,<sup>63</sup> Kingdon's<sup>64</sup> consensus decision-making theory, and cue-taking research as typified by Matthews and Stimson,<sup>65</sup> also presuppose a static construct in principal, and therefore are vulnerable to the Jones critique. As noted above, each of these works presumes that their research provides the "best" possible explanation of legislative decision-making. As with role research, each of these works employs a design which predicates that the basic decision process identified by the authors will structure most of a Congressman's voting decisions. For example, for Matthews and Stimson, a Congressman's cue network will dominate his decision-making process. If one can identify a legislator's cue network, he presumably can predict his voting behavior. The same kind of assumption is present in Kingdon, Cherryholmes and Shapiro and, to some extent, even in Clausen. For Kingdon, a researcher need only know the compatibility of demands surrounding a legislator on a given vote to accurately forecast his decision. And, for both Clausen and for Cherryholmes and Shapiro, a Congressman's decisions can be reasonably known and predicted if his/her policy predispositions and communications are known. The problem with each scheme is that the basic decision process of an individual Congressman, as identified, while perhaps accounting for a sizable share of his legislative behavior, leaves unexplained numerous variations and deviations. Members do not reach decisions in the same way or on the same basis on all votes.

For our purposes, then, the strength of a developed contextual theory is that it would offer a way around the Jones' criticisms by providing the framework for developing contextual interpretations of role orientations, policy domains and cue-taking. It would allow the

specification of the conditions under which each orientation and each decision mode (including the so-called atypical or deviating ones) is likely to shape the behavior of individual members.

In sum, a developed metronomic approach would lead to the abandonment of research designs that presume persistent decision behavior. It would encourage research designs which acknowledge that individual legislators may utilize various role orientations and decision short cuts depending on the type of legislation and the kind of decision at hand. It would encourage the development of sophisticated questionnaires that ask members about their decision processes with open-ended questions that accept multiple responses (for example, When are you a delegate? a trustee? or, When do you engage in cue-taking? In policy decision voting?) This is in sharp contrast with conventional questionnaires that investigate decision-making with mutually exclusive responses (for example, How do you generally define your role? Do you take cues? or, Do you vote on the basis of policy positions?) Such improved questionnaires would further the sophisticated view that variations in legislative behavior are not so much a matter of member preference as a matter of contextual appropriateness.

### 3. The Integration of Contending Theories of American Democracy

This third potential payoff of a contextual theory is similar to the first, but relates to the more profound question of "How democratic is America?" Specifically, a developed contextual theory of the legislative process would provide the basis for formulating a sharper conception of democratic pluralism that could take into account some of the more recent revisionist critiques.

Led by Robert Dahl,<sup>66</sup> V. O. Key, Jr.<sup>67</sup> and David Truman,<sup>68</sup> political scientists in the post-World War II era have tried to define the essence and sources of "democracy" (succinctly defined as elite responsiveness to mass preferences) in the American political process. Their most important contribution has been the formulation of a theory of democratic pluralism--a theory that attempts to develop a sophisticated understanding of actual political practice. This theory constitutes a more realistic, empirically-based interpretation of American democracy than conventional Madisonian and Jeffersonian "textbook" theories.

The writings of Dahl, Key, and Truman reveal two major characteristics of American democracy. They are: (1) the election of representatives that assures a scheme of mass/elites linkages and (2) a situation of elite competition/opposition concerning major policy questions that assures the availability of meaningful choices and alternatives at the mass level and a system of countervailing powers at the elite level. Although the American political system fails to measure up in many ways to classical electoral notions of democracy, democracy is sustained by the pluralistic competition between different political interests and by the capacity of elected public officials to broker and alter the outcomes of this competition. Stability, the peaceful resolution of conflict, open participation, and potential, if not actual, responsiveness are held to be the major assets of such a system.

In elaborating the tenets of pluralism, Key, Dahl, Truman, and others have specified the contribution to democratic practice of the institutions and processes of the American political system. Specifically, with regard to the Congress, pluralist theorists contend that Congress contributes to democracy by (a) serving as a representative forum, (b) providing a deliberative forum, (c) providing a competitive forum, (d)

facilitating bargaining, and, most relevant in contemporary society, (e) checking and restraining bureaucrats, specialists and technocrats through the exercise of both manifest and latent oversight.<sup>69</sup>

As with all aspects of pluralism, its legislative tenets have been criticized recently by those offering a revisionist perspective on the Congress. The revisionist authors<sup>70</sup> attempt to show instances where the tenets and expectations of pluralism are not met in practice. Specifically, they attack the pluralists' contention that the Congress provides a democratic process. They point to numerous cases involving the breakdown of mass/elite linkages and the absence of meaningful competition. They identify cases where both choices and countervailing opposition are nonexistent.

The relevant point to be made here--which, incidentally, is not incompatible with the positions of either the pluralists or the revisionists--is that a developed contextual theory would specify the conditions and contexts under which the empirical propositions of pluralists are likely to be valid and those under which the contentions of the revisionists are apt to be appropriate.

#### 4. The Construction of an "Analytical Theory" of the Legislative Process

A consistent theme of those works that attempt to develop an "epistemological" inventory of the legislative process field is the need for a theoretical framework or overarching theory with which various studies and research efforts can be synthesized. Meller notes that

Like raindrops on a dirty windowpane, legislative-behavior studies afford brief glimpses at a broader vision of the legislative process, but have failed to furnish a framework enabling its full comprehension. Studies are yet too disperse and lack replication; conflicting findings have not always served as stimuli for

subsequent clarificatory research. Also, there has been too ready a subsuming of the basic unity of the legislative process and too little attention given to the generation of an inclusive theory.<sup>71</sup>

Wahlke notes that

. . . the problems most immediately facing such analyses involve articulating "psychologist" and decision-process studies into a coherent attack on questions about the institutional character of representative bodies, a contribution to development of a general theory of representative bodies. . . . progress toward such a theory requires articulation of behavioral analyses with political theory in a still more general sense. . . .<sup>72</sup>

Eulau and Hinckley argue that ". . . legislative research, despite much progress in recent years, remains in infancy. . ."<sup>73</sup> They call for "accelerated theoretical advance" through a strengthening of the "converging tendencies in theory construction." For Fenno, our understanding of Congress is "bereft of theory." In his words, ". . . we cannot communicate our understanding in the language of generalization."<sup>74</sup> For Peabody, "the critical need is for theory at several levels for, quite clearly, in congressional research the generation of data has proceeded much more rapidly than the accumulation of theory."<sup>75</sup> He argues that ". . . the search must intensify for a general, or overarching, theory of congressional behavior."<sup>76</sup> Tidmarsh laments that ". . . the most serious lacuna in the literature is in the area of middle-range theories. . ."<sup>77</sup>

Finally, Shannon notes that

if social research is conceived as an individual exercise of competence and an occasional thrust of brilliant imagination, there is some of each to be found here. If, on the other hand, it is conceived as a quest for highly reliable generalizations and causal explanations that culminate in nicely integrated theoretical structures, this literature, collectively, leaves much to be desired. If the latter is to be the goal that we seek, we had better get our heads together.<sup>78</sup>

A developed contextual approach to the legislative process would be a step toward the kind of "theory" called for by these authors.

Specifically, a contextual scheme would advance theory in two ways. First, as noted above, by providing the basis for the integration of contending theories, the metronomic model would offer the opportunity for an inclusive theory of "converging tendencies." Second, and more important, through the use of typologies, a contextual scheme would provide the basis for developing what Nagel refers to as "nomothetic" propositions. As he notes, nomothetic statements are ". . . general in form, and contain few if any references to specific objects, places, and times. . ."<sup>79</sup> They are general statements in which, as Przeworski and Teune note in their Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, the proper names of countries, personalities, and institutions are replaced by references to abstract variables.<sup>80</sup> Also, as Przeworski and Teune emphasize, the goal of all social science endeavors should be formulation of nomothetic statements. Such statements provide the basis for analytical theories of social phenomena.

For students of Congress, the typologies of the contextual approach offer the opportunity for providing nomothetic propositions. Such propositions can lead to the analytical theory of the legislative process for which epistemological works on congressional research are calling. The schemes of Lowi, Wilson, Jones, etc. provide the basis for examining contextual variations in the legislative process in terms of general variables such as policy types, policy arenas, issue characteristics, extent of information, changes, burdens and benefits, rather than in terms of substantive, proper names such as "civil rights," "law enforcement," "foreign policy."

In sum, a sophisticated contextual perspective would be a major advancement toward the development of analytical theory--i.e., theory in the sense of Nagel, Przeworski and Teune--of the legislative process.

##### 5. The Formulation of a Basis for Sophisticated "Policy-Oriented" Manipulations of the Legislative Process

Presumably, if one specifies the conditions and contexts of differences in legislative behavior, one affords the opportunity for "inducing" certain desired forms of behavior. A sophisticated theory of why Congressmen vote as they do and why they rely on certain decision modes in one situation and other modes in other situations would be of great value to those various actors--party leaders, Presidents, interest groups--intent on influencing legislative outcomes.

Huitt's discussion of Lyndon Johnson's tenure as Senate majority leader serves as a relevant example of the pragmatic uses to which sophisticated knowledge of Congress can be put. Huitt emphasizes Johnson's adroitness in promoting Democratic party cohesion in the Senate by manipulating the definition of an issue. To secure maximum party support, Johnson attempted to represent issues as "procedural" or "party" votes. In Huitt's words, ". . . important as a leadership technique was the manipulation of the role perceptions of other Senators. . . . he exploited every opportunity to get his colleagues to think, not as Northerners or Southerners, Liberals or Conservatives, but as Democrats."<sup>81</sup> Votes were defined as party votes. This example shows how contestants in the legislative process might employ a contextual perspective as the basis for sophisticated issue definition strategies with which to shape congressional decision-making.

In his study, "Policy Analysis in Congress," Polsby suggests an application of conditional theory. Polsby notes that coalitions for or against certain proposals are constructed through a variety of means: ". . . invocation of party loyalty, promises of future help, log-rolling,

the sacrificing of certain provisions, etc."<sup>82</sup> What a developed contextual perspective may offer lobbyists is the knowledge of (a) which of these means is likely to be relevant in a given situation and (b) what one must do in a given context to activate the necessary means.

On a larger scale, a developed conditional theory can perhaps be used to promote particular normative conceptions of the Congress. Davidson, et al.<sup>83</sup> and Saloma<sup>84</sup> identify major normative models of the Congress. A concatenation of these models reveals at least five different perspectives: the Literary (Whig/Congressional Supremacy) Theory, the Presidential Supremacy Theory, the Constitutional Balance Theory, the Party-Government Theory, and the Presidential-Pluralistic Model. They differ with regard to the major functions of Congress. A contextual theory, in addition to specifying the conditions under which each model is likely to be approximated, can be employed to enhance the probability that a given model will be approximated. In this respect, a contextual approach can contribute to a goal-oriented, policy science of Congress that Ripley employs in his study "The Impact of Congress on Public Policy."<sup>85</sup> Ripley argues that normative prescriptions concerning the role of Congress in public policy-making should be based on well developed, empirical notions of how Congress functions and what the probable effects of desired reforms are likely to be. Surely, a developed contextual approach with substantiated "cause and effect" propositions could enhance the prospects for realistic reform.

#### C. Problem: The Undeveloped State of Contextual Schemes

Contextual schemes can contribute much to sophisticated notions of the legislative process, legislative behavior, and democratic process.

They offer the potential for nomothetic propositions concerning legislative behavior and have important policy implications. It is very disappointing, therefore, to discover, upon closer scrutiny, that, with few exceptions, those writings that are considered to be the crux of contextual literature fail to both address major questions of democratic theory and to conform to the requisites of social science theorizing and research. With the exception of Lowi's initial study, nowhere among the major works that use "conditional" analysis is there any effort to relate a metronomic scheme to the questions of democratic theory. Instead, most research is pre-occupied with the more mundane topics of decision-making arenas and patterns of influence.

Most disheartening, however, is the primitive state of theorizing. Specifically, as a body of literature, all of the major works that employ a contextual approach suffer from three major deficiencies: (1) the lack of developed, coherent, explicit conceptualization, (2) the lack of direct, additive, systematic research, and (3) the absence of true nomothetic concepts.

### 1. The Lack of Developed, Coherent, Explicit Conceptualization.

Contextual schemes suffer from three specific problems of conceptualization.

First, no standard language has developed. As noted above, metronomic research has evolved along two major lines. One involves the writings of Lowi and subsequent attempts by Ripley,<sup>87</sup> Ripley and Franklin,<sup>88</sup> Vogler,<sup>89</sup> Salisbury,<sup>90</sup> and Presthus<sup>91</sup> to either refine or revise the basic distinction among distributive, regulatory, and redistributive arenas of

interaction. The other includes works by Jones,<sup>92</sup> Price,<sup>93</sup> Cobb and Elder,<sup>94</sup> and Wilson.<sup>95</sup> This latter course seems to accept Lowi's assumption that the legislative process is conditional, but looks for patterns different from those suggested by the Lowi typology (although in fairness to Lowi, it should be noted that these patterns are quite possibly implied by him). The result is a plethora of typologies, each attempting to link a different bundle of dependent variables to a different bundle of independent variables. For Lowi and subsequent refinements of his scheme, policy content determines the diversity and intensity of the policy arena within which legislators function, the relationship among legislators and other actors, the loci of decision (influence patterns) within the legislature, and the nature of both the policy decision and the implementation structure.<sup>96</sup> For Jones, utilizing Braybrooke and Lindblom, the extent of available knowledge and the scope of change associated with a given policy issue are related to the kinds of actors who get involved in congressional policy-making and the analytical method used by Congress in responding to the issue.<sup>97</sup> For Wilson, costs and benefits of a policy affect the intensity and diversity of congressional policy arenas.<sup>98</sup> For both Price, and Cobb and Elder, different configurations of different "issue characteristics" are associated with different decision referents.<sup>99</sup> The result of this multiplicity of jargon and typologies is, of course, the lack of a standardized scheme, for the only tie that binds is adherence to the implied metronomic model.

Second, contextual literature lacks an explicit rationale for explaining the identified relationships. None of the authors who use a metronomic approach spell out the causal schemes implied in their writings. They fail to explain the theoretical basis of relationships between

independent and dependent variables. For example, Lowi in his pioneering work suggests broad patterns of legislative decision-making, but he does not provide a succinct explanation of suspected relationships. He does not directly tell us why different types of bills are related to differences in legislative behavior. Subsequent studies, which might be classified as spinoffs or derivatives of Lowi because they are predicated on his distributive/regulatory/redistributive typology, do no better. For example, although Ripley and Franklin do much to identify and differentiate variables and to clarify causal schemes, they do not provide a sharp explanation that suggests why different policy types are associated with different kinds of decision processes. These criticisms also apply to those contextual approaches that do not build on Lowi's typology.

Third, contextual literature fails to distinguish between macro and micro levels of analysis or to specify how they are linked together. Although certain patterns are discerned at the macro level, there has been no attempt to specify precisely how these macro variations translate to the micro level. Authors utilizing a contextual approach fail to provide us with a standard, operationable set of benchmarks at which we can observe predicted patterns of legislative behavior. What is different about the decision environment of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive issues that leads legislators to employ different kinds of decision processes? What happens with regard to a member's decision-making behavior on distributive issues that is different from redistributive issues? These concerns are simply not addressed in current research.

There has been some progress in the conceptual development of conditional schemes, especially the works of Jones, Cobb and Elder, and Price. In these it is argued that "issue characteristics" and not policy

types are related to legislative process patterns. Generally speaking, however, metronomic approaches because of the lack of standardization, the lack of explicitness concerning causal schemes and independent and dependent variables, the absence of a compelling rationale, and the failure to link macro and micro phenomena, must be considered at best conceptually primitive.

## 2. The Lack of Direct, Additive, Systematic Research

Contextual literature also suffers from the absence of rigorous empirical scrutiny. As Hofferbert notes, "to date, little empirical work has been fruitfully conducted with any of these typologies. . . . The evidence is not yet in concerning the typologies. . . but it is disturbing that. . . the bait has not been taken by other researchers."<sup>100</sup> No doubt this state of affairs is the result of the general conceptual fuzziness of contextual schemes noted previously. Indeed Cobb and Elder,<sup>101</sup> Froman,<sup>102</sup> Dornan,<sup>103</sup> Wilson,<sup>104</sup> and Greenberg et al<sup>105</sup> argue that, at least with regard to the Lowi scheme, a contextual approach is unoperational because the policy types are not mutually exclusive--that is, all policies have some distributive, regulatory, and redistributive aspects. Therefore, it is most difficult to establish an objective classification of policies. To decide whether a policy is mainly distributive, regulatory, or redistributive would require, as Greenberg et al. argue, an enormous study of policy impacts, that in itself would involve highly "subjective" types of assessments on the part of the researcher.<sup>106</sup>

Lowi<sup>107</sup> tries to empirically "test" for some of his expected patterns. Ripley and Franklin attempt a test of the Lowi scheme with a series of disparate case studies. Yet, Lowi has not been examined in the

fashion legislative process scholars traditionally test their schemes: in a single session of Congress where various factors internal (e.g., leadership, member composition, party control of the Presidency, party alignment) to the legislature can be held constant. Metronomic schemes other than Lowi also generally lack broad-based research. Jones verifies his scheme with only case studies of congressional responses to the environmental movement. Both Cobb and Elder and Wilson are limited to anecdotal examples in support of their schemes. Price relies on impressionistic views of commerce policy-making over a period of several Congresses. As a body of literature, contextual approaches to the study of Congress have not been examined nor researched in keeping with the high standards and precepts of scientific method and the demands of generality.

### 3. The Absence of True Nomothetic Concepts

There have been several attempts to uncover conditions and variations in the legislative process through empirical research. The most noteworthy are Miller and Stokes's "Constituency Influence in Congress,"<sup>108</sup> Clausen's How Congressmen Decide,<sup>109</sup> and Clausen and Cheney's "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953-1964."<sup>110</sup> The third and final criticism that can be made of contextual literature is that even those few works that have employed rigorous methodologies have not been truly nomothetic. Although the Miller and Stokes and Clausen works empirically demonstrate a metronomic working of Congress, their models do not utilize general variables, relying instead on substantive policy categories or issue domains. Miller and Stokes use "civil rights," "foreign policy" and "social welfare;" Clausen focuses on "government management," "social welfare," "international involvement,"

"civil liberties" and "agricultural assistance;" and Clausen and Cheney use "economic policy" and "welfare policy."

To summarize, those works that can be considered "contextual" are either conceptually fuzzy or unsystematic, on the one hand, or lack the true nomothetic quality necessary for useful and sophisticated theorizing, on the other hand. These deficiencies may be a reflection of the relative newness of literature that stresses a metronomic working of the Congress. Nevertheless, given the potential advantages to be gained from the study of legislative contexts, there can be no doubt that attempts to improve on the metronomic model are worthwhile and significant. This is especially so because numerous textbook approaches and spinoff studies have been stimulated by the various contextual schemes, especially Lowi. In fact, so great is contemporary interest in contextual schemes that they may very well have become the new fad of legislative process scholars, succeeding such topics as legislative process, case studies, roll-call analysis, legislative behavior, small group decision-making, and comparative legislative policies. Yet, we have yet to demonstrate the validity of a metronomic effect in an acceptable fashion.

#### D. Summary and Conclusions

Floor voting in the U. S. Congress generally has been considered an important act of legitimization in the American political system. Political scientists have devoted much time and energy to explaining the decision behavior of Congressmen. Their works have addressed major questions such as how do Congressmen decide? Who influences Congressmen? How do they define their job? Who do they hear from when making a decision?

How do they inform themselves? What kind of representation is afforded by Congress? How does Congress, as an institution, function and how does it process issues? And, what contributions does Congress make to national policy?

Traditionally, students of Congress have employed static research designs to answer these questions. Static studies use general propositions to understand legislative behavior, such as "Congressmen hear from few actors when making a decision" or "fellow members are the most consistently consulted information source." Static models generalize about legislative decision-making by focusing on a single factor that is presumed to account for most voting decisions. Some studies alert us to party as the basis of decision-making. Others emphasize cue-taking, policy positions, constituency, or consensus decision-making. The result has been a plethora of competing models.

A review of legislative process literature has allowed us to differentiate a new line of contextual or metronomic research from the more traditional, static models of legislative behavior. The newer perspective calls attention to different decision settings within the legislature, such as with the distinction between distributive, regulatory, and redistributive arenas. The essence of this newer thrust is a firm emphasis on contextual patterns in legislative behavior. It employs issue-based qualifications when discussing how Congressmen decide. While static theories implicitly stress patterns of decision-making based on differences in party, constituency, and background characteristics such as length of service, the metronomic model emphasizes issue-based variations.

Static designs imply that the legislative actor goes through the same intellectual processes and steps and exhibits the same behavior when

making each and every decision. Although the premises on which decisions are based may vary, the process remains the same. Thus, according to those who utilize this type of construct, legislative decision-making is best explained by a parsimonious theory based on general propositions. Conversely, metronomic constructs depict the legislator as one who utilizes various processes and exhibits different behaviors depending on the kind of issue at hand. Authors who utilize a contextual perspective emphasize the applicability of multiple models. According to metronomic literature, if one desires a sophisticated perspective on legislative decision-making, he is better served by an approach that acknowledges various decision contexts/conditions/tracks/arenas of the legislative process than by a static/general/grand theory/all-inclusive model that stresses typicalness, generality, normality, or universality.

Although the notion of contextually dynamic decision-making offers a promising line of investigation, it is not well developed. It has not been formulated, operationalized, nor researched in keeping with the standards of the discipline, nor has it been used to address central questions of democratic theory.

It is the goal of this dissertation to coherently explicate the micro theory underlying, or at least implied by, metronomic schemes and to offer a design that operationalizes the theory with nomothetic concepts, provides an acceptable empirical test of propositions logically deduced from said theory, and attempts to link the findings of the research to literature concerning the democratic process and democratic linkages in America.

## CHAPTER II

### CONTEXTUAL THEORY: AN EXPLICATION, RATIONALE, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

This chapter will attempt to improve the contemporary state of contextual approaches to legislative decision-making. Specifically it will (a) formally and explicitly state the major propositions that inhere in contextual approaches and discuss them in terms of democratic theory, (b) elaborate on the reasons why the stated relationships can be expected, (c) provide a research design with which to operationalize and test major hypotheses drawn from the formally stated theory, and (d) describe the procedures through which the research design was implemented and data actually collected.

#### A. Theoretical Explication: Issue-based Variations in Legislative Decision-Making

The basic intellectual construct of the contextual approach is that legislative decision-making is a highly variable task that is best understood as a process involving several different patterns of behavior. In other words, Congressmen reach decisions by employing and relying on a variety of decision processes, rules and aids that vary by circumstances, conditions and contexts. Thus, for those who use this approach, the study of congressional behavior and decision-making is better served by a dynamic or metronomic approach that synthesizes several different models than by a static model that stresses generalizations.

As noted in chapter I, a major limitation of the contextual approach is the lack of explicated theory. The contemporary contextual

approach is more a framework that emphasizes issue-based variations than a theory. This section will attempt to formally state the theory implied by contextual approaches.

The specific theory ("theory: taken in the strict sense to mean an explanation of directional relationships among several variables<sup>1</sup>") which is implicit in the major contextual schemes is, succinctly stated, that "issue characteristics" strongly affect the decision-making process in Congress, with issues having characteristics commonly considered to make for low grade problems (e.g., technicality, complexity, low visibility, low conflict, low salience, routineness) being associated with narrow decision referents and specialist-dominated decision-making processes, while issues with the opposite characteristics (e.g., non-technical, non-routine, high conflict, high visibility, high salience, comprehensiveness) are associated with broad, or expanded, forms and styles of legislative behavior.

This theory is not, of course, explicitly stated in a single piece. But, despite the enormous diversity of work in the contextual school, it is clear that the basic approach of most scholars who have a conditional perspective at least implicitly posits the theory that the "issue characteristics" of a bill will determine both (a) how it is handled and responded to by the legislature (macro aspect) and (b) how individual legislators reach a decision on it (micro aspect). True, Lowi posits a link between policy and political arena. Subsequent critiques by Ripley and Franklin, Vogler, Jones, Coble and Elder, and Price make it clear, however, that the major link in metronomic schemes is one between issue characteristics, and policy relationships. Ripley and Franklin conclude that "The argument has been made . . . that different relationships have

varying degrees of importance in determining final policy actions depending on the kind of issue at stake.<sup>2</sup> Vogler discusses how "on some types of issues . . ." pressure groups and their lobbyists are influential; on others they are not.<sup>3</sup> Jones draws relationships among "issue-area characteristics," on one hand, and "institutional characteristics," "decision-making characteristics" and "policy characteristics."<sup>4</sup> Thus, most contextual literature implies that how decision-makers define an issue will determine how they will react to it. Few authors follow the Lowi scheme which holds that decision-making is affected by policy substance. In fairness to Lowi, however, his three-fold scheme does imply an issue-based model. Certainly, distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies can be distinguished in terms of issue dimensions. Lowi's distributive issues are very similar to low grade issues, while redistributive issues might be considered hot, with regulatory issues somewhere in between.

The clearest expression of the proposition that the characteristics of an issue will sharply influence how a member makes up his mind is found in both Cobb and Elder and in Price. Both state the theory in terms reminiscent of the Schattschneider thesis concerning the "scope of conflict." For Cobb and Elder, the less routine, technical, complex, specific, and immediately relevant an issue is, and the more visible, controversial, costly, comprehensive, and significant it is, the more likely the issue will be resolved in an expanded or larger public.<sup>5</sup> When the opposite conditions are present, the decision is likely to be thrashed out within a narrow or specific public comprised primarily of those affected or those for whom the decision is immediately relevant. In Price's words, ". . . the degree of conflict an issue is thought to

entail and its perceived salience to the electorate . . . influence both the distribution of legislators' policy-making 'investments' and the extent to which they take their bearings from broader interests."<sup>6</sup>


The propositions that can be garnered from various contextual schemes thus suggest the issue characteristics model depicted in Table 2.1. From Lowi and other works based on his model, we get the basic construct that there are different contexts of legislative decision-making. From Jones, Cobb and Elder, and Price, we get the notion that behavioral variations are related to issue characteristics.

Link A of Table 2.1 posits that issue characteristics and legislative backgrounds are reciprocally influential. How an issue is defined will influence (a) the division of the committee vote, (b) whether or not a minority report is issued, (c) whether or not the committee will be the locus of the decision, and (d) whether or not what Froman calls "alternative procedures"<sup>7</sup> (Discharge petition, calendar Wednesday, and cloture) are invoked. For instance, legislation that is considered hot, controversial, and visible will be decided in committee. Likewise, hot legislation is likely to be handled in an extraordinary fashion (i.e., with a highly divided committee and with floor attempts to override the committee).

Link B is a macro one and involves the impact of Congress, as an institution, on public policy. This link, which will be of only tangential interest in this dissertation, is classically expressed by Huntington in his "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century."<sup>8</sup> He notes that the more complex and technical an issue is the more likely it is that Congress will defer to the executive's expertise.<sup>8</sup> For Huntington, the implication of this relationship (given the increasing level of technology and the government's involvement in it) is that Congress will have to

Table 2.1

## Model of Theoretical Linkages Implied by Contextual Literature



"adapt" by de-emphasizing its "law-making" responsibilities in favor of oversight functions or "delaying" powers.<sup>9</sup> Numerous commentators have likewise posited the macro proposition that high levels of political conflict concerning legislation will also lead Congress to defer to the Presidency in an effort to "pass the buck" or find a "heat shield."

Linkage C, the micro propositions of the model--i.e., those concerned with the behavior of individual Congressmen--will serve as the major focal point of this dissertation. The contextual approach argues that the decision behavior of individual members is related to issue characteristics, thus affecting the probability that subgovernment decision-making will occur (i.e., that committee members will be deferred to) or, conversely, that Congressmen will decide in a fashion approximating the classic model (i.e., balancing particular needs with the general good, assessing alternatives, responding to broader publics, and countervailing expertise).

For democratic theory, the implications of contextual theory are to reaffirm the contention of Schattschneider,<sup>10</sup> Key,<sup>11</sup> Truman,<sup>12</sup> and Dahl<sup>13</sup> that the American system, if not always actually democratic, is democratic on important or hot issues and, more importantly, potentially so on almost all issues. True, certain kinds of low grade decisions may be reached with reference to only those who are most immediately affected and choice and countervailing pressure are not always available. But contextual theory assumes checks will become available if dissatisfaction with prevailing policies escalates controversy to the extent that "potential" or "latent" groups are activated and mobilized and that, to paraphrase Dahl, "homo civici" become "homo politici."<sup>14</sup> In sum, America is democratic not because all decisions are made according to the precepts

of democratic pluralism, but because (a) the widespread and diverse nature of political resources makes it possible to resolve issues in a competitive manner if sufficient opposition should develop and (b) political elites are restrained by the political power of broader publics in that elites must constantly anticipate the reactions of broader publics when making narrow or specific policy.

#### B. Theoretical Rationale: Variable Decision Modes as a Strategy for Coping with "Constrained" Rationality

A theory is more than a statement of relationship among variables. It is an explanation of the relationship. It offers the reasons why certain relationships should be expected. As noted in Chapter I, contextual literature lacks a formal theoretical rationale. The purpose of this section is to formulate a theoretical justification for the contextual approach to the legislative process.

A theoretical rationale for the metronomic scheme of legislative behavior and its predicted relationships is provided by four different literatures: (1) organization decision-making theory, (2) legislative behavior, (3) democratic theory, and (4) micro economic investment theory. Each provides justification for the expected metronomic patterns. The specific rationale, as gleaned from these literatures, is as follows: decision-making constraints within Congress lead members to employ various decision rules that vary according to the inducements to participation present in different decision arenas.

From organization and decision-making theory, two notions help explain the posited relationships of the contextual approach: (a) that decision-makers utilize decision shortcuts and (b) that different kinds of shortcuts are used under different circumstances.

If any one major theme is present in organization theory, it is, as Palumbo notes in his review of the literature, that there are limits to rationality in all decision settings.<sup>15</sup> In what has been alternatively called "the Carnegie Model," "bounded rationality," "muddling through," "mutual adjustment," "limited successive comparisons," "incrementalism" and "satisficing"—perspectives developed by such organizational "realists" as Simon,<sup>16</sup> March and Simon,<sup>17</sup> Cyert and March,<sup>18</sup> March and Olsen,<sup>19</sup> Braybrooke and Lindblom,<sup>20</sup> Lindblom,<sup>21</sup> Wildavsky,<sup>22</sup> and Crecine<sup>23</sup>—there is a contention that decision-making actors, when faced with a multitude of choices, are forced to make compromises with the purely rational comprehensive model. The rational model—or what is sometimes called the "ideal" or "synoptic approach"—holds that all decisions should be made only after a consideration of all alternatives and their expected consequences. Each decision is an attempt to fit means to ends in order to derive maximum or optimum benefits. The realists argue, however, that the ideal process cannot be followed due to the constraints imposed by time and the lack of knowledge, information, and clearly annunciated, agreed upon goals. To cope with the large volume of decisions that must be made concerning a multitude of policy questions, decision-makers rely on "decision rules" or what Sharkansky appropriately calls the "routines of politics."<sup>24</sup> In other words, all decision-makers—legislators included—cope with dissensus and high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty by using intellectual shortcuts that become part of routine behavior. As Edwards and Sharkansky note, ". . . they rely on decision rules, rules of thumb or standard operating procedures that make policy-making manageable and keep decisions within the bounds of political and economic feasibility."<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, as organizational theorist James D. Thompson emphasizes, decision rules are variable. There are different "types of decision issues" and "it seems clear that each type of decision issue calls for a different strategy."<sup>26</sup> Thus, for the purposes of the contextual theory of legislative behavior, the basic contribution of theories of decision-making in large, complex organizations is to give credibility to the expectation that Congressmen will employ "variable decision rules," "different" routines, "different shortcuts and strategies."

Students of legislative behavior have recently begun to adapt the "bounded rationality" approach to decision-making in order to learn how Congressmen cope with complexity and uncertainty within the legislature. This literature justifies the notion of variable legislative decision rules. Specifically, this literature gives support by arguing (a) that legislators use decision shortcuts as a way of "rationally" working around constraints, (b) that these shortcuts are patterned, and (c) that the particular shortcut employed depends on issue contexts. Matthews and Stimson identify major cognitive and structural constraints affecting floor voting, the most important being the large number of decisions, the varied scope of these decisions, the technical complexity of many bills, the presence of time limitations, and the existence of limited staff assistance.<sup>27</sup> In summarizing the contributions of cue-taking research, Ripley argues that "decision rules" are the legislator's way of contending with these constraints. As he notes, "obviously, no single individual can become even semi-expert in everything on the governmental agenda. Therefore, members seek shortcuts as they try to make up their minds. They seek cues for how to behave and how to vote on a great variety of policy matters."<sup>28</sup> He concludes that ". . . cue taking is not a random matter in Congress but

that patterns of regularity and predictability do exist . . . [and involve] . . . varying sources of influence. . . ."<sup>29</sup> Cleaveland emphasizes the patterned variability of these decision rules. For him, variations can be accounted for by different "issue contexts." "Issue contexts" are ". . . the way members of Congress perceive a policy proposal that comes before them, how they consciously or unconsciously classify it for study, and what group of policies they believe it related to."<sup>30</sup> To Cleaveland, "such issue contexts strongly influence legislative outcomes because their structure helps determine the approach for analysis . . . as well as the advice and expertise that enjoys privileged access."<sup>31</sup> Thus, contextual theory receives justification from the general literature of legislative behavior.

The theory of democracy as formulated by Schattschneider provides the rationale for the specific configurations predicted by contextual theory. Schattschneider argues that

. . . the basic pattern of all politics . . . is that the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it. That is, the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants affects the results.<sup>32</sup>

In other words, there are different decision arenas in politics; these arenas can be differentiated on the basis of the degree of conflict and the number of actors involved; and the degree of conflict on an issue and the number of people involved will affect how the issue is resolved. What this means is that on non-controversial legislation only a relatively few actors will get involved, and the outcome will likely reflect the preferences of affected publics and those considered to be "specialists" or "experts." On "controversial issues," more people will be involved and, therefore, the decision will reflect this "expanded" input. In the opinion of one interpreter of Schattschneider,

To a large degree the actions of the audience would determine the strategies that the original parties would adopt to seek resolution of the conflict. If additional parties get involved in the actual conflict, the scope of the conflict changes and so might its possible outcome.<sup>33</sup>

In their application of Schattschneider to the legislative arena, Keefe and Ogul provide a justification of the contextual theory on this point. In their words,

The more controversial the issue, the greater the possibility that the processes of legislative bargaining and adjustment will be exposed to public view and consideration. Where the stakes are large, the contestants vocal and insistent, and a test of strength desired, it is difficult to keep the attentive public from getting clear views of the struggle. In addition, the more the burden of decisions can be transferred to the floor, the greater the possibility that larger portions of the public will be attracted by the contagiousness of conflict and stimulated to become involved in its resolution.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the democratic theory of Schattschneider explains the contextual theory by distinguishing between "controversial" and "uncontroversial" political arenas and by implicitly arguing that, because of the different sizes of the audience, uncontroversial arenas will be considered narrow, while controversial ones will be broad.

Finally, the investment theory of micro economics provides both support and explanation for the contextual approach by arguing that different categories of decisions provide decision-makers with varying inducements for participation and involvement. In an adaptation of investment theory to the study of legislative behavior, Ogul notes that members consider some activities more important than others.

Each member is faced with a variety of obligations that are legitimate, important, and demanding of time and energy. In principle, he should be working hard at all of them. In fact, since he does not weigh them equally, he is unlikely to give them attention. He may attend to all of the areas that he is supposed to cover, but he probably will not handle all of them well.<sup>35</sup>

To cope, members must prioritize. As Ogul states, "In making their choices

about what to do, members of Congress will do things considered important to them at the time."<sup>36</sup> For our purposes, what this means is that some issues will be considered important, some will not. Some issues provide incentives for involvement, others do not. Combining this approach with Schatteschnieder's provides a partial explanation for the contextual theory. The reason that non-controversial, low-grade decisions will be based on narrow or specialist referents while broad decision referents will provide bearings for controversial, hot issues, is that only a few actors are involved in non-controversial issues, but many actors are involved in ~~controversial~~ ones. Presumably, on low grade issues that do not interest a member, do not entail political pressure and high decision costs, and generally are not well known, the member is willing to base the decision on the "specialist" or on "narrow" criteria. So-called hot issues, in comparison, provide sufficient incentives for "broader" behavior. In other words, on controversial issues, Congressmen, reflecting expanded inputs and knowing that many are watching, feel compelled to base their vote decisions in terms of broader, perhaps more political, criteria. On the other hand, on non-controversial issues, where few are heard from and few are watching, deference to specialists or narrow criteria may be appropriate. This definitely seems to be the basic position, but not the emphasis, of the Matthews and Stimson cue-taking theory. To them, for the vast majority of items Congressmen must vote on--nominally "low visible" votes--Congressmen engage in the specialist-dominated process of cue-taking. They take their bearings from a trusted, respected and informed colleague. "On the handful of abnormally visible decisions members record each year,"<sup>37</sup> the more political decision rules of "voting the district," "personal precedent," and "ideology" are employed.<sup>38</sup>

To conclude this discussion, contextual theory receives justification from the literatures of organization theory, legislative behavior, democratic theory, and investment theory. Combining the concepts of "decision constraints," "variable decision rules," "the contagion of conflict theory," and "investment incentives" provides a strong rationale for the theoretical expectations of the metronomic approach.

It should be noted that, throughout this dissertation, there is a strong assumption that the legislative decision-maker is a rational, purposive actor.<sup>37</sup> It is presumed that the scheme of contextually appropriate decision rules as outlined here constitutes the member's patterned way of rationally coping with the situation within which he finds himself with regard to the large volume and diversified scope of floor votes. On those issues on which he does not care, is not pressured, and is not informed, it is logical to defer to an "expert." On those issues on which he is pressured, does care, and is informed, a "broader" more "political" response is appropriate. It should also be noted that this dissertation is predicated on the hunch that decision rules constitute different types of decision processes--i.e., a specialist-oriented strategy involves behavioral and decision processes very different from a "broader" rule--and therefore decision-making is best understood not as universal process but as multiple-patterned modes. Subsequent chapters will investigate the validity of this idea.

C. Theoretical Operationalization: A Variation on a Theme  
of John W. Kingdon's Congressmen's Voting Decisions

The ultimate validity of an analytical theory is determined by the extent to which it predicts reality. To insure that this criterion of "epistemic correlation"<sup>40</sup> is satisfied, it is imperative that all analytical theories be operationalized and tested with "hard" data. This section will relate the procedures with which the contextual theory of legislative decision-making was operationalized and tested.

The hypothesis that can be reasonably deduced from the contextual theory and that guided this research is: Patterned differences in issue characteristics are associated with patterned differences on the micro level in congressional behavior and decision-making, with low-grade issues related to narrow and "specialist-oriented" behavior and decision-making, while hot or high-profile questions are related to broader behavioral responses. The null hypothesis is that there are no meaningful differences in legislative behavior and decision-making per issue contexts. Although all the works identified in Chapter I as presuming a "static" construct implicitly posit this null proposition, it is explicitly put forth by Jackson in his study of U.S. Senators. He concludes that "it does not appear that they (senators) are influenced by one person or one set of influences on one bill and an entirely different person or set on the next . . . This routine is largely invariant with the type of legislation."<sup>41</sup> Jackson thus provides a denial of contextual theory. From his perspective, students of legislative decision-making are better served with a parsimonious, all encompassing decision model than with contextually based, multip decision models. He emphasizes general propositions in contrast to those of the contingent, contextual variety that are featured as the hallmark of the metronomic approach.

The unit of analysis of this study is recorded floor votes in the U.S. House. The appropriateness of studying floor votes and their validity as indicators of the congressional decision-making process has been a topic of some contention in the literature. The implication of Chamberlain<sup>42</sup> and of Huntington<sup>43</sup> is that, because of a general decline in the power of Congress vis-a-vis the presidency, congressional roll call votes are not an important locus of policy-making in the American system. Less extreme, but nonetheless damaging, are criticisms which contend that roll calls reflect very little about the Congress. There are three very formidable arguments along these lines. First is the position that seems to inhere in "policy" case studies. It is that struggles at the subcommittee and committee levels concerning the wording of a particular bill are more important in determining congressional output than a floor vote. Second, as T. V. Smith emphasizes, each bill involves a number of "issues" and it is difficult to determine which issue is decisive for the member. In his words,

The predicament of the legislator is that every vote is a dozen votes upon as many issues all wrapped up together. . . and given a single number. . . to decide what issue of the many hidden in each bill one wants to vote upon is delicate, but to make certain that the vote will be actually on that rather than upon another issue is indelicate presumption.<sup>44</sup>

Third, as Anderson, et al. note in their Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, focusing on the final vote of a member on a given bill may mask some very important and relevant legislative activity on the part of that member, activity that may in fact be at variance with his roll call commitment.

Although methods of roll call analysis provide information about the voting behaviors of legislators, one cannot with confidence infer from information about voting behavior to information about

the behavior of legislators in other phases of the legislative process. For example, the fact that a legislator is discerned to vote in a highly partisan way does not necessarily indicate anything about the partisanship of his behavior off the floor of the legislative chamber.<sup>45</sup>

Despite these criticisms, this dissertation will be based on recorded floor votes. In doing so, two assumptions are made. First, reflecting a sizable literature contributed to by Polsby,<sup>46</sup> Sundquist,<sup>47</sup> Orfield,<sup>48</sup> Moe and Teel,<sup>49</sup> and Johannes,<sup>50</sup> it is assumed that Congress makes important contributions to the incubation and formulation of public policy in the American system, and therefore congressional actions are appropriate subjects of inquiry. Second, it is assumed that the floor vote, although obviously an incomplete and imperfect data source, merits the attention of students of legislative decision-making, because it is a publicly recorded decision point that, in Jones parlance, is used to "legitimate" public policies.<sup>51</sup> As Truman notes, "Like statistics on elections, they [the roll call votes] represent discrete acts the fact of whose occurrence is not subject to dispute."<sup>52</sup> Although an articulate member of Congress did offer

Why are you studying floor votes? I don't think they reflect the things thought to be important around here. You should be asking about subcommittee and committee participation and how offices are set up to handle constituent services. Those things reflect real member priorities.

And although some recent empirical evidence indicates that members spend less time on lawmaking than on constituency service,<sup>53</sup> the nearly 1,300 recorded votes that members are now asked to make each Congress and the 318 hours the House devotes to them (approximately one-sixth of the total time in session)<sup>54</sup> must loom as an important concern for the individual Congressman. The importance of roll calls to members is certainly indicated by the awareness of members that their votes are monitored and by

their efforts to achieve a certain kind of record. Moreover, on close votes, floor decisions determine the direction of public policy. Thus, although the student of legislative decision-making should not relegate himself exclusively to floor decisions, roll call floor votes provide a salient data source. At the very least, they constitute a hard decision point at which all members, regardless of committee assignment, must commit themselves.

The instrument employed for gathering data to test the guiding hypothesis of this dissertation is a variation of the interview questionnaire used by Kingdon in Congressman's Voting Decisions.<sup>55</sup> Kingdon asked rotating, stratified, random samples of House members how they reached a decision on specific floor votes cast within the past week--i.e., members were asked to reconstruct the various factors and forces that led to their eventual decision. At least three distinct advantages seem to be offered by Kingdon's research approach.

First, in comparison with roll-call analysis (previously, the major source of legislative behavior data), the Kingdon method presents a most direct way of observing congressional decision-making. As Anderson, et al. note ". . . techniques of roll call analysis themselves do not explain to the researcher the patterns he may discern in voting. . . . They do not provide information about the factors or variables operating in a situation that explain or account for these variations."<sup>56</sup>

In Ripley's words,

Typically, these studies examine the relationship between potential cues and roll call voting on the floor. They do not prove causality in the sense that a member consciously searches for a cue, receives it, and behaves accordingly; instead they infer that patterns of behavior reflect patterns of cue-giving and cue-taking.<sup>57</sup>

In contrast, Kingdon's cue study provides an instrument for obtaining data firsthand from decision-makers themselves concerning how they made up their minds. As such, it avoids the risky enterprise of roll call studies of attempting to infer, extrapolate, or second-guess on questions pertaining to legislator decision processes and cognitive map.

A second advantage of the Kingdon approach stems from its "issue-by-issue" orientation. By studying aspects of legislator cognitive map on a vote-by-vote basis with open-ended questions, Kingdon overcomes the major weaknesses of static designs that, as noted in Chapter I, plague legislative behavior research of role conceptions and decision modes.

Third, the Kingdon approach affords the opportunity for the researcher to tap salient aspects of the political culture of political leaders and elites as related and reconstructed by leaders and elites. The fact that scholars have failed to do this in the past is seen by some as an inherent weakness of political science research on Capitol Hill. As James S. Young notes in his The Washington Community,

Political science has yet to confront squarely the proposition that the governing group in Washington . . . has an inner life of its own--a special culture which carries with it prescriptions and cues for behavior that may be far more explicit than those originating outside the group, and no less consequential for the conduct of government.<sup>58</sup>

The advantage of Kingdon's data collection procedure is that it provides glimpses into their world in the words of members. By interviewing the member in a face to face situation, the researcher has an opportunity to tap the member's attitudes, certainly a better opportunity than with mailed or "dropped off" questionnaires that members routinely delegate to staffers.

Despite these major assets, a close inspection of Kingdon's work reveals, at least for our purposes, three shortcomings that limit its utility in a search for issue-based patterns of legislative decision-making.

The first problem pertains to the nature of the questions Kingdon asked and the nature of the inferences he drew from them. Table 2.2 displays Kingdon's interview schedule. As can be seen, it appears that Kingdon is asking questions about information sources, communications, and cognitive procedures. In his text, however, he draws conclusions about the relative influence of various actors operating within the legislator's "force field." This poses several problems. "Information," "communications" and "influence" constitute very different aspects of cognitive map. The fact that a Congressman agrees with an actor who has access to him and gives him information is no indication of the actor's influence (as Dahl uses the concept<sup>59</sup>) on the Congressman. Also, some actors (e.g., groups, parties) can be influential via other agents (e.g., constituency). For example, "party," although not frequently mentioned as a decision-making influence in the Kingdon study,<sup>60</sup> may nonetheless be influential through the medium of state delegation. State delegations, which are frequently cited as an influence, are in fact party groupings of representatives from the same state. The fact that they are influential indicates that party as a label has an impact on voting, although not necessarily through leaders. Likewise, the position of interest groups, which is also not frequently mentioned, may be "carried" into decision-making through other members who lobby on behalf of group interests. Finally, the questionnaire fails to distinguish between what

Table 2.2

## Kingdon Questionnaire

1. (Cite the vote picked.) How did you go about making up your mind? What steps did you go through?
2. Were there any fellow congressmen that you paid attention to? If no: I don't mean just following them; I mean looking to them for information and guidance. If yes: Who? Why them?
3. What did the party leadership do? How about informal groups within the party? (e.g., Democratic Study Group)
4. Did you talk to staff people about this?
5. What do you think your constituents wanted you to do on this? How was your mail?
6. Did anyone in the administration or executive branch contact you?
7. Did you hear anything from any organizations?
8. Was there anything that you read that affected how you saw it?
9. At any point along the way, were you ever uncertain about how to vote?

Source: Kingdon's Congressmen's Voting Decisions, p. 287.

Kovenock, echoing Simon, refers to in his "Communications Audit" as information for "factual premises" and information for "evaluative premises."<sup>61</sup>

A second problem which limits the use of Kingdon for a contextual study is that no systematic data is provided on how Congressmen perceived or defined the issue. With the exception of Kingdon's own perceptions concerning the relative public salience of the various pieces of legislation studied,<sup>62</sup> no attention is given to the characteristics of different issues. Moreover, Kingdon chose only those votes that were (to him) politically "important" and "interesting." All of these were, in Kingdon's words, "big votes." There was no attempt to insure a representative sample of legislation. As he notes, deliberately excluded were ". . . the vast number [of votes] that appeared to be noncontroversial and routine. . ."<sup>63</sup>

A third limitation is the absence of a formal analysis of the legislative backgrounds of the sampled legislation (e.g., committee vote, type of rule, amendments over committee objections, party leadership activity, other House action, degree and kind of presidential involvement). At the very least, such information is required to identify various patterns of legislative decision-making. If the contextual theory is valid, it is reasonable to expect that differences in legislative backgrounds will be related to differences in micro decision processes.

Table 2.3 presents the questionnaire used here in our study of the conditional nature of congressional decision-making. It differs from Kingdon's decision-making approach in two respects. First, various components of actor cognitive map are separated rather than intertwined.

Table 2.3

## Questionnaire

1. Re the \_\_\_\_\_ vote, who did you hear from or talk to concerning how to vote?
2. Was there anyone else you paid attention to?
3. I imagine that these kinds of communications and information sources are helpful to you in different ways.
  - a) Who was helpful in informing you about the facts of the bill?
  - b) In your estimation who/what was most decisive in helping you make up your mind?
4. What kind of issue do you feel this is?
  - a) Do you feel it is complex? y n
  - b) Do you feel it is technical? y n
  - c) Is there a lot of conflict and disagreement on this bill? y n
  - d) Is it major legislation? y n
  - e) 1) Is this legislation important to the people of your district? y n  
2) Are they aware of it? y n
  - f) Did you receive a lot of mail on it? y n
  - g) Do you feel that your vote on this could affect (1) your renomination? y n  
(2) your reelection? y n
  - h) Do you feel that this is a routine matter? y n
  - i) How strongly do you personally feel on this issue? 1 2 3
  - j) When did you make up your mind on this issue?
  - k) Is it a tough decision? y n
5. When making up your mind on this piece of legislation what did you rely on: constituency wishes, your own opinion, or something else
6. Was your focus the national interest, local interest, both?
7. How informed do you feel about the issues raised in this legislation?  
1 not at all                  2 somewhat                  3 very well
8. Did you put much thought into it?

Second, actors are asked to define the characteristics of the issue on which they made a decision.

To operationalize the dependent variable of legislator behavior and decision-making process, a distinction was made among four components of the member's cognitive map: (1) force field/policy arena, (2) information sources, (3) decision rules and premises/rationales/determinants/explanations, and (4) role conception. Each refers to a different aspect of micro decision-making. Each has been used in various studies of decision-making and, therefore, each seems appropriate for an investigation for a "metronomic" effect within the Congress.

Force fields, or "field of forces" as Kingdon refers to them,<sup>64</sup> describe who the member heard from/paid attention to in the course of the decision. This concept is similar to that of "policy arena" as used by Lowi. Both focus on the input a member receives on a given issue. Both refer to those actors a legislative decision-maker feels were relevant to his decision--i.e., those whose position he actively considered when making up his mind. To tap this notion of force field, policy arena, relevant actor, questions #1 (Re the \_\_\_\_\_ vote, who did you hear from or talk to concerning this vote?) and #2 (Was there anyone else you paid attention to?) were employed.

Information sources, as used here, pertain directly to what Kovenock refers to as "factual premises."<sup>65</sup> They are communications and contacts that provide information about the specific wording and facts of a bill and the issue raised by them. To study this component of cognitive map, question #3a was used: "Who was helpful in informing you about the facts of the bill?"

As an aspect of cognitive map, "decision rules" or "determinants" refer to those forces, factors, and actors that were decisive in leading a member to make up his mind. They are the "evaluative premises" in Kovenock's Lexicon. They are the "shortcuts" or "rules" that the member uses when reaching a decision. Question #3b (In your estimation who/what was most decisive in helping you make up your mind?) was used to study this aspect of decision-making. Although it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to assess patterns of "influence," this question seems to probe influence in a more direct fashion than Kingdon's correlations of member-actor agreement.

Role conceptions are broad orientations members have toward the legislative system and their place in it. They are the basic perspectives with which legislators view their decision processes. Questions #5 ("When making up your mind on this piece of legislation what did you rely on: constituency wishes, your own opinion, perhaps a combination of both, or something else?"<sup>66</sup>) and #6 ("Was your focus the national interest, local interest, both?") were used to gather data on congressional role perceptions.

The real advantage of using four different components of decision-makers' cognitive map is that it affords the opportunity to identify actor involvement and importance more fully. Kingdon's general model looks at actor influence in a general way.<sup>67</sup> It seems reasonable to expect, however, that the importance of various actors may vary according to different aspects of cognitive map--i.e., actors who may not serve as a decision cue may nonetheless be important as an information source. The four fold distinction employed here is capable of detecting the range of

contributions each actor makes to legislative decision-making.

To operationalize the independent variable of "issue contexts" in a "nomothetic" fashion--i.e., with maximum generality--questions #4 (a through k) and #8 were used to obtain the member's definition and perception of the "issue characteristics" of the particular vote at hand. This follows Cobb and Elder's position that "issue dimensions" can be studied with perceptual, attitudinal data collected from among political elites.<sup>68</sup>

Several prominent attempts have been made to differentiate various issue dimensions. Cobb and Elder identify the dimensions of (a) specificity (the abstractness or concreteness of an issue), (b) scope of social significance, (c) extent of temporal relevance, (d) degree of complexity and technicality, and (e) degree of categorical precedent (routineness).<sup>69</sup> Froman and Ripley identify: (a) visibility, (b) procedurality (as opposed to substantiveness), (c) "constituency pressured," and (d) actor relevant (the fact that actors such as party leaders and state delegations are interested in and concerned with the outcome).<sup>70</sup> Price highlights (a) controversiality, (b) electoral salience, and (c) executive involvement.<sup>71</sup> Finally, Miller and Stokes imply, in the case of civil rights legislation, an issue dimension of "political or decision" costs as conveyed by their concept of "reward or punishment at the polls for legislative stands. . . ."<sup>72</sup> An integration of all of these works reveals at least ten dimensions on which issues are thought to vary: (1) technicality, (2) complexity, (3) specificity, (4) routineness, (5) visibility, (6) temporal relevance, (7) controversiality (which includes actor involvement), (8) social significance, (9) decision costs,

and (10) electoral salience. In this study, there was an attempt to operationalize all ten dimensions.

"Complexity" was measured with #4a: "Do you feel it is complex?" "Technicality" was covered with #4b: "Do you feel it is technical?"<sup>73</sup>

"Controversiality" was investigated with #4c: "Is there a lot of conflict and disagreement on this bill?" "Salience" was tapped with #4e(1) "Is this legislation important to the people of your district?"; and #4i "How strongly do you personally feel on this issue?" Question #4d "Is it major legislation?" attempted to gain data on social significance.

"Visibility" was tapped with #4f "Did you receive a lot of mail on it?" and #4e(2) "Are they (constituents) aware of it?" To obtain perceptual data on decision cost, the following questions were deemed appropriate: #4g(1) "Do you feel that your vote on this could affect your renomination?"; #4g(2) "Do you feel that your vote on this could affect your reelection?"; #4k "Is it a tough decision?"; and #8 "Did you put much thought into it?" It was presumed that the "proceduralness" of Froman and Ripley is covered by the questions on technicality, routineness, and visibility.

In addition to the subjective, perceptual data from members concerning their definition of the issue, both "objective," and "researcher subjective" data were collected in order to study "issue contexts." These supplements were used (a) to provide indicators for "temporal relevance" and "specificity" that were not deemed appropriate for an attitudinal question and (b) as alternative indicators for dimensions operationalized with perceptual, subjective questions.

Objective characteristics refer to various parliamentary and non-parliamentary aspects of a bill obtained from documents and other public

sources. Source material includes committee report, Congressional Record for the day of debate, Congressional Quarterly and National Journal coverage, copies of the bill and its rule, and personal research. Legislative background data coded for each examined vote are: type of rule, margin of rule adoption, type of vote, margin of passage, party unity for both Democrats and Republicans, index of party likeness, number of amendments passed over committee objections, committee vote, and party endorsements. Other examples of objective indicators are: mention as a story in the Washington Post and Congressional Quarterly, amount of money involved and projected time as obtained from the committee report on each bill, the President's position on the legislation as obtained from Congressional Quarterly, and listing as a "main issue facing the country today" in a Yandelovich poll.<sup>74</sup>

"Researcher subjective" characteristics are those traits attributed to the vote by the researcher on the basis of interview sessions with a committee staff person close to the bill. Specific characteristics investigated in this fashion were the role of Congress vis-a-vis the presidency on the issue (i.e., initiator, modifier/broker, or facilitator/ratifier<sup>75</sup>), the repetitiveness of the issue, the specificity of the issue, and the degree of policy change that will result from the bill. Although categorizations of this type are strictly judgmental, they have been commonly accepted by students of the policy process.<sup>76</sup> It is hoped that this use of standardized benchmarks for the collection of subjective data on each vote studied will, in the words of Yin and Heald, ". . . enable aggregate reviews (and comparisons) of individual case studies to be undertaken with scientific rigor."<sup>77</sup>

Table 2.4 presents a summary of the indicators of issue characteristics employed in this study. Indicators are displayed by type, issue dimension measured, and data source.

This research design also employed controls for member backgrounds and constituency characteristics.

Background characteristics used were party, regional section, length of service,<sup>78</sup> membership on the Republican policy committee or Democratic steering and policy committee,<sup>79</sup> ratings by certain interest groups (ADA, ACA, CORE, and Chamber of Commerce) for the second session of the 94th Congress,<sup>80</sup> party unity scores, bipartisan support score, conservative coalition score for both the second session of the 94th<sup>81</sup> and the first session of the 95th,<sup>82</sup> and presidential support scores for the first session of the 95th.<sup>83</sup>

Constituency characteristics employed were percent of the constituency that is urban, the percent of the population that falls within a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), the percent non white, the percent of families earning \$15,000 or more, the percent of families below the low income level, the percent of white collar workers, and the percent of owner occupied units.<sup>84</sup> Also used were political characteristics of the district such as the percentage with which the member won the last election and whether or not, in the case of freshmen, the district was a "switch" type--i.e., if party control of the district changed hands.<sup>85</sup>

Each of these legislator and constituency characteristics will be entertained as possible, alternative explanations to the contextual theory. As noted in Chapter I, the basic thrust of static research designs implicitly seems to be that the most meaningful variations in

Table 2.4  
Summary of Issue Characteristics Indicators

<u>Type of Indicators</u>	<u>Issue Dimension Measured</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Perceptual (Questionnaire)	Complexity Technicality Controversiality Salience	Question #4a (complexity) Question #4b (technicality) Question #4c (conflict) Questions #4e1 (constituency importance) and #4f (personal feelings) Question #4d (major status)
Objective, Legislative Background	Social Significance Routineness Visibility Decision Cost Political Heat	Question #4h (routine matter) Questions #4f (mail) and #4e2 (constituency awareness) Questions #4g1 (renomination effect) #4g2 (reelection effect), and #8 (thought) Type of Rule (e.g., closed, modified open, open) Rule Margin (CQ) Democratic Unity Republican Unity Index of Likeness } Computed from CQ data Amendment over Committee Objections (interviews) Committee Vote (committee report) Minority Report (committee report) Presidential Involvement (CQ) Democratic Policy Endorsement (policy committee) Republican Policy Endorsement (policy committee) Role of Congress (legislative history)

Table 2.4--Continued

<u>Type of Indicator</u>	<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
	Visibility	CQ Box Score CQ Story Washington Post Box Score Washington Post Story Standing in Polls as a Major Issue Facing the Country (Yankelovich Poll)
	Social Significance	Money (Committee report) Time Frame (Committee report)
Researcher Subjective	Newness/ Recurringness	Interviews with Committee Staff
	Change	Interviews with Committee Staff
	Specificity	Interviews with Committee Staff

legislative behavior occur among different types of legislators. In other words, all legislators utilize the same basic process. But, for reasons that can be attributed to differences in background, different kinds of legislators will have different kinds of normative premises and therefore they will make different decisions, although the basic decision process itself is universal. If the static approach is valid, we should expect these control variables to account for most of the meaningful variance in decision-making behavior. If, on the other hand, the metonomic construct is valid, most variance should occur according to differences in issue contexts.

#### D. Data Collection Procedures: An Inside Strategy

Data was collected over a four month period beginning the first week of March 1977 and ending the first week of July 1977. Allowing for two, week long recess periods (Easter and Memorial Day), sixteen weeks of intensive interviewing was undertaken. In that period eighty-one different members were interviewed, thirty-one different floor votes were studied, and 361 questionnaires were completed.

The most formidable problem confronted was that of gaining access to members. There are several reasons why it is difficult to obtain interviews. First, members receive numerous requests for meetings by those seeking to influence or sell, by those with a problem to solve, or by those just wanting to visit. Second, there are enormous institutionalized demands on the time of members. As several prominent congressional scholars noted in conversations with this author, within the last ten years these demands have increased immensely.<sup>86</sup> Third, within the

last decade, political scientists and their students have flocked to the Hill, resulting in an often outworn welcome for political researchers bent on gathering attitudinal data from members.<sup>87</sup> Finally, as Kingdon emphasizes "Asking a Congressman to divulge how he went about casting a vote in a specific instance is a potentially touchy subject."<sup>88</sup> To cope with the problem of access, an inside strategy within the U.S. House was pursued.

For two reasons, it was decided to focus solely on the House rather than on both the House and the Senate. First, it was felt that Senators, as the result of state-wide responsibilities, greater visibility, and more committee assignments, would simply be more difficult to see. Second, the House and Senate are so different as institutions that comparisons would be extremely difficult if data were collected from both houses.

After consultation with several experienced researchers,<sup>89</sup> it was decided that having a member sponsor the researcher would minimize the risks of being turned down or referred to staff. Accordingly, the support of Congressman Jim Lloyd (D, Calif.), a professional acquaintance, was requested and graciously granted. Congressman Lloyd made office facilities available and, most importantly, had a member of his staff--Marsaleete Harmon--make appointments with members in the Congressman's name. Although it might be logically argued that Mr. Lloyd's sponsorship might have contaminated the sample by yielding responses mainly from his friends and ideological counterparts, his moderate Democrat stance, position as zone whip for California, and his status as an officer within both his class and state delegation seem to assure and in fact did provide balanced access.

In undertaking the research, two very critical sampling procedures were performed: (a) the sampling of members and (b) the sampling of decisions or votes.

To sample members, Kingdon's strategy of rotating sub-samples was closely followed. Kingdon used four samples of fifteen members each,

rotated on a weekly basis. Three advantages are present in this procedure. First, fifteen interviews seem to be all a researcher can hope to accomplish within a week. Second, by rotating weekly, no member will be interviewed more than once a month. In Kingdon's words, "Under such conditions, very little response fatigue--annoyance, contamination, interviewer effects--was in evidence."<sup>90</sup> Third, frequent brief visits develop a sense of familiarity and trust with the respondent that may produce a higher response rate for appointments and greater candor in subsequent interview sessions.

Four sub-samples were chosen on a stratified, random basis. As with the Kingdon study, the House membership was stratified on the basis of variables thought to reflect a cross section of members: party, North/South<sup>91</sup> region within the Democratic party, and length of service. That these distinctions are important is generally supported by legislative behavior research. Following Kingdon,<sup>92</sup> members thought to be too busy to respond were excluded from the sample. These were (a) party leaders (Speaker, floor leaders, major whip officials), (b) chairmen and ranking minority members of exclusive committees and chairmen of other "major" committees,<sup>93</sup> and (c) several members who were in the media limelight and thus were presumed to be unavailable. The total number of such exclusions numbered twenty-two. In addition, at the time of the sampling, three seats were vacant. Table 2.5 presents the stratification of the remaining 410 Congressmen in terms of party and length of service. These comprise our universe. A comparable percentage stratification of the desired sample size ( $N=15$ ) is offered in Table 2.6. The raw numbers in each cell were the desired distribution for each of the four samples. For each of the samples, the representatives for each of the strata were randomly chosen from among all the members of the whole House in that

Table 2.5

Stratification of U.S. House of Representatives,  
Ninety-Fifth Congress, Per Two Variables

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Total</u>
Short (0-5 years)	111 (27%)	38 (9%)	71 (17%)	220 (53%)
Medium (6-11 years)	30 (7%)	17 (9%)	38 (9%)	85 (21%)
Long (12+ years)	57 (14%)	22 (5%)	26 (6%)	105 (25%)
	<b>198 (48%)</b>	<b>77 (19%)</b>	<b>135 (33%)</b>	<b>410 (100%)</b>

Table 2.6

Stratification of Sample (N=15) of U.S. House  
of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress

Length of Service	Northern Democrats	Southern Democrats	Republicans	Total
Short (0-5 years)	5 (30%)	1 (7%)	2 (14%)	8 (53%)
Medium (6-11 years)	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	3 (20%)
Long (12+ years)	2 (14%)	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	4 (27%)
	3 (20%)	8 (53%)	4 (27%)	15 (100%)

strata. If a randomly chosen member was unwilling or unable to be interviewed, he was replaced in accordance with Kindon, with a substitution also randomly drawn from the strata.<sup>94</sup> Finally, also following Kindon,<sup>95</sup> several members whom the author knew were used as representatives of their respective strata. Six non-randomly chosen members were used in this way--three Democrats and three Republicans.

Requests for interviews were made to one hundred and thirty-one members, substitutions included. Of that number, interviews were granted by eighty-one. Thus, the study yielded a response rate of sixty-two percent. The stratified distribution of these respondents is displayed in Table 2.7. As can be seen there, in contrast with Table 2.5, Northern Democrats with short tenure were substantially over-represented (plus nine percent) while Northern Democrats with long service were substantially under-represented (minus five percent). With these exceptions, the respondents are relatively equivalent to the stratification of the universe. Because decisions or votes are the concern of this study, the stratified distribution of the 361 questionnaire responses is a more appropriate measure of sample representativeness. Table 2.8 presents this distribution. In comparison with Table 2.5, it can be seen that Northern Democrats with short tenure were substantially over-represented (plus eleven percent), while Northern Democrats with long tenure were substantially under-represented (minus eight percent), and "long" Republicans and "short" Southern Democrats were moderately under-represented (minus three percent for both). The stratified distribution for each of the study votes is contained in Appendix A.

Every effort was made to retain the integrity of the four samples. Ideally, four samples would be chosen. The plan was that throughout the

**Table 2.7**  
**Stratified Distribution of Respondents**

Length of Service	Northern Democrats	Southern Democrats	Republicans
Short (0-5 years)	29 (36%)	7 (9%)	10 (12%)
Medium (6-11 years)	6 (7%)	5 (6%)	9 (11%)
Long (12+ years)	7 (9%)	4 (5%)	4 (5%)
N=81			

**Table 2.8**  
**Stratified Distribution of Interviews**

Length of Service	Northern Democrats	Southern Democrats	Republicans
Short (0-5 years)	135 (38%)	22 (6%)	63 (18%)
Medium (6-11 years)	23 (6%)	31 (9%)	35 (10%)
Long (12+ years)	23 (6%)	16 (4%)	11 (3%)

N=359\*

\*Due to an oversight, two questionnaires were not collated with the member with whom the interview was obtained.

sixteen week period of data gathering, each sample would be used four times. Each week an attempt would be made to interview respondents concerning two pieces of legislation acted on the preceding week. Thus, optimally, each sample would be interviewed four times and would yield data on eight votes with a total of thirty-two different votes from all four samples.

Holding to the plan was not possible however. For two reasons, the substitution process, thought to be valid by Kingdon, was by necessity frequently employed here, detracting somewhat from the integrity of the samples. First, not all members of a given sample were available within a week of the vote on which the sample was being interviewed, the time frame within which, Kingdon argues, members are able to accurately recall and reconstruct their decision processes. During certain busy weeks in Congress, it was difficult to obtain more than ten appointments. Second, not all sampled members were able to or desired to continue on a regular basis. Of the eighty-one members interviewed, thirty completed less than four protocols, while the desired number was eight protocols. Table 2.9 displays the number of questionnaires completed by different numbers of Congressmen. As can be seen, only fourteen Congressmen (one-fourth as many as desired) completed the optimum number of seven to eight questionnaires. Thus, in order to have an adequate number of interviewees on each vote, liberal substitutions had to be made. Often, in accordance with Kingdon, members used in a particular sample in one month became substitutions in another sample the next month.

One final point should be emphasized concerning the sampling of members. The sample is randomly chosen and stratified, but no pretense of representativeness is made. It is not a probabilistic sample, and

Table 2.9

Distribution of Frequency of  
Questionnaire Responses

Number of Completed Questionnaires	Number of Congressmen	%
1	5	6
2	10	12
3	15	19
4	14	17
5	14	17
6	9	11
7	4	5
8	19	12
	N=81	99%

therefore, in the process of data analysis, the usual "inferential" measures and statistical manipulations do not apply. Data will be analyzed, however, in the tradition of great classics in legislative behavior research by Kingdon, Fenno,<sup>96</sup> and Deckard:<sup>97</sup> impressionistic searches for "the feel" and "the blood" of Congress on the basis of summary statistics that measure for broad tendencies.

To sample votes an effort was made to obtain as much diversity as possible. As noted above, Kingdon excluded "non-controversial" and "routine" votes. As he stated, his study is based on "...some of the major issues of the decade."<sup>98</sup> Here, because of the desire to test the notion that different kinds of issues are associated with different micro decision processes, it was necessary to obtain a diversified assortment of votes. To promote a mix, a member of Mr. Lloyd's staff--Ms. Lisa Phillips--was consulted each week. On each Friday, Ms. Phillips, who assists the Congressman in his performance of zone whip duties, would recommend one controversial or major or important vote and one routine matter from the past week's schedule. These would then be the subject of the next week's interviews. Two pieces of legislation were studied for each of the sixteen weeks during which research was conducted, with the exception of one week cut short by a recess. In that case only one vote was studied. This yielded a sample of thirty-one different votes. Table 2.10 displays a synopsis of the sampled votes together with the number of interviews collected for each vote. Those votes classified as "major" or "important" were the Ethics Code, Tax Cuts, Rhodesian Chrome, Common Situsicketing, Strip Mining, Budget Targets, Clean Air, Energy Department, and the Hyde Amendment. The remaining twenty-two votes were considered less important.

Table 2.10

## Synopsis of Sampled Votes

1. H Res 287. House Ethics Code (14 interviews). Adoption of the resolution to require comprehensive financial disclosure by House members, ban private office accounts, increase office allowances, ban gifts from lobbyists, limit outside earned income and impose other financial restrictions on members. Accepted 402-22. March 2, 1977.
2. HR 3839. Second Budget Recission, Fiscal 1977 (10 interviews). Chappell (D Fla.) amendment to the committee amendment to restore \$81.6 million in the previously appropriated long-lead-time funds for a Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier. Rejected 161-252. March 3, 1977.
3. HR 3477. Stimulus Tax Cuts (10 interviews). Passage of the bill to provide for a refund of 1976 individual income taxes and other payments, to reduce individual and business income taxes, to increase the individual standard deduction, and to simplify tax preparation. Passed 282-137. March 8, 1977.
4. HR 3843. Supplemental Housing Authorization (10 interviews). Goldwater amendment to delete Title II of the bill establishing a National Commission on Neighborhoods. Adopted 243-166. March 10, 1977.
5. HR 1746. Rhodesian Chrome Imports (11 interviews). Passage of the bill to halt the importation of Rhodesian Chrome in order to bring the U.S. into compliance with U.N. economic sanctions imposed on Rhodesia in 1966 (repeals Bryd Amendment). Adopted 250-146. March 14, 1977.
6. HR 4088. NASA Authorization (10 interviews). Passage of the bill to authorize \$4.05 billion for NASA for fiscal 1978. Accepted 338-44. March 17, 1977.
7. HR 4250. Common-Site Picketing (11 interviews). Passage of the bill to permit a labor union with a grievance with one contractor to picket all contractors on the same construction site and to establish a construction industry collective bargaining committee. Rejected 205-217. March 23, 1977.
8. HR 3965. FAA Authorization (10 interviews). Passage of the bill to authorize \$85 million for research and development programs for fiscal 1978. Accepted 402-6. March 24, 1977.
9. HR 5045. Executive Branch Reorganization Authority (13 interviews). Passage of the bill to extend for 3 years Presidential authority, which expired in 1973, to transmit to Congress plans for reorganization of agencies in the Executive Branch. Accepted 395-22. March 29, 1977.

## Table 2.10--Continued

10. H Res 433. House Assassination Committee (13 interviews). Adoption of the resolution to continue the Select Committee on Assassinations. Adopted 230-181. March 30, 1977.
11. HR 5294. Consumer Credit Protection (11 interviews). Passage of the bill to prohibit debt collection agencies from engaging in certain practices alleged to be unfair to consumers. Passed 199-198. April 4, 1977.
12. HR 5717. Romanian Earthquake Relief (9 interviews). Motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill to authorize \$120 million for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and other victims of the March 4, 1977 earthquake in Romania. Passed 322-90. April 18, 1977.
13. HR 5101. Environmental Protection Agency Research and Development (6 interviews). Passage of the bill to authorize \$313 million for fiscal 1978 research and development activities of the EPA and to promote coordination of environmental research and development. Accepted 358-31. April 19, 1977.
14. HR 5840. Export Administration Act (10 interviews). Passage of the bill to revise U.S. export controls on sensitive materials and to prohibit U.S. firms from complying with certain aspects of the Arab Boycott against Israel. Passed 364-43. April 20, 1977.
15. HR 4877. First Regular Supplemental Appropriation, Fiscal 1977 (11 interviews). Brademas (D Ind.) motion that the House recede and concur with a Senate amendment to provide an additional \$20 million to reimburse state and local governments for the costs of snow removal incurred during the 1976-77 winter emergency. Defeated 124-279. April 21, 1977.
16. H Con Res 195. Fiscal 1978 Budget Targets (12 interviews). Passage of the resolution, as amended, providing for fiscal 1978 budget targets of revenues of \$398.1 billion, budget authority of \$505.7 billion, outlays of \$466.7 billion and a deficit of \$68.6 billion. Rejected 84-320. April 27, 1977.
17. HR 2. Strip Mining Regulation (13 interviews). Passage of the bill to regulate surface coal mining operators and to acquire and reclaim abandoned mines. Passed 241-64. April 29, 1977.
18. HR 11. Public Works Jobs Programs (9 interviews). Adoption of the conference report for the bill to authorize an additional \$4 billion for the emergency public works employment program as requested in President Carter's Economic Stimulus Package. Accepted 335-77. May 3, 1977.
19. H Con Res 214. Fiscal 1978 Budget Targets (7 interviews). Adoption of the budget resolution setting fiscal 1978 targets of revenues of \$398.1 billion, budget authority of \$502.3 billion, outlays of \$464.5 billion and a deficit of \$66.4 billion and binding limits for fiscal 1977. Adopted 213-179. May 5, 1977.

Table 2.10--Continued

20. HR 6655. Housing and Community Development Programs (12 interviews). Passage of the bill to authorize \$12.45 billion for the Community Development Block Grant Program for fiscal 1978-80 and to authorize more than \$2 billion for federally assisted, public and rural housing and to continue FHA mortgage and flood insurance programs. Passed 369-20. May 11, 1977.
21. HR 6810. Countercyclical Assistance Authorization (13 interviews). Passage of the bill to extend for an additional year, through fiscal 1978, a program of countercyclical grants to help state and local governments avoid cutbacks in employment and public services and to authorize a maximum of \$2.25 billion for the five quarters beginning July 1, 1977. Passed 243-94. May 13, 1977.
22. HR 1139. Child Nutrition Programs (9 interviews). Passage of the bill to extend through fiscal 1979 the Summer Food Program and to make other changes in the School Lunch and Child Nutrition Programs. Passed 393-19. May 18, 1977.
23. HR 6161. Clean Air Act Amendments (15 interviews). Dingell (D Mich.) substitute for Title II to delay and relax automobile emissions standards, to reduce the warranties for emissions control devices, and make other changes in existing law regarding mobile sources of air pollution. Adopted 255-139. May 26, 1977.
24. HR 6970. Tuna-Dolphin Protection (12 interviews). Passage of the bill to limit the total number of dolphins that could be accidentally taken during the 1977 commercial tuna fishing operations, to authorize significant further reductions after 1977, to establish a 100 percent federal observer program on tuna boats, and to establish certain incentives and penalties to encourage conservation of dolphins. Adopted 334-20. June 1, 1977.
25. HR 6804. Federal Energy Department (16 interviews). Passage of the bill creating a cabinet level Department of Energy by combining all powers currently held by the FPC, FEA, ERDA, and various other energy authorities and programs currently scattered throughout the federal bureaucracy. Passed 310-20. June 3, 1977.
26. HR 10. Hatch Act Amendments (12 interviews). Passage of the bill to revise the Hatch Act to allow federal civilian and postal employees to participate in political activities and to protect such employees from improper solicitations. Approved 244-164. June 7, 1977.
27. HR 7553. Public Works-ERDA Appropriations, Fiscal 1978 (16 interviews). Conte (R Mass.)-Derrick (D S.C.) amendment to delete funding for 16 water projects and reduce funding for one more project, but to retain the total appropriations amount in the bill. Rejected 194-218. June 14, 1977.
28. HR 7555. Labor-HEW Appropriation, Fiscal 1978 (14 interviews). Hyde (R Ill.) amendment to prohibit the use of federal funds to finance or encourage abortions. Adopted 201-155. June 17, 1977.

## Table 2.10--Continued

29. HR 7558. Agriculture Appropriations, Fiscal 1978 (12 interviews). Voice vote to delay for one year the HEW proposed saccharin ban. June 21, 1977.
30. HR 7797. Foreign Aid Appropriations, Fiscal 1978 (11 interviews). Miller (R Ohio) amendment to cut 5 percent from the \$7,046,454,000 recommended by the Appropriations Committee for Foreign aid programs. Adopted 214-168. June 23, 1977.
31. HR 7932. Legislative Branch Appropriations, Fiscal 1978 (18 interviews). Grassley (R Iowa) amendment to prohibit use of funds appropriated in the bill for the 29 percent pay increase for high-level federal officials that took effect March 1, 1977. Rejected 181-241. June 29, 1977.

### E. Summary and Conclusions

A recent emphasis in legislative behavior literature contends that Congressmen reach decisions differently in different kinds of situations. It is the notion that there are different decision "tracks" or "arenas" in Congress that are related to different patterns of decision-making behavior. A close review of this work, which can be considered "metronomic," reveals serious lacunae in both conceptualization and research. The purpose of this chapter has been to formally state the contextual theory and to provide a research design for operationalizing and testing it. If the basic assumptions of the metronomic scheme are correct, legislative behavior is best understood not with a general/static model but with a contextual/conditional perspective that is (a) based on an issue-by-issue approach and (b) grounded in an appreciation of "nomothetic" issue characteristics.

Table 2.11 highlights the major features of the research design. As noted there, the major theory with which a search for a metronomic effect will be made is one of varying specialist influence. It hypothesizes that low grade issues will involve narrow "policy arenas" and specialist or subgovernment dominated decision-making processes, while hot issues will involve "broad" or "expanded" legislative behavior responses. Hot issues, high in political incentives, provide sufficient inducements for member involvement. Under hot conditions, members are likely to make a decision on the basis of their ideology. Conversely, low grade issues, lacking incentives, are apt to be based on shortcuts, such as deference to the perceived knowledge and expertise of others.

Table 2.11  
Synopsis of Research Design

<u>Topic:</u>	The contextual aspects of Congressional decision-making.
<u>Problem:</u>	Immediate--Replication of Kingdon's study employing revised questionnaire in order to search for possible metronomic effect in the Congress.
<u>Theoretical (place to return)--</u>	Conditional nature of the democratic process in the U.S. Congress.
<u>Importance of the Topic:</u>	Re the functioning of the democratic process, the conditions under which the legislature functions in its classic sense of debating, deliberating, checking and balancing specialists, utilizing expanded cue and information networks and broadened role conceptions.
<u>Focus:</u>	Patterned differences in issue characteristics, legislative backgrounds, force fields, information and cue networks, decision processes, and role conceptions.
<u>Theory:</u>	A legislator's policy relationships are a function of issue contexts. Issues are said to vary on the following dimensions: technicality, complexity, specificity, routineness, visibility, temporal relevance, controversiality, decision cost, and social significance. The more routine, technical, complex, specific, and the less visible, controversial, costly, and significant an issue is, the more likely legislators are to depend on specialists. This is because, <u>in the absence of strong political pressure, legislators will defer to specialists (within and outside the legislature) as a decision short cut.</u> When the opposite issue characteristics are present, we expect low specialist dependence, an expanded policy arena, and a broader role conception.
<u>Central Research Question:</u>	Do issue characteristics affect the policy arenas, information sources, decision modes, and role conceptions of legislators?
<u>Hypothesis:</u>	Variations in the configuration of issue characteristics will be related to differences in force fields, information sources, decision processes, and role conceptions, with low grade issues associated with narrow forms of legislative behavior and hot issues associated with expanded or broad behavior.

Table 2.11--Continued

<u>Null Hypothesis:</u>	Jackson: "Decision-making is largely invariant by type of legislation."
<u>Alternative Hypothesis:</u>	Actor differences, not issue differences, account for major variations in legislative behavior.
<u>Variables:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dependent--Decision-making processes as observed in force fields, information sources, decision modes, role conceptions.</li> <li>2. Independent--Issue characteristics (objective and subjective measures), legislative backgrounds.</li> <li>3. Control--Member and constituency characteristics, majority/minority status.</li> </ol>
<u>Data:</u>	Interviews, documents and records.
<u>Method:</u>	Investigate the extent to which patterns of the dependent variable are associated with patterns of the independent variable. Examine which of the objective and subjective issue characteristics are most associated with variations in the independent variable
<u>Possible Policy Relevance:</u>	Specify the conditions under which Congressmen exhibit various forms of legislative behavior.
<u>Unit of Analysis:</u>	Recorded floor votes, U.S. House of Representatives.
<u>Task:</u>	To determine if our understanding of legislative behavior, as derived from static models and general propositions, is enhanced by a contextual, "issue-based" approach.

\*John E. Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Role Call Voting," American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 468.

The theoretical rationale for the contextual scheme of legislative behavior and its predicted relationships is provided by four different literatures: (1) organization decision-making theory, (2) legislative behavior, (3) democratic theory and (4) micro investment theory. Specifically, the rationale is as follows: because of decision-making constraints, legislators employ various decision rules that vary according to the incentives for involvement present in different political arenas.

This study will test the contextual theory with data provided through a research strategy patterned after John Kingdon's. Kingdon obtained data directly from members. They were asked to reconstruct their decision process on specific votes. The questionnaire used here differs from Kingdon's in two respects. First, data were collected on four different aspects of decision-making behavior: communications, information sources, decision rules, and role orientations. Second, issue characteristics were systematically studied. Various perceptual, objective, and subjective data sources were used as nomothetic indicators of issue characteristics.

Subsequent chapters will analyze interview data collected using four rotating, stratified samples. Chapter III will examine member perceptions of issue characteristics. Chapters IV through VII will analyze findings pertaining to the four aspects of cognitive map. Chapter IV will focus on force fields, Chapter V on information sources, Chapter VI on determinants and decision processes, modes and shortcuts/rules, and Chapter VII on role orientations.

If the hypothesis is true, the expectation here is that on low grade issues (i.e., issues that are technical, complex, specific,

routine, non-visible, temporally relevant, non-controversial, non-socially significant, low in decision cost, and low in electoral salience) Congressmen (a) will have narrow, specialist-dominated force fields, (a) will have low information as a result of perfunctory scan and a low volume of information, (c) will rely on specialists, and (d) will employ a trustee orientation. On hot issues (i.e., votes that are non-technical, non-complex, non-specific, non-routine, visible, non-temporally relevant, controversial, socially significant, high in decision cost, and electorally salient) Congressmen (a) will have full and broad force fields, (b) will have high level of information resulting from extraordinary search and high information volume, (c) will employ ideological decision rules and (d) will have a district role orientation. The rationale for each of these specific expectations will be detailed in subsequent chapters. For now, it is sufficient to say that it is felt that each proposition constitutes a reasonable deduction from the contextual theory.

Although this research will be "hypothesis-oriented" in that a search for the hypothesized directional relationships will guide data analysis, it should be mentioned in concluding this chapter that the study will also be explorative. Throughout, our guiding questions will be: (1) Does legislative behavior vary according to issues? (2) Do decision-making modes differ from issue type to issue type? In sum, what follows will be a search for "issue-based" patterns of legislative behavior and decision-making.

## CHAPTER III

### MEMBER PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTEXTS

The theory that different kinds of issues are related to differences in decision-making behavior has an important implied ancillary hypothesis: that legislative decision-makers uniformly perceive different decision contexts. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate this theoretical corollary and its major, underpinning assumptions. Subsequent chapters will address the relationship between contexts and decision-making.

The basic thrust of the conditional/contextual approach is that there are different, patterned decision contexts or "arenas" in Congress, each involving very distinct forms and manners of legislative behavior. Thus, according to Lowi, Wilson, Jones, Price, Cobb and Elder, and others who write from this perspective, congressional scholars should go beyond constructs that attempt to generalize about congressional decision-making as a whole. They should set their sights on constructs that attempt to capture the major contextually patterned variations in behavior and decision-making. This line of reasoning posits three implicit assumptions with regard to member perceptions of issue characteristics and contexts.

The first assumption is that legislators themselves think in terms of issue contexts and characteristics. When Lowi writes of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive decision arenas and when Wilson discusses various combinations of benefits and burdens, there is a strong inference that members recognize these distinctions as salient and adapt their behavior accordingly. In other words, the theory that

different issue conditions will lead to differences in legislative behavior carries with it the notion that different issue contexts will register in the cognitive map of members. Members will think in terms of different kinds of decisions and different issue characteristics and will act differently on the basis of them. Although no one author fully develops this point (and hence we should consider it a basic flaw in existing conditional/contextual theory), Cobb and Elder strongly infer it when advocating that researchers interested in issue characteristics study the perceptions of decision-makers.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, such a recommendation assumes that legislators perceive categories of issues.

The second assumption concerning member perceptions of issue characteristics is that different categories of legislators will similarly perceive different kinds of issues. Unlike the more traditional, static studies that found it useful to qualify their findings on the basis of the background characteristics of legislators, conditional/contextual schemes do not consider demographic factors pertinent, at least not with regard to member perception of issue characteristics. Lowi's typology seems to presume that Republican and Democratic legislators will make the same distinction among distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policy issues. Likewise, Cobb and Elder seem to imply that most legislators will discern the same degree of specificity, social significance, complexity, etc. in any given issue,<sup>2</sup> although to be sure disputants will define an issue differently. Thus, a major feature of the conditional construct is its assumption that legislators will uniformly perceive or define an issue, with little variation occurring according to member backgrounds. All legislators, regardless of demography, will similarly recognize and differentiate "hot" vs. "routine" issues.

The third and final assumption is that certain issue characteristics will factor together. This presupposition is rather obvious in metronomic literature. Froman and Ripley seem to assume that low visibility, technicality or procedurality, and low controversiality occur concomitantly.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, Cobb and Elder implicitly maintain that the issue dimensions of specificity, social significance, temporal relevance, complexity, and categorical precedence can be considered natural correlates--i.e., non-specific legislation will tend to be socially significant, have extended temporal relevance, be non-technical, and constitute a precedent, while specific legislation will be ambiguous, complex, non-significant, temporally relevant, and non-precedent making.<sup>5</sup> Price, although acknowledging different mixes of salience and controversiality, expects that high salience issues will also be highly controversial. In sum, contextual perspectives hold that various issue characteristics cluster together in a dichotomized fashion as either a) "hot," "high profile," "emotional" issues or as b) "low grade," "low profile" or "routine" issues.

These three assumptions--that legislators perceive different kinds of issues and decisions, that different legislators will define issues similarly, and that various issue dimensions are highly inter-correlated--constitute three major propositions that can be empirically examined. The remainder of this chapter explores the validity of these propositions among data collected from the questionnaire study.

#### A. PROPOSITION 1: Legislators Perceive Different Kinds of Issues

Data for investigating the validity of this proposition are provided by two questionnaire sources. The first is a general, open-ended question that broadly asked the member to describe in his own words what kind of issue he felt was at stake. The question is #4 in the questionnaire and was worded as follows: "What kind of issue do you feel this is?" The second data source is the series of short, closed-answer questions that appear as #4a-1, and 4k and #7. Data yielded from both sources reveal that members do distinguish among issues.

##### 1. A Test Among General Responses

Although not every interview session afforded the opportunity and time to ask the general question, most Congressmen were able to respond, and their responses allow us to draw some generalizations. Table 3.1 displays members' descriptions of the "kind of issue at stake" on sampled votes. These comments, displayed by the vote in question, clearly show that members think in terms of different categories of issues and decisions. Specifically, a review of that table reveals that members classify or typologize votes on at least the following bases: locus of controversy, topic of controversy, legislative setting, importance, emotionality, controversiality, normative judgments, toughness, level of intellectualization, impacts, visibility, intensity of pressure, typicality, recurringness, and time frame allowed for decision.

Examples of how members differentiate on the basis of locus of controversy are comments by members that the Public Works Conference vote and the School Lunch Bill were "committee votes" involving conflict

**Table 3.1**  
**Member Perceptions of the "Kind of Issue at Stake" on Sampled Votes**

<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Goldwater Amendment</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Real issue"</li> <li>"Important"</li> <li>"Hypocritical"</li> <li>"No question"</li> <li>"Philosophical difficulties"</li> <li>"Press problem"</li> <li>"Policy oriented"</li> <li>"Not difficult"</li> <li>"Affects us"</li> <li>"Highly publicized"</li> <li>"Basic"</li> <li>"Simple"</li> <li>"Emotional"</li> <li>"Explosive"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Fundamental: President vs. Rickover"</li> <li>"Safe vote"</li> <li>"Non-emotional"</li> <li>"Non-question"</li> <li>"Mixed up"</li> <li>"Toss up"</li> <li>"Symbolic"</li> <li>"Unusual"</li> <li>"Esoteric"</li> <li>"Low profile"</li> <li>"Patterned: involves ideological split"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Media exposure"</li> <li>"Theoretical"</li> <li>"Campaign issue"</li> <li>"Perennial"</li> <li>"Presidential issue"</li> <li>NASA</li> <li>"Low controversy"</li> <li>"Non-issue"</li> <li>"Simple"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Non-controversial"</li> <li>"Extension of ongoing policy"</li> <li>"Non-monumental"</li> <li>"Short time frame"</li> <li>"Easy"</li> <li>"No problem"</li> <li>"Not significant"</li> <li>"Symbolic"</li> <li>"Same factions, different questions"</li> <li>"Important"</li> </ul>

Table 3.1 --Continued

<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>Common Status</u>	<u>House Assassinations</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>
"Important, social, emotional, symbolic" "Simple" "Emotionally defused" "Technical" "Explosive" "Symbolic" "Important" "Philosophical" "Controversial" "Value judgment" "Symbolic/emotional" "protest vote"	"Difficult" "Complicated" "Close" "High intensity" "Very controversial" "Publicized" "Old issue--nothing new" "Controversial" "Old" "Either for or against--but not difficult" "Emotional" "Nasty" "Polarizing"	"Emotional" "Unusual" "Not normal" "Difficult" "Challenging" "Controversial" "Salient" "Philosophical" "No compromise" "Conflict of personalities" "Controversial and complex"	"Politically visible" "Minor biff!" "States rights debate" "Philosophical differences" "Not major" "Low Pressure" "Two schools of thought" "Fundamental" "Close" "Federal involvement issue" "Not burning"

Table 3.1--Continued

<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Energy</u>	<u>Government Reorganization</u>
"Common based"	"Basic"	"Symbolic and significant"	"Political"
"Not difficult"	"Emotional"	"Non-parochial"	"One-sided"
"Very routine"	"Open/shut"	"Substance vs. politics"	"Not complicated"
"Emotional"	"Compromise--deal made"	"Lots of pressure"	"Recurring question"
"Not major"	"Subtle, sophisticated"	"Far reaching"	"Low conflict"
	"Simple with complex implications"	"Not politically charged"	"Historic pattern"
	"Not straight up or down"	"Simplistic"	"Easy"
	"Run of the mill"	"Simple"	"Compromise"
	"Technical, but not complex"	"No big deal"	"Media fabricated"
		<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works Conference</u>
		"Special interest"	"Self interest"
		"Minor"	"Committee issue"
		"Simple"	"Up or down"
			"Can't affect--fights over"
		<u>Countercyclical</u>	
		"Involves policy principals"	"Not life or death"
		"Theoretical"	"Parochial and visible"
		"Run of the mill"	"Policy matter"
		<u>HUD</u>	
		"Typical social programs vote"	
		"Fundamental"	
		"Annual bill with regional fight"	

Table 3.1--Continued

<u>Budget I</u>	"Misadventure" "Short time frame" "Lot in it" "Politically tough" "Major" "Simple" "Not a good bill" "One of 600 votes" "Test on new budget"	"Generalities" "Conglomeration of things" "Not typical" "Important" "New"	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	"Narrow interest" "Emotional" "Industry-specific" "Not important" "For or against" "Recurring cleavage" "Exotic and symbolic" "Simple--one of many you see"
<u>Budget II</u>	"Generalities" "Conglomeration of things" "Not typical" "Important" "New"	<u>Saccharin</u>	"Simplistic" "Populistic" "Political ploy" "Symbolic" "Clear cut" "A nothing" "Philosophical issue"	"Generalities" "Conglomeration of things" "Not typical" "Important" "New"
<u>Foreign Aid</u>	"Generalities" "Conglomeration of things" "Not typical" "Important" "New"	<u>Saccharin</u>	"Cut and dry" "Not an issue" "Wide implications" "Statistical thing" "Delaney vs. others" "Emotional" "Emotionally charged"	"Committee bill" "No visibility" "Cash vs. commodities" "Annual review for authorization" "Human involvement" "Liberal vs. conservative" "Few that simple"
<u>School Lunch</u>	"Generalities" "Conglomeration of things" "Not typical" "Important" "New"	<u>Hatch</u>	"Civil liberties vote" "Philosophic" "Before us many times" "Balancing act"	

Table 3.1--Continued

<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde (Abortion)</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>
"Specialized"	"Moral, emotional"	"Self-interest"	"Balanced budget issue"
"Jobs vs. environment"	"Passionate"	"Emotional"	"President vs. Congress"
"Hazy"	"High profile"	"Easy--" "for or against"	"Symbolic"
"Emotional!"	"Farce/sham"	"political"	"Pork"
"Employment issue"	"Volatile"	"Bitter"	"Representational"
"Hair splitting"	"Symbolic"	"Important politically"	"Fiscal"
"Old issue"	"Important"	"Lot of heat"	"Bana"
"Not emotional"	"Politically"	"Not an issue--"	"Vital"
"Not knee jerk"	"Lot of heat"	"Not life and death"	"Fiscal responsibility vs. pork barrel"
"Economics vs.	"Economics vs.	"Hot"	"Jobs"
energy and environment"	moral question"	"Superficial"	"Flashy"

among committee members that was carried to the floor; comments that the Water Projects vote was a "President vs. Congress" issue; and members' statements that votes like the Nuclear Navy one, Renewal of the House Select Panel on Assassinations, and the Saccharin Ban involved conflicts among personalities (Chappel vs. the Budget Committee, the Select Committee vs. Special Counsel Sprague, and Delaney vs. other members of Congress, respectively).

Examples of classifications on the basis of topic of controversy are: a member's perceptions of the Nuclear Navy vote as "a fundamental clash between the President and Rickover concerning nuclear surface fleets," the Clean Air Act Amendments seen by one member as "jobs vs. the environment" or by another as "economics vs. energy and environment," perceptions that the School Lunch vote involved a debate over a "cash vs commodities policy strategy," and perceptions that the Water Project vote stems from a conflict between "fiscal responsibility vs. pork barrel."

Differences in legislative setting are highlighted by statements that votes such as Government Reorganization and the Arab Boycott involve "compromises" and "deals," while votes like the House Assassinations Committee are "not compromises." Also, the Hatch vote is an attempt to perform a "balancing act" among conflicting policy goals, while the Budget Act is a "test" vote.

Throughout Table 3.1, there are references to the varying degrees of importance. Votes like the Ethics one, Rhodesian Chrome, Strip Mining, and the Budget are considered "major," "important" and "real issues." The Goldwater Amendment is considered "non-monumental," NASA is considered a "non-issue," and the FAA and Snow Removal votes and the "Debt Collection Practices" are called "minor" and "not a life or death matter." Romanian

Earthquake Relief is "not major" and Marine Mammal Protection is "not important."

Emotionality seems to be an "issue dimension" on which many Congressmen contrast legislation. Legislation is described as "non-emotional," "not-burning" and, conversely, "explosive," "nasty;" "symbolic," and, in the case of the Pay Raise vote, involving a "fist fight" mentality.

Controversiality is seen as a variable issue trait. Votes such as Rhodesian Chrome, Common Situs Picketing, and House Assassinations are considered "controversial" ones, and the Hyde Amendment is described as a "passionate" issue, while the Goldwater Amendment and the FAA vote are called "noncontroversial."

Members' perceptions of various votes also differ according to various normative assessments that are made about bills. Obviously, on some bills, members do not feel strongly and therefore pass no judgment when describing the vote. On other issues such as the Ethics vote, the Hyde Amendment, Common Situs Picketing, or the Foreign Aid Reduction, members are aroused enough to employ such phrases as "hypocritical," "press fabricated," "farce," "sham," "political ploy," "good bill," "bad bill," and "a nothing."

Perceptions of varying degrees of toughness seem to be conveyed with the classification of votes as "basic," "simple," "easy," "not difficult," "one-sided," "no big deal," "tough," "toss up," "ambiguous," "difficult," or as one member described the Clean Air Act decision, "a non-knee jerk decision, unlike busing and abortion."

The statements in Table 3.1 also reveal that members distinguish votes on the basis of the level of intellectualization involved in the

decision. Some votes, such as Public Works Conference, are "straight up or down" votes "that you are either automatically for or against." Because such decisions are relatively snap judgments, they entail little intellectualization on the member's part. The member does not relate them to an abstract doctrine. Other votes involve intellectualization. Members consider votes such as Debt Collection Practices and Countercyclical "policy votes" because they involve ideological preference for or against a certain program approach. On these, the task for the member is to discover how his ideological predispositions apply. Others, like Ethics and the Hyde Amendment, are defined by members as "philosophical" or "moral" votes. They involve considerations of conscience.

Members appear to feel that policy impacts or consequences also offer grounds for classifying votes. Along these lines, the Ethics and Pay Raise votes are seen as "affecting us;" Strip Mining is a "regulation issue;" Snow Removal is parochial and a "special interest matter;" Marine Mammal Protection is "industry-specific;" the Water Projects vote is one of "pork;" and the Arab Boycott Prohibition is one of "far reaching implications."

Congressmen allude to different degrees of visibility. Votes like Snow Removal for Congressmen in the affected region, Debt Collection, the Pay Raise and the Hyde Amendment are considered "politically visible," "high profile" or "window-dressing" issues. Conversely, the School Lunch Program is held to be a "non-visible" issue.

The intensity of heat generated by a vote is also a basis for differentiation. The Hyde Amendment and the Arab Boycott vote are viewed as issues that involve a "lot of heat" and "high pressure." On the other hand, the Debt Collection vote was described as "a low pressure" one.

Typicality, as an issue dimension on which votes vary, seems to be illustrated with comments that the Second Budget vote, and votes on the Nuclear Navy, House Assassinations Committee, FAA, and Rhodesian Chrome are "not typical," "esoteric," "unusual," "not usual," and "routine." The Arab Boycott, the First Budget, Countercyclical Aid, and HUD votes are referred to as "run of the mill." Member statements concerning the Budget and HUD are most relevant here. One member said of the Budget, "This is one of 600 money bills you see a session. You just handle them the same." Regarding the HUD vote, one member noted, "This is a typical social program vote."

Recurringness as a dimension for contrasting issues is a theme one finds running through Table 3.1. Government Reorganization Authority is referred to as "a recurring question, an historic pattern." Both Common Situs and Clean Air are described as "old issues." As one member noted with regard to Common Situs, "There is nothing new here." Or, as one member noted on the Hyde Abortion Amendment, "This isn't the first (nor the last) time I've faced this one."

Finally, the time frame a vote allows for decision can be pinpointed as a basis for differentiating issues. This is specifically emphasized in members' statements concerning both the Goldwater and Budget Resolutions, both of which involved "short time frame issues that permit little time for thought or deliberation."

In sum, the comments and statements arrayed in Table 3.1 provide strong evidence that the actual lexicon of various members evidences categories for differentiating types of decisions. But, although the language listed in Table 3.1 is a rich original source, this table by itself is not

sufficient for empirically examining the first proposition. The general statements reveal, broadly, that members do indeed employ distinctions among votes. But, their general comments lack equivalence and standardizations. Not every respondent reflected on the same issue dimensions. Thus, the short, closed-answer questions are, for our purposes, a more valid and thorough test of the first proposition. With these questions, each respondent was asked to define the issue at hand on the basis of certain standardized dimensions.

## 2. A Test Among Specific Questions

As noted in Chapter II, very specific questions were asked on each sampled vote to gain, in the style of Cobb and Elder, members' perceptions of the issue dimensions of complexity, technicality, controversiality, salience, political cost, visibility, and routineness. Additionally, after pretesting the questionnaire and after a number of in-depth conversations with members, it was felt that inclusion of questions concerning constituency awareness, intensity of member feelings, major/minor status, toughness, and degree of thought put into the vote by the member was advisable given that members themselves seem to differentiate on the basis of these dimensions.

The aggregate responses to the specific questions for the sampled votes are displayed in Table 3.2. As can be noted, there are a number of missing cases with regard to each dimension. This is especially true with regard to dimensions concerning major status, constituency awareness, toughness, and thought, all of which were added after the study was underway. These were included, however, because members kept using them to distinguish votes.

Table 3.2

**Member Aggregate Responses to Specific Questions Concerning Their  
Perceptions of Issue Characteristics  
For All Sampled Votes**

- a) Do you feel this is a complex issue?  
No 63% Yes 37% (N = 346)
- b) Do you feel this is a technical issue?  
No 63% Yes 37% (N = 343)
- c) Is there a lot of conflict and disagreement on this?  
No 47% Yes 53% (N = 347)
- d) Is this a major vote?  
No 33% Yes 67% (N = 210)
- e) Is this vote important to the people of your district?  
No 49% Yes 51% (N = 335)
- f) Are your constituents aware of it?  
No 57% Yes 43% (Mass electorate--39%, affected only--4%)  
(N = 258)
- g) Did you get a lot of mail on it?  
No 87% Yes 13% (N = 348)
- h) Is this something which might affect your renomination?  
No 76% Yes 24% (N = 339)
- i) Is this something which might affect your reelection?  
No 75% Yes 25% (N = 339)
- j) Is this something on which you have strong feelings?  
No 53% Yes 47% (N = 295)
- k) Is this a routine issue for you?  
No 31% Yes 69% (N = 347)
- l) Did you put a lot of thought into it?  
No 56% Yes 44% (N = 84)
- m) Is this a tough decision?  
No 79% Yes 21% (N = 248)

In a general way, responses to the specific questions show that most members are able to differentiate among issues on the basis of these dimensions. Throughout the interviews, most members were able to understand the bases of comparison and to use them in distinguishing issues. The distributions in Table 3.2 reveal that members feel that some decisions have certain characteristics, while others do not. For example, sixty-three percent of all decisions were considered complex, while, in thirty-seven percent of the interviews, members defined a vote as non-complex. Such findings seem to indicate that specific questions tap meaningful issue dimensions within the Congress.

When the responses to the specific questions are arrayed by the different votes covered by this study, as displayed in Table 3.3, it is clear that members do indeed differentiate among votes with perceptual issue characteristics. There, the percent responding yes to questions concerning specific "issue characteristics" is arrayed according to the studied votes. Questions for which insufficient data are available due to either late inclusion of the question or lack of response during interview sessions are labeled N/A for "not applicable."

The data in Table 3.3 show that on each dimension, members rated some votes high and some low. For example, with regard to complexity, votes on the EPA, Arab Boycott, Energy Department, Countercyclical, the Budget Resolution, and Clean Air were perceived as complex by at least sixty percent of the respondents, while ten percent or less rated The House Assassination Committee, Snow Removal, Foreign Aid Amendment, and Pay Raise votes as complex. With regard to conflict, certain votes were perceived as highly controversial (Ethics, Common Situs, House

Table 3.3

### Percentage of Interviews in which Members Responded "Yes" on Specific "Issue Characteristics" Questions as Arrayed by Votes

Table 3.3--Continued

<u>House Assassinations Committee</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>	<u>Energy Department</u>
Complex	8%	11%	60%*	27%	70%	55%*
Technical	0%	0%	60%*	27%	40%*	70%
Conflict	70%	11%	0%	64%*	20%	55%*
Major	N/A	N/A	0%	N/A	60%*	64%*
Salience	31%	0%	80%	55%*	67%	46%*
Aware	82%	25%	40%*	30%	50%*	64%*
Mail	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%
Renomination	8%	0%	20%	0%	30%	18%
Reelection	8%	0%	20%	0%	30%	18%
Routine	39%*	78%	80%	82%	50%*	100%
Feeling..	55%*	11%	0%	36%*	70%	66%
Tough	N/A	25%	N/A	20%	10%	0%
Thought	N/A	33%	0%	N/A	80%	40%*
						N/A

Table 3.3--Continued

	<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Counter Cyclical</u>	<u>Community Development ("HUD")</u>	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Foreign Aid (Miller Amendment)</u>
Complex	9%	56%*	64%*	55%*	42%*	73%	50%*	10%
Technical	18%	78%	64%*	55%*	42%*	55%*	38%*	11%
Conflict	27%	22%	58%*	27%	58%*	100%	38%*	20%
Major	N/A	100%	92%	73%	8%	100%	100%	30%
Saltence	18%	75%	77%	82%	8%	91%	75%	13%
Aware	9%	88%	18%	44%*	10%	18%	25%	14%
Mail	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	9%	0%	10%
Renomination	0%	44%*	8%	55%*	0%	18%	38%*	10%
Reelection	0%	44%*	8%	55%*	0%	27%	38%*	10%
Routine	100%	67%	100%	67%	83%	45%*	50%*	90%
Feeling	27%	25%	17%	42%*	8%	73%	88%	50%*
Tough	N/A	11%	0%	0%	8%	13%	13%	10%
Thought	N/A	25%	33%	60%*	0%	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 3.3--Continued

	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde Amendment</u>	<u>Hatch Deregulation</u>	<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
Complex	93%	21%	54%*	13%	46%*	59%*	0%
Technical	87%	21%	54%*	25%	36%*	53%*	0%
Conflict	93%	93%	85%	25%	36%*	94%*	100%
Major	100%	86%	77%	13%	30%	63%*	72%
Salience	93%	83%	42%*	43%*	73%	35%*	47%*
Aware	21%	83%	44%*	0%	100%	73%	94%
Mail	13%	36%*	69%	0%	64%*	24%	28%
Renomination	20%	64%*	31%	0%	50%*	47%*	61%
Reelection	20%	71%	31%	0%	50%*	47%*	72%
Routine	47%*	43%*	39%*	88%	64%*	38%*	56%*
Feeling	20%	86%	69%	25%	73%	47%*	72%
Tough	60%*	50%*	15%	0%	9%	59%*	50%*
Thought	57%*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

N/A indicates insufficient responses.

\* Indicates that there is less than two-thirds agreement among members concerning the issue characteristic of that vote.

Assassinations, Debt Collection, Energy Department, Budget I, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, Water Projects and Pay Raise). Other votes were low in conflict, such as those that underwent prefloor compromising (Tax, Rhodesian Chrome, Government Reorganization, Arab Boycott, and Budget II), those votes that appeared to be uncontroversial at the committee level (NASA, FAA, EPA, Romanian Earthquake, Public Works, Community Development, and School Lunch), and those that appeared to be widely supported floor changes to committee bills (the Goldwater Amendment, Miller Amendment, and Saccharin).

At the very least Table 3.3 reveals that, in a political sense, members distinguish between votes such as Ethics, Common Situs, Strip Mining, Public Works, Community Development, the Budget, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, Water Projects, and Pay Raise, which they rate high on salience, major status, conflict, renomination and reelection potential, awareness, mail, toughness, and thought; and votes such as the Nuclear Navy, Goldwater Amendment, NASA, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, Debt Collection, Snow Removal, Marine Mammal, Foreign Aid, and School Lunch that are not rated high on those characteristics.

A problem with issue characteristics, however, is that not all dimensions mean the same to all members. Some dimensions are plagued by potential problems of reliability. Some members found it difficult to determine if they were being asked to describe their own experience with the bill or to define the issue "in general." For example, with regard to "conflict," members asked "in what way?" "Do you mean is it controversial with me or was it controversial in the House?" Thus with regard to each dimension it was most important for the interviewer to be as precise as

possible in order to insure standardization and equivalence. Despite the effort, each dimension emerged with a number of slightly different, albeit related, meanings. To fully explicate member perceptions on each dimension, Appendix B contains a dimension by dimension discussion.

To conclude the discussion of proposition one, the responses and data displayed in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 strongly argue that members do indeed perceive "issue differentials" in congressional decision-making. They recognize different kinds of issue characteristics and dimensions when discussing votes, verbalize these distinctions, think in terms of them, and apparently use the distinctions to differentiate among various votes and decisions. Therefore, we can accept the first proposition.

#### B. PROPOSITION 2: Different Legislators Similarly Perceive Different Kinds of Issues

Data to test this proposition are provided by three sources, two indirect and one direct. All offer qualified validation of the second proposition. They show that members usually define an issue with a high degree of consensus.

Tables 3.1 and 3.3 permit an indirect test of this proposition.

Table 3.1 reveals that in some instances different legislators do indeed have the opposite impression of the "issue characteristics" of the same vote. The Goldwater Amendment is alternatively, but conflictually, described as "not significant" and "important," Rhodesian Chrome as "simple" and "technical," Common Situs as "an either for or against issue" and "complicated--difficult," Debt Collection as "politically visible" and "low pressure," the Budget as "politically tough" and "simple," Clean Air

as "emotional" and "not emotional," and the Pay Raise as "not a life and death matter" and "a fist fight situation." As noted earlier, Congressmen frequently define a vote in highly partisan terms with such emotionally charged phrases as "hypocritical," "farce," and "media fabricated," and perhaps it is the case here that a member's stand on a given vote may color his perception of "the kind of issue at hand." In any event, these general descriptions gleaned from the open-ended question indicate that some members will often be at odds in terms of how they describe the issue characteristics of given votes. But, the point to be emphasized and the major generalization which can be drawn from Table 3.1 is that, in most instances, most members tend to use language that indicates a standardized conception of the issue.

Table 3.3 provides additional but indirect evidence of some actor disagreement amidst general concensus concerning issue characteristics. As noted above, the table displays the percent responding "yes" on various issue dimensions for each vote studied. By noting the degree of consensus present in members' perceptions, Table 3.3 can be used to examine the second proposition. A preponderance of responses that display a greater than two-thirds/one-thirds split among respondents would provide support for the second proposition by showing majority agreement concerning the description of an issue. A preponderance of close divisions (i.e., those that approach a fifty-fifty split) would detract from the proposition by indicating severe disagreement concerning issue definition.

Table 3.3 offers the possibility of 403 cells: thirteen perceptual questions concerning issue characteristics for each of the thirty-one studied votes. As noted above, several cells are empty due to either

late inclusion of a question or insufficient responses to the question during interview sessions. The total number of those blank and labeled not/applicable is fifty-nine. Subtracting these from the potential of 403, leaves 349 cells. Of those, ninety-four, or twenty-three percent, involve a split closer than two-thirds/one-third, while seventy-seven percent of the cells involve at least a two-thirds/one-third split with many displaying a unanimous response rate. This warrants the conclusion that in an overwhelming majority of cases (more than three-fourths of the cells) members exhibited a strong rate of cohesion concerning the specific characteristics of the issue at hand. Yet almost one-fourth of the cells do display a lack of consensus. Agreement in issue definition is present most often on low-grade issues (Romanian Earthquake, Snow Removal, and School Lunch) and least on hot issues (Saccharin) and those issues that differentially affected members' districts (Community Development, Water Projects). Evidently, members are likely to agree concerning what constitutes a low profile issue but disagree as to what constitutes a hot vote. The specific questions that display the greatest amount of disagreement are technicality, complexity, and routineness, perhaps indicating differences of opinion based on experience and involvement with the issue. There are few instances of disagreement concerning major status, awareness, mail, and thought, indicating that most members tend to similarly perceive the configuration of these characteristics on the examined issues.

A more direct test of the second proposition is afforded by control procedures. Employing various background, political situation, and constituency variables allows for a test of the notion that different kinds of legislators will have the same perceptions of issue characteristics. If perceptions are indeed independent of control variables, sufficient

support would exist for the acceptance of the second proposition. An opposite finding--i.e., legislator differences strongly related to or "explaining" perceptions--would strongly militate in favor of this proposition's rejection.

The three broad categories of control variables utilized here--legislator backgrounds, constituency characteristics, and member's political situation--provide a total of twenty different controls. There are ten background variables, eight constituency characteristics, and three political variables. Table 3.4 lists these controls by type and how they were operationalized. On the basis of past legislative research and/or common sense, each variable seems to offer a possible explanation of issue characteristic perception.

Relationships between controls and issue characteristics were computed on an issue-by-issue basis rather than directly with all responses. Although the issue-by-issue control procedure has the dual drawbacks of large cell numbers and low numbers of respondents in each cell, it offers a more thorough test of the second proposition.

Control procedures provided an enormity of data. The 403 cells in Table 3.4, yielded as the product of thirteen questions on each of thirty-one votes, renders a total of 8,060 tables when controlled by the twenty variables. Neither space nor emphasis permit the exhibition of these displays. A summary of the data is provided, however, by relying on the statistic Lambda ( $\lambda$ ). Lambda "... is a measure of association for crosstabulations based on nominal-level variables."<sup>6</sup> It is an "error reduction statistic in that it measures the percentage of improvement in our ability to predict the value of the dependent variable once we know the value of the independent variable."<sup>7</sup> As such, Lambda seems well suited

Table 3.4

## Control Variables and Their Operationalization

<u>Controls</u> (Background variables)	<u>Operationalization</u>
1) party	Northern Democrat Southern Democrat <sup>a</sup> Republican
2) length of service	Freshman to five years <sup>b</sup> Six to eleven years Twelve years plus
3) Membership on Party Policy Committee	Yes No
4) Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Score <sup>c</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
5) Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA) Scores <sup>c</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
6) AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) Scores <sup>c</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
7) Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS) Score <sup>c</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
8) party unity <sup>c,d</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
9) bipartisan support <sup>c,d</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
10) conservative coalition <sup>c,d</sup>	Above the mean Below the mean
 (Constituency Characteristics)	
11) percent white collar	Above the mean Below the mean
12) percent owner occupied housing	Above the mean Below the mean
13) percent urban population	Above the mean Below the mean

Table 3.4--Continued

14) percent of population within metropolitan area (SMSA)	Above the mean Below the mean
15) percent black	Above the mean Below the mean
16) percent earning above \$15,000	Above the mean Below the mean
17) percent earning below low-income level	Above the mean Below the mean
<b>(Political Variables)</b>	
18) 1976 election results <sup>e</sup>	Close Marginal Safe
19) switched district status	Switch of party control No switch of party Control
20) Yea or Nay vote <sup>f</sup>	Yea Nay

<sup>a</sup>The South is defined as the eleven states of the confederacy.

<sup>b</sup>These categories correspond to Kingdon's distinctions. Congressmen's, 291.

<sup>c</sup>For the second session of the ninety-fifth Congress.

<sup>d</sup>For the first session of the ninety-fifth Congress.

<sup>e</sup>There is no firmly agreed upon measure of what constitutes a "safe," "marginal," and "close" election. Cover and Mayhew in "Congressional Dynamics" define marginal as a victory under 60%. For our purposes, the categorizations were based on the distribution of the victory margins of sampled legislators. A close result is from fifty to fifty-two percent of the vote; marginal is from fifty-two to fifty-five; and safe is fifty-six percent plus.

<sup>f</sup>Yea or nay were coded from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report of House, roll call votes. The sources of data for these controls can be found on pp. 63-64 of this dissertation.

to a test of proposition 2 in that a) the data from the questionnaire, the votes, and the categorized control variables are nominal level data and b) to test proposition 2 it is necessary to know the extent to which knowledge of a member's background, constituency, or political characteristics will predict his responses to questions concerning the issue characteristics of each vote.

The only drawback in using Lambda--or for that matter any correlation coefficient--as a control for issue definition when arrayed by votes with small sample sizes is that many cells will be blank. Indeed twenty-nine percent of the possible 8,000 tables are blank--i.e., the small sample numbers when controlled left this many cells vacant due to the lack of representatives having the ascriptive qualities for which control was made. Although these Lambda controls employed by vote may be an imperfect test for intervening effects, they seem to be the only possible ones. At the very least they give a rough measure of basic tendencies in control variable influence.

Lambda coefficients range from 1.00 "which occurs when prediction can be made without error, i.e., when each independent variable category is associated with a single category on the dependent variable," to zero which signifies ". . . no improvement in prediction."<sup>8</sup>

Here, the computed Lambda are quite low. They show that for most control distributions, different categories of members perceive an issue similarly. When using the rather low figure of .50 as the "bottom line" coefficient of significant relationships (i.e., half the configuration in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variable) only six percent of the 5,723 resulting tables have a Lambda of .50 or above. The overwhelming majority of tables have a zero coefficient. Few have one

of 1.00. What this indicates, by way of generalization, is that in ninety-four percent of the tables yielded from the cross-tabulation of issue characteristic questions on each of the thirty-one votes, with twenty variables controlled for, members' definitions of the kind of issue at hand are independent of various distinctions among legislators allowed for by these controls. In other words, different kinds of members do not substantially define votes differently. Predictions of how a member will define an issue are not measurably improved by knowing his background, constituency, or district political situation.

Although these findings give overwhelming support to the second proposition, they do not warrant its complete acceptance. Of the twenty controls, the ones having the greatest number of significant Lambda are party, length of service, election results, switch status, percent SMSA, and policy committee membership. Twenty-two percent of all available distributions by length of service have Lambda ranging from .50 to 1.00. Nine percent of the party and policy committee member arrays, eight percent of those controlled by election result and percent SMSA, and seven percent of those controlled for switch status also have significant coefficients. In comparison, the other controls have only a handful (six percent or less) of significant Lambda out of all possible distributions. What this means is that party, policy member status, election results, switch status, percentage SMSA, and especially length of service sometimes do exert an influence on how a member perceives the kind of issue a given vote involves.

It should be noted that the issue dimensions on which significant Lambda were most frequently observed are complexity, technicality, thought, and seeing, indicating that differences in the perception of these characteristics are somewhat attributable to control variables. The fewest

relationships with controls were observed with regard to mail and major status. Evidently, members' perceptions of the volume of mail and major status are unrelated to the control variables. The votes on which significant Lambda were most frequently observed are EPA, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, Strip Mining, and Hatch. On these votes there was the highest degree of unanimity concerning issue definition. On the Hyde vote and House Assassinations, Miller Amendment, Marine Mammal Protection, and the Water Projects, control variables accounted for the fewest differences.

Before concluding the discussion of proposition 2, several sub-hypotheses should be entertained as a tangential test of the proposition.

The general literature of legislative behavior and legislative decision-making, conversations with members, and common sense imply some basic relationships between certain background, constituency and political variables and issue definition. These hypotheses might be grouped as follows: Those involving the position of the member within Congress, those involving ideological extremity of members, those involving the situation of electoral security within which the legislator finds himself, and those involving the legislator's stand on the issue.

There are two reasonable hypotheses concerning the status of members within the Congress. First, members serving on the parent committee of a piece of legislation, due to their expertise and involvement, will define issues differently in comparison to those not on the committee. Second, new members, having less experience in legislative matters and perhaps reflecting more recent electoral trends, will look at issues differently than more experienced Congressmen.

It also seems reasonable to expect that legislators with greater ideological extremity will define issues differently than those not exhibiting such excessiveness, the reason being that extreme or "avid" legislators might tend to see more issues as "hot" or "high profile."

A reasonable hypothesis regarding the political security of Congressmen is that those experiencing such insecurity might perceive constituency salience, awareness, mail, and renomination and reelection effects at a higher rate than those not suffering from such insecurity.

Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that whether a member votes yea or nay on a given vote will affect how he thinks of it, especially its major status, how tough he thinks it is, and how much thought he puts into it.

To test these hypotheses, the responses on perceptual issue characteristics were cross-tabulated according to whether or not the member was on the committee, member length of service, mean-based dichotomization of ADA and ACA scores for Second Session of the Ninety-fourth Congress, trichotomized results from the 1976 elections, switch district status, and yea or nay voting position. The cross-tabulations were made regardless of vote, the rationale being that a straight test of these hypotheses did not require "vote controls" for a direct examination.

None of the Lambda for these cross-tabulations proved significant. None even reached the .50 level, indicating that these various independent variables had little explanatory impact in accounting for dependent variable configuration. Yet, a close look at the distribution of percentages in the cross-tabulations reveals several tendencies that offer pause in completely rejecting the impact of these variables on issue perception and definition.

Table 3.5, A through F list the more noteworthy displays. These reveal that there are linear relationships in the directions predicted by the hypotheses.

Part A of Table 3.5 shows the breakdown of responses by committee membership. As can be seen there, committee members are more likely than those not on the committee to view legislation that emerges from the committee as complex and technical, and as involving conflict, salience, constituency awareness, non-routineness, and thought. Thus, membership on the relevant committee does affect the way a member views legislation before him on the floor.

Part B reveals that the longer one is in Congress the more often he will view legislation as being non-complex and non-technical, non-conflictual, and as lacking constituency awareness, mail, reelection effects, and toughness. Obviously, members feel that the more issues are seen and grappled with the easier they are. Salience presents an interesting curvilinear relationship. Both freshmen and seniors seem to consider legislation as salient at a higher rate than those with moderate lengths of service. Regardless of linearity or curvilinearity, these distributions show some influence of length of service on issue definition.

The displays in part C exhibit several instances in which ACA scores are related to issue definition. Although there are only a few instances of relationship and although no relationships were found between ADA scores and issue definition, these data show that those with less avidness (below the ACA mean for sampled votes) define legislation less frequently in terms of salience, awareness, mail, and thought but, paradoxically, more in terms of personal feeling.

Table 3.5

**Cross-tabulation of Responses to Questions Concerning Issue Characteristics with Selected Control Variables**

**A. Noteworthy Cross-tabulations of Issue Characteristics with Committee Membership**

	<u>Committee Member</u>		<u>All Respondents</u>
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
% Yes Complexity	50%	35%	37%
% Yes Technicality	50	37	37
% Yes Conflict	29	56	53
% Yes Salience	75	58	51
% Yes Aware	100	47	43
% Yes Routine	50	72	69
% Yes Thought	100	39	44

**B. Noteworthy Cross-tabulations of Issue Characteristics with Length of Service**

	<u>Freshman</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>	<u>12+ years</u>	<u>All</u>
% Yes Complexity	53%	49%	16%	10%	37%
% Yes Technicality	51	41	26	27	37
% Yes Conflict	61	54	49	46	53
% Salience	61	44	54	57	51
% Yes Aware	59	43	41	25	43
% Yes Mail	22	10	19	04	13
% Yes Reelection	34	22	27	16	25
% Yes Routine	55	71	68	77	69
% Yes Tough	29	22	19	13	21

Table 3.5--Continued

**C. Noteworthy Cross-tabulations of Issue Characteristics with Mean-Based Dichotomization of ACA Scores, 2nd Session, 94th Congress**

	<u>ACA Scores</u>		<u>All Respondents</u>
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	
% Yes Salience	44%	57%	51%
% Yes Aware	36	48	43
% Yes Mail	09	16	13
% Yes Feeling	51	44	47
% Yes Thought	40	49	44

**D. Noteworthy Cross-Tabulations of Issue Characteristics with Trichotomization of Election Results**

	<u>Election Results<sup>1</sup></u>			<u>All Respondents</u>
	<u>Close</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Safe</u>	
% Yes Conflict	70%	57%	51%	53%
% Yes Major	77	71	66	67
% Yes Salience	60	41	52	51
% Yes Routine	55	67	70	69
% Yes Feeling	72	39	46	47
% Yes Thought	100	00	47	44

Table 3.5--Continued

**E. Noteworthy Cross-tabulations of Issue Characteristics with "Switch" District Status**

	<u>Switch District</u>		<u>All Respondents</u>
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
% Yes Major	85%	66%	67%
% Yes Salience	72	50	51
% Yes Aware	67	41	43
% Yes Mail	38	12	13
% Yes Renomination	52	22	24
% Yes Reelection	52	29	25
% Yes Feeling	63	46	47
% Yes Thought	17	47	44

**F. Noteworthy Cross-tabulations of Issue Characteristics with "Yay or Nay" Position**

	<u>Position</u>		<u>All Respondents</u>
	<u>Nay</u>	<u>Yay</u>	
% Yes Conflict	65%	48%	53%
% Yes Feeling	52	43	47
% Yes Thought	57	39	44

/Classification by election result is based on 1976 election results according to the following categories: Close = 50% to 52% of the vote, marginal is from 52% to 55%; and safe is 56% plus.

The cross-tabulations in part D are most interesting. They show that those experiencing a close race in the last election define issues more in terms of conflict, major status, feeling, and thought, and less in terms of routineness than those from safe districts. With regard to salience, a curvilinear relationship exists revealing that salience is perceived by legislators from both close and safe districts.

The data in part E show that there are meaningful differences in issue definition between those representing a "switch" district and those serving a district in which there has been no change in party control.

Those from switch districts are more likely to see legislation as major, salient, and involving constituency awareness, mail, renomination and reelection effects, and personal feeling. These arrays substantiate the thesis put forth by Strain,<sup>9</sup> Keefe and Ogul,<sup>10</sup> Fiorina,<sup>11</sup> and Brady and Lynn<sup>12</sup> that legislators from a "switch" district are very different in their behavior and, implicitly, outlook than those not from such a district.

Most telling are responses on feeling and thought which show that members from "switch" districts exhibit a) stronger feelings on legislation than those from continuously controlled districts and b) less thought (or perhaps more knee jerk reaction), perhaps indicating that marginal representatives do not "... adopt moderate, compromise positions aimed at pleasing all sorts of the constituency."<sup>13</sup> Instead, to reiterate Fiorina, "... the data support the argument based on the model . . . that marginal representatives align with the stronger group."<sup>14</sup>

Finally, section F shows three noteworthy relationships between nay/yea position and issue definition. Members voting nay tend to ascribe conflict, feeling, and thought at a higher rate than those who vote yea.

To conclude the discussion of proposition 2, the foregoing analysis indicates that, on the basis of data gathered by the questions of this study, how a member perceives and defines an issue is strongly determined by the kind of vote at hand rather than by various background, constituency and district political characteristics. Most members view the same kind of issue similarly. Yet, the data show evidence that several variables--most notably length of service, committee membership, party, and electoral security--have some impact on issue definition. Thus, although most Congressmen will tend to see the same issue in the same way--indicating different patterns of issue characteristics--how a specific member defines a vote may be colored not only by issue contexts in Congress but also, at times, by his partisanship, status in the legislature, district political situation, and involvement with the bill itself. With this qualification, proposition 2 can be accepted.

#### C. PROPOSITION 3: Issue Characteristics Will Factor Together

Interviews with members reveal that they often link certain issue characteristics with other issue characteristics, with a strong underlying inference that various characteristics cluster together along the lines of hot and low profile dimensions. Indicative of this are the quotations exhibited in Table 3.6.

To examine the veracity of the relationships posited by proposition 3 and, as noted above, implied both in writings that emphasize the contextual nature of decision-making and by statements such as Kingdon's that ". . . the volume of the mail is clearly related to issue salience . . .,"<sup>15</sup> a series of correlations were run among various indicators of issue characteristics. As noted in Chapter II, three

Table 3.6

Members' Quotations Concerning Relationships  
Between Issue Characteristics

- "Major legislation is always controversial."
- "Controversial votes are ones that are close."
- "Usually if they're not controversial, there are not strong feelings on it."
- "Because it's not controversial it can't affect reelection."
- "New directions in policy are 'major' and a 'major' issue can cause you election problems."
- "A non-routine issue is one that gets a lot of attention."
- "Tough votes are those involving policy changes."
- "Tough votes have a lot of technical provisions."
- "Tough votes are emotional and conflictual."
- "A routine vote is not major."
- "A minor issue is routine."
- "Routineness and publicity are inversely related, because nonpublicized issues are routine."
- "A non-routine issue is an emotional one."
- "Constituents are usually aware of issues that are important to them."
- "The Budget is too complex a matter for Congressmen to be aware of."
- "Anytime a lot of money is involved it is major."
- "Saccharin is major, because it was publicized."
- "Old issues don't seem as complex and technical, because we have already seen them."

broad categories of issue characteristics indicators were employed: "perceptual," "objective, legislative background," and "researcher subjective." As will be recalled, perceptual indicators are those utilized as questions in the questionnaire. "Objective, legislative background" indicators are those gleaned from public documents and other printed sources. "Researcher subjective" indicators are subjective judgments made by the researcher concerning the degree of change, newness and specificity an issue is thought to entail. By way of summary, Table 3.7 lists the various indicators and how they were operationalized. The precise classification of each of the sampled votes on each of the objective and subjective dimensions is contained in Appendix C.

The correlations of issue characteristics involved six separate comparisons: (1) intercorrelations of perceptual indicators, (2) intercorrelations of objective indicators (3) intercorrelations of subjective indicators, (4) correlations of perceptual and subjective indicators, (5) correlations of subjective and objective indicators, and (6) correlations of perceptual and objective characteristics.

If the third proposition is valid, there should be strong, positive correlations among the indicators, signifying a high degree of symmetry along the lines of a hot/low profile continuum. In other words, the presumed hot values of all indicators should be highly intercorrelated and the presumed low profile values of all indicators should be highly intercorrelated. For example, complexity should correlate highly with technicality, no mail, and non-major status, while non-complexity should be associated with non-technicality, mail, and major status. A vote that passes by a slim margin should be related to a close committee vote, a minority report, mention in CQ, disunity in the House Democratic

Table 3.7

Issue Characteristics and Their Operationalization<sup>a</sup>

<u>Characteristic</u> (Perceptual Dimensions)	<u>Operationalization</u>	
Complexity	Yes	(LP) <sup>b</sup>
	No	(H) <sup>c</sup>
Technicality	Yes	(LP)
	No	(H)
Conflict	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Major Status	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Salience	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Aware	Yes	{H}
	No	(LP)
Mail	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Renomination	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Reelection	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Routine	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Feeling	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Tough	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
Thought	Yes	(H)
	No	(LP)
(Objective Dimensions)		
Type of Rule <sup>d</sup>	Open	(LP)
	Modified open	(LP)
	Closed	(H)
Margin of Rule Adoption	Below Average	(H)
	Above Average	(LP)

Table 3.7--Continued

<b>Margin of Final Passage</b>	Defeated (0-49% of the Vote) (H) Close (50% to 68% of the Vote (H) Comfortable (69%+ of the Vote (LP)
<b>Margin of Committee Passage</b>	Below Average (H) Above Average (LP)
<b>Presence of a Minority Report</b>	Yes (H) No (LP)
<b>Mention in CQ Box Score</b>	Yes (H) No (LP)
<b>Mention as CQ Story</b>	Yes (H) No (LP)
<b>Mention in Washington Post Box Score</b>	Yes (H) No (LP)
<b>Story in Washington Post</b>	Yes (H) No (LP)
<b>Role of Congress</b>	Initiation (H) Modification (H) Ratification (LP)
<b>Time of Policy Coverage</b>	Below Average (LP) Above Average (H)
<b>Democratic Party Unity</b>	Below Average (H) Above Average (LP)
<b>Republican Party Unity</b>	Below Average (H) Above Average (LP)
<b>Index of Likeness</b>	Below Average (H) Above Average (LP)
<b>Amendment Over Committee Objection</b>	No (LP) Yes (H)
<b>Democratic Policy Committee Endorsements</b>	No (LP) Yes (H)
<b>Republican Policy Committee Endorsements</b>	No (LP) Yes (H)
<b>Mention as Major Issue in the Polls</b>	No (LP) Yes (H)
<b>Amount of Money Involved</b>	Below Average (LP) Above Average (H)
<b>Presidential Involvement</b>	No (LP) Yes (H)

Table 3.7--Continued

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## (Researcher/Subjective Dimensions)

Newness	Yes No	(H) (LP)
Specificity	Yes No	(LP) (H)
Change	Yes No	(H) (LP)

<sup>a</sup>Refer to Table 2. (p. ) for elaboration concerning indications of issue characteristics

<sup>b</sup>LP = Presumed low profile characteristic

<sup>c</sup>H = Presumed not characteristic

<sup>d</sup>Closed = no amendments allowed

Modified open = only committee member can offer amendments or only entire sections, no provisions can be substituted.

Open = no restrictions on source or object of amendment

party, and a large policy change. A vote that passes by a comfortable margin should be related to a wide margin in the committee, no minority report, no mention in CQ, and a relatively high degree of cohesion among House Democrats.

The resulting correlations do not provide support for the third proposition. The intercorrelations among all issue characteristics and the procedures through which they were computed are presented in Appendix D.

These results detract from proposition 3 in two ways.

First, only a fraction of the correlations are significant. Only nineteen percent of all the correlations are of moderate (.30) strength or above. Table 3.8 presents the significant intercorrelations among perceptual characteristics. Table 3.9 presents the significant intercorrelations among objective characteristics. The significant correlations between objective and subjective characteristics are displayed in Table 3.10, while Table 3.11 exhibits correlations between perceptual and objective issue characteristics. Only twenty-six percent of the intercorrelations among perceptual indicators are significant. Thirty-seven percent of the intercorrelations among objective indicators are significant. Twenty-one percent of the correlations between objective and subjective indicators are significant, while only six percent of the correlations between perceptual and objective indicators are meaningful. There are no significant intercorrelations among subjective indicators nor any significant correlations between perceptual and subjective indicators. These scant findings do not indicate a high level of multicollinearity among various indicators of issue characteristics. Issue characteristics are only infrequently associated. Members' perceptions of one characteristic are unrelated to their perceptions of other characteristics.

Table 3.8

**Significant Intercorrelations Among Perceptual Characteristics****Confirming Proposition 3****Strong Positive Correlations (.50+):**

Complex and Technical  
Salience and Reelection  
Renomination and Reelection

**Moderate Correlations (.30 to .49):**

Major Status and Conflict  
Tough and Conflict  
Salience and Major  
Reelection and Salience  
Renomination and Aware  
Mail and Aware  
Reelection and Aware  
Thought and Aware  
Renomination and Mail  
Reelection and Mail  
Thought and Mail  
Reelection and Renomination  
Thought and Renomination  
Thought and Reelection  
Thought and Tough

**Weak Correlations Between Hot and Low Profile Characteristics****Disconfirming Proposition 3****Strong Negative Correlations (-.50+):**

Routine and Complex  
Routine and Technical

**Moderate Correlations (-.3. to .49):**

Thought and Complex  
Thought and Routine

**Low Correlations Among Hot Characteristics**

Major and Tough  
Mail and Major  
Tough and Salience

Table 3.9

**Significant Intercorrelations Among  
Objective Characteristics**

**Confirming Proposition 3**

**Strong Positive Correlations (.50+):**

- Rule and Rule Margin
- Democratic Unity and Margin of Passage
- Committee Vote and Margin of Passage
- CQ Story and Margin of Passage
- Washington Post Story and Margin of Passage
- Committee Vote and Index of Likeness
- Washington Post Story and CQ Story
- Washington Post Box Score and Money
- CQ Box Score and Democratic Policy Endorsements
- Rule and Republican Policy Endorsements
- Democratic Policy and Republican Policy Endorsements
- Washington Post Story and Washington Post Box Score

**Disconfirming Proposition 3**

**Strong Negative Correlations (-.50+):**

- Rule and Republican Unity
- Rule and Time Frame
- CQ Box Score and Margin of Passage
- Amendment over Committee and Republican Unity
- Rule and Presidential Involvement
- Margin of Passage and Presidential Involvement

**Moderate Negative Correlations (-.30 to .49):**

- CQ Story and Rule
- Washington Post Story and Rule
- CQ Box Score and Index of Likeness
- Margin of Passage and Money
- Index of Likeness and Money
- Committee Vote and Money
- Democratic Unity and Presidential Involvement
- Amendment over Committee and Presidential Involvement
- Polls and Presidential Involvement

- Large Number of Small Correlations
- Thirty low, Negative Correlations
- Positive Relationship Between Time frame and Rule Margin

Table 3.9--Continued

Confirming Proposition 3

Moderate Correlations (.30 to .49):

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <u>Margin of Passage and Rule</u>               | <u>CQ Story and Democratic Policy</u>          |
| <u>Republican Unity and Rule Margin</u>         | <u>Endorsement</u>                             |
| <u>Committee Vote and Rule Margin</u>           | <u>Washington Post Box Score and</u>           |
| <u>Washington Post Box Score and</u>            | <u>Democratic Policy Endorsement</u>           |
| <u>Rule Margin</u>                              | <u>Rule Margin and Republican Policy</u>       |
| <u>Index of Likeness and Margin of</u>          | <u>Endorsement</u>                             |
| <u>Passage</u>                                  | <u>Minority Report and Republican Party</u>    |
| <u>Index of Likeness and Democratic</u>         | <u>Endorsement</u>                             |
| <u>Unity</u>                                    | <u>Rule and Mention in Polls</u>               |
| <u>Committee Vote and Democratic Unity</u>      | <u>Index of Likeness and Mention in Polls</u>  |
| <u>CQ Story and Committee Vote</u>              | <u>Minority Report and Mention in Polls</u>    |
| <u>CQ Story and Minority Report</u>             | <u>Presidential Involvement and Money</u>      |
| <u>Washington Post Story and Minority</u>       | <u>Democratic Policy Endorsement and Money</u> |
| <u>Report</u>                                   | <u>Republican Policy Endorsement and Money</u> |
| <u>CQ Box Score and Washington Post Box</u>     | <u>Polls and Democratic Policy Endorsement</u> |
| <u>Score</u>                                    | <u>Washington Post Story and Democratic</u>    |
| <u>Washington Post Story and CQ Box Score</u>   | <u>Policy Endorsement</u>                      |
| <u>Time Frame and CQ Box Score</u>              |  |
| <u>Washington Post Box Score and CQ Story</u>   |  |
| <u>Minority Report and Money</u>                |  |
| <u>CQ Story and Money</u>                       |  |
| <u>Republican Unity and Presidential</u>        |  |
| <u>Involvement</u>                              |  |
| <u>Washington Post Box Score and Presiden-</u>  |  |
| <u>tial Involvement</u>                         |  |
| <u>Time Frame and Presidential Involvement</u>  |  |
| <u>Rule and Steering and Policy Endorsement</u> |  |
| <u>Committee Vote - Democratic Policy</u>       |  |
| <u>Endorsements</u>                             |  |
| <u>Minority Report and Steering</u>             |  |
| <u>and Policy Endorsements</u>                  |  |

Table 3.10

**Significant Correlations Between Objective and Subjective Issue Characteristics****Confirming Proposition 3****Strong Positive Correlations (.50+):**

**Rule and Specificity  
Change and Washington Post Story**

**Moderate Positive Correlations  
(.30 to .49):**

**Democratic Policy Endorsement  
and Newness**

**Disconfirming Proposition 3****Moderate Negative Correlations  
(-.30 to -.49):**

**Margin of Passage and Newness  
Democratic Unity and Newness  
CQ Box Score and Specificity  
Democratic Policy Endorsement  
and Specificity  
Republican Policy Endorsement  
and Specificity  
CQ Story and Change  
Washington Post Story and Change  
Democratic Policy Endorsement  
and Change**

Table 3.11

**Significant Correlations between Perceptual and  
Objective Issue Characteristics**

**Confirming Proposition 3**

**Strong Positive Correlations (.50+):**

Conflict and Margin of Passage  
 Mail and Margin of Passage  
 Tough and Margin of Passage

**Moderate Positive Correlations (.30  
 to .49)**

Salience and Rule  
 Reelection and Rule  
 Aware and Margin of Passage  
 Reelection and Margin of Passage  
 Feeling and Margin of Passage  
 Tough and Democratic Unity  
 Major and Minority Report  
Conflict and Washington Post  
 Box Score  
Conflict and Washington Post Story  
 Major and Money  
 Major and Presidential Involvement  
 Major and Democratic Policy Endorsement  
 Mail and Rule

**Disconfirming Proposition 3**

**Many Low Correlations**

**Negative Correlations between Objective  
 Indicators and a) Complexity,  
 b) Technicality, and c) Routineness**

Objective characteristics do not neatly factor together. Perceptions are not strongly related to objective and subjective characteristics.

Second, the significant correlations yield contradictory evidence.

Tables 3.8 through 3.11 show that although there are many findings that confirm proposition 3, many of the significant findings are disconfirming in that they show relationships between presumably hot and low profile categories.

To conclude the discussion of proposition 3, no definite synoptic, issue characteristics differential was discovered. Perceptual, objective, and subjective indicators do not neatly clump together in arrays of hot and low-grade dimensions. Many of the relationships are configured in the direction predicted by proposition 3, but many are not. This argues that, although there are obviously some relationships among some indicators, most indicators should be considered separately. Thus, the third proposition is rejected. Yet, this does not preclude testing for a conditional effect among member decision behavior. Following in the footsteps of Froman and Ripley, in our subsequent searches for variation in cognitive map, each issue characteristic "for analytical purposes will be considered . . . in isolation."<sup>16</sup> But also like Froman and Ripley, an effort will be made at the conclusion of this work to specify the interrelationships among the various factors.

#### D. Summary and Conclusion

Each year, members of Congress face at least 750 roll call votes on the floor of the U.S. House. What this chapter conclusively demonstrates is that members neither lump all of these issues together by viewing each in the same fashion nor consider each vote a separate,

discrete, unique occurrence. Instead, they develop categorizations and classificatory schemes with which they differentiate among various broad types of legislation. In other words, they identify different decision settings. Some votes are controversial; others are non-conflictual. Some votes are tough; others are simple. Some votes are emotional, visible, and atypical; others are non-emotional, non-visible, and typical. Some votes involve intense political pressure; others are devoid of pressure. There are routine votes, recurring votes, monumental and watershed votes, and votes of conscience.

Students of legislative behavior have long hinted at the fact that legislators may very well view different kinds of legislation differently, but, for the most part, these differences have been linked to differences in the formal legislative backgrounds of bills and are usually captured by analysts with parliamentary distinctions such as private bill, unanimous consent agreement, public bill, revenue bill, etc. However, recent authors, such as McFarland who differentiates between critical and routine issues,<sup>17</sup> call attention to distinctions among pieces of legislation in terms of the issue characteristics with which votes are perceived and defined.

What this chapter shows is that members themselves differentiate among votes with general conceptions, or what have been referred to as nomothetic concepts. This has been demonstrated by both responses to a general question asking members to describe the kind of issue at hand and in their differentiation of votes on the basis of various, specific perceptual dimensions. Although not all members were in agreement concerning the specific characteristics of each vote, most defined the issue similarly. This chapter has also shown, however, that a member's background,

experience in the legislature and with the bill, and district political situation may color and affect his perception of issues. But, in most cases, issue definition is independent of such intervening variables.

Contrary to the expectations of many conditional authors, data displayed here do not show a high degree of interrelationship among issue characteristics. Indicators do not linearly clump together in neat clusters of issue contexts as many authors have presumed. Evidently, members' perceptions of one dimension are unrelated to their perceptions of others. Although there is some relationship among characteristics in terms of a hot/low profile continuum, there are numerous instances where a relationship does not appear or where there is association in the direction opposite our expectations. As such, subsequent analysis will treat each indicator as a separate factor.

The task at hand, then, is to determine if the variations in issue definition noted here in the test of ancillary hypotheses are meaningfully associated with patterned differences in members' cognitive map. In essence, what follows is the use of issue characteristics as independent variables. The fact that different members will often perceive issues differently provides justification for examining the relationships between perceptual characteristics and decision-making behavior. By correlating perceptual characteristics with decision-making behavior, one is actually searching for decision-making patterns on the basis of the member's definition of the kind of issues at hand.

Although beyond the scope of this investigation, it is strongly felt here that attention also should be placed on the importance of employing and understanding issue dimensions as dependent variables. Although we tangentially explored for correlates and mediating factors of

issue definition, much needs to be done along these lines so that students of Congress will have a better understanding of how members come to classify legislation.

Finally, our examination of intercorrelations among indicators has afforded a unique opportunity, albeit a limited one, for utilizing congressional documents and publications. Such resources appear pregnant with possibilities for the congressional researcher.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

Actors both external and internal to the legislature attempt to influence congressional decision-making. Congressional party leaders, interest groups, the President, bureaucrats, staff members, and constituents, as well as other members, make deliberate attempts to shape congressional outcomes.<sup>1</sup> In an effort to study lobbying, political scientists have focused on communications within the Congress. They have examined who Congressmen hear from or pay attention to as they attempt to reach a decision on a floor vote. Their research has supported two major conclusions. First, for most votes, Congressmen hear from few sources to which they actually pay attention. As Dexter has emphasized, "A Congressman hears most often from those who agree with him."<sup>2</sup> Second, in Kingdon's words, ". . . fellow Congressmen appear to be the most important influence on voting decision, followed by constituency."<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the conditional nature of these conclusions. First, there will be a brief introduction that will distinguish between communications and other aspects of member decision-making. This will be followed by a series of general statements, supported by this research, concerning congressional communications. Finally, in an effort to test the conditional theory, members' communications will be examined both on a vote-by-vote basis and according to variations in issue characteristics.

Two propositions will be tested in this chapter. The first, proposition 4, is: The volume (number) of communications a member receives varies according to the kind of issue at hand. Hot political issues are related to a high volume of communications, while low profile decisions involve low volume communications. The second, proposition 5, is: the actors from whom a member hears vary according to the kind of decision at hand. Low profile issues generate input from very narrow sources, usually only those affected by the decision. Hot issues involve broader input from many different actors. Both propositions are reasonable deductions from the contextual approach to legislative decision-making.

#### A. Congressional Communications: The Member's Force Field

To understand congressional communications, political scientists have used Kingdon's concept of "field of forces," Lowi's notion of "policy arenas," and Ripley and Franklin's "policy relationships." All of these focus on who members hear from or turn to in the course of making up their minds on floor votes.

The force field or policy arena of a member refers to incoming communications received by the member from the political environment. As a concept, force field focuses on all the meaningful inputs a member considers on a policy question.

A member's force field connotes an aspect of a member's decision process that is different from information sources, decision rules, and role. As a measure of input, force field is the component of a member's cognitive map that gives the broadest possible picture of a Congressman's policy relationships. It refers to all those people that the member feels

made an attempt to influence him and to whom he paid attention when deciding. It includes all the factors relevant to the member's decision. Also, force field is a good indication of lobbying activity in Congress. In comparison, information sources and decision rules, as components of cognitive map, pertain to the member's selective use of other actors. Information sources are those actors that members rely on for learning the facts of a bill. Determinants are those actors that a member relies on as a decision aid or shortcut. Role is the member's general conception of how a particular decision relates to the member's overall perspective on representation. Table 4.1 summarizes the differences between force field and these other components of cognitive map.

#### General Observations

On the basis of this research, two general conclusions can be drawn with regard to the communications that members receive concerning legislative matters.

First, the average volume of communications that a member can recall paying attention to on given votes is quite low. For the 361 decisions studied here, the average was three contacts per vote. Table 4.2 is a frequency distribution of the volume of communications. As noted there, for eight percent of the decisions studied, members did not receive any input. For only a small proportion of decisions did members recall more than six communications.

Second, staff, constituents and other members are the actors most frequently mentioned by members as providing noteworthy input to congressional decision-making. Provided in Table 4.3 are the percentage

Table 4.1

**Four Components of the Member's Cognitive Map**

<u>Component</u>	<u>Decision-Making Aspect</u>
Force Field/Policy Arena	Communications Input--Attempts to influence to which member pays attention in making a decision
Information Sources	Actors/Sources from which member learns about the factual aspect of a bill
Determinants	Actors/Decision Rules on which members rely when making a decision
Role	Broad Philosophical Perspective with which members observe the representational aspects of a bill

Table 4.2

Frequency Distribution of Volume of Communications: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Various Numbers of Communications

<u>Number of Communications</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	8%
1	15
2	17
3	19
4	14
5	15
6	8
7	1
8	1
9	1

Table 4.3

Percentage of the Interviews in which Each Actor was Mentioned by  
 Members in Response to the Question "Who Did You Hear  
 From, Pay Attention to, Consider Concerning  
 This Decision?"

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Responses</u>
Committee Chairman	20%
Ranking Minority	3
Committee Members	36
State Delegation	31
Party Leader	13
Other Congressmen	36
Committee Staff	5
Personal Staff	42
Individual Constituents	37
Inspired Mail	8
Group Constituents	26
Private Groups	22
Public Interest Groups	5
Public Groups	3
Bureaucrats	3
White House	14
Media	14
N = 361	

of times each of the major potential communicators was listed by members as they responded to the question, "Who did you hear from, pay attention to, in making this decision?" It can be seen there that, contrary to Kingdon, a member's personal staff was the most frequent source of input. Staff was followed by individual constituents (as distinguished from organized interest groups in the district and inspired mail) and then by other Congressmen, both those on the committee and those from the ranks of the general membership.

The following are general findings concerning each potential source of decision input.

#### Committee Chairman

Although many members acknowledged that the chairman of the committee from which legislation originated does exercise enormous influence over a bill, for only twenty percent of the decisions studied did members cite the chairman as a relevant input. This rather low level of input may reflect increasing subcommittee dominance. Although the question was not asked, conversations with members revealed that they often paid more attention to the chairman of the parent subcommittee than the chairman of the full committee.

#### Ranking Minority

The position of ranking minority member on a congressional panel has assumed great importance in recent years. The last few Congresses have witnessed much wrangling in the ranks of the Republican party concerning how the ranking minority member should be selected. Yet, those interviewed in this study mentioned the ranking minority only three percent of the time.

Committee Members

The rank and file members of the parent committee were mentioned as an input thirty-six percent of the time.

Congressmen noted that their contacts with those on the committee are both antecedent from and proximate to the actual vote, as committee members attempt to influence the floor member both in advance of the vote and on the floor immediately prior to the vote.

In Advance of the vote, non-committee members hear from committee members through three means. First, members hear from those on committee via a dear colleague letter. Through these communications, committee members attempt to lobby others concerning a piece of legislation just completed or still being processed in committee. Second, the committee report, forwarded to all members prior to the time of the vote, lists the positions of committee members. This offers the member the opportunity to learn the stand of committee members. But, as one member noted, "Usually, you'll already know. You'll hear about a committee member's position either through a dear colleague or informal talk." Third, committee members make contact through informal, ad hoc groups. Numerous members noted that they hear from committee members at weekly or biweekly meetings of their class (i.e., members of the same party elected to Congress the same year), state delegation, or ideological clique (e.g., Society of Statesmen).

Committee members are heard from at times more proximate to the vote through either debate or an institutionalized advocacy/adversary system at the doors leading to the House floor. As several members contended, if a member is present during debate, he will hear from committee members, because they normally dominate debate. If he is not present for

debate but comes to the floor to cast a vote when the bells beckon, he will encounter committee members at the doors. Committee members pro and con are usually present at the doors and in the cloak rooms to lobby members. Several members described this setting in detail. One noted that "On each side of the hallway, committee proponents and opponents will line up." For this reason alone, he noted, "Predictably you will hear from those on committee."

Two versions of the nature of these proximate contacts at the door were presented by interviewees.

One version describes the committee members as low-key advocates. As one member noted, "They don't tell you how to vote. They just discuss." As another added, "They talk to you in a general way. They don't advise." A freshman Republican's recollections serve to illustrate. "When you come in, committee members, sponsors, and one of the whips will be at the door to tell you the arguments. They give you both sides."

The second version depicts a system of intense pressure devoid of arguments. "You come in and these guys give a sign of either thumbs up or down. They kind of rely on the trust and confidence members have in them."

#### State Delegation

Recently, political scientists have examined the role of state delegations in congressional decision-making.<sup>4</sup> They have discovered that state delegations are a major influence. The interviews here also found state delegations to be important. For thirty-one percent of the decisions studied, state delegation members made an input.

In line with studies of state delegations, these interviews revealed an enormous variety of practices through which delegation members

communicate. For some of the larger delegations, a formal meeting is held and presided over by the most senior member, commonly referred to as "the dean." The dean establishes an agenda, and various matters of interest to the delegation are brought up. Other delegations enjoy a more informal conclave—perhaps over lunch in the House dining room. Smaller, two or three member delegations are often involved in steady communications. As a member of a two-man delegation noted, "We talk about everything. If we can, we walk over to the floor together and I think we really shape each other's decisions."

#### Party Leaders

In some cases, those interviewed had difficulty determining who specifically is a party leader. One member stated that "John Moss and Mo Udall are leaders in our party." However, for our purposes, a party leader is thought to be a member in the formal, official party hierarchy.

For only thirteen percent of the decisions studied here did members mention that party leaders provided an input to which they paid notice. This is extremely low and, as will be argued subsequently, really does not give an accurate indication of the extent of party influence in Congress. Although many members acknowledged that they heard from party whips who are stationed at the House doors along with committee members to provide the party's position on a vote, few members define this as input to their decision. When leaders were mentioned, those who were most commonly mentioned were the Speaker, zone whip, and, for Republicans, the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee. Contacts occurred through both face to face and written communications.

### Other Members

Thirty-six percent of the time, members mentioned that Congressmen other than those on committee, in the leadership structure, or in the state delegation made an input to them.

The occasions for member communications and interactions are lunch, dear colleague letters, walks to the floor, class meeting, debate, cloakroom and floor conversations, and discussions with others with whom the member serves on committee.

The input of members to other members is a natural occurrence within the Congress. As one member noted, "We know each other well enough that we know where a colleague's coming from." Or, as another argued, "We talk informally so often that it's hard not to pay attention to another member."

There are two occasions when other members are likely to be considered an input to decision-making. The first occurs when certain members, although not on a committee, are considered to have expertise on an issue ("On technology I turn to Lloyd, on Energy I go to Emery and on something like Saccharin I talk to several of the members who are doctors"). The second involves the politics of pork ("Pork will put the pressure on. You'll hear from them all").

### Committee Staff

Committee staff was mentioned on only five percent of the decisions. Several members mentioned that committee staff was a potential source of input for members, since on each bill committee staff are present for the floor vote to answer questions during debate.

One interesting fact concerning the input of committee staff came to light during interviews with members serving on Appropriations, Ways and Means, Rules, and Budget committees. Several members on these committees noted that staffs on these committees were influential in their decisions on a spate of floor votes not necessarily related to committee jurisdiction.

#### Personal Staff

As the largest single input (forty-two percent mention), personal staff seemed pervasive in congressional decision-making.

For floor votes, the staff position most often referenced was the legislative assistant or "LA."

There seemed to be two major ways in which staff provides an input for decision-making.

First, for a few, staff is a definite lobbying force. Illustrating this were comments to the effect "I was lobbied hard on this by my staff" and "The staff gets their say like anyone else at the legislative meeting. They are frequently advocates."

Second, and what seems to be the most prevalent approach, staff acts as an information conduit for the member. Examples of this were the statements "I don't debate with my staff," "My staff's job is not to argue with me but for me," "Staff boils it down for me and tries to give me both sides," and "Staff's job is to tell me what people are saying."

Which staff style is utilized seems to depend on the individual member's conception of the role of staff in his decision process.

### Constituents

Individual constituents, as opposed to constituent groups and inspired mail from the constituency, were mentioned thirty-seven percent of the time.

The most frequently mentioned means of citizen input were the mail, calls, personal visits, and informal conversations. Also mentioned as sources of citizen input to decision-making were a) polls through which the member solicits communications from the district and b) empathy the member has for district interests and issue positions. With regard to the latter, members noted that because of their contacts with their constituents, they can generally predict what people want and they take this into consideration. "When you talk to people on weekends all year, you can tell what they are for or against. You know them and it impacts on you."

Members made seven points concerning general constituency input. First, few issues really activate constituents. In the words of one Congressman, "Most legislation is non-material for the average citizen. I hear very little from them." Members noted that most often they hear from segments of the electorate--those with a special interest in a given piece of legislation. Second, the more the member is committed to a vote and the more his position is known, the less he will hear from constituents. Third, even when citizen contacts and mail are low, members still pay attention. As one member noted, "Even when there are a few letters, if it's not organized I'll pay attention." Fourth, mail is usually processed by personal staff. The usual procedure is for staff to open and handle it and forward representative samplings to the member. Fifth, when ordinary citizen contacts are high, in the words of a member, "Real

pressure is on." Sixth, most of the contact members have with constituents concerning legislation is only indirectly related to specific votes. For example, as one member stated, "The Pay Raise and Ethics votes are referenced only in passing as constituents talk about corruption in government, excessive benefits, and Wayne Hays. Likewise those who made an input on Reorganization Authority and the Ethics vote linked it to the broader question of red tape in government." Finally, not hearing from constituents is disconcerting for many members. Several noted that they try to stimulate constituent contacts. One confessed that "I don't hear much and I'm troubled. All of us in this office feel that something should be done on this."

#### Inspired Communications

Jewell and Patterson have noted the high volume of inspired mail received by members. These kinds of communications are instigated by organized interests and are usually in the form of a post card.<sup>5</sup> In only eight percent of the decisions studied here did members acknowledge paying attention to or turning to such communications.<sup>6</sup>

The reason why so few mentioned inspired mail is the general aversion one finds in Congress to this form of political communication. Members offered that they made an effort to guess the source of communications. In the words of a freshman Democrat, "I must pay attention to who is sending this stuff." For some it seems easy. "I can tell if it's generated," one member stated. Another allowed, however, that "It's hard to do. I find it difficult to tell letter-writing campaigns from letters. Not all organized campaigns are post cards." When they do

detect an organized effort, members maintained they ignore it. A Republican stated, "That junk from the John Birch Society and other issue-oriented stuff is generally dismissed."

Inspired mail presents an interesting example of what Keefe and Ogul refer to as an indirect strategy.<sup>7</sup> On the Common Situs Picketing Bill, construction companies that opposed it attempted to generate pressure on members by stimulating letter-writing campaigns in the district.

#### Group Constituents

In twenty-six percent of the cases covered, members acknowledged an input from an organized interest in the constituency. Members said that they heard from the Chamber of Commerce on Strip Mining, from environmentalists on Tuna/Porpoise, from producers of chrome products on Rhodesian Chrome, and from bill collectors in their district on Debt Collection Practices. Several alluded to a general "corporate" mail that they receive from the district.

Many members noted that a lot of lobbying is done by municipal officers who serve in communities affected by a vote. A good example is the School Lunch vote. As one member noted, "We all heard from the school lunch people in our districts." Several members offered that groups in the district are often contacted on the member's initiative. "We'll often call interest groups and public officials to find out what they want and how they feel they will be impacted."

#### Private Interest Groups

Private, national interest groups were mentioned as having made an input to which the member actually paid attention on twenty-two percent of the decisions studied.

Most of the contacts involved issue specific groups; home builders on HUD, NOW and AMA on the Hyde Amendment, UAW and auto dealers on Clean Air, steel companies on Rhodesian Chrome, tuna men on the Marine Mammal Protection Bill, pharmaceutical houses on Saccharin, and AFL-CIO on Hatch and Common Situs.

Members made three points concerning national interest groups. First, national interests usually make only subtle contact. As one member emphasized, "Interest groups don't make a strong push." Second, groups target for pressure those members thought to be uncommitted or wavering. According to one member, "You don't get pressure if they know where you stand. If you're a swing vote, they'll zero in on you." Finally, members noted that an often used strategy by national interest groups is to approach Congressmen through groups in the constituency. In this vein, Congressmen noted that they were approached by tuna producers in their district with regard to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, by district auto dealers on the Clean Air Act, and by groups of workers on Common Situs Picketing. In each of these instances, those interviewed felt that these locally initiated contacts were the result of a concerted national effort. The wisdom of doing this seems verified by one member's statement that "I don't pay attention to any of these interest groups unless they are in my district."

#### Public Interest Groups

Much has been made of the emergence of public interest groups, such as the Ralph Nader organization and Common Cause, as a formidable political force. Surprisingly, for only five percent of the cases did

members recollect an input from these kinds of groups. When a public interest group was mentioned, it was usually a Common Cause chapter in the district.

#### Public Group

Both Suzanne Farkas's The Urban Lobbyists<sup>8</sup> and Haider's When Governments Come to Washington<sup>9</sup> document the increased lobbying activity of public sector lobbyists--i.e., national representatives of subnational governments and organizations of public employees and local government officials. Several such contacts were mentioned in this study. Several mentioned being approached by public employee and postal unions on the Hatch Act. Others recalled communications from city and county organizations of mayors and managers with regard to the HUD and Countercyclical votes. Generally, contact from such groups was minimal. Only three percent of those interviewed recalled a public group input on the examined decision.

#### Bureaucrats

Despite the growth of legislative liaison activities of federal agencies, few members mentioned bureaucratic input.<sup>10</sup> On only three percent of the decisions was the input of bureaucrats recalled. When bureaucrats were mentioned, it was frequently in connection with a visible political appointee whose testimony during committee hearings was recalled. Examples of this are former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on the Nuclear Navy and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger on the new Department of Energy. Sometimes, however, an agency position was mentioned, as with the Army Corp of Engineers on the Water Projects vote and HEW on the School Lunch Bill.

White House

The President and his White House apparatus was judged to be an input on only fourteen percent of the votes that were studied. Most often, the input was through White House legislative liaison staff. Not infrequently, however, members did acknowledge that the President's position was considered, because they ". . . paid attention to major aspects of his program." For example, a member noted that he related President Carter's human rights position to the Rhodesian Chrome vote. Others related the energy and tax votes to the Carter platform.

The relatively infrequent mention of the President as a decision input runs counter to past scholarly assessments that there is increasing presidential hegemony on Capitol Hill.<sup>11</sup> Yet several members, including a member of the majority party leadership, argued that the President was still getting organized and for that reason the role of the White House in congressional decision-making is probably underestimated by data collected at the outset of a new administration.

Media

Recently, media influence on the affairs of government has been a much discussed topic.<sup>12</sup> In fourteen percent of the interviews, members mentioned the media as a force to which they paid attention. When discussing the media, Congressmen acknowledged that contact occurs primarily as the result of members "following issues in the press or on TV."

Miscellaneous Communications/Inputs

In addition to the traditional list of actor influences, this study uncovered a number of miscellaneous sources of input. They are:

The General Accounting Office, Library of Congress, Congressional Budget Office, family and friends, The Brookings Institution, the Coalition of Industrial/Northeastern States, Supreme Court rulings, and a member's past experience or own position the last time the legislation was handled by Congress. Although none of these miscellaneous inputs were mentioned more than one percent of the time, they do illustrate the plethora of forces to which a member pays attention when reaching a decision.

#### Types of Communications

To conclude this section on general observations, interviews revealed two ways in which communications can be differentiated. First, a distinction can be made on the basis of when the input was received. There are inputs proximate to the time of the vote, such as the partisan members who man the doorways, and inputs more antecedent to the decision, such as constituency mail, staff briefing, and correspondence from interest groups. Second, communications vary according to whether or not there is an attempt to exert pressure. Some inputs involve active attempts to sway and influence. Examples are lobbying activities by those competing for a member's attention, such as other members, the President, constituents, and interest groups. Other inputs do not involve intense pressure. Rather, they are best thought of as a member's self referents for decision-making. Examples are perceptions of constituency interests, opinions obtained through member sponsored polls, inquiries a member makes to a trusted colleague, staff work on an issue, and communications received from congressional agencies such as Library of Congress, Congressional Budget Office, and General Accounting Office.

B. PROPOSITION 4: The Volume (Number) of Communications a Member Receives Varies According to the Kind of Issue at Hand

The Lowi scheme and other contextual approaches assume that congressional inputs are better described with conditional propositions than with individual generalizations. With regard to the volume of communications a member receives, it is inferred that more actors are heard from on politically hot issues than on those of a low profile variety. For example, for Lowi, distributive issues constitute a very narrow policy arena in which only those affected communicate.<sup>12</sup> For Cobb and Elder,<sup>13</sup> and for Price,<sup>14</sup> hot issues will involve "expanded publics" and "broader" inputs.

A test of this proposition is based on the mean number of communications for all decisions in this study (i.e., an average of three inputs for each decision). For each vote and for each value of the perceptual, objective, and researcher/subjective indicators, the percentage of respondents with contacts above the mean was computed. Both tests support the fourth proposition.

Volume by Vote

Table 4.4 contains the percentage of communications above the mean for each of the sampled thirty-one votes. It shows that the volume of communications does vary by vote. Many of the hot issues--Ethics, Tax, Common Situs, Clean Air, Hatch Act, Saccharin, Water Projects, and Pay Raise--involve at least sixty percent above mean contacts. For six low key votes--Supplemental Housing, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Smog Removal, School Lunch--all contacts are below the mean. For another five--NASA, Government Reorganization, Debt Collection, Marine Mammal, and Foreign Aid--the

Table 4.4

## Distribution of the Volume of Communications by Vote

Ethics	79%
Nuclear Navy	46
Tax	70
Supplemental Housing	0
Rhodesian Chrome	55
NASA	20
FAA	0
Common Situs	62
Government Reorganization	23
House Assassination	39
Romanian Earthquake	0
EPA	0
Debt Collection	18
Arab Boycott	50
Strip Mining	31
Energy Department	31
Snow Removal	0
Public Works Conference	33
Countercyclical	39
HUD Authority	58
Marine Mammal	17
Budget I	46
Budget II	50
Foreign Aid	9
Clean Air	73
Hyde	43
Hatch	62
School Lunch	0
Saccharin	64
Water Projects	77
Pay Raise	83

\*Proportion represents percentage of respondents who reported four or more contacts.

percentage of communications volume above the mean is below twenty percent. These votes are perhaps good examples of what one member described as "quiet issues." "You hear from nobody. You usually go to the floor and shoot from the hip."

Thus, the breakdown of the volume of communications by vote does generally support proposition 4. There are several exceptions. Two hot issues--Strip Mining and the Energy Department votes--had only thirty-one percent above the mean input. The highly emotional Hyde Amendment had less than fifty percent above the mean. The low profile, routine HUD Authorization had a surprisingly high fifty-eight percent of the respondents with above mean contacts. Evidently, an intense dispute on HUD concerning the specific provisions of the distribution formula was associated with above average communications. In general, however, hot issues are associated with above average contacts, while low profile votes have relatively empty force fields.

#### Volume by Issue Characteristics

Table 4.5 contains the breakdown of volume of communications by issue characteristics. It supports two conclusions.

First, the volume of communications a member receives markedly varies according to issue characteristics. Seventy-four percent of the distributions in Table 4.5 involve variations of nine percent or more among issue characteristics' values (i.e., there is at least a nine percentage variation in the percent of members with above average contacts on, for example, votes defined as "complex" in contrast with those defined as "non-complex").

**Table 4.5**  
**Volume of Communications by Issue Characteristics: the Percentage of Interviews in which  
 Members Reported Communications Above the Mean (i.e., Four or More Contacts)  
 Under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>Perceptual Indicators</u>	<u>Objective Indicators</u>
(Vote defined as involving)	
Complexity (No 37% Yes 55%)	<u>Renomination Effects</u> (No 38% Yes 61%).
Technicallity (No 40% Yes 51%)	<u>Reelection Effects</u> (No 38% Yes 61%).
Conflict (No 25% Yes 59%)	<u>Routineness</u> (Yes 35% No 60%).
Major Status (No 35% Yes 54%)	<u>Strong Feeling</u> (No 39% Yes 45%).
Salience (No 37% Yes 49%)	<u>Toughness</u> (No 41% Yes 70%).
Constituency Awareness (No 29% Yes 58%)	<u>Thought</u> (No 21% Yes 62%).
Heavy Mail (No 36% Yes 80%)	<u>Committee Vote</u> Below the Mean 46% Above the Mean 40%.
	<u>Margin of Rule</u> (Below the Mean 72% Above the Mean 35%).
	<u>Margin of Passage</u> (Defeat 60% Close 45% Comfortable 31%).
	<u>Democratic Party Unity</u> (Below the Mean 48% Above the Mean 37%).
	<u>Republican Party Unity</u> Below the Mean 47% Above the Mean 38%. /
	<u>Index of Likeness</u> Below the Mean 44% Above the Mean 39%.
	<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u> No 43% Yes 40%.

Table 4.5--Continued

<u>Objective Indicators (continued)</u>	<u>Subjective Indicators</u> (vote is judged to involve)
<u>Minority Report</u> (No 34% Yes 50%)	<u>Presidential Involvement</u> (No 8% Yes 44%)
<u>CQ Story</u> (No 15% Yes 48%)	<u>Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement</u> (No 35% Yes 57%)
<u>WP Box Score</u> (No 23% Yes 52%)	<u>Republican Policy Endorsement</u> (No 36% Yes 58%)
<u>Time Frame</u> Below the Mean 40% Above the Mean 44%	<u>Mention in Polls</u> No 42% Yes 39%
<u>Role of Congress</u> (Initiator 46% Modifier 36% Ratifier 26%)	<u>Money Below the Mean</u> 26% <u>Above the Mean</u> 50%
<u>CQ Box Score</u> (No 38% Yes 50%)	
<u>WP Story</u> (No 15% Yes 50%)	

\*Proportions represent the percentage of members reporting communications above the mean (i.e., in excess of three communications on a single vote)

- ( ) = Minimum 10% difference between categories
- = 9% variation
- = variation of 20% or more

Second, the variations in the volume of communications generally conform to the expectations of proposition 4. Under most hot conditions, members receive more input while under most low profile conditions they receive less.

There are several findings in Table 4.5 contrary to proposition 4. For instance, members receive more communications on issues that are considered complex and technical than they do on hot issues (i.e., those "non-complex" and "non-technical"). Decisions considered complex and technical have a higher percentage of members with above mean communications than those considered "not complex" and "not technical," indicating that more actors try to influence members on complex and technical decisions than when the opposite is true. Those votes not mentioned in the polls as an important national issue actually have slightly more above average contacts than those mentioned. Also, some distinctions on the basis of issue characteristics fail to produce any meaningful variations in congressional input. For example, none of the subjective indicators reveal a meaningful difference. There are minimal differences when communications volume is arrayed by salience, feeling, party unity, index of difference, amendment over committee objection, committee vote, minority report, and time frame.

Most of the distinctions, however, support qualifications concerning congressional communications in the predicted direction.

With regard to perceptual indicators, a substantially higher proportion of members have above mean volume of communications when the mail is high, when the decision is tough and non-routine and when it involves renomination and reelection effects, conflict, and thought. Less than forty percent have contacts exceeding the mean when there is no conflict,

constituency awareness, mail, renomination and reelection effects, feeling, toughness and thought and when the decision is thought to be non-conflictual, non-major, non-salient, and routine.

With regard to objective indicators, important variations in the volume of inputs that members receive occur according to distinctions made in margin of rule and final passage, coverage in CQ and Washington Post, role of Congress, presidential involvement, party endorsement, and amount of money involved. Specifically, a much higher percentage of members reporting above average contacts is found when: the margin of both a vote's rule and final passage is above average, the vote is covered in both a box score and story item in both CQ and Washington Post, Congress initiates the policy decision, the President is involved, both congressional parties make endorsements, and above average sums of money are at stake. When the opposite characteristics are present--e.g., no presidential involvement, Congress as modifier or ratifier, below average sums of money--the percent with above average contacts is substantially lower.

In sum, Table 4.5 reveals that important qualifications concerning how many communications members receive can be made on the basis of various indicators of issue characteristics. These data, combined with those already discussed in Table 4.4, support the conclusion that the volume of communications a member receives concerning a vote is more precisely described with categorical concepts than with the general proposition that "Congressmen hear from few sources." On hot issues they hear from more and on low profile issues they hear from less. Certain hot values of perceptual and objective indicators of issue characteristics are associated with relatively full force fields. The opposite is true for many low profile values. As a result, proposition 4 can be accepted.

C. PROPOSITION 5: The Actors From Whom a Member Hears Vary According to the Kind of Decision at Hand

Contextual approaches posit that low profile issues involve very narrow policy arenas in which members hear from only those affected by the vote. Hot issues involve input from much broader publics.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, for low profile issues, the expectation is that interest groups and Congressmen on the relevant committee will be the actors most frequently mentioned. In contrast, hot issues should involve party leaders, constituents, and the President.

To test this proposition, the percentage of members mentioning each of the sources of input was arrayed by vote and by issue characteristics. Both exercises corroborate Proposition 5.

1. Input by Vote

Table 4.6 is the breakdown of sources of input by vote. It shows that which actors Congressmen hear from depends on the issue at hand. An actor by actor description illustrates variable patterns of congressional input.

Committee Chairman

The input of the committee chairman to the floor voting member's decision-making process is highly variable. On some issues such as Ethics, Nuclear Navy, and Government Reorganization, more than fifty percent mentioned the chairman. On fourteen votes (Rhodesian Chrome, NASA, EPA, Debt Collection Practices, Arab Boycott, Snow Removal, Countercyclical, Foreign Aid, Tax, Hyde, Hatch, Saccharin, Water Projects, and Pay Raise), the chairman's input was ten percent or less.

Table 4.6

Congressional Communications by Vote: Distribution by Responses to the Question "Who Did You Hear From, Pay Attention To?"

<u>Actor</u>	<u>All Responses</u>	<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Gol'twater</u>	<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>FAA</u>
Committee Chairman	20%	57%	55%	0%	20%	9%	10%	12%
Ranking Minority	3	14	0	10	0	9	0	0
Committee Members	36	7	18	40	20	9	40	38
State Delegation	31	50	36	60	0	18	0	0
Party Leader	13	50	18	20	0	9	0	0
Other Congressmen	36	65	27	30	40	36	20	0
Committee Staff	5	7	0	20	0	0	10	13
Personal Staff	42	43	27	70	0	55	50	13
Individual Constituent	37	50	9	40	20	45	20	0
Inspired Mail	8	7	0	0	0	9	0	0
Group Constituents	26	21	0	20	40	18	0	0
Private Groups	20	0	0	40	20	45	0	0
Public Interest Groups	5	57	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public Groups	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bureaucrats	3	0	36	0	0	17	10	0
White House	14	0	73	50	10	45	0	0
Media	14	0	46	30	0	55	10	0

Table 4.6--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Common Situs</u>	<u>Govt. Reorg.</u>	<u>House Assn.</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>
Committee Chairman	31%	54%	39%	20%	0%	0%	9%	10%	38%
Ranking Minority	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Committee Members	46	8	77	20	20	27	30	10	23
State Delegation	46	15	31	20	20	27	10	0	23
Party Leader	22	8	0	10	0	0	0	0	8
Other Congressmen	70	23	39	0	20	36	40	40	15
Committee Staff	0	8	23	0	0	0	10	10	0
Personal Staff	46	23	46	30	80	64	30	30	38
Individual Constituents	69	23	38	10	0	36	60	60	15
Inspired Mail	69	0	8	10	0	0	0	0	0
Group Constituents	46	8	0	0	0	18	40	40	0
Private Groups	85	0	8	0	0	27	40	46	46
Public Interest Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23
Public Groups	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Bureaucrats	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
White House	8	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
Media	31	39	23	10	0	0	0	0	23

Table 4.6--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Energy Dept.</u>	<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Counter-Cyclical</u>	<u>HUD</u>	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>
Committee Chairman	25%	0%	11%	8%	25%	25%	36%	
Ranking Minority	6	0	0	8	0	8	18	
Committee Members	56	0	11	31	50	67	45	
State Delegation	25	0	44	31	42	0	54	
Party Leader	0	0	11	8	8	0	55	
Other Congressmen	19	18	22	23	33	17	27	
Committee Staff	6	9	22	23	17	0	0	
Personal Staff	44	9	22	85	58	25	82	
Individual Constituents	31	0	33	8	17	42	9	
Inspired Mail	0	0	11	0	0	8	0	
Group Constituents	13	18	44	69	75	8	9	
Private Groups	19	0	0	8	17	58	0	
Public Interest Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Public Groups	0	0	0	15	8	0	0	
Bureaucrats	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	
White House	31	0	11	0	0	0	0	
Media	25	0	22	0	0	0	9	

Table 4.6--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Foreign Aid</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
Committee Chairman	38%	0%	40%	0%	8%	13%	0%	6%
Ranking Minority	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
Committee Members	87	36	67	14	38	38	46	71
State Delegation	37	9	53	21	38	13	36	47
Party Leaders	37	18	0	0	0	0	0	89
Other Congressmen	50	36	40	21	23	0	0	0
Committee Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personal Staff	50	36	53	21	31	25	46	47
Individual Constituents	0	0	34	71	62	0	100	59
Inspired Mail	13	0	7	29	46	0	9	6
Group Constituents	0	9	100	43	31	37	18	53
Private Groups	26	0	53	57	46	0	18	24
Public Interest Groups	13	0	27	0	0	0	0	6
Public Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
Bureaucrats	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0
White House	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	77
Media	13	0	20	14	8	0	27	12

\*Percentages represent the proportion of interviewees on that vote mentioning the actor.

Mention of the chairman usually depends on the visibility of his involvement and his dominance as a competitor. On Ethics, the Navy vote, and the Reorganization Act, he was a major, visible competitor. For example, on Government Reorganization, one member noted that "I followed closely the position of Jack Brooks. He was the President's major adversary on it, and I looked to him to work things out." On those issues on which the chairman is only infrequently mentioned, the chairman was one of many competitors attempting to shape a piece of legislation on the floor. Specifically, with regard to Rhodesian Chrome, Debt Collection Practices, Arab Boycott, Snow Removal, Countercyclical, Foreign Aid, Hyde, Saccharin, Water Projects, and Pay Raise, controversy primarily involved rank and file members on and off committee.

#### Ranking Minority

Although the ranking minority member is generally not frequently mentioned, there are certain votes where he made a sizable input. The bills on which ranking minority members were most mentioned are Ethics and the Budget. On more than half of the sampled votes, no member listed the ranking minority. Many of these votes are generally low profile, but some--such as Clean Air, Hyde Amendment, Water Projects, Pay Raise, Strip Mining--are hot issues.

#### Committee Members

The input of committee members varies greatly, from an eighty-seven percent mention on the second Budget vote to mention by no interviewees on the Snow Removal vote. It was highest on two kinds of issues: those that were hot but somewhat technical (Tax, Common Situs, House Assassinations, Energy Department, Budget, HUD, Clean Air, and Water Projects)

and those that were low grade, esoteric, and obscure (NASA, HUD and Marine Mammal). Votes on which committee members were infrequently mentioned are those that came up quickly in a parliamentary fashion and the committee was not fully mobilized (Nuclear Navy, Goldwater Amendment, Romanian Earthquake, Snow Removal, and Public Works Conference) and those issues that "were around for awhile" (Rhodesian Chrome, Government Re-organization, EPA, Debt Collection Practices, Strip Mining, HUD, Hyde Amendment).

Several members provided an explanation for these patterns. One noted that "Committee members must be paid attention to on technical amendments. After all, they are usually proposed on the floor by members who get shot down in committee." Another noted that "On Marine Mammal Protection, I had to pay attention to McCloskey who's on the committee. He was one of the major contestants." Another noted that when there is an attempt to significantly amend a bill (an occurrence for most major bills), the sponsor of the amendment (usually a member of the committee) will approach the floor member. In the member's words, "On something like the Energy Department bill the sponsor--in this case John Moss--will talk to me."

#### State Delegation

The mention of State Delegation as a decision input ranges from eighty-nine percent on the Pay Raise to no mention on the NASA and FAA votes. The frequency of communications within state delegations was highest on two kinds of bills: some really hot issues (Ethics, Tax, Common Situs, the Budget, Clean Air, and the Pay Raise) and those votes that involved grants and pork barrel projects (Public Works, Counter-cyclical, HUD, and Water Projects). With regard to the hot issues,

members seem to check how the delegation votes. As one member related, "On real issues, I want to see how others in the state voted." For grant and park bills, members communicate to maximize the gains for their state. A member stated, "We talk together to insure a good deal for the state." State delegation was weakest as an input on routine bills (Marine Mammal Protection and authorizations for NASA, FAA, EPA, School Lunch), bills with short parliamentary suspenses (Goldwater Amendment, Snow Removal, Foreign Aid Amendment), and old bills (Rhodesian Chrome, Government Reorganization, Debt Collection, Arab Boycott, and Hyde). Members also noted that state delegation is not usually an input if state interests are not involved.

#### Party Leaders

Party leaders were mentioned by as many as eighty-nine percent of the interviewees on the Pay Raise and by no members on the Goldwater Amendment. Party leaders were mentioned most on votes on which the majority party staked its prestige: Ethics, the Budget, and the Pay Raise. As one member related, "I really heard from party people on those votes through the whip system. They really worked the Pay Raise and the closed rule for the Ethics vote." A Republican noted that "On a vote like the Budget, most Republicans will turn to the Republican Policy Committee to see what they have to say." Party inputs were lowest on routine, low grade issues (no member mentioned party leaders on Goldwater, NASA, FAA, House Assassinations, EPA, Debt Collection, Arab Boycott, Snow Removal, Marine Mammal, and School Lunch) and, surprisingly, on many hot issues (no mention of leader input on Rhodesian Chrome, Energy Department, Clean Air, Hatch, Hyde, Saccharin, and Water Projects). This indicates that party leaders are very selective when investing their prestige. They

provide guidance on only those issues they want to feature as the party's hallmark.

#### Other Members

The mention of other members not on the committee or in the state delegation ranges from a high of seventy-three percent on the Saccharin vote to a low of no mention on the FAA vote. Other members became an input when the issue was extremely hot such as Ethics, Common Situs, the Budget, Saccharin, and Water Projects. In the words of a member, "When the heat is on, everybody talks to everyone else to find out what they are doing." Input from other members was the lowest on many routine bills (NASA, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Snow Removal, Marine Mammal, and School Lunch) and bills on which members may already have staked out a position or conviction (Strip Mining, Hyde, Hatch, and the Pay Raise). With regard to this latter category, most members realize that "It's no use lobbying; most have already made up their minds."

#### Committee Staff

Committee staff was practically irrelevant on the hot, important issues. No member mentioned the staff employees of committee on Common Situs, Strip Mining, the Budget, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, Saccharin, Pay Raise, and Water Projects. Also light input was made on routine issues (no mention on Nuclear Navy, Goldwater Amendment, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Debt Collection, Marine Mammal, Foreign Aid, and School Lunch) and older issues (no mention on Rhodesian Chrome, Strip Mining and Clean Air). Several votes did involve above average input from committee staffers: Tax, House Assassinations, and several grant programs such as Public Works, Countercyclical, and HUD. Tax was a difficult issue to understand,

and several members mentioned that they solicited the advice of committee staff. House Assassinations was a rare issue where an imbroglio surrounded staffers. For the grant programs, a member mentioned he talked to staffers "if I have a problem deciphering how the darn thing will impact on my district."

#### Personal Staff

The mention of personal staff ranges from in excess of seventy percent on the FAA and Tax votes to less than ten percent on the Goldwater Amendment and the Snow Removal Funds vote. The highest incidence of personal staff input occurred on three kinds of votes. First, votes that were hot but also complicated tended to involve a lot of staff input (Tax, Budget, Clean Air, Saccharin, Rhodesian Chrome, and Water Projects). Perhaps explaining this is the statement by one member, "On controversial issues that are somewhat complicated, I put staff to work. I want them to give a briefing on both sides of the issue." Second, staff input was high on low profile issues that were hard to understand (NASA, EPA, and Debt Collection Practices). Third, in the words of one member, "Staff gets put to work on votes that might specifically affect the district." Grant programs such as the HUD and Countercyclical votes were judged by members to involve a high rate of staff input. Staff input was lowest on a) votes with little lead time (Goldwater Amendment, Snow Removal and Nuclear Navy), b) routine bills (FAA, Public Works, Marine Mammal and School Lunch) and c) those hot issues on which the member is likely to have a fairly well developed position (Government Reorganization, Arab Boycott, Strip Mining, Hyde, Hatch, and Pay Raise).

### Individual Constituents

The mention of individual constituents varies from eighty-nine percent on the Pay Raise vote to no mention on the School Lunch vote.

Individual constituents were heard from most frequently on certain hot issues: Common Situs Picketing, Arab Boycott, Hyde, Hatch, Water Projects, Saccharin, and the Pay Raise. This reflects a Congressman's observation that "If it a vote gets publicity, you'll hear from people on it." Citizen input was lowest on routine issues (NASA, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Countercyclical, HUD, and School Lunch) and short suspenses (Foreign Aid, Snow Removal, Nuclear Navy, and Goldwater Amendment). Also, certain hot but technical issues--perhaps the kind of issues that do not generate citizen interest--were associated with low citizen input. They were Government Reorganization, Strip Mining, Budget, and Clean Air.

Members acknowledge that constituency can be a latent input since members consider how the interest of the constituency will be affected by a given vote. As one noted, "On all votes, I ask myself, 'How will this affect programs and policies in my state?'"

### Inspired Mail

Only three votes were associated with any significant degree of inspired mail: Common Situs Picketing, Hyde Amendment, and Hatch Act. The rest of the votes did not receive mention of this kind of input.

### Group Constituents

Groups within the constituency were mentioned by as many as one-hundred percent of the interviewees on Clean Air and by no member on the Nuclear Navy vote. Organized groups of constituents were heard from on two basic types of legislation: (1) certain "hot" votes (Clean Air, Water

Projects, Strip Mining, Common Situs and Arab Boycott) relevant to certain local interests and (2) votes affecting grant programs (Goldwater Amendment, Public Works, Countercyclical and HUD) that have existing constituencies. Group contacts appeared less frequently on almost all of the routine issues and on hot votes that lacked specific constituencies: e.g., the Budget and Pay Raise.

#### Private Interest Groups

The input of private national groups varied from fifty-eight percent mention on Marine Mammal to no mention on both the Ethics and the Nuclear Navy vote. The issues on which national private interests were most frequently heard from are Common Situs ("I felt constant pressure on that one."), Arab Boycott, Strip Mining, Marine Mammal Protection, Clean Air, Hyde, and Hatch. Most of these were hot issues on which individual citizens also made significant input. But, on Marine Mammal there was not significant citizen communication. The tuna lobby was the only input external to Congress. Interest groups were mentioned less on many routine bills (NASA, FAA, House Assassinations, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Public Works, Countercyclical, HUD, and School Lunch), bills with short suspenses (Nuclear Navy, Snow Removal, Public Works, and Foreign Aid) and several hot bills (Ethics, Government Reorganization, and the Pay Raise) that seemed to lack a defined group interest.

#### Public Interest Groups

The input of these associations was generally very low except on reform (Ethics) and environmental legislation (Strip Mining and Clean Air).

Public Groups

These groups made themselves felt most often on grants (School Lunch, HUD and Countercyclical) and general governmental issues (Government Reorganization and Hatch).

Bureaucrats

Bureaucrats were recorded as having the highest frequency of contact on two votes: Nuclear Navy and Saccharin. In both cases, members mentioned that they paid attention to the position of bureaucrats with expertise on these controversial, technical matters.

White House

The input of the President to congressional decision-making varied from seventy-seven percent mention on the Water Projects vote to no mention on the Ethics vote. It was greatest on those issues on which the President chose to get involved. The Nuclear Navy, Tax, Rhodesian Chrome, Government Reorganization, Energy Department, and Water Projects votes had above average mention of the President due to the fact that the Carter Presidency chose to stake its prestige on them. Others had low presidential involvement because the Presidency was not involved.

Media

The media was mentioned by fifty-five percent of the interviewees on Rhodesian Chrome and by no interviewees on eleven votes. Mention of the media was most prevalent on certain hot issues such as Tax, Rhodesian Chrome, Government Reorganization, Saccharin and the Pay Raise. On these issues, members felt that past or future media coverage of an issue was a

force to be considered. Also, the media was frequently mentioned on one routine issue--the Nuclear Navy vote--which had been debated in a general way in the press many times prior to the specific vote. Most hot and routine votes did not involve significant press coverage.

To conclude the discussion of Table 4.6, these findings support the notion that input into member decision-making varies according to the type of legislation at stake. Although there is not a neat dichotomization of hot/low profile decisions along the lines predicted by the theory of major authors who employ a contextual approach, there are general tendencies in this direction. Reading down the columns of Table 4.6, rather than across the rows, reveals that most of the issues that can be considered low profile (Nuclear Navy, NASA, FAA, House Assassinations, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Debt Collection, Foreign Aid, School Lunch and Marine Mammal) involved sizeable input from committee chairmen, committee members, and personal staff. Many hot issues (Ethics, Tax, Rhodesian Chrome, Common Situs, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, Saccharin, and Pay Raise) involved input from broader sources that include individual citizens, group constituents, interest groups, and, in some cases, party officials and the White House. This conclusion is strongly supported in Table 4.7 that shows the input of each actor by volume of communication. When communications are below average, personal staff and committee members were the two most frequent inputs. When communications are above average, individual constituents and state delegation members were the most frequently mentioned actors. Evidently, there are two broad types of decision arenas in Congress. There are quiet, internal issues where members receive input only from staff or committee members, and there are expansive issues that involve input from constituents and state delegation members.

Table 4.7

**Sources of Congressional Communications Arrayed  
By Volume of Contacts**

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Below Average Contacts</u>	<u>Above Average Contacts</u>
Committee Chairman	(13%	29%)*
Ranking Minority	0	6
Committee Members	(23	54)
State Delegation	(11	59)
Party Leader	( 4	26)
Other Congressmen	(21	56)
Personal Staff	(31	57)
Individual Constituents	(21	59)
Inspired Mail	( 4	14)
Group Constituents	(14	41)
Private Groups	(10	33)
Public Interest Groups	( 1	11)
Bureaucrats	1	5
White House	( 9	21)
Media	( 9	28)

\*Proportions represent the percentage of interviews in which members mentioned contact with the actor

( ) = A variation of 10% or greater

; = A variation of 20% or more

/ = Below and above average contacts were computed on the basis of a mean of three communications for each decision.

A more precise description of the patterns of congressional input uncovered in Table 4.6 may be provided by a four-category classification scheme: routine issues, grant programs, hot issues, and specialized hot issues. Routine issues primarily involve staff and committee input. Contrary to the expectations of Proposition 5, those affected do not make a substantial input on these issues. That is not to say they are not influential. It is to say, merely, that they do not register in the component of cognitive map referred to as force field. Grant programs and public works programs involve staff and state delegation input plus contacts with specific clientele within the district. Hot issues (Hyde, Hatch, Pay Raise, Ethics and Saccharin) involve input from a variety of forces including private interest groups, constituents, party leaders, and the White House. Specialized hot issues are hot issues that are also complex and technical. Examples are Arab Boycott, Budget, Energy, Clean Air, Strip Mining, Common Situs. These involve expanded input combined with significant mention of committee members and constituent groups.

## 2. Input by Issue Characteristics

The distribution of input sources by issue characteristics reveals four interesting findings.

First, who Congressmen hear from varies according to issue characteristics. A breakdown of communications by perceptual, objective, and researcher-subjective indicators of issue characteristics is presented in Appendix E. In some instances, there is very little variation in actor input among the issue characteristics. In other instances, meaningful differences appear. Overall, thirty-three percent of the distributions

involve meaningful variations--i.e., variations of nine percent or more in the mention of input sources--as various values of an issue characteristic's indicator. These meaningful variations are marked off in brackets in Appendix E.

Second, the characteristic most associated with variation in the mention of various communications' sources is the policy role of Congress. Evidently, the contribution Congress makes to a bill--initiation, modification, ratification--is associated with differences in congressional communications. When Congress initiates, members are more likely to hear from other members, constituents, and interest groups. When Congress ratifies, chairmen, the White House and the media are more prominent. Other characteristics associated with a number of variations are presidential involvement, conflict, amount of money, constituency awareness, mail, toughness, thought, type of rule, CQ story, Washington Post story, amendment over committee objection, and Democratic party endorsements. The characteristics associated with the fewest amount of variations are complexity, technicality, salience, feeling, Democratic party unity, Republican policy endorsements, and newness. Overall, thirty-eight percent of the perceptual indicators, forty-one percent of the objective indicators, and only twenty-four percent of the subjective indicators are associated with significant variations.

Third, the involvement of each actor in the decision-making process has certain correlates. Table 4.8 displays the issue characteristics associated with the mention of various actors. Although the relationships may be minimal in some cases, this table shows that different inputs are more likely to occur under certain issue conditions than when the opposite conditions are present.

Table 4.8

Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Input Sources  
(These correlates are based on variations of nine percent or more)

<u>Chairman</u>	<u>Committee Member</u>	<u>State Delegation</u>
Thought (H)	Complex (LP)	Conflict (H)
Constituency not aware (LP)	Technical (LP)	Major (H)
No reelection effects	Conflict (H)	Non-routine (H)
Closed rule (H)	Non-routine (H)	Tough (H)
Committee Dissensus (H)	Tough (H)	Mail (H)
CQ Box Score (H)	Mail (H)	Renomination (H)
CQ story (H)	Closed rule (H)	and Reelection effect (H)
Congress ratifies (LP):	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Constituency awareness (H)
No amendment over committee (LP):	High Index of Likeness (LP)	Thought (H)
Democratic endorsement (H)	Amendment over committee (H)	Closed rule (H)
Republican endorsement (H)	Yes in polls (H)	Below average rule margin (H)
Presidential involvement (H)	Above average money (H)	Defeat (H)
Policy change (H)	No presidential involvement (LP)	Committee dissensus (H)
	Congress modifies (LP)	Minority report (H)
		CQ story (H)
		Washington Post Box Score (H)
		Washington Post story (H)
	Congress modifies (H)	Congress modifies (H)
		Below average Democratic unity (H)
		Below average Republican unity (H)
		Amendment over committee (H)
		Below average index of likeness (H)
		Democratic endorsement (H)
		Republican endorsement (H)
		Above average money (H)
		Presidential involvement (H)

Table 4.8--Continued

<u>Inspired Mail</u>	<u>Group Constituents</u>	<u>Private National Groups</u>	<u>Media</u>
Constituency awareness (H)	Complex (LP)	Complex (LP)	Constituency awareness (H)
Mail (H)	Technical (LP)	Technical (LP)	Below average rule
Renomination and	Conflict (H)	Conflict (H)	margin (H)
Reelection effects (H)	Major (H)	Salient (H)	CQ Box Score (H)
Strong feeling (H)	Salience (H)	Constituency awareness (H)	CQ story (H)
Tough (H)	Constituency awareness (H)	Mail (H)	Washington Post story (H)
Non-routine (H)	Non-routine (H)	Renomination effects (H)	Congress ratifies (LP)
Below average rule	Reelection effects (H)	Reelection effects (H)	Above average money (H)
margin (H)	Non-routine (H)	Non-routine (H)	Presidentia
Close (H)	Tough (H)	Tough (H)	involvement (LP)
Above average time (H)	Thought (H)	Thought (H)	Policy change (LP)
Committee dissensus (H)	Open and modified rule (LP)	Open and modified rule (LP)	
Below average index	Close (H)	Close (H)	
of likeness (H)	Minority report (H)	Committee dissensus (H)	White House
Washington Post Box	CQ story (H)	Minority report (H)	No rail (H)
Score (H)	Washington Post Box Score (H)	CQ Box Score (H)	Thought (H)
Washington Post story (H)	Congress modifies (LP)	Washington Post Box	Tough (H)
Amendment over	Above average time (H)	Score (H)	Open rule (H)
committee (H)	Amendment over committee (H)	Washington Post story (H)	CQ story (H)
Democratic endorsements (H)	Above average	Congress modifies (H)	Washington Post
Republican endorsements (H)	Republican unity (LP)	Above average time (H)	story (H)
Above average money (H)	Above average money (H)	Amendment over	Congress as ratifier (H)
Above average	Presidentia	Democratic endorsement (H)	Below average
Republican unity (LP)	involvement (H)	No mention in polls (LP)	Republican unity (H)
Change (H)	Specificity (LP)	Above average money (H)	Amendment over
	Not new (LP)	Presidentia	committee (H)
		Presidential	Presidential
		involvement (H)	involvement (H)
		New issue (LP)	Specificity (LP)
		Non-specificity (H)	Policy change (H)
		Policy change (H)	
<u>Public Interest Groups</u>			
	Tough (H)		
	Thought (H)		
	Below average rule margin (H)		
	Minority report (H)		
	CQ Box Score (H)		
	Democratic endorsement (H)		

Table 4.8--Continued

<u>Party Leader</u>	<u>Other Members</u>	<u>Personal Staff</u>	<u>Individual Constituents</u>
Conflict (H)	Conflict (H)	Complex (LP)	Conflict (H).
Major (H)	Major status (H)	Technical (LP)	Salience (H)
Constituency awareness (H)	Constituency awareness (H)*	Conflict (H)	Constituency awareness (H).
Renomination effects (H)	Mail (H)	No feelings (LP)	Mail (H).
Reelection effects (H)	Renomination (H)	Thought (H)	Renomination (H).
Feelings (H)	and	Closed rule (H)	and
Closed rule (H)	Reelection effects (H)	Committee	Reelection effects (H).
Below average rule margin (H)	Non-routine (H)	dissensus (H)	Non-routine (H).
Defeated (H)	Thought (H)	Minority report (H)	Tough (H).
CQ story (H)	Tough (H)	CQ story (H)	Thought (H).
Washington Post Box Score (H)	Below average rule margin (H)	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Feelings (H).
Story (H)	Modified open rule (H)	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Modified open rule (H).
Below average frame (LP)	Defeated (H)	Congress as modifier (LP)	Below average rule margin (H).
Below average	CQ story (H)	Democratic endorsement (H)	margin (H).
Democratic	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Republican endorsement (H)	Defeat (H).
Above average	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Mention in polls (H)	CQ Box Score (H).
public unity	Washington Post Box Score (H)	Above average money (H)	Washington Post Box Score (H).
Below average index of likeness (H)	Washington Post Story (H)	Non-specificity (H)	Washington Post story (H).
Amendment over committee (H)	Congress initiates (H)	Congress initiates (H)	Congress initiates (H).
No Democratic endorsement (LP)	Above average time (LP)	Above average time (H)	Above average time (H).
Presidential involvement (H)	Democratic endorsement (H)	Above average money (H)	Above average money (H).
Congress initiates (H)	Republican endorsement (H)	No mention in polls (LP)	No mention in polls (LP).
	Committee	Presidential involvement (H)	Presidential involvement (H).
	consensus (LP)	Policy change (H)	Policy change (H).
	Specificity (LP)		(These correlates are based on variations of nine percent or more)

H = Presumed hot value  
 LP= Presumed low profile value

\* = Variation of twenty percent or more

Fourth, there is some evidence of the configurations predicted by Proposition 5. The presentation of force field inputs by issue characteristics in Table 4.8 shows that, under characteristics presumed to be hot, members are more likely to mention chairmen, state delegation, party leaders, other members, and constituents. Committee members, group constituents and private national interests make input (i.e., are heard from and paid attention to and thus are part of the member's decision-making field); under some low profile conditions--especially complexity and technicality.

In conclusion, when comparing the arrays of input by issue characteristics with the distribution of communications by vote, basic tendencies in the direction of Proposition 5 can be observed. Members mention different sources of decision-making input in different decision contexts. Under low profile conditions, they have narrow force fields, hearing mainly from only those affected. Under hot conditions they experience broader inputs. One qualification is in order. On low profile issues, personal staff is mentioned in addition to groups and committee members. With this qualification in mind, Proposition 5 is verified.

### 3. Communications Controlled by Background and Constituency Factors

Background and constituency factors offer the possibility of alternative explanations of patterns of input. The control variables that seem to be most logically related to the volume and sources of communications a member receives are: ideological extremity, party and presidential loyalty, election results, committee membership, and length of service.

Ideological extremity may be related to input because, as several members noted, "If you have a position on the issues, you won't be pressured." Thus we might expect those with above average ADA and ACA scores to have a low volume of communications.

Loyalty to the party and to the President may be a predictor of a member's force field inasmuch as high support for the party may indicate high input from party just as high presidential support may indicate high input from the White House.

Election results may be related since the more politically vulnerable legislators may pay attention to constituents at a higher rate than those more electorally secure. If this is true, those with a close margin of victory and those from switch districts might be expected to hear more frequently from their constituents.

Committee membership may be related to input since those on the committee may be pressured more than those not directly involved with a bill.

Finally, length of service might be related to communications since those relatively new to the legislature, and hence without an established record, may be lobbied more intensively than those who have prior positions.

To test these alternative hypotheses, both communications' volume and the input of individual actors were controlled by ACA and ADA rating, party support in both the second session of the 94th Congress and first session of the 95th, presidential support, election results and switch status, committee membership, and length of service.

The control procedures yielded only a few meaningful results. For the overwhelming majority of distributions, no relationship was found.

Several control distributions provide some evidence of background and constituency impact on input patterns. Table 4.9 displays these meaningful control results.

Part A shows, contrary to prediction, that those with high ACA ratings receive more, not less, input (in this case, from committee chairmen) than those with lower scores.

Part B reveals that members with lower ADA ratings pay attention to chairmen at a slightly higher rate than those with a higher rating.

Part C shows that committee members do receive more staff and group constituency input than those not on committee. They also receive less input from other committee members, state delegation members, and membership in general.

The control for election results shows that those members from close districts are more likely to mention individual constituents and less likely to mention groups than those from either marginal or safe constituencies.

The control for switch status shows a meaningful differential. Those from a switch status district are more likely to hear from other actors and to mention a high volume of input than those not from such a district.

Part F shows that there is a tendency for junior legislators to mention more frequently committee members and other Congressmen, individual and group constituents, and the White House than more senior members mention these. Also, junior legislators mention committee chairmen as a decision input at a much lower rate than their seniors. Finally, freshmen members have a much higher (fifty-eight percent) rate of above mean contacts than those with more than twelve years of experience (thirty-one percent).

Table 4.9

Meaningful Relationships between the Mention of Force Field Actors and Certain Background Characteristics of Members: the Percentage of Interviews in which Different Actors were Significantly Mentioned Under Various Control Categories

A. Meaningful Distributions of Force Field Actors by ACA Scores

<u>Force Field Actor</u>	<u>Control</u>		
	<u>ACA Scores</u>	<u>Members with High ACA Score</u>	<u>Members with Low ACA Score</u>
Committee Chairman		73%*	85%

B. Meaningful Distributions of Force Field Actors b. ADA Scores

<u>Force Field Actor</u>	<u>Control</u>		
	<u>ADA Scores</u>	<u>Members with High ADA Score</u>	<u>Members with Low ADA Score</u>
Committee Chairman		86%	75%

C. Meaningful Distributions by Committee Members

<u>Force Field Actor</u>	<u>Control</u>		
	<u>Committee Membership</u>	<u>Members on Committee</u>	<u>Members not on Committee</u>
Committee Member		25%	39%
State Delegation		25	82
Other Member		25	38
Personal Staff		62	40
Group Constituents		63	23

Table 4.9--Continued

**D. Meaningful Distributions by Election Results  
Force Field Actor**

	<u>Control</u>		
	Election Results.		
	Members from:	Marginal Seats	Safe Seats
Committee Chairman	75%	94%	77%
Individual Constituents	70	56	64
Group Constituents	10	22	27
Private Group	5	28	20

**E. Meaningful Distributions by Switch District Status  
Force Field Actor**

	<u>Control</u>	
	District Party Control	Switch Status
	Members from Switch District	Members not from Switch District
Above Average Volume of Communications	62%	40%
Committee Chairman	48	38
Party Leader	24	72
Individual Constituents	57	36
Inspired Mail	24	7

**F. Meaningful Distributions by Length of Service  
Force Field Actor**

	Freshman	<u>Control</u>		
		Length of Service	6-11 years	12+ years
Committee Chairman	18%	19%	16%	33%
Committee Member	46	36	34	27
Other Congressmen	41	38	33	25
Individual Constituents	56	34	38	22
Group Constituents	31	27	23	18
White House	25	10	13	14
Above Mean Volume	58	39	42	31

/ Non-significant distributions are omitted from the table.

\*Proportions represent the percent of the interviews during which actor was mentioned under various control categories.

Classification by election results are based on 1976 election results according to the following categories:

Close = 50% to 52% of the vote;  
Marginal is from 52% to 55%; and  
Safe is 55% plus

In sum, there are some relationships between background/constituency factors and the force field of Congressmen. These seem to be overshadowed, however, by variations in force field that occur according to type of vote and issue characteristics.

#### D. Summary and Conclusions

Previous studies of congressional communications have yielded two generalizations commonly cited in the literature of congressional decision-making. The first can be inferred from Dexter's research. It is that members receive a low volume of communications, usually only from those with whom they already agree. The second is Kingdon's finding that constituents and other members are the actors who most frequently provide inputs to the decision processes of members.

This chapter has shown that who Congressmen hear from or pay attention to depends on the kind of vote involved. There are multiple patterns of congressional input.

The volume of communications a member receives concerning floor votes is not always low as Dexter infers. The volume of input to member decision-making is highly variable. Some votes involve a low volume of contacts, while others involve a high volume. High profile votes are associated with more input than low profile votes. Variations in volume are also related to issue characteristics. This evidence helps to corroborate a member's view that:

There is no law of congressional communications. If there is an existence of contrary approaches on a bill, you do talk to a lot of people on it. When a lot of people are interested, when the range of opinion is wide, many attempt to talk to you and you have no alternative but to talk to them. On big, important bills, you will always hear from people.

Variations also occur with regard to the specific actors from whom members hear when making a decision. Contrary to Kingdon's findings, the personal staff of members, not other members and constituents, provide the most frequently mentioned input. But input from staff is highly variable. In excess of seventy percent of the respondents mentioned a decision input from staff on the tax and EPA votes, while less than ten percent mentioned staff on the Goldwater Amendment and the Snow Removal Funds vote. This kind of variation was found to hold true for all communication sources.

Under certain conditions, confirming Kingdon's findings, members hear mainly from constituents and other members. Under other conditions however, they hear from many different actors. The greatest variation in sources of communication occurs among routine issues, grant programs, hot issues, and specialized hot issues. Also, each communication source has certain issue characteristic correlates. For each communication source, there are certain values of perceptual, objective, and subjective indicators of issue characteristics under which the source is more likely to make an input. These patterns generally conform to the expectations of those authors who have a conditional approach. Hot characteristics are related to broader inputs (party, committee chairman, state delegation, constituents), while some low profile characteristics (complexity, technicality) are associated with communications from narrower, more affected sources (group constituents, national private interests, committee members).

All of this suggests that to understand congressional communications, one should have an appreciation for policy differentials in Congress. There are different arenas of decision-making in Congress. There are

"quiet internal issues" on which there is little pressure and on which few are heard. There are also extremely visible decisions that attract heavy mail, press coverage, and party and presidential involvement. General propositions about congressional communications necessarily gloss over these differences.

Finally, interviews with members reveal two important qualifications with which to conclude this discussion of members' force fields. First, "Just because you hear from somebody during the course of a decision and pay attention to them, doesn't mean you agree with them or are influenced by them." In other words, although a member may mention an actor as a source of communication or input, that actor may not be part of the member's decision equation. Second, actors who are influential in the legislative process are not necessarily present in a member's force field. As one member stated, "You don't run into much pressure here. It's exercised subtly and indirectly, frequently down at the subcommittee level."

## CHAPTER V

### THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION PROCESS

How Congressmen inform themselves on floor votes has been a matter of recent scholarly interest. Basically, this interest stems from the realization that, as Saloma states, ". . . information is a form of power . . ."<sup>1</sup>

Studies of congressional information flows and information processing have yielded several general conclusions. First, Congressmen have a pressing need for information. As Deckard notes, "All Congressmen, the most senior as well as the freshmen, are faced with a perpetual need for information at as cheap a cost in time as possible."<sup>2</sup> And, as Congressman Udall has written,

In order to make decisions on increasingly complex and constantly changing issues, to respond to a melange of requests from constituents, to keep abreast of the activities of the Congress itself--all require constant acquiring and sifting of information.<sup>3</sup>

Second, to cope with information problems, Congressmen devise various routine shortcuts. Stevens, et al. argue that "The insight gained from recent research is that certain institutional forms and practices have developed in the House that provide the Congressman with 'shortcuts' toward gaining the information he needs."<sup>4</sup> Relying on various findings in organization theory, Saloma emphasizes the patterned, routine aspects of congressional information.<sup>5</sup> Third, Congressmen have need for various types of information. As Ornstein notes, there are five distinct patterns of information: content-descriptive, procedural-technical, institutional-political, constituency-political, and ideological.<sup>6</sup>

With specific regard to the micro aspects of congressional information gathering—that is to say, the behavior of the individual legislator as he processes information—important generalizations have been drawn concerning information sources, information search, and information adequacy.

Concerning information sources, the major research finding has been that other members are the major source of a Congressman's information. Kovenok discovered that information inputs coming directly from members of the House were three times as great as from other sources.<sup>7</sup> Bauer, Pool and Dexter note that "Congressmen develop an implicit roster of fellow-Congressmen whose judgment they respect, whose viewpoint they normally share, and to whom they can turn for guidance on particular topics of the colleague's competence."<sup>8</sup>

Concerning the search for information, the finding has been that most members usually engage in what Kingdon refers to as problemistic search. ". . . Congressmen confine their searches for information only to the most routine and easily available sources."<sup>9</sup> Usually, they consult only a few regular sources.

Concerning the adequacy of congressional information, the major finding has been that members suffer from a general shortage or inadequacy of information. Davidson, Kovenock, and O'Leary found that "The most frequently mentioned problems were associated with the complexity of decision-making: the lack of information . . ."<sup>10</sup> The problem of deficient information for decision-making was cited by sixty-two percent of their sample—the most frequently mentioned complaint.<sup>11</sup> Janda notes that "Students of the legislative process have identified the information problem as a major factor in the decline of modern legislatures."<sup>12</sup>

Saloma highlights various problems of information such as decentralized control, dependence on the executive, and contradictory information.<sup>13</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the contextual applicability of these conclusions concerning Congressmen and information. To do this, the following three propositions--derived from the conditional theory of the legislative process--will be examined.

The first--proposition 6--is that "Information sources vary according to the kind of issue at hand." The thesis of the conditional scheme is that specialized interests will dominate on low-grade kinds of votes, while more visible issues involve broader political interests. With regard to the information sources of Congressmen, the inference is that Congressmen receive information primarily from narrow or affected sources on low grade issues, while on hot issues information comes from broader sources. In sum, information sources vary according to the kind of vote at hand.

The second is proposition 7: "The volume of information (the number of sources) a Congressman refers to varies according to the kind of issue involved." The inference of the conditional theory is that on low grade issues members rely primarily on narrow sources of expertise and involvement and make only a perfunctory scan of information. They usually lack sufficient interest to search beyond the few sources of information provided by those proximately involved. According to this line of reasoning, scan will be much more intense on major issues. Highly visible issues will involve extraordinary information searches, with reference to many sources.

Proposition 8, the third proposition to be examined in this chapter, is as follows: "The member's perception of the adequacy of information varies according to the kind of issue at hand." On low profile votes, only those proximately involved are informed. The average floor voting

member, due to the lack of personal interest, does not feel particularly well informed. On hot, burning issues, which are frequently raised in political discourse, the member will be relatively well informed.

It should be noted that factual information, or what Truman calls technical knowledge (in comparison to political knowledge), will be the kind of information emphasized in this chapter.<sup>14</sup> Focus will be primarily on how members inform themselves concerning ". . . the content of a policy issue."<sup>15</sup> In sum, this chapter will stress the sources of factual decision premises while the following one will be devoted to the source of evaluative, political premises.<sup>16</sup>

A. PROPOSITION 6: Information Sources Vary According to the Kind of Issue at Hand

After a general discussion and a description of the information sources identified by members, two tests of this proposition will be made: information sources by vote and information sources by issue characteristics.

1. General

Table 5.1 presents a frequency distribution of sources mentioned by members throughout the 361 interviews in response to the question, "Where did you get your information--i.e., where did you turn to find out about the facts of the bill." Responses to this question and subsequent elaborations by members support three conclusions concerning information sources in general.

First, congressional information stems from what Saloma refers to as a system of "multiple information channels."<sup>17</sup> As displayed

Table 5.1

**Aggregate Frequency Distribution of Information Sources: the  
Percentage\* of Interviews in which Members Mentioned  
Various Information Sources**

Committee Chairman	5%
Committee Members	13
State Delegation	4
Party Leader	4
Party Whip Notice	22
Floor Debate	18
Committee Report	14
Other Members	9
Committee Staff	3
Personal Staff	33
Constituents	5
Interest Groups	5
White House	3
Media/Reading	18
Democratic Study Group (DSG)	30
Republican Ad Hoc Group	1
Steering/Policy Committee Membership	1
Personal Experience/Learning	5
Membership on Other Committee	2
Committee Membership	6
Dear Colleague Letter	5
Environmental Study Group (ESG)	2
Last Time Through	8

\*Percentages are based on an N= of 361 interviews.

in Table 5.1, fourteen different sources were mentioned at least five percent of the time. Seven were mentioned in more than ten percent of the interviews. The findings in Table 5.1 corroborate Clapp's finding that

. . . legislators use many sources in the course of their deliberations . . . such as . . . individual colleagues, informal organizations of Congressmen to which a legislator belongs, committee and personal staffs, the hearings and reports of committees, pressure groups, executive departments, the mail, and floor debate.<sup>18</sup>

Second, in Kingdon's words, ". . . certain actors in the legislative system are more prominent in the decision-making of Congressmen than others."<sup>19</sup> The most frequently mentioned information source is personal staff followed by publications of the Democratic Study Group (DSG), party Whip Notices, floor debate, media and general reading, committee reports, and committee members. These findings provide several surprises. Contrary to both Kingdon<sup>20</sup> and Matthews and Stimson,<sup>21</sup> other members (including both members on the relevant committee and those not on it) are not the most frequently mentioned source of information. Also, despite the emphasis in recent publications on the information value of "books and scholarly studies,"<sup>22</sup> congressional research and investigatory agencies<sup>23</sup> such as General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office, and Office of Technological Assessment), and Information Technologies<sup>24</sup> (such as the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress), few members mentioned them as a significant source of information.

Third, some sources of information such as personal staff, DSG publication, Whip Notices, and the committee report perform what both Kingdon<sup>25</sup> and Schnefer<sup>26</sup> refer to as a filtering or "gate keeper"

function. These sources act to synthesize and forward information from a number of diverse sources.

## 2. Sources

Major congressional information sources can be grouped as follows: personal contacts with other members, impersonal contact with other members, inhouse publications, personal staff, outside sources, and members' experience and reading. Members provided a number of insights concerning the utility and contributions of these major sources.

### Members as Information Sources

Information concerning a floor vote comes from committee chairmen, committee members, other members, party leaders, and state delegation members.

Committee chairmen, cited five percent of the time, were mentioned as an information source in instances where the chairman was an obvious, dynamic actor such as Udall on Strip Mining, Thompson on Debt Collection, Brooks on Reorganization Authority and the Energy Department, Giaimo on the Budget, and Stokes on the Assassinations Committee.

Committee members were mentioned thirteen percent of the time. Other members note the information utility of committee members in two ways. First, those on committee are often turned to for clarification of bills that originate from their committee. As one member described: "I'll seek committee people out if I don't understand. If I have no trouble, no questions--there's no need to visit with them." Another noted, "I usually talk to committee proponents to get a clearer view." Second, committee members "at the door" often provide information. The

function of committee members positioned as such is ". . . to discuss. They do not tell you how to vote." One freshman Republican illustrated the use of committee members at the house door with his reconstruction of his decision with regard to the FAA Authorization. "I walked on the floor cold on that one. I got all of my information by asking a committee member at the door." Many members emphasized the selective use of committee members. Again and again members noted how they turn to committee members in whom they have confidence. In the words of one member, "I usually talk to friends on the committee to find out about the bill."

Other members not on the committee are mentioned in nine percent of the decision cases. Other members mentioned as an information source are a) class members, b) those who closely monitor floor debate ("For Republicans, Bauman of Maryland is very informative-- he practically lives on the floor"), c) those who offer amendments ("I talked to Baucus to find out how his amendment would affect the Strip Mining Bill"), d) those who have pork barrel projects at stake in any given vote (especially on Snow Removal and the Water Projects), and e) those with recognized expertise on an issue (e.g., the Michigan delegation on Clean Air, doctors on Saccharin). Many members pointed out that their fellow members are a natural source of information. As one noted, "You always survey the guys to find out about things that seem to be ambiguous."

Party leaders are mentioned in only four percent of the cases. Three forms of contact were mentioned. One is through official leadership positions issued on major issues. Democrats disseminate leadership positions in the form of published endorsements of the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. Republican leaders have two forums:

publications of the House Republican Policy Committee and publications of the Republican Research Committee. These endorsements and stands primarily provide ". . . general information. They do not advise." As one Republican described Republican party pronouncements, "They are factual materials that help a guy make up his mind. Usually you'll go with them unless there is an overriding philosophical or local interest."

A second way in which party leaders provide information is meetings with party whips. As a Democratic zone whip noted, "These meetings are used primarily to get information out through the whip network."

A third type of party leader information input is through doormen and cloakroom recordings. The leadership of both House parties station partisan members of the doorkeeper's staff at all entrances to the House floor. These doorkeepers closely follow parliamentary developments and are prepared to give both a synopsis of the facts of a bill under consideration and the party's stand on it. Also, both leaderships provide telephone-accessed information lines in their cloakrooms so members away from the floor at the time of a vote can call to find out "what is up."

State delegations are also reported in fewer than five percent of the interviews, despite the fact that several studies have emphasized the "information sharing" utility of state delegations.<sup>27</sup> Members mentioned several occasions in which delegations provided information: reliance by delegation members on a member of the delegation ("On those kinds of things we all turn to . . ."); delegation meetings where each member briefs the delegation on developments in his committee ("These

run-downs by committee are really helpful"); and, finally, consultation by delegation members with U.S. Senators from the same state.

#### Impersonal Contact with Other Members

Impersonal contact that members have with other members also provides information for floor voting. Two very noteworthy impersonal contacts are "dear colleague" letters and debate.

Dear colleague letters are mentioned overall in approximately five percent of the decision cases. These communications are sent to all colleagues by a member--on or off the parent committee--concerned with a particular bill. The letters give a concise, but biased, statement of the issue and the member's position on it. Although some members said that these kinds of communications are "simply too much to read, I don't have the time," many members mentioned their utility for "getting the pros and cons." One member stated that "due to their information value and the political situation around here, I always read them to see who is doing what."

General floor debate on a bill is mentioned in eighteen percent of the interviews as an information source. Academic literature tends to downplay the importance of debate. Clapp notes that "Legislators commonly believe that debate is more important in terms of public education than for member education . . ."<sup>28</sup> Matthews argues that debate ". . . lacks drama and excitement. . . . most members have already made up their minds . . ."<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, many members interviewed in this study stressed the informativeness of debate. A freshman Democrat stated that "Listening to debate affords a way to hear the arguments." A senior southern Democratic mentioned the information value of debate as follows:

"From debate I learn what a bill and its amendments do. Nine times out of ten, if you have a question on a bill, someone will answer it during debate." The information value of debate is also emphasized by widespread support by members for closed circuit telecasting of debate into House offices. As one member noted, "The TV allows me to conduct business in my office without missing the value of debate." Finally, it should be noted that committee members indirectly provide information through debate, since they usually serve as floor managers for a bill and thus dominate debate.

#### In-House Congressional Publications

Members identified three in-house congressional publications that have an information value: committee reports, party Whip Notices, and DSG materials.

The report a committee issues on a bill was mentioned as a source in fourteen percent of the decisions. As Zinn notes,

The report describes the purpose and scope of the bill and the reasons for its recommended approval. Generally, a section-by-section analysis is set forth in detail, explaining precisely what each section is intended to accomplish.<sup>30</sup>

Also, the report lists all changes the proposed bill will make in existing law, cost estimate, and new budget authority.<sup>31</sup> Finally, the report records the views of the committee majority together with any concurring, dissenting, or minority views.

Many members noted that the report is invaluable as an information source. "It is just a good background summary of the bill" one member stated. Several members mentioned that members can determine their need for further study by examining the report. In one member's words, "If

there are minority or dissenting views, that indicates to me that there was trouble in committee and there is likely to be a floor fight. For that reason I conscientiously read them." This member also noted that members probably don't have to read the report to get the information from committee. "You'll get the points of view of the committee from committee members on the floor."

Party information packets distributed through whip networks are mentioned in twenty-two percent of the interviews, the third most frequently-mentioned information source. Both parties distribute packages of information to their members. The Democrats title their packet "Whip Advisory." It is prepared a week in advance, and members receive it usually the Friday before each new legislative week. It consists of a schedule of all bills to be called up to the floor for the following week, together with a synopsis of each bill. The synopsis lists the floor manager of the bill, gives a title by title summary of the bill, a background of the bill, dissenting views, and estimated cost. Republicans call their notice "Legislative Digest." It is published under the auspices of the House Republican Conference. Like the Democratic "Whip Advisory," it provides a schedule and summary of bills. The Republicans supplement the "Legislative Digest" with publications from the minority leaders office entitled "Legislative Alert." These are in-depth studies of major bills prepared by minority counsels to the parent committee. It should also be noted that the Democratic and Republican packages are made available on the floor as well as through the mail. Many members--especially those who seem to be on the fringes of their parties--acknowledged that they try to read information packages from both parties.

Publications of the DSG rank as the second most frequently cited information sources, having been mentioned by thirty percent of the interviewees.

As both Stevens, et al.<sup>32</sup> and Ferber<sup>33</sup> have written, the DSG was originally intended as a counter balance to the conservative coalition.

The DSG constituted an attempt--and there is some evidence available to conclude that it has been moderately successful<sup>34</sup>--to develop higher voting cohesion among liberal Democrats. The contemporary DSG, although continuing these efforts, has also secured a reputation on both sides of the aisle and among those of all persuasions as the congressional information source par excellence. In the first session of the 95th Congress, it had approximately 230 members.

DSG distributes four different publications: "Legislative Report," "Daily Report," "Special Reports," and "Fact Sheets." "Legislative Report," is issued weekly. It gives a complete schedule of the upcoming week's activities together with a summary of all bills. The particular utility of "Legislative Report" in comparison to party publications is that it anticipates the amendments that are expected to be offered. It also lists the arguments pro and con for each amendment. In a commentary section, "Legislative Report" lists the support and opposition of the administration and major interest groups. "Daily Report" is issued each day and provides a detailed, updated schedule for the particular day plus a last minute listing of possible amendments. "Special Reports" are in-depth discussions of issues that, although not presently up, are imminent. They are compiled by the legislative staff of the DSG and are intended to provide background information on the major bills of the session. "Fact Sheets" are detailed studies of major, controversial pieces of information that are coming up.

Members were effusive in their praise of the information value of DSG. Several Republicans confided that they belonged to DSG solely to receive the information packets. As one Republican noted, "It's the best information source up here." A Democrat pointed out that "It is a quick summary of issues that is put forth without pressure." Another Democrat said that "It is useful in telling us what is coming up, that it's coming up, and what consent and suspension stuff and amendments entail." Of a different order one member observed, "When the membership of a committee splits, DSG is good for an objective statement of pros and cons." Members frequently mentioned the information value of the special reports on the Strip Mining and Clean Air bills. These special reports seem obligatory reading for members. "If it's something I feel DSG will cover and review, I go to it," one member stated.

#### Personal Staff

The personal staff of a member was the most frequently cited source, mentioned in thirty-three percent of the decision cases.

The interviews revealed three uses of personal staff in information gathering: filtering and preparing, researching, and following debate.

The usual information input of staff is through the preparation of information packages and briefing papers. In this way, staff filters and distills information received from DSG, committee, other members, interest groups, party organizations, the Administration, and constituents. The following comment from a member serves to illustrate this staff function: "The staff breaks down a bill for me. They digest the information forwarded from DSG, sponsors, and constituency mail and then synthesize it."

Other members pointed to a research contribution. One member noted that

I don't get briefed by staff. I pick up basic information on the floor, especially in conversations with other members and the party stuff they have on the floor. For me, staff contributes by looking into questions.

Another member, a Republican, stated that my staff ". . . goes on the assumption that I've read "Legislative Alert." Their job is to get into it. If there is controversy in the report, that serves as a red flag to get to work on it." Another mentioned that he used staff to research things in which he gets interested and involved. "On those kinds of things where I see a problem, I put them to work. On the Pay Raise deal I had them do research on salary systems." Several members noted that staff research usually involves consultation with committee people and committee staffs and the staffs of other members, especially those in the state delegation and those with whom the member has ideological compatibility.

A final information contribution of staff stems from positioning staff in the House gallery to follow debate on hotly contested issues when the member cannot be present. Several members noted the utility of doing this when they are in committee and unable to be on the floor. In one members words, "This way I can keep abreast of developments in the committee of the whole and the business of amendments."

#### Outside Sources

Constituents and interest groups constitute the only real outside actors contributing information, and this contribution must be regarded as minimal since both were mentioned equally--only five percent of the time. The White House, a potential outside source, is mentioned only three percent of the time.

Members noted that information from the constituency is only rarely forwarded by average citizens. In fact, the only information input from individual constituents seems to come through members' district opinion polls. These tell the member what constituents know and think about bills. Information from constituents usually comes from groups in the district that are somehow affected by the bill in consideration--e.g., local public officials on grant programs, district industrial plants and auto dealers on Clean Air, and postal workers on Hatch Act revisions.

Although Clapp,<sup>35</sup> Jewell and Patterson,<sup>36</sup> Milbrath,<sup>37</sup> and Tacheron and Udall<sup>38</sup> have written of the information value of interest groups and lobbyists, it is surprising to discover that groups and their lobbyists are mentioned for only five percent of the decisions.

The few who did mention interest groups viewed them as providing information in one of two ways. First, as a senior Republican noted, "Pressure groups help by providing background materials." Such background information on bills is often routinely forwarded to members through the mail. Second, hearing from competing interest groups on a policy question provides the pros and cons of an issue. Those situations where groups were mentioned as information sources mainly involved narrow groups on specific issues such as tuna fishermen, grocers, and the Heinz Corporation on Marine Mammal; "right to work" committees and labor on Common Situs; coal companies on Strip Mining; government labor unions on the Energy Department; United Auto Workers on Clean Air; National Organization of Women (NOW) on Hyde; postal workers on Hatch; and pharmaceutical concerns and the American Diabetic Association on Saccharin. In commenting on interest groups and legislation, many members corroborated the notion of

Bauer et al. that interest groups deal only with legislators who are already sympathetic with the group's objectives.<sup>39</sup>

Member's Experience and Reading

Members noted that information is often provided by their general learning and experience, their experience with a similar bill in a previous session of Congress, and their general reading.

Five percent listed personal experience. Personal experience was felt to be helpful in the following ways. First, "Expertise accumulated before one comes to Congress can be relied on." Second, experience that results from a member's following of a policy issue for several years can be a source of information. In this way, one member felt sufficiently informed on the FAA vote since he had ". . . followed FAA matters for years." Another felt that his interest in foreign policy provided sufficient background on the Miller Amendment. Finally, a member's involvement with a bill provides him with information. Several members, not on the parent committee of a bill, emphasized that, due to constituency or personal interest, they had become active at the committee stage of a bill giving testimony, debating, following the hearings, etc. This kind of involvement was felt to provide "all the guidance one needs."

The experience one has with a policy issue "the last time it was through" was cited in eight percent of the interviews. For experienced members, routine authorizations and appropriations and bills such as Strip Mining, Countercyclical Aid, Common Situs, and the Hyde Amendment that "have been around for a while" pose no information problems. As one member noted, "These things tend to be the same as before--I don't have to look into them again." Another emphasized that "When they have been around for a few years, I have low information needs. I know what

the bill is." Even in the case of amendments, prior experience is helpful. "If you've experienced it once before, you know what the major issues are and you can let your personal experience guide you--even on the amendments."

Media and general reading were mentioned in eighteen percent of the interviews. Those who mentioned the media felt that the media provided them with background information on the Ethics Bill and on the Saccharin debate. The media most frequently mentioned were the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Congressional Quarterly.

#### Miscellaneous

In addition to the above noted sources, a number of miscellaneous information sources were identified, although not by any great numbers of members. These miscellaneous sources of information are: committee staff ("especially the staffers on subcommittee who wrote the bill--more than anyone they can help members understand what the bill does"), membership on another committee (Ways and Means and budget committee members mentioned they received information on major bills by virtue of their membership on those committees), copies of the actual bill and amendments, class organizations, Republican ad hoc groups (such as the Society of Statesmen and the Republican Study Committee), study organizations such as the Democratic Research Organization that services southern Democrats, the bicameral, bipartisan "Environmental Study Group," and the liberal "Members of Congress for Peace through Law." Republicans noted that their party's practice of scheduling and stationing younger members on the floor as monitors was an additional source of information for the monitor and others who could turn to him.

Also mentioned were the White House and federal bureaucrats. The White House was seen as a source of information on the Energy Department vote and on the R&D vote where the Carter administration provided the breakdown of aid by states and congressional districts for alternative allocation formulae. Bureaucrats were viewed as helpful on School Lunch [HEW], Saccharin [HEW, FDA] and the Water Projects vote (Army Corp of Engineers).

Finally, sponsorship of a bill and, more important, membership on the parent committee is seen as a source of information. Carroll has argued that less than a majority of the membership of a committee's membership are "efficient" in terms of the committee's business.<sup>40</sup> For those who are, however, hearings and the testimony of witnesses is a valuable information resource. In the words of one member, "If I pay attention on committee, I have no reason to read party, committee or group synopses."

Two major conclusions can be drawn from the above general descriptions.

First, congressional information sources can be differentiated on two bases: directness and proximity. With regard to directness, there are 1) direct contacts that involve a personal, direct face to face relationship between the member and the source and 2) indirect sources that involve impersonal relationships. With regard to proximity, some sources provide information to the member at a point most proximate to the point of the decision while others are antecedent. Table 5.2 shows the classification of major sources according to these two variables.

Second, DSG publications, Whip Notices, the committee report and staff inputs act as carriers for information provided by other sources.

Table 5.2

**Classification of Major Congressional Information Sources by Proximateness and Directness**

		<u>Directness</u>	
		<u>Personal</u>	<u>Impersonal</u>
<u>Proximity</u>	<u>Proximate</u>	Committee Chairman Committee Members Other Members Party Leaders State Delegation Personal Staff	Doormen Caucus Recording Debate
	<u>Antecedent</u>	Committee Members Other Members State Delegation Personal Staff Dear Colleague Interest Groups Constituents	DSG Publications Whip Notice Media/Reading Committee Report Policy Committees

Both DSG and Whip Notices give the committee position. DSG provides positions taken by interest groups and by the Administration. The committee report contains the positions of key Congressmen and interest groups. Staff input often involves consultation with the committee and the staffs of other members, constituents, and bureaucrats. As such, these sources constitute collective channels of information.

#### Sources by Vote

Several members argued that they did in fact use the same information sources for each and every vote. One member described his standard procedure: "My staff gives me a packet for each bill that's up. It contains a copy of the bill, the Report, DSG, and samples of correspondence we've received on it." Another described a routine search process: "The day before the vote, I'll look at the bill, the Report, the Whip and DSG summaries, Legislative Staff Summary, a sample of the mail, and staff assessments of district relatedness."

Other members acknowledged a normal or typical scan for information but noted that there are some votes that do fall outside the realm of the routine. As one member emphasized, "Not all votes are normal. You use different sources on different votes." For another, "Ninety percent of my decisions do not involve substantive information. But, ten percent do."

Table 5.3 is a listing of information source by vote. It clearly shows that there is a good deal of variation in the mention of sources from vote to vote. There are votes on which normal sources (i.e., those most frequently mentioned such as DSG, staff, Whip Notices, and committee

Table 5.3

Information Sources by Vote: the Percentage of Interviews in Which Members Mentioned Various Information Sources on Different Votes

<u>Source</u>	<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Goldwater</u>	<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>FAA</u>
Committee Chairman	43%*	9%	0%	10%	0%	10%	0%
Committee Members	0	9	20	10	27	10	25
State Delegation	14	0	0	0	9	0	0
Party Leader	29	9	10	10	9	0	0
Whip Notice	0	18	40	30	9	0	0
Debate	7	36	0	60	18	20	0
Committee Report	0	0	20	20	9	10	13
Other Members	0	27	0	30	27	0	0
Personal Staff	14	9	30	30	46	60	0
Constituents	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Interest Groups	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Media/Reading	14	0	20	0	18	0	0
DSG	29	36	40	20	18	20	25
Personal Experience	0	0	0	0	18	0	0
Dear Colleague	0	18	0	10	0	0	13
Last Time	0	0	0	0	27	0	0

Table 5.3--Continued

<u>Source</u>	<u>Common Situs</u>	<u>Govt. Reorg.</u>	<u>House Assn.</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>
Committee Chairman	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	15%
Committee Members	15	0	31	10	20	18	10	15	
State Delegation	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	
Party Leader	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	8
Whip Notice	15	15	15	30	40	36	40	23	
Debate	8	8	0	6	0	27	20	0	
Committee Report	23	15	0	0	0	18	30	8	
Other Members	8	15	0	10	0	0	10	8	
Personal Staff	31	8	8	30	60	36	20	23	
Constituents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Interest Groups	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Media/Reading	0	23	23	0	0	0	10	8	
DSG	15	23	0	40	60	36	40	31	
Personal Experience	15	0	8	0	0	0	6	0	
Dear Colleague	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	
Last Time	23	0	0	0	20	27	20	39	

Table 5.3--Continued

<u>Source</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Foreign Aid</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde</u>	<u>Hatch</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
Committee Chairman	13%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%
Committee Members	38	0	20	0	8	13	9	12	6	6
State Delegation	13	0	7	7	0	13	0	6	6	6
Party Leader	13	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whip Notice	63	18	27	29	23	25	0	29	6	6
Debate	0	9	20	29	46	13	9	19	0	0
Committee Report	13	9	27	21	31	25	0	0	0	0
Other Members	0	9	40	7	0	0	9	29	0	0
Personal Staff	0	55	47	21	46	50	46	35	22	22
Constituents	0	0	13	7	15	0	46	6	11	11
Interest Groups	0	0	20	0	15	13	18	0	0	0
Media/Reading	0	18	13	21	15	13	73	47	39	39
DSG	25	46	67	36	39	25	0	53	17	17
Personal Experience	0	9	0	21	15	13	0	6	11	11
Dear Colleague	13	18	0	0	15	0	9	12	0	0
Last Time	13	9	13	36	8	0	0	0	0	0

\*Percentages represent the proportion of interviewees on that vote mentioning the information source.

Table 5.3--Continued

<u>Source</u>	<u>Energy Dept.</u>	<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Counter-Cyclical</u>	<u>HUD</u>	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>
Committee Chairman	0%	0%	11%	0%	0%	0%	9%
Committee Members	25	0	11	8	8	33	9
State Delegation	0	0	0	15	17	0	0
Party Leader	0	9	0	0	0	0	18
Whip Notice	38	9	22	15	17	33	45
Debate	38	55	33	15	8	25	36
Committee Report	19	0	44	8	17	50	27
Other Members	0	9	0	8	0	17	9
Personal Staff	31	27	0	77	67	50	46
Constituents	13	9	0	8	0	8	0
Interest Groups	6	0	0	0	0	25	0
Media/Reading	38	9	22	0	0	17	0
DSG	31	9	33	8	25	17	36
Personal Experience	6	0	0	8	8	8	0
Dear Colleague	0	9	0	0	8	0	9
Last Time	0	0	0	15	0	0	0

report] are relied on and other votes where atypical sources come into play. Moreover, reliance on normal sources varies from issue to issue. DSG is mentioned as an information source by sixty-seven percent of the interviewees on the Clean Air Act and by no member on the Saccharin vote. The mention of staff varies from a high of sixty-seven percent on HUD to no mention on FAA, Public Works conference, and the Second Budget. Whip notices are mentioned by as many as sixty-three percent on the Second Budget vote and by no member on the Ethics and the NASA votes. The committee report is cited as an information source by fifty percent of the interviewees on Marine Mammal and by more on Ethics and the Nuclear Navy.

Personal staff, DSG publications, Whip Notices, and committee reports are mentioned on practically all votes but were cited less on two types of votes: those that might be considered visible and salient and those that had been seen before. In both cases members had low information needs since they already had something on which to rely.

Whip Notices were mentioned most on fiscal votes (Tax, Budget), Arab Boycott, and EPA; infrequently on Ethics, Saccharin, the Pay Raise, Rhodesian Chrome, and amendments (Nuclear Navy, Snow Removal, and Foreign Aid reductions).

Committee reports were frequently mentioned when the committee was divided (Common Situs, Public Works, Marine Mammal, and the Hatch Act) or when the committee evinced unanimity on a controversial matter (Arab Boycott). Reports were not perceived as an important information source on major issues (Ethics, Rhodesian Chrome, Strip Mining, Energy Department, Saccharin, Water Projects, and the Pay Raise] on which the member himself was already likely to be informed and those low-grade

votes on which he might have received a synopsis of committee action from another source (Nuclear Navy, NASA, FAA, EPA, Romanian Earthquake, House Assassinations, Snow Removal, Countercyclical, HUD, and Foreign Aid).

Personal staff contributed the most on those votes that were either extremely controversial and complex (Rhodesian Chrome, Budget I, Foreign Aid, Clean Air, Hatch Act, and Saccharin) or low grade and complex (NASA, EPA, Marine Mammal) or involved grant programs (Countercyclical, HUD, and School Lunch). Personal staff was mentioned least on votes that members usually knew something about from conversations with other members (Ethics Nuclear Navy debate, Government Reorganization, House Assassinations, Public Works, the second Budget resolution, the Hyde Amendment, and the Pay Raise).

DSG input was highest on issues that were hot but complex (Tax, Arab Boycott, Clean Air, and the Water Projects) and those low grade votes for which little information was available (Romanian Earthquake, EPA, and Foreign Aid). It was lowest on relatively straight forward hot issues and all types of issues for which information was plentiful.

Other sources, not so prominent in the total breakdown of sources, were mentioned with a high frequency on certain bills, indicating that the information contributions of various atypical sources are highly contextual.

Committee chairmen were mentioned in forty-three percent of the interviews concerning the Ethics vote.

Committee members were mentioned when they themselves became major combatants on the floor: House Assassinations, Marine Mammal, and the second Budget resolution.

State delegation members were most prominent as an information source on two major grant programs: Countercyclical and HUD.

Party leaders were perceived by many as informative on the Ethics vote.

Debate was most mentioned as an information source on those bills that were handled on short suspenses (amendments such as Nuclear Navy, Goldwater, and Snow Removal) and those bills that tended to involve a high level of disagreement (Energy Department, the first Budget vote, and the Hatch Act revisions).

Other members not on the committee or in the state delegation were most prominently mentioned on both the Clean Air Act and the Goldwater Amendment--two instances of attempts by floor members to override the committee.

Constituents were mentioned as an information source in forty-seven percent of the interviews on Saccharin. Constituents were also slightly mentioned on other hot bills such as the Energy Department Bill, Clean Air, and the Hatch revisions.

Interest groups were mentioned by approximately twenty percent on Common Situs, Marine Mammal, and Clean Air--issues where groups did make a determined effort to influence Congress.

Media/reading was an information factor on the highly visible votes: Tax, Common Situs, Energy Department, Hyde, Saccharin, Water Projects, and Pay Raise.

Personal experience was mentioned in approximately one-fifth of the interviews concerning both Rhodesian Chrome and the Hyde Anti-Abortion Amendment--issues that had been faced in the previous Congress.

Dear colleague letters were judged as an information source on the Foreign Aid cut vote.

Experience the last time up was viewed as important by some on four votes: Rhodesian Chrome, Debt Collection Practices, Strip Mining, and

the Anti-Abortion Amendment.

To summarize the distribution of sources by vote, data presented in Table 5.3 shows that there is significant variation, according to vote, in member use of various normal as well as atypical information sources. Normal sources (DSG, party material, staff, committee report) are used if the member has an information need--i.e., if the vote is both unfamiliar to him and at least somewhat important. These normal sources are supplemented by atypical sources under various special circumstances.

Testing the specific relationships of Proposition 6 (that low-profile votes will be dominated primarily by narrow sources of information, while hot issues will involve broader input) with Table 5.3 provides results that are inconclusive. Supportive is the finding that extremely high profile votes--Strip Mining, Clean Air, Hyde, and Water Projects--involve high levels of input from the member's own general reading of media. Disconfirming is the finding that on low-profile votes such as NASA, FAA, EPA, HUD, Countercyclical, Marine Mammal, and School Lunch, information is provided not by committee members or affected interest groups, but by DSG, Whip Reports, and staff. Yet, there is the possibility that these normal sources may very well be based on subsystem sources.<sup>41</sup>

#### Sources by Issue Characteristics

Information sources were arrayed by issue characteristic. These distributions are contained in Appendix F.

These data do not show a marked variation in information sources by issue characteristics. Only eleven percent of the arrays involve distributions where the mention of a source varies more than nine percent under different values of the same issue characteristic.

These variations of nine percent or greater do permit the identification of some correlates of information sources--i.e., the values of issue characteristics under which a source is more likely to be mentioned than not. Table 5.4 presents these significant correlates of each information source.

The issue characteristic that is associated with the most variation is type of rule. It is associated with the variations of four sources, indicating that, on closed rules, party Whip Notices provide information, while under more open circumstances the member relies on staff and personal reading. Other characteristics associated with the variation of at least three sources are: complexity, constituency awareness, renomination effects, margin of the rule, and presidential involvement. Characteristics not associated with any variations are conflict, major status, CQ Story, Washington Post Box Score, Index of Likeness, and amount of money. The three categories of indicators--perceptual, objective, and subjective--are associated with an equal percent of variations.

With regard to the specific relationship between type of source and kind of vote, the breakdown of sources by issue characteristics offers only mixed support for proposition 6. Supportive is the fact that committee members, presumably a narrow information source, are more apt to be mentioned on complex and technical votes. Yet, contrary to proposition 6, Whip Notices and DSG Publications, presumably broader sources (although as mentioned earlier, they may in fact be based on the committee), are also prevalent in many low profile situations. Also disconfirming are the following findings: a) Whip notices are more often mentioned on issues involving low constituency awareness, and the absence of perceived renomination and reelection effects and b) DSG is mentioned when the issue is defined as complex, technical, and not involving constituency awareness or renomination or reelection effects.

Table 5.4

**Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Information Sources**  
 (These Correlates are Based on Variations of Nine Percent or More)

<u>Committee Chairman</u>	<u>Committee Member</u>	<u>Debate</u>	<u>Whip Notice</u>	<u>Committee Report</u>
No correlates observed	Complex (LP) Technical (LP) Closed rule (H) Congress modifies (H)	No renomination effects (LP) Routineness (LP) Above average rule margin (LP) Above average policy time (H) Presidential involvement (H)	Salient (H) Constituents unaware (LP) No renomination effects (LP) Closed rule (H) Above average rule margin (LP) Minority report (H)	Congress as modifier (H) Above average policy time (H) Above average Republican unity (LP) Amendment over committee objection (H) Republican endorsement (H)
State Delegation				
No correlates mentioned				Closed rule (H)
Party Leader				

Table 5.4--Continued

<u>Other Members</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Media</u>	<u>DSG</u>	<u>Last Time</u>
Above average rule margin (LP)	Complex (LP)	Constituency aware (H)	Complex (LP)	Minority report (H)
No Republican endorsement (LP)	Constituency not aware (LP)	Mail (H)	Technical (LP)	Congress as initiator (H)
Policy change (H)	No strong feeling (LP)	Tough (H)	No constituency awareness (LP)	Above average policy time (H)
<u>Constituency</u>	Thought (H)	Modified open rule (LP)	Mail (H)	Not new (H)
	Open rule (LP)	Rise (LP)	No renomination effects (LP)	
	Above average rule margin (LP)	Defeated status (H)	Tough (H)	
	Congress modifies (H)	Committee consensus (LP)	Thought (H)	
	No presidential involvement (LP)	Washington Post story (H)	Minority report (H)	
	Thought (H)	No Republican endorsement (LP)	Below average Democratic unity (H)	
<u>Interest Groups</u>	CQ box score (H)	New (H)	Democratic Change (H)	
		Specific (LP)	Democratic endorsement (H)	
<u>Personal Experience</u>			No presidential involvement (LP)	
	Mail (H)		H = Presumed hot value	
			LP = Presumed low profile value	
			= Variation of twenty percent or more	
<u>Dear Colleague</u>				
	No presidential involvement (LP)			

Thus, in sum, the data in Table 5.4 show that the use of information sources varies according to only some issue characteristics. Variation in members' mention of information sources occurs more by vote than by issue characteristics.

### Controls

A reading of general literature concerning congressional information sources together with statements of members suggests that the use of various sources may be related to certain member background characteristics. As Ornstein has written, "Legislative information is not a monolithic entity. Different legislators, at different times, will have very different information requirements before being able to cast votes."<sup>42</sup>

Several of the participants in the study noted that seniority strongly affects the member's use of information sources. As one expressed,

The first term you're here, you must rely on the legislative system—I mean you must turn to other members and something like DSG. After that, you develop a familiarity with the stuff that comes through—you know, these routine authorizations and appropriations. You get to know what they are.

Other more senior members, especially those on Ways and Means and Appropriations, noted that senior members usually do not have time to keep up with the flow of information. As a senior Democrat on Ways and Means emphasized, "I'm too busy to read the Report, DSG, and Whip Advisories. I rely on my own network and my past experience."

To examine the relationship between source and seniority and other possible relationships with other background variables, cross-tabulations were run between selected sources and selected background characteristics. Only a few significant relationships were discovered.

Table 5.5 displays the more meaningful relationships between use of source and member's background factors. Those data show that background controls do account for some variation, although slight, in members' use of sources. Southern Democrats and Republicans tend to rely on Whip Notices more than Northern Democrats. Freshmen use Whip Notices at a rate twice as high as their more senior counterparts. It is interesting that those with below average party support scores mention party whip notices at a slightly higher rate than those with higher scores. Those with above average ADA scores mention DSG at a rate twice as high as those with below average scores. Junior members reference committee reports slightly more frequently than more senior representatives. Finally, those with above average presidential support scores for the 95th Congress are slightly more likely to mention the White House as an information source than those with scores below average.

In addition to background controls, it was thought that input from individual actors and force field volume may provide alternative explanations to variable use of information sources. Specifically, it was felt that, with regard to individual sources, if an actor was perceived by the member to be making a decision input, the actor would be more likely to be mentioned by the member as an information source. Also, with regard to force field volume, it was felt that a low volume of communications would likely be associated with normal information sources while a high volume would be associated with atypical ones.

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 display sources with control by force field input and force field volume. As will be recalled from Chapter IV, force field is a concept used by John Kingdon to identify all the relevant communications a member recalls concerning a particular decision. Generally

Table 5.5

**Meaningful Relationships between Use of Information Sources and Member's Background Characteristics: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Information Sources Under Various Control Categories**

% Mentioning Use of Whip Notice	<u>Party</u>			
	Northern Democrats	Southern Democrats	Republicans	
	18%	21%	31%	
<u>Length of Service</u>				
% Mentioning Use of Whip Notice	Fresh.	2-5 years	6-11 years	12+ years
	31%	24%	18%	16%
<u>Party Unity 214</u>				
% Mentioning Use of Whip Notice	<u>Below Average</u>		<u>Above Average</u>	
	27%		20%	
<u>ADA Scores</u>				
% Mentioning Use of DSG	<u>Below Average</u>		<u>Above Average</u>	
	19%		37%	
<u>Length of Service</u>				
% Mentioning Use of the Report	Fresh.	2-5 years	6-11 years	12+ years
	16%	17%	10%	12%
<u>Presidential Support Scope 95th Congress</u>				
% Mentioning Use of White House	<u>Below Average</u>		<u>Above Average</u>	
	8%		14%	

Table 5.6

**Information Sources Controlled by Force Field Sources: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned an Information Source After Mentioning Source as a Force Field Input**

<u>Mention of Chairman as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Chairman as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 1%	<b>Yes</b> 21%
<u>Mention of Committee Member as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Committee Member as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 5%	<b>Yes</b> 28%
<u>Mention of State Delegation as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of State Delegation as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 1%	<b>Yes</b> 10%
<u>Mention of Party Leader as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Party Leader as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 2%	<b>Yes</b> 17%
<u>Mention of Other Members as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Other Members as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 6%	<b>Yes</b> 16%
<u>Mention of Personal Staff as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Personal Staff as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 15%	<b>Yes</b> 58%
<u>Mention of Constituents as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Constituents as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 2%	<b>Yes</b> 11%
<u>Mention of Private Groups as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of Private Groups as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 2%	<b>Yes</b> 17%
<u>Mention of White House as Input</u>		
<b>Mention of the White House as Information Source</b>	<b>No</b> 1%	<b>Yes</b> 16%

Table 5.7

Information Sources Controlled by Force Field Volume: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Information Sources when Force Field Volume is Below and Above Average

	<u>Force Field Volume</u>	
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>
<u>Normal</u>	Whip Notice	23%
	DSG	27
	Report	17
	Personal Staff	29
	Committee Members	11
<u>Atypical</u>	White House	9%
	Constituents	3
	Interest Groups	3

the data in Table 5.5 support the supposition that a member's information sources are related to who he hears from and from how many he hears.

Table 5.6 clearly shows that the probability that an actor will be mentioned as an information source is significantly increased if that member is first mentioned as an input.

Table 5.7 displays information sources as controlled for by force field volume. It supports two conclusions. First, all of the atypical sources are more likely to be an information source when force field volume is above average. Secondly, normal sources seem to be relatively unaffected by force field volume. Only personal staff seems to be appreciably mentioned more when force field volume is above average. Committee reports and Whip Notices are mentioned more, however, when force field volume is below average. In sum, Congressmen pay attention to normal information sources when the communications volume is lower. When the volume is higher, certain atypical sources are more likely to be mentioned along with normal sources, while committee report is not likely to be as important.

#### Conclusion to Proposition 6

To conclude the discussion of proposition 6, tests by vote reveal that members mention different information sources on different pieces of legislation. Evidently, different issues pose different information needs for the member that cannot be satisfied by consistently referencing a single source or a set of sources. In most instances, normal information channels suffice. Under several noted special circumstances, however, members turn to atypical sources. Although there are slight relationships between member background and information sources and between force field

characteristics and information sources, the relationship between source and type of vote seems independent of them. Few relationships exist between source and issue characteristics.

B. PROPOSITION 7: The Volume (How Many Sources) of Information A Congressman Refers to Varies According to the Kind of Issue Involved

A major conclusion in Kingdon is that ". . . Congressmen confine their searches for information only to the most routine and easily available sources."<sup>43</sup> Applying the theories of "problemistic search" and "satisficing" to the legislative information network, Kingdon concludes that most Congressmen ". . . engage in an extended search for information only rarely . . ."<sup>44</sup> In other words, most members use the same search procedures on most issues.

In describing their own information procedures, several members corroborated the notion of a single process. When asked "From where did you obtain information," several answered, "the usual process" or "the normal procedure." The following quotes are examples of members' descriptions of standardized procedures for all decisions:

If I do anything, I take a passing look at DSG.

For most votes, you know all you have to to make a yea or nay decision. There is no need for extended research.

I rely totally on DSG, Library of Congress stuff and Ways and Means staff.

I read the Whip Advisory on everything and get it all from there.

The conditional approach implies a process that is much more variable. It is inferred that low grade issues involve no more than perfunctory search, but hot issues witness an extraordinary, broader search for information. Kingdon accepts the notion of a variable search process. In his words, "There is more

reading, talking, and seeking out of information during consideration of the highest-salience issues than with other issues."<sup>45</sup> But, this occurs only rarely for the member ". . . only when confronted with some unusual problems."<sup>46</sup>

Several members spoke of a pronounced variation in information scan, as shown by the following statements:

To inform myself, I merely go to two or three on each side and hear what they have to say. If I'm confused, I go to two or three more.

Intense conflict clearly raises a different perspective. Routine matters involve different information gathering procedures than those not so routine. On those not so routine you must visit with other members.

For every vote you try to get all the facts. Sometimes you can do this by just going to DSG publications. At other times, especially when the vote is controversial and my constituency is involved or affected, I go to committee members, state delegation members, and, if I have to, to debate.

What is a routine information procedure on one issue may not be routine for another. What's routine for one member may not be routine to another because of interest and involvement.

To test proposition 7 and to address the disparity between the routine and variable perspectives, two tests were made.

First, the number of information sources cited in each interview session were counted and categorized as being above or below the mean number of contacts (the average for all respondents was approximately two information sources for vote). The distribution of above and below mean sources were then cross-tabulated by vote and issue characteristics' indicators. It was felt that if proposition 7 is correct, the number of members having above mean sources should vary from issue to issue, with hot issues involving a preponderance of above mean sources.

The second test involves inspection of the responses of all members for whom four or more questionnaires are available. It was felt that if proposition 7 is valid, the responses of those who were interviewed

numerous times should evince diversified search procedures, as seen in the mention of different sources on different votes.

Table 5.8 displays a general frequency distribution of all members for all issues. Overall, most members relied on only one or two sources when making a decision, giving superficial support to the perfunctory scan generalization. It is interesting that for seven percent of the decisions, no information source was mentioned. In these cases, members acknowledged that "There wasn't much on it."

Cross-tabulations by both votes and by issue characteristics reveal meaningful variation in information search.

Table 5.9 shows that how many information sources members refer to depends on the vote at hand. The percent of members with above mean information sources varies from vote to vote, from a high of eighty percent on Clean Air to a low of thirteen percent on the FAA vote. For eight of the votes studied--including some of the more controversial ones such as the Arab Boycott, Energy Department, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, and Water Projects--more than half of those interviewed had above mean information sources. In contrast, for twelve votes, less than thirty percent of the interviewees had above mean information sources. The twelve are basically of three types: 1) low grade votes (FAA, House Assassinations, NASA, Romanian Earthquake, Public Works, and HUD), 2) votes with short parliamentary suspense (Nuclear Navy, Snow Removal, and Saccharin), and 3) hot votes for which the member is usually already fairly well informed (Pay Raise, Ethics, and the Budget).

Tables 5.10 to 5.12 show significant variation in the information volume by issue characteristics. Fifty percent of the distributions involve variation in above mean information sources in excess of nine percent.

Table 5.8

Frequency Distribution of Information Sources: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Various Numbers of Information Sources

<u>Number of Sources</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	7%
1	29
2	26
3	23
4	10
5	5
6	1

Table 5.9

Percent Volume of Information by Vote: the Percentage of Interviews in which Member Cited an Above Average Number of Information Sources (i.e., Three or More Sources) on Selected Votes

<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Supplemental Housing</u>	<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>FAA</u>	<u>Common Status</u>	<u>House Assassination</u>
% Above the Mean	29%	18%	40%	66%	46%	30%	13%	31%
% Above the Mean	Romanian Earthquake	EPA	Arab Boycott	Strip Mining	Energy Department	Snow Removal	Public Works	Counter-Cyclical
% Above the Mean	20%	40%	60%	31%	56%	18%	22%	46%
% Above the Mean	Debt Collection	Tuna	Budget I	Budget II	Foreign Aid	Clean Air	Hyde	Hatch
% Above the Mean	School Lunch	Saccharin						
% Above the Mean	38%	27%						
						65%	22%	

Table 5.10

**Information Volume\* by Perceptual Issue Characteristics: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Cited an Above Average Number of Information Sources (i.e., Three or More Sources) Under Various Conditions of Perceptual Indicators**

Above Mean Number of Sources	Complex		Technical		Conflict		Major	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	(34%)	(50%)	(35%)	(49%)	(31%)	(48%)	46%	48%
<u>Saliency</u>								
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
37%	42%	40%	41%	(37%)	(57%)*	42%	38%	
<u>Reelection Effects</u>								
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
42%	36%	63%	55%	45%	37%	(42%)	(57%)	34%
<u>Feeling</u>								
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
42%	36%	63%	55%	45%	37%	(42%)	(57%)	34%
<u>Tough</u>								
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
42%	36%	63%	55%	45%	37%	(42%)	(57%)	34%
<u>Thought</u>								
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
42%	36%	63%	55%	45%	37%	(42%)	(57%)	34%

\*Volume = Number of sources  
 { } = Variation of ten percent or more among categories  
 { } = Variation of twenty percent or more

Table 5.11

**Information Volume by Objective Characteristics:** the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Cited an Above Average Number of Information Sources (i.e., Three or More Sources) under Various Conditions of Objective Indicators

Above Mean Number of Sources	Rule			Margin of Rule			Margin of Passage		
	Open		Modified Open	Closed	Below Average		Above Average	Defeat	Close
	(44%)	38%	32%	(27%)	41%		37%	45%	39%
<b>Democratic Party Unity</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	Below Average	Above Average	Below Average	Average	Below Average	Average	Below Average	Average	Average
	42%	36%	36%		36%	40%	40%	37%	
<b>Amendment over Committee Objective</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	Below Average	Average	Below Average	Average	Below Average	Average	Average
	34%	43%	34%		38%	39%	39%	36%	
<b>CQ Story</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Init.	Mod.	Rate
	32%	40%	33%	42%	38%	39%	(40%)	(44%)	(17%)
<b>Presidential Endorsement</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	42%	44%	(35%)	48%	40%	35%	38%	40%	34%
<b>Role of Congress</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Below Average	Average	Average
	32%	40%	33%	42%	38%	39%	(40%)	(44%)	(17%)
<b>Committee Vote</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	34%	43%	34%	43%	38%	39%	(32%)	(44%)	36%
<b>Minority Report</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	34%	43%	34%	43%	38%	39%	(32%)	(44%)	36%
<b>Time Frame</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Below Average	Average	Average
	32%	40%	33%	42%	38%	39%	(40%)	(44%)	(17%)
<b>Index of Likeness</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	34%	43%	34%	43%	38%	39%	(32%)	(44%)	36%
<b>Force Field Volume</b>									
Above Mean Number of Sources	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	34%	43%	34%	43%	38%	39%	(32%)	(44%)	36%

( ) = Variation of ten percent or more among categories

( / ) = Variation of nine percent

( )\* = Variation of twenty percent or more

Table 5.12

Information Volume by Subjective Issue Characteristics: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Cited an Above Average Number of Information Sources (i.e., Three or more Sources) under Various Conditions of Perceptual Indicators

Above Mean Number of Sources	<u>Newness</u>		<u>Specificity</u>		<u>Change</u>	
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>
	39%	38%	39%	37%	(31%)	43%

( ) = Variation of ten percent or more among categories

A higher volume of information sources is associated with votes considered complex, technical, conflictual, major, and tough, and those involving mail, an open rule, above average adoption of the rule, an amendment over committee objection, a minority report, Washington Post Box Score, Congress as initiator and modifier, above average policy time frame, Steering and Policy Committee policy endorsements, and above average force field volume. Most of the correlates of high volume information are hot characteristics. Exceptions are those votes defined as complex and technical. Arrays by these characteristics reveal that extended search occurs on both hot and low profile issues. Although one member insisted that "On old issues, there just isn't an information need," this study shows no difference in terms of information volume between old and new policy questions.

The second test--inspection of information processes of the fifty-one members for which there are four or more questionnaires--reveals that eighty percent of the interviewed legislators evince what might be described as a diversified information process. They mention different sources and have a different information volume on different pieces of legislation. For only twenty percent of the legislators for whom four or more questionnaires were collected was there anything resembling a routine search procedure--i.e., use of the same sources and the same information scan in most cases.<sup>47</sup>

#### Controls

Interviews suggested that there may be relationships between information volume and whether a member voted yea or nay, a member's election status, and length of service. With regard to yea or nay, a

member argued that "If you're for it, there is no need to get into a vote. You tend to sluff off." With regard to election status, several members noted that those who are electorally insecure "need to get into it more because the ramifications of their actions are more awesome." Finally, numerous legislators contended that junior members, in comparison to those more senior, have information needs that require extensive search.

Table 5.13 exhibits information volume as controlled by these variables. These data show that there are meaningful differences in the volume of information a member references and these variables. Those who vote yea (not nay as the member insisted), are electorally marginal, from a switch district, more junior, and have a higher volume of information.

#### Conclusion to Proposition 7

To conclude the discussion of proposition 7, on some issues, members make a perfunctory scan, and on others they engage in extraordinary search. These variations do not neatly coincide according to a hot/low profile distinction. Instead, search seems to vary more by complexity/technicality, parliamentary suspense, as well as by hot/low profile status. High volume search is associated with hot issues that do not personally affect the member, votes without short parliamentary suspense, and low profile votes that are complex and technical. On these kind of votes, members are likely to refer to many sources of information.

Table 5.13

Relationships Between Number of Information Sources Cited and Certain Background Characteristics of Members: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Above Average Information Sources (Three or More Sources) under Various Control Categories

<u>Percent with an Above Average Information Volume</u>	<u>Controls</u>		
	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>Vote</u>	
	<u>Member Voted Yes</u>	<u>Member Voted No</u>	
	34%	41%	
<b>Election Results</b>			
	<u>Close Seats</u>	<u>Members from Marginal Seats</u>	<u>Safe Seats/</u>
	15%	44%	39%
<b>District Party Control Switch Status</b>			
	<u>Members from Switch District</u>	<u>Members not from Switch District</u>	
	52%	38%	
<b>Length of Service</b>			
	<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>
	48%	42%	34%
			<u>12+ years</u>
			25%

/Classification by election results are based on 1976 election results according to the following categories:

Close = 50% to 52% of the vote;  
 Marginal is from 52% to 55%; and  
 Safe is 55% plus.

C. PROPOSITION 8: The Member's Perception of the Adequacy of Information Varies According to the Kind of Issue at Hand

General

Although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, lack of information is considered a characteristic of the congressional information process, in only eleven percent of the interviews did members note that they felt inadequately informed.

Table 5.14 gives the distribution of responses to the question: "How informed did you feel on this decision?" It shows that most classify their level of information in the "moderate" or "somewhat" category and the "very well" category. Table 5.15 presents a list of verbal descriptions that members offered for each of the response categories available to them for the level of information question. It shows that those classifying their information level as "not much" do not feel informed on the issue and feel their knowledge is below average. Conversely, those classifying their information as "very well" consider themselves to be above average in knowledge, due to either committee responsibilities or intimate involvement. Those classifying their information level as "somewhat" fall somewhere in between. They feel they have enough information to adequately or comfortably make a yea/nay vote.

Level by Vote

The distribution of responses to the question on level of information by vote reveals that a member's level of information varies from vote to vote. Table 5.16 presents this distribution. "Not much" responses vary from a high of sixty percent mention on the FAA vote to a low of no

Table 5.14

Distribution of Responses to the Question: "How Informed Did You Feel on This Decision?"

Level of Information

Not Much	11%
Somewhat	46%
Very Well	43%

N = 351

Table 5.15  
Verbal Responses to Closed Answer Question  
Concerning Level of Information

<u>Not Much</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Very Well</u>
<p>"very limited"            "didn't know"            "don't know enough"            "below average"            "barely"            "extremely technical"            "too specific"            "inadequate, but typical"            "not that much"            "uninformed"</p>	<p>"close"            "not well enough"            "I don't know for some"            "comfortable"            "reasonably well"            "not on committee"            "for all I have to do"            "better than most"            "relatively well informed"            "average"            "enough to vote on it"            "not as well as I could be"            "not well!"            "pretty well!"            "didn't know at: the issues"            "marginal"            "superficially"            "not an expert"            "as much as any"            "not a lot of knowledge"            "fairly well"            "not too much"            "not detailed knowledge"            "can handle"            "don't know details"</p>	<p>"really know"            "more than the average member"            "one of the areas I'm interested in"            "well"            "due to a lot of staff work"            "from debate"            "most aren't in know this well"            "on the committee"            "not unless it affects you"            "local issue"            "on sub-committee"</p>

Table 5.16

**Level of Information by Vote: Distribution of Responses, by Vote, to the Question "How Informed did you Feel?"**

<u>Level of Information</u>	<u>Vote</u>				<u>Vote</u>			
	<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Goldwater</u>	<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>FAA</u>	
Not Much	0%	0%	20%	10%	9%	56%	60%	
Somewhat	14	82	60	80	27	33	40	
Very Well	86	18	20	10	64	11	0	

<u>Level of Information</u>	<u>Vote</u>				<u>Vote</u>			
	<u>Common Situs</u>	<u>Govt. Reorg.</u>	<u>House Assn.</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>
Not Much	0%	15%	23%	50%	0%	9%	0%	25%
Somewhat	33	54	31	40	100	64	80	42
Very Well	67	31	46	10	0	27	20	33

Table 5.16-Continued

<u>Level of Information</u>	<u>Energy Department</u>	<u>Vote</u>			<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>
		<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Counter-Cyclical</u>		
Not Much	0%	18%	33%	8%	17%	8%
Somewhat	50	46	11	67	33	55
Very Well	50	36	55	25	50	45

<u>Level of Information</u>	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Vote</u>			<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
		<u>Foreign Aid</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde Hatch</u>				
Not Much	0%	0%	20%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%
Somewhat	38	40	53	21	46	50	55	59
Very Well	63	60	27	79	54	25	45	41

mention on Ethics and several other votes. "Very well" responses vary from ninety-four percent on the pay raise to no mention on the FAA vote. Low profile votes such as NASA, FAA, and Romanian Earthquake are associated with above average "not much" responses and below average responses in the "somewhat" and "very well" categories. Hot votes such as Ethics, Rhodesian Chrome, Common Situs, Energy Department, the second Budget, Hyde Amendment and Pay Raise are associated with inordinately high "very well" responses and zero percent in the "not much" category. Low profile or short suspense bills such as Nuclear Navy, Goldwater Amendment, Marine Mammal, EPA, and Arab Boycott and complex/technical/specialized votes such as Tax and Clean Air are associated with below average "very well" responses.

The reasons for these variations are best provided in members' words. One member noted,

We are usually prepared on major bills and significant amendments to them. Divisions in committee which occur on important votes provide safeguards by communicating to the member that there will be a fight, and be better inform himself. On things not so important, you fly by the seat of your pants.

Another argued that

The more controversy, the more you'll know about it. If you are to be respected by your colleagues, you should be able to talk the pros and cons on an issue. When there is less controversy and emotion and more complexity, a member is not likely to know.

Another noted that

On major bills you get stuff from the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Organization, and party and factional groups. There is usually an abundance of information that allows you to get familiar with basic issues. On minor issues you just don't get much information. You often have to guess.

### Level By Issue Characteristics

The array of level of information by various indicators of issue characteristics reveals that there are meaningful differences in perceived level of information among various values of issue characteristics. The arrays are presented in Appendix G, with significant differences specially marked. More than sixty-five percent of these distributions involve meaningful differences (in excess of nine percent variation) among values of issue characteristics.

The issue characteristics' correlates of information level provide overwhelming support for the directional relationships predicted by proposition 6. These correlates, based on variations of nine percent or more, are exhibited in Table 5.17. "Not much" responses are associated with only low profile values. All of the correlates of "very well" responses are, with only one exception, hot values. Correlates of "somewhat" responses are, with a few exceptions, low profile values.

### Controls

Several members suggested that a member's perception of his level of information may be a function of seniority. The newer members, due to the lack of seniority, the reasoning went, would be more likely than more senior members to classify their decision as involving "not much" information. A cross-tabulation of level of information and length of service, however, revealed no meaningful differences.

### Conclusions to Proposition 8

Congressmen view their level of information in varying degrees depending on the kind of issue involved. On hot issues they feel relatively

Table 5.17

**Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Levels of Information**

(These correlations are based on variations of nine percent or more)

<u>Not Much</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Very Well</u>
No conflict (LP)	Complex (LP)	Not complex (H)
Constituency not aware (LP)	No conflict (LP)	Not technical (H)
No mail (LP)	Not major (LP)	Conflict (H)
Routine (LP)	Constituency not aware (LP)	Major (H)
No thought (LP)	No mail (LP)	Salient (H)
Modified open rule (LP)	No renomination effects (LP)	Constituency aware (H)
Comfortable margin of passage (LP)	No reelection effects (LP)	Mail (H)
No CQ story (LP)	Routine (LP)	Renomination effects (H)
No <u>Washington Post</u> story (LP)	No strong feelings (LP)	Reelection effects (H)
Congress ratifies (LP)	Above average rule margin (LP)	Not routine (H)
Above average Democratic party unity (LP)	Close final passage (H)	Feeling (H)
	Committee dissensus (H)	Thought (H)
	No minority report (LP)	Closed rule (H)
	No <u>Washington Post</u> box score (LP)	Below average rule margin (H)
	No Republican party endorsement (LP)	Final passage defeated (H)
	Presidential involvement (H)	Minority report (H)
		CQ story (H)
		<u>Washington Post</u> score (H)
		<u>Washington Post</u> story (H)
		Congress initiates (H)
		Below Democratic party unity (H)
		Below average likeness (H)
		Democratic party endorse- ment (H)
		Republican party endorse- ment (H)
		Above average money (H)
		No presidential involve- ment (LP)

H = Presumed hot value

LP = Presumed low profile value

. = Variation of twenty percent or more

well informed. On low-grade votes, perhaps due to the lack of incentives and interest, they perceive their information to be relatively scant.

#### D. Summary and Conclusions

Students of Congress have formulated three major generalizations concerning congressional information: (1) Kovenock's finding that other members are the main source of a Congressman's information, (2) Kingdon's conclusion that Congressmen confine their information searches to routine sources and "only rarely" go beyond them, and (3) Davidson et al.'s conclusion that most members perceive an information deficiency when voting.

This chapter has examined the contextual nature of congressional information and has revealed a process much more variable than implied by previous research. An examination of three aspects of congressional information from the perspective of the member--sources, volume, and adequacy--has revealed that the sources members utilize, their search procedures, and their perceptions of their own level of information vary according to different kinds of votes. Thus, for the congressional scholar, descriptions of congressional information seem better captured by the identification of contexts than by single models.

This chapter has revealed that members rely on many different sources of information. These sources are of both a personal and an impersonal nature and are disseminated both proximate to and antecedent from the vote. The most frequently mentioned sources are personal staff and various in-house publications and not other members as Kovenock has suggested. Use of information sources is variable. Normal sources (those most frequently mentioned such as personal staff, DSG publications, party

materials, and the committee report) satisfy usual information needs. Normal sources are supplemented by other actors and sources, however, under special circumstances. Variation in sources is not strongly related to either issue characteristics or to hot/low profile distinctions. Instead, variable use of information sources seems to be a function of member knowledge and need. If a member is unfamiliar with a vote, but it is somewhat important to him, he will consult with normal sources such as staff and congressional publications. Special contextual circumstances cause him to turn to other sources for various reasons. For example, committee members provide information when they are combatants. Debate is an information source when bills are handled on short suspense.

The search procedures of Congressmen are highly variable. The number of sources a member refers to prior to a floor vote varies from only a few on some votes to many on others. These variations are related to different values of issue characteristics but not solely in the direction of a hot/low profile distinction. Members search for more information when the issue is hot, when there is not parliamentary suspense, and when there are certain low grade issues that are hard to understand. Combining these findings with an inspection of questionnaires from members from whom four or more interviews were completed reveals a search process more varied than Kingdon's notion that members only occasionally deviate from routines.

How informed a member feels when casting a vote is also highly variable, and these variations do conform to the distinctions between hot and low grade issues. In contrast to Davidson, et al., members feel at least adequately prepared to cast a vote. On low profile votes, however, a disproportionate number admit to knowing "not much" on an issue. On

hot votes a disproportionate number perceive that they know an issue "very well." There is a very high (sixty-five percent) variation among different values of issue characteristics. These variations conform to a hot/low profile distinction, with hot characteristics associated with a higher level of perceived information and low profile characteristics associated with a lower level.

A major research question not examined in this chapter involves the actual sources from which congressional publications and personal staff receive the information that they forward to members. As Schneier notes, "There is a two-step flow of information within the legislature."<sup>48</sup> Yet, the initial source of information was not studied. Statements from various members and interviews with party and group information systems, however, do suggest that most of the information distributed by these sources is based on committee sources. This seems to corroborate Schneier's notion of "functional fragmentation"--i.e., that the information process in Congress is fragmented into policy subsystems.<sup>49</sup> The problem with this kind of system is that, in Schneier's words, "There are few general sources . . . of information."<sup>50</sup> If information is based on the committee system, there is no guarantee that multiple, competing points of view are being heard. Instead, if the committee is the major information source, floor information may be based on a homogeneous group of Congressmen. Committee recruitment patterns are such that members are attracted to a committee primarily because of constituency interests and case work responsibilities. In other words, most committee members are motivated by a sense of service to affected interest groups rather than to service to the public interest. If, then, committees are the major source of floor information,

an effort should be made to insure broad based representation on the committees of Congress.<sup>51</sup>

Members provided a number of insights concerning problems of the congressional information process. These perspectives are provided in Appendix H.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF DECISION DETERMINANTS

The most important component of the legislative decision-making map is, of course, the basis on which the member actually makes the decision. In the parlance of decision theorists, it is referred to as the "normative premise."

To explain why Congressmen vote as they do, political scientists have focused on two major concepts: determinants and roles. Decision determinant refers to the determinative cause of a Congressman's floor vote.<sup>1</sup> Role is the basic orientation with which the legislator approaches his decision responsibilities. In employing both concepts, analysts have assumed that a Congressman's decision-making is generally dominated by a single determinant and a single role. This chapter will investigate the variability of decision determinants. The next will examine role variability.

The enormous research efforts undertaken by political scientists to uncover why legislators vote as they do have identified a plethora of forces, factors, and actors that correlate with, cause, or explain the vote. These various determinants can be classified according to four categories, depending on how proximate they are to the vote and whether they are internal or external to the legislature or legislator. Table 6.1 classifies the major, identified causes according to four possible categories.

Actors internal to or within the legislature and proximate to the vote that have been identified as influential in congressional voting are

Table 6.1

**Forces, Factors and Actors Variously Identified  
As Determinants of Legislative Voting**

<u>External to the Legislature or Legislator</u>	<u>Internal to the Legislature or Legislator</u>
Constituents	Committee System
President	Friends
Bureaucrats	Classes
Lobbyists	Ideological Groups
	State Delegations
	Party Leaders
	Personal Staff
	Party
	Ideology
	Legislator's Demography
	Legislative Procedures
	Norms/Folkways
	Constituency Characteristics
	Media
	Electoral Outcomes
	Public Opinion
	Distal from the Vote

the committee system,<sup>2</sup> fellow members,<sup>3</sup> party leaders,<sup>4</sup> and a member's personal staff.<sup>5</sup>

Internal forces somewhat remote from the vote are party,<sup>6</sup> ideology,<sup>7</sup> legislator's demography,<sup>8</sup> legislative procedures,<sup>9</sup> and norms/folkways.<sup>10</sup>

External actors proximate to the vote are constituents,<sup>11</sup> the President,<sup>12</sup> bureaucrats,<sup>13</sup> and lobbyists.<sup>14</sup>

Factors external to the legislature and antecedent to the vote are constituency characteristics,<sup>15</sup> media,<sup>16</sup> electoral outcomes,<sup>17</sup> and public opinion.<sup>18</sup>

Many of those who identify these actors, forces, and factors presume that the determinant which they pinpoint determines most legislative voting. For example, for Turner "... party continues to be more closely associated with congressional voting behavior than any other discernible factor."<sup>19</sup> For Matthews and Stimson, as the subtitle of their work states, cue-taking is the "normal" decision-making procedure in the House.<sup>20</sup> For Clausen, most decisions are made on the basis of policy dimensions. In his words,

...legislators reduce the time and energy requirements of policy decision-making by (1) sorting specific policy proposals into a limited number of general policy content categories and by (2) establishing a policy position for each general category of policy content, one that can be used to make decisions on each of the specific proposals assigned to that category.<sup>21</sup>

Kingdon fosters a consensus mode theory. To him,

Congressmen begin their consideration of a given bill or amendment with one overriding question: Is it controversial? ...when there is no controversy in the Congressman's environment at all, his decision rule is simple: vote with the herd. ...If the Congressman does see some conflict in his total environment, . . . he proceeds. . . to the next step in the decisional flow chart.<sup>22</sup>

Each of these authors fails to emphasize that different legislators may be influenced by different determinants or that legislators may be alternately affected by various factors, depending on the decision situation.

In contrast, Lowi, Ripley and Franklin, and Price stress the contextual applicability of different decision referents. Lowi, and Ripley and Franklin, for example, argue that different forces are influential on different kinds of decisions. Although they do not specifically address determinants of decision-making from the perspective of the member's cognitive map, these authors imply that on distributive issues members will engage in cue-taking from committee members, on regulatory issues they will make ideological decisions, and on redistributive issues they will ratify compromises hammered out among prominent political elites.<sup>23</sup>

This chapter will test a proposition concerning determinants that seems to be a logical deduction from the conditional model. It is:

**Proposition 9:** The basis on which a representative casts a vote varies by kind of issue. On low key issues, members will be more likely to engage in cue-taking (i.e., leaning on, looking to, taking bearings from other actors), while on hot issues members are more likely to make an ideological (or what Clausen calls a policy) vote.

The rationale for this proposition stems from theories of economic incentives. On those issues considered to be low profile and relatively unimportant, members will lack incentive to become involved. Due to lack of interest in the question, they will be willing to defer to the judgments of others. On hot issues that are perceived to be important, members will be sufficiently motivated to develop policy commitments.

**PROPOSITION 9: The Basis on Which a Representative**  
**Casts a Vote Varies by Kind of Issue**

**Distinctions**

The study of congressional decision-making has spawned a veritable lexicon of terminology used to describe various aspects of the decision process. Terms such as referent, determinant, correlate, and decision rule have been used to illustrate various scholarly concepts concerning decision-making. A precise definition of each will clarify the ensuing discussion.

A decision referent is an actor, force, or factor that the Congressman feels is important in shaping his decision.

A decision determinant is the actor, force, or factor that the Congressman cites as being most influential in his decision.

A correlate is an actor, force, or factor discovered to be associated with patterned voting among roll call data. Thus, the major difference between a correlate and a determinant is the method used to identify them. Correlates are discovered through roll-call analysis, while determinants are identified through interviewing.

A decision rule is a patterned, shortcut process through which a decision determinant is routinely influential. For example, continued, routine reliance on a committee member as a determinant by a member would point to the decision rule of "cue-taking." Similarly, continued use of ideology would involve the decision rule of policy voting.

The conditional approach to legislative behavior argues that the decisions of each Congressman are determined by different determinants depending on the issue at hand. Congressmen employ not one decision rule but different rules on different kinds of issues.

### Generalizations

To obtain data on decision determinants, the question "Why did you decide as you did--i.e., on what did you base the decision?" was asked. Responses support five general statements: (1) members acknowledge decision shortcuts, (2) members will frequently cite several determinants for each decision, (3) there are a multitude of possible determinants, (4) an overwhelming majority of decisions are determined by ideological considerations, and (5) there are seven discernable decision-modes in congressional voting.

#### (1) Members Acknowledge Decision Shortcuts

Several members offered the insight that shortcuts are a necessary and rational approach to legislative decision-making. As one member said, "Shortcuts must be developed. It reduces decision-making to a routine."

#### (2) Members Frequently Cite Several Determinants for each Decision

Although members were asked to identify the single factor that was most influential in their decision, an average of two determinants were mentioned by each member for each decision. Table 6.2 displays a frequency distribution of the number of determinants cited. As can be seen there, many members mentioned two or three factors and some mentioned as many as four and five. Evidently, in many instances, members felt that their decision was the result of several co-weighted determinants rather than any one cause.

#### (3) There are a Multitude of Possible Determinants

Table 6.3 provides a frequency distribution of determinants. It shows that members identified no less than fourteen different, major decision determinants throughout the course of this study. In addition,

Table 6.2

Distribution of Number of Cited Determinants: the Percentage of Interviews  
in which Members Mentioned Different Numbers of Determinants

<u>Number of Determinants Cited</u>	<u>Number of Congressmen</u>	<u>%</u>
0	4	1
1	149	41
2	139	39
3	53	15
4	14	4
5	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	N = 361	101%

Table 6.3

**Frequency Distribution of Determinants: the Percentage of Interviews in which Various Decision Determinants were Mentioned**

Committee Chairman	6%
Committee Members	10
State Delegation	3
Party Leader	2
Other Congressmen	4
Personal Staff	4
White House	6
Constituency	13
Compromise	7
Consistency	7
Consensus	7
Philosophical Convictions	11
Policy Assessments (Ideology)	65
Campaign Promises	3
Miscellaneous:	
Testimony Before Committee	1
Bureaucrats	2
Media/Reading	1
Rule	1
No Choice	2
Family/Friends	1
Personal Experience	2
On Committee	7
Other Items	1
Protect the Process	2
Prioritization	2

many miscellaneous determinants were brought to light. The following narrative summarizes members' use of the various determinants.

#### Chairmen

Chairmen were mentioned as a decision determinant in the context that the member was following the lead of the chairman. Examples are statements such as "I followed Obey on Ethics," "I went with Jack Brooks on Government Reorganization," "I stuck with Mahon on Snow Removal," "I'm sticking with Conte on the Water Projects vote," or "I'm following Gonzales on the Assassinations Committee vote." In each case the member looked to the chairman's position for guidance. As one member noted with regard to Marine Mammal Protection, "I looked to see if the chairman appeared personally satisfied with the tuna/porpoise quotas. After finding out that he was, there was no problem for me."

#### Committee Members

Committee members were mentioned as decision determinants in two ways: 1) individual members were identified by other members as cue-givers and 2) the committee's position on legislation as put forth in the committee report was mentioned as a kind of collective decision determinant.

Use of committee members as cue-givers takes the form of following a member on committee and mentioning that member's position as the decision determinant. Examples are "I relied on Rodgers' judgment on that," "I watched Bennet and did as he did," "I was persuaded by Frenzel's explanation," "I gave my vote to McCloskey on Marine Mammal," "I always follow the California Democrat on the committee," and "Pattison convinced me that Debt Collection reforms was the way to go."

Members justified cue-taking from committee members on grounds of time constraints and the necessity to specialize within the legislature. One member stated, "Congressmen must be encyclopedic, but we don't have time. We must rely on what others say on the floor during debate." Another stated that "Members need to concentrate on those things that they can have an impact on. To have the time to be effective you must defer to the judgment of others in their area of expertise." Another stated that

Everyone must pick an area of expertise. You can't know everything. Sometimes you must know legislative histories going back thirty years. The only way to logically do it is to rely on committee members.

Members emphasized that cue-taking is not a random matter but involves a relationship of friendship, trust, propinquity, constituency similarity, and ideological compatibility. "There's enormous expertise on committees," a member noted, "and the wisest thing a guy can do here is to energize his trusted friends to help him develop a position." Another noted that

Members get to know where their colleagues are coming from. A major problem of the congressional decision process is that you aren't always familiar with all questions. A key factor must be cue-taking.

The mediums for cue-taking often are informal conversations on the way to or on the floor and information swapping across committees by friendship, class, state delegation, and ideological cliques. As a member noted, "Most members check out each other on a day to day basis and become familiar with different positions being taken in committee." Many members were emphatic in arguing that aversion to a member is also a factor in cue-taking. One member stated firmly that "Anything Bob Goldwater proposes, I automatically oppose." Another argued that "Who speaks on the floor,

who is a sponsor, who presents a report makes a difference. Often, how I go on a bill depends on who makes the recommendations."

Many members commented that cue-taking from committee members is highly situational, reserved primarily for "technical things, like amendments" and "esoteric matters." As one member stated, "Relying on someone on the committee is the only way I know how to rationally handle minor, non-controversial votes." Another emphasized the importance of committee members on amendments.

You don't always know what amendments will be up on the floor--especially amendments-to-amendments. On these kinds of things you have to make up your mind on the spot. I always look to someone on the committee for my stand.

Another felt that much of the cue-taking within the Congress was a takeoff from institutionalized party screening of the private, consent, and suspension calendars. On these, parties appoint a committee of "objectors" to study supposedly non-controversial bills. Members normally will defer to the judgment of their party's objectors. "We are encouraged to follow them and for most things, due to the lack of information, there is no alternative."

Finally with regard to cue-taking, several members mentioned that deference to committee members has become more subtle over the years. "There's little blatant deference these days," a Democrat with moderate seniority noted. He went on to say that

Things have really changed here. When I first arrived, members on the floor would say to committee members, 'What's our vote?' Now a days they say, 'What's the issue?' But I suspect the effect is still the same.

The second use of committee members pertains more to the committee system than to individual members. It involves "following committee." Examples are "I followed the committee on the HUD vote," "I supported

the committee on Clean Air," "I supported the committee report on the FAA," and "I followed Ways and Means on tax changes." Also illustrative are the statements of several Republicans that they followed minority and dissenting views.

Members defend reliance on committee reports on the grounds that panels are partisan and heterogeneous and ". . . provide the possibility to raise red lights."

The reputation of various committees seems to affect the willingness to defer. As one member noted, "I'll go along with Ways and Means. They have it all together. But, that turbulence on the Select Committee on Assassinations led me to conclude that expenditures are not warranted." Several members expressed fear of going against the Public Works Committee in its opposition to the President on the Water Projects issue. As one member stated, "There is a tradition in the House that you don't disagree with the Public Works Committee or you'll regret it. You'll be on their blacklist."

#### State Delegation

Members of state delegation were mentioned as a decision determinant in the same context as committee members. Often, when committee members were cited as a decision cue, the interviewee added that the committee member was also a member of his state delegation. This corroborates traditional conceptions of cue-taking which argue that cue-givers are usually members of both the parent committee and the cue-taker's state delegation.<sup>24</sup>

State delegations were also mentioned as a collective determinant. In several instances members stated that their vote was decided by a

common commitment by members of the state delegation. The most interesting example is a statement by a member of the Washington state delegation concerning his decision on the Clean Air Bill:

We caucused and Foley (Rep. Thomas Foley, state delegation dean) stated that he wanted us to come in together on this one. I was prepared to vote against it if it were not for this push for delegation unanimity.

Finally, colleagues from state delegations were cited by a limited number of members as a decision determinant on the basis of recognized, but not committee-related, expertise. For example, several members of the Wisconsin delegation noted that they followed Rep. Aspin on the Nuclear Navy vote. Although Aspin is not a member of the Budget Committee that had parent jurisdiction over the vote, members of the delegation turned to him on the basis of his expertise in defense matters.

#### Party Leaders

Many members acknowledged that party leaders often determined votes, especially budget and appropriations measures. "These are party votes," one member emphasized. Also, members will follow leaders on those votes on which leadership has staked their prestige. The statements that "I followed the will of leadership on Ethics" and "I gave O'Neill my vote on the Pay Raise" provide examples of this.

The mediums for party cues are party publications and endorsements. As a senior Republican emphasized, "The Republican Committee staff is good. Their publication helps us make up our minds." Others noted that they ". . . got the position from party publications."

All emphasized the relative light-handedness of leadership pressure. One member stressed that "Leadership is restrained by a very strong ethic around here--follow your district first." Leaders do appear to have some leverage on procedural votes.<sup>25</sup> The following recollection by a Democratic

freshman serves to illustrate how leaders can manipulate the vote up to the point of final passage:

I opposed Common Situs and leadership knew it. Though I was a crucial vote, they did not pressure me. They knew I had made up my mind and was voting nay for reasons of both philosophy and constituency. I met with both a sponsor and a whip and both said 'I won't twist arms, but let us have our bill. Support our amendments so that we have our bill for the straight up or down vote on final passage.'

#### Other Members

Members not on the committee of origin or in the state delegation were frequently cited as a determinant. Examples are "I followed Dingell and Moss on Energy," "I supported Conte," "I turned to Jeffords on Strip Mining, especially on all those darn amendments," "I followed Goldwater on Housing since it was a political vote," "I was persuaded by Goldwater's requests," "I followed the rebuttal to Goldwater on the floor," and "I decided to give in to peer pressure and support those with Water Projects."

Other members likely to provide a cue are a) those involved (witness Rep. Goldwater providing cues on his amendment), b) social and ideological comrades, c) those who are trusted ("You're influenced by members you have confidence in"), and d) those with similar constituencies ("I always check to see how \_\_\_\_\_ votes since we have the same kind of district. If I feel he knows more about it than I, I'll follow him").

#### Personal Staff

Some members cited personal staff as the determinant of a decision. Examples are "I followed the recommendations of staff on the tax vote," "Staff gave me my vote," "Staff looked into the question of the formula [HUD] vote] and I took my vote from them," "Detailed staff study

convinced me that the committee had put together a good compromise on the tuna/porpoise question," "I delegated that matter to my staff," and "Staff determined my position on that housing bill."

Again, as with both decision inputs and information, influence by staff seems to be a function of idiosyncratic staff organization. Those members mentioning staff as a decision determinant spoke of "elaborate staff setups" and "regular issue meetings." They acknowledged that they "put staff to work on obscure votes" and would usually defer to them. Others argued that they "don't lean on or turn to staff." "I know what I want" a member emphasized. "I use staff to answer questions, to try to find out policy and political impacts, to weigh the pros and cons." Another noted that staff input was restricted to a "once a year meeting on the major issues likely to crop up that session."

#### White House

Many noted that they followed the President's judgment on selected issues. Examples of the President as a decision determinant are: "I followed Carter on the Water Projects," "The President's position that 'The Arab Boycott is not good policy' convinced me," "I was persuaded by Carter that we don't have to have another super aircraft carrier," "I support Governmental Reorganization Authority because it is a primary objective of the President," "I gave my vote to Carter on Reorganization," and "I followed the White House on the Nuclear Navy vote."

The citation of the President in interview sessions seemed affected by two conditions. The first is the desire of many members to give support to the President during the so called honeymoon period. Along these lines

a member said his vote on the Energy Department was based on his ". . . desire to give the President a chance." One of the more senior Republicans noted that though he would usually oppose the tax bill, he ". . . gave the President his way. I want to avoid obstructionism during these early days of the new administration."<sup>26</sup>

The second condition, although somewhat peculiar, merits inclusion. All four Georgians interviewed stated their firm support for the Georgian President. All mentioned their fervid desire and sense of obligation to support the President's position on all issues.

#### Constituency

Many decisions were determined by constituency. As a decision determinant, constituency is influential in four ways.

First, members relate that they are responding to pressures and communications from individual constituents. Examples are:

I didn't have a choice on Saccharin if I read our letters.

I followed the strong expression of opposition in my district concerning Common Situs.

I know the desires of people on Strip Mining and I followed them.

The constituency desires Reorganization.

That bill is just not what my constituents wanted.

That position was the consensus in the district.

People in my district are against the Assassination investigations.

I'm responding to the widespread concern in my district for neighborhood revitalization.

Second, members vote on the basis of their perceptions of constituency interests. Examples are the following statements:

I'm a populist--I voted the district.

I did what was best for my state on the HUD formula vote.

I voted yes on the Budget--it will help unemployment in my region.

Countercyclical Aid is good for my district.

Public Works is important to my district.

Water is the future of our state, therefore, I supported the Water Projects. Projects.

School Lunch is popular at home--it's good for farm interests.

Constituency interests as a decision rationale often lead to peculiar reasoning. For example, a southern representative from a tobacco district noted that he voted for the Byrd Amendment on Rhodesian Chrome because "I don't want them to expand their tobacco crop in competition with us in order to compensate for the commercial losses from chrome." Another rural representative, taking a most provincial view, stated that he opposed the Clean Air Act because "Pollution is not a problem in my district. There is a need for regulation in big cities but not with us."

The third way constituency becomes a determinant is through fear of political backlash. Examples are "I voted 'no' on the Pay Raise because I'm fearful of constituency reaction," "I'm afraid of the electorate's response on the Pay Raise vote--"How can I explain the fact that I voted myself a raise that itself is in excess of what most people in the district earn," and "I normally vote against raids on the U.S. Treasury such as Snow Removal Aid, but since it benefits my state and people expect me to support it, I will. God help me if I didn't." One member eloquently summed up the preemptive and directive influences of constituency as carried by the anticipatory political reasoning of representatives:

You must pay attention to constituency on local issues and when you hear from them in volume, Under these conditions, if you desire political survival you have no recourse but to follow. Up here, I hear so infrequently from people. When I do--and I'm

not referring to that post card junk--like on Common Situs, Clean Air, and Saccharin--I've got no choice but to go with them. I'd be dead if I didn't.

The fourth use of constituency is in a very narrow sense. Members sometimes base their decisions on the desires of only a segment of the constituency. Examples are "My local public officials preferred that formula alternative for Countercyclical Aid," "Postal employee complaints about the ambiguity of the implementation of the Hatch Act convinced me of the need for change," and "I acceded to demands of government workers in my district for repeal of the Hatch Act."

#### Compromise

The perception that the vote under consideration strikes a proper balance was used by many members as a justification for their decision.

Citing the determining factor of a vote to be the fact that a bill "seems to be a reasonable compromise" stems from a brokerage conception of the Congress. As one member pointed out, "In Congress you need to find happy mediums and half way (maybe assed) mediums in public policy. The nature of yea and nay, up and down voting requires it." Another added that "It's our job to weigh positions and to forge compromises among competing interests."

The following statements provide examples of how compromise is cited as a decision determinant:

I voted for Marine Mammal Protection because it is a balance between environmental protection and the needs of tuna fishermen.

The tuna bill seems to strike a bargain between the needs of the industry and the needs of the environment.

The McCloskey Amendment to Marine Mammal is a good compromise.

I voted for the Ethics package--it may not be the total solution, but it's the only one we'll get.

The Clean Air Amendments by Dingell offer a balance between clean air, energy and jobs--Dingell's version avoids going too far too fast.

The revised budget (second budget vote) is a good compromise between economic reality and an instrumental position.

The loss of jobs and inflationary pressures that would likely ensue, on balance, outweigh the immediate implementation of the Clean Air Act--delay it.

I voted for final passage on Governmental Reorganization Authority because it seemed to be acceptable to both Brooks and Carter--good compromise.

Additionally, three votes--Arab Boycott, Strip Mining and Rhodesian Chrome--were rationalized by some as ratifications of good compromise because affected industries seemed to put aside their initial objections.

In elaborating on compromise voting, several noted that a member's perception of the degree to which the membership of a parent committee or, in the case of a conference report, a conference committee is balanced would affect his perceptions of how good a bargain had been struck. For example, bills reported by Ways and Means were judged "good compromises because it has a good mix." On the other hand, one member felt that the Budget Committee was composed of "too many pro spenders who are usually out of step with most members--I vote against that bunch."

#### Consistency

Many defined their vote as an attempt to get in line with a past position. In these cases, the desire to be consistent was identified as the determining factor.

Examples of consistency voting are:

Revision of the Hatch Act is consistent with the reform image I desire.

My vote on the Pay Raise is an attempt to be consistent with the Ethics bill to give us a more reformed Congress.

I am a strong supporter of labor legislation, and Common Situs Picketing is just a logical extension of my position.

The Hyde Amendment is the same thing we had last time--I voted the same as before--we had an election since and I was reelected so obviously people aren't objecting.

I'm always for those kinds of programs--I voted that way last time.

I voted yes on final passage because I favor extension of those on-going programs.

The Arab Boycott bill is the same bill we had before--I have no reason to change.

The mechanics of consistency voting were detailed by several interviewees. "With so many decisions around here, all you can do is stick to your guns and do what you did the last time, unless you have reason to switch." Another noted that

There are a lot of repetitive issues around here. Every year you see the same policies and hear similar issues and arguments. You notice that things fall into categories and you find yourself referring back to how you voted before. You feel the pressure and need for consistency.

### Consensus

Many bills are acted upon within the House with unanimity or virtual unanimity. Many members acknowledged that a perceived consensus on a bill is often the grounds for a decision.

Examples of consensus voting are:

I went that way because there was a mountain factor--things were snowballing.

There was no way to oppose if you desire the basic program.

There was no controversy on it.

The tide was running toward it.

It was inevitable.

Everybody realized that the alternative of a nay vote was bleak--the program would die.

There was a consensus on Ethics--I just followed the herd.

I was assured that the Tax bill would pass, so I just went along with everyone else.

On FAA, there was no reason to do otherwise--there was no conflict out of committee.

It was kind of a contagious situation.

I had no reason to vote no.

There was no opposition, no one objecting, a quiet bill in every respect--no one in leadership was against.

The committee system, the political liabilities associated with minority status, and the handling of routine business in a consensus fashion were identified as major factors encouraging the use of consensus voting.

The committee system is thought to provide a good ad hoc adversary system for screening legislation. As one member emphasized, "We have a good rumor network here. Unless I hear strong rumblings, unless someone is objecting, I support. My law is--if no conflict, appropriate."

Members confess that they will often go with a big majority to avoid the stigma and repercussions of lone dissent. In the words of one member,

You need a strong reason to be in a minority of thirty or less. They'll target your ass. Unless it's something to do with my district and I have the overwhelming approval of my constituents, when they have 300 plus they have me.

Suspensions, unanimous consent matters and the private calendar are handled in a consensus fashion. As one member noted "on these kinds of things, if no one objects and the tide is running in their direction, they will pass." Many offered the opinion that many members take the

same approach to all but the most controversial of bills.

Recognition of the importance of consensus voting is found in the commonly adopted strategy of, as one member describes it, "Let's all vote early." If Polsby and Wildavsky are correct in assuming that "Watching strategies helps us to learn how political leaders use the constraints and opportunities of their environment to achieve their goals"<sup>24</sup> then the "vote early" strategy testifies to the importance and pervasiveness of consensus voting.

### Philosophical Convictions

Often, the decisions of members will invoke moral judgments and strong personal beliefs. According to one member, decisions of this kind "involve the member's assessment of right and wrong." In the words of another, "These are things you can't compromise. I won't change my mind. I will get defeated first." Another stated,

Sometimes your own philosophy intrudes--things that stem from your learning and experience. It boils down to how you feel about it, rather than a question of facts like with the Water Projects vote. It's almost an unconscious process.

Examples of votes that involve personal philosophy are:

I'm against abortion on religious grounds and would never vote yea.

Debt collection involves a basic question concerning our form of government--I'm intuitively opposed.

My vote on Common Situs is the result of my strong philosophical view.

My life's experiences led me to that vote.

The Arab Boycott vote involves basic questions of rights and constitutional beliefs--the 18 year old vote is the same thing because basic rights are involved.

Abortion is a different kind of decision than authorizations and appropriations--it is a moral issue.

I based my decision on the Arab Boycott on the basis of fairness, equity, and compassion.

I have moral doubt that abortion is right.

I'm morally opposed to abortion--this is unique for me since usually I'll bargain.

The government has no damn business getting into the abortion business--that's a question for the woman to decide--this isn't the USSR.

Rhodesian Chrome gets into broad philosophical questions.

Although, as a Republican, I wanted to vote against Carter's Reorganization Authority (the Democrats voted against Nixon's), I didn't--reorganization authority for the President is part of my philosophy of government and I can't play politics with it.

I voted against Romanian Earthquake Relief as a matter of principle. I think it is wrong to give aid to a Communist nation.

Strip Mining is bad legislation--it is overly restrictive.

#### Policy Assessments

As a determinant of congressional voting, policy assessments involve the use of ideology and policy objectives as the basis of congressional voting.

Interviews with members indicate that policy assessments as a decision determinant take three forms: endorsement for or opposition to a specific bill, support for or opposition to the policy approach of a particular program, and assessments that a specific vote is in or out of line with certain narrow policy objectives of the member. Although each way may seem to present a distinctive determinant, all are similar in that they involve the citation, by the member, of policy reasons as the basis for the decision.

Endorsement of or opposition to the bill in question involves assessments that the content of a bill is "good legislating," "good arguments," "a good bill," "a bad bill" or "a lousy bill." The following are examples:

Strip Mining is bad legislation--it is overly restrictive.

Hyde is a bad bill--there should be exceptions to the abortion ban.

That bill is not needed at this time.

The arguments of the bill are compelling.

I don't like the bill.

Dingell is a good amendment--it provides flexibility.

We need the Romanian Relief bill--it's a humanitarian thing.

I want the Common Situs bill.

Support or opposition to a basic policy approach is a commonly cited policy-oriented determinant. It entails a member's position that the program at hand is good or bad public policy. Indicative of a policy approach are judgments by members that a program is "not justifiable," "absurd," "not a proper approach," "a step in the right direction," "a good concept," "a good approach," and "a correct policy."

Many members described the mechanics of a policy approach. They note that representatives identify various categories of public policy and then formulate general, preconceived positions for or against the policies and programs within each category. In the words of one member, "These positions become standing and automatic. They involve an almost knee jerk reaction." Specific examples of this kind of voting are presented in Table 6.4.

The third and final category of policy assessments are those that involve a member's limited policy objectives. Unlike the first two, this kind does not involve support for or aversion to a specific bill or basic policy approach. Instead, the member makes reference to a narrow, more-limited, situational rationale that, more than less, entails policy objectives. Votes are said to be determined not by standing commitments for

Table 6.4

Specific Examples of Policy Voting (i.e. A Vote Cast on the basis of  
A Member's Ideological Support for or Opposition to a Basic  
Policy on Program Approach)

- "I'm opposed to deficit spending."
- "I vote yes on social issues."
- "I'm opposed to increases in military spending."
- "I opposed Debt Collection Practices because I'm for state rights."
- "I don't like the pork barrel system."
- "The Pay Raise is bad policy--we ought not to vote on a raise which affects us."
- "I'm against NASA funding--let's get our society in shape."
- "We need more regulation of debt collection practices."
- "I'm against Countercyclical Aid because it is an inappropriate policy."
- "I have a bias toward simplification of the tax system."
- "It's poor policy to get the federal government involved in abortion when so many oppose."
- "We need economic stimuli."
- "The Hatch Act has served us well."
- "Keep Strip Mining and all other forms of regulation in the hands of the state if at all possible."
- "School Lunch programs are the kinds of things I support."
- "Revenue Sharing is fiscally unsound."
- "Deficit spending is not justifiable."
- "I support the concept of aid to localities incurring excessive costs due to natural calamities."
- "I'm an environmentalist and for strip mining control."
- "Housing programs are good programs."
- "I'm for labor legislation--it's a policy thing with me."
- "I'm for governmental activism as epitomized in the jobs bill."
- "The targeting strategy in the jobs bill is good."
- "We should not send relief to Communist nations."
- "Governmental employees should have political rights."
- "The way to get good people in government is to pay them well."
- "Don't ban anything unless you know for sure."
- "The government should stop international boycotts."
- "I'm generally against foreign aid--too much waste."
- "We need to reorganize the federal bureaucracy."

or against programs but by such considerations as spinoffs, impacts, consequences, sunk costs, and instrumental goals. Examples of this kind of policy assessment are presented in Table 6.5. Voting on the basis of limited policy objectives dramatizes the importance of what Keefe and Ogul refer to as "sweetener amendments."<sup>28</sup> Astute floor managers will permit moderate changes in a bill in an effort to put together a majority coalition. These interviews confirm the validity of this strategy by revealing that in many instances members do make up their minds on the basis of limited, situational, instrumental criteria.

#### Campaign Promises

Several reconstructed decisions pointed to a campaign promise as the major determinant. Examples are:

I had made a campaign commitment to support reorganization.

I'm on record promising to reduce deficit expenditures.

I ran against the Pay Raise.

During the campaign, abortion was the issue and I even received primary opposition on it--I didn't have to agonize on Hyde since it's politically essential not to go back on my word.

I campaigned on the new budget process and thus will support any congressional budget resolution.

Since the Pay Raise came up during the campaign, I voted my position.

In the campaign I was asked about the Arab Boycott and it was there that I committed myself to strong support of Israel.

#### Miscellaneous

Interviews also revealed a spate of what might be classified as miscellaneous determinants--i.e., those that are not frequently cited.

At the very least, these are interesting because they indicate the multiplicity of determinants uncovered in this study.

Table 6.5

Specific Examples of Policy Assessments that Involve  
A Member's Limited Policy Objectives

- "I supported that housing bill because of the economic stimulus it will have on building."
- "I don't think there is any reason to delay on Clean Air."
- "The case is not proven against saccharin."
- "The Second Budget resolution is a step in the right direction."
- "The proposed distributions of funds under that formula are inequitable--the alternative is preferable."
- "We need to cut back, so we might as well start with these water projects."
- "I voted no on the carrier because I was convinced they would be sitting ducks."
- "Congress is not an investigative body and any investigation of the assassinations should be made by the Justice Department."
- "After they made those changes, it was acceptable to me."
- "Snow Removal is a rip off."
- "It's unfair to boycott Rhodesia."
- "It's too late to pick up the trail in the assassinations probe."
- "A brief delay in Clean Air regulations is necessary."
- "We need a central place to handle energy programs."
- "Strip Mining Regulation will hurt those on fixed incomes."
- "Environmentally, these water projects don't seem to be supported."
- "I think we should protect the porpoise."
- "I didn't vote for the Dingell Amendment for fear it would make the Clean Air Bill more palatable, and it would make it on final passage."
- "I voted 'yes' on the Energy bill because of the weakening amendments."

Logrolling was mentioned in several instances. A member of the New York City delegation supported Snow Removal out of a desire "to build bridges for the city's fiscal plight." Another sided with the Public Works Committee because "I have a bill coming up in front of that committee."

Interest groups were mentioned as a decision determinant in only a few instances. Generally, the lack of opposition to a bill by an affected group is cited as the specific interest group determinant. Examples are:

I went with Rhodesian Chrome because the affected industries weren't complaining.

The fact that the Navy didn't seem to be pushing the super carrier seemed to me to indicate they really didn't need it--if they don't act like they need it, who am I to insist that they do.

Labor and business usually are on the opposite side of any issue--that's why when I saw them both calling for a delay on the Clean Air Regulations I was persuaded that it must be a sound course of action.

Involvement with a bill, especially at the committee stage, was offered as a determinant. One member noted that he supported Rhodesian Chrome because "I was involved with it." Another cited committee service with a bill as the reason for decision: "I supported my committee." Others cited testimony before committee as the decision determinant. Obviously, when a member votes on the floor on a bill that comes out of one of his assigned committees, his decision process involves many more considerations than on a regular bill.

Aversion to threat was listed by some as the source of their decisions. One mentioned that he opposed the Marine Mammal compromise due to the "... high handed tactics of the tuna people." Another stated that "Whenever people get tough around here you naturally take an 'I'll show them approach'."

The personal experience of the legislator was cited in several instances. A freshman stated that he voted for Debt Collection Reform because he ". . . felt the need due to law practice." Another noted that his support for the Nuclear Navy was based on ". . . my experience as a sailor--because of it, I usually support the Navy."

Several members indicated the attraction of a "Christmas tree" or omnibus bill. Illustrative are the remarks of one member that "Although I generally oppose the concept of revenue sharing, I voted for the HUD bill because of other items in it." Another added that the up or down vote on the Water Projects determined his vote, "Because they didn't split it up, I voted for them because there are some good ones there. But that's a strategy up here--in numbers there is strength."

"The line of least resistance" was cited in two decision cases. A member expounded--"On Clean Air I just went the way of the littlest trouble--and that is with the Dingell bill."

Bureaucrats were mentioned on some votes. Several members indicated the importance of agency reputation.<sup>29</sup> This is especially true of the Army Corps of Engineers, whose support of the Water Projects was flaunted by proponents.

Some votes were justified on the grounds that they were "politically necessary but with little impact." Several "games" were uncovered throughout the course of the interviews. One is the situation where a member actually is opposed to a bill but votes for it for political reasons, while feeling confident that "It will have little impact anyway." The second is where a member supports a bill but votes against it, because "It was going to pass anyway." In both cases, members can accomplish programmatic purposes without taking political risks.

Protest was a determinant on several votes. A member from a western state confided that he voted "present" on one vote just to protest to the President the lack of a national energy policy.

Committee staff was cited in several decision cases. One member stated that he relied solely on committee staff when deciding on FAA. A Republican said that he based his decision on Snow Removal on the advice of the minority staff of the Appropriations Committee.

"Support of the process" was listed as a determinant, especially on the Snow Removal, the Budget and Water Projects votes. "We must preserve the appropriation process" was the way this determinant was expressed.

Wife and family were cited on a few votes, mainly Ethics and Pay Raise, that were relevant to the families of members.

The legislative process as structured by a closed rule was cited by two members--one on the Ethics vote and one on the Tax vote. In both decision cases, members argued that the closed rule shaped the decision by boxing them in so that a yes vote was the only way they could go.

The press was identified as the determinant in several cases. On the Pay Raise, the media was identified as the major decision factor, because "They were putting the heat on." In several instances, editorials appearing in the Washington newspapers were said to have tilted the member toward the decision.

The Supreme Court, described by one text as an "intermittent pressure" on Congress,<sup>30</sup> was mentioned by only one member as a determinant. The decision involved the Common Situs vote and the member cited a Supreme Court case which purportedly intimated that governmental authorization of secondary boycotts is unconstitutional.

Several members mentioned what might best be categorized as a "get on with it mentality." As one member pointed out "The fight's over, the outcome's inevitable--it's just best to move on and get to some other business."

Finally, "keeping the respect of colleagues and supporters" was identified as a basis for decision. "I voted the way I did on Ethics, first and foremost, so that I wouldn't violate and lose the respect of others."

In sum, Congressmen are apt to base their decisions on one of what seems to be an infinite, almost bewildering, number of determinants.

#### (4) The Primacy of Policy (Ideological) Voting

A re-examination of Table 6.3 reveals that, by far, the major determinant of congressional voting, as perceived by members, is ideology as expressed through a policy assessment. In sixty-five percent of the interviews, a policy assessment was mentioned as the basis of the decision. The next most frequently mentioned determinant is constituency, followed by philosophical convictions and committee members. Each of these were mentioned in only approximately ten percent of the interviews.

For two reasons, the actual percentage of decisions attributable to policy voting may be somewhat larger than is shown in Table 6.3.

First, many of the other determinants do involve policy considerations--e.g., compromise, campaign promises, consistency, consensus, some of the miscellaneous category, and even possibly philosophical convictions--and, when combined with policy assessments, drive the total frequency of policy voting up to almost one-hundred percent.

Second, many of the instances where a member lists multiple determinants involve a mix of actors and situational concerns with policy assessments. The following answers to the question "Why did you vote as you did?" reveal a policy-oriented blend of determinants:

(re Ethics)

I voted that way because I'm for reform and change. It is consistent with my position on reform. It would really disappoint my close supporters if I didn't.

(re Nuclear Navy)

I think we need to reorder priorities and spend less on the military. The President is in the best position to know on this. I checked it out with Tom Downey and he said it was ok.

(re Countercyclical)

My state would lose money if I voted 'no'. I voted the same as last year. It's still a good idea.

Also, as both Norpoth and Macarthey have argued, reliance on other actors often involves policy (ideological) voting.<sup>31</sup> The following quotations reveal how cue-taking involves policy assessments:

(re a chairman)

I'm for Udall on Strip Mining. He has a practical, balanced environmentalist position.

(re committee members)

I turn to \_\_\_\_\_ to find out what the damn thing does. I follow him on the policy implications.

(re other members)

When I use a member as a short cut, it is intertwined with philosophical considerations.

I followed Hyde. I support his amendment in concept.

I followed Delaney on Nuclear Navy. Like me, he is for redressing the budget so we can allocate more to social programs.

Ned Patterson made up my mind. He expressed my views on Debt Collection.

Staff gives me a synopsis and makes a recommendation. They know my philosophy.

Staff talks to people for me. They are an extension of me. They know what I want.

On the Housing vote, I voted my own position plus staff's. I believe there is a need for housing, and staff determined what my position would be on that one.

(re party leader)

(re constituency)

My position was set by the outpouring of letters on Saccharin plus my personal belief that government agencies ought not to have that kind of authority.

(re the White House)

I followed the President, because he has a more national view, and because we must start to cut back.

I took my vote from the President, because I'm for fiscal responsibility

Many factors account for the predominance of policy voting. Foremost is the perceived need by members for an explanation (rationale) for their votes. As one member stated,

You must worry about how things will appear. You must be able to explain. If you can give the reasons for your vote in philosophical terms, you can defend your self against the critics.

A policy assessment seems to provide such an explanation.

Another factor encouraging policy voting is the nature of the committee system and legislative procedure. "When it comes to the floor, it is open or shut--up or down, nay or yea. This kind of decision-making requires that you have a set position that enables you to know where you stand."

A third factor is the issue content of congressional campaigns at the level of attentive and affected publics. As one member noted, "You develop positions during the campaign and they stay with you. People ask for your views and you must comment." As another added,

You get looked at on your views pertaining to hot and emotional issues. Due to the campaign, you get positions on the major issues and they stick. The only issue that I've changed my position on since before my election is Vietnam.

A fourth stems from the need to simplify. "Bills of national significance require a member to have a point of view even if not on the committee," one member pointed out. Another discussed in detail the

utility and need for policy positions:

You need to have a value system to know where you are coming from. You need to decide what to do and this boils down to a policy approach. After a couple of years, you get a strong position on basic issues and it guides you.

Finally, the day-to-day operation of Congress encourages policy voting. The whip packets of both parties stress the policy goals and implications of bills. Bills are frequently discussed by members on a day-to-day basis in terms of what they do. The Democratic whip organization prepares recess briefing packages designed to aid members as they answer questions back in the district. These strongly emphasize explanations. The voting records of members are scrutinized by various interest groups who search voting habits for signs of consistency and support. All of this weighs heavily toward policy voting.

The importance of policy voting seems to be confirmed by an interest group strategy identified by several members. In the words of one member,

If they want to influence me, they have to give me a solid reason why I should vote that way. They know that I can't vote on the basis of friendship. That's why they provide reasons that can be used to explain and defend. They help you out by casting things in philosophical terms and telling you why it would be good and popular to vote that way.

(5) There are Seven Different Decision Modes in Congressional

Voting

Although policy assessment is the most frequently cited decision determinant in congressional voting, it would be simplistic to conclude that policy voting is the only important mode of decision-making. Rather, the interviews undertaken here suggest that there are at least seven distinct modes of congressional voting: cue-taking, policy assessment, philosophical convictions, consensus, campaign promise, compromise, and

constituency representation. Although policy assessment is the most prevalent mode and although all of the others involve, to some extent, members' policy goals,<sup>32</sup> each mode involves a different decision rule, or different approach to issues and, thus, a different way of making decisions.

Cue-taking is a decision mode whereby the decision is made primarily on the basis of the counsel or position of other actors. Although Matthews and Stimson contend that committee members and those in the state delegation are the most likely cue-givers,<sup>33</sup> Kingdon<sup>34</sup> and this study reveal that members also take positions from staff and the White House. This kind of decision is not devoid of policy content. Rather, cue-taking should be viewed as voting based on policy positions that are obtained as the result of deference to another actor.

Policy assessment is a standing ideological predisposition to vote for or against certain programs. It involves the persistent employment of a general decision rule to support or not to support some action of government. Policy assessments are fairly automatic, although various actors do provide information so that the member can place the vote in the context of his policy predispositions. The basis of decision is a policy objective and the desire for consistency, not another actor's position. The difference between policy assessment and cue-taking is that cue-taking reflects the human side of Congress. Decisions are made on the basis of trust and friendship. Policy voting is based on a desire to achieve a record. Referring to his policy objectives concerning a bill, a member emphasized that "on votes like that I'm not here to make friends."

Philosophical conviction is a mode of reaching a decision by relying on deep-seated, strongly-felt positions. It is an automatic mode

in which other actors are relied on primarily for information. When making decisions based on philosophical convictions, a member simply applies a standing commitment that was most likely developed long before he entered Congress.

The consensus mode, best described by Kingdon,<sup>35</sup> involves decision-making by herd instinct. Yea votes are cast because everything is pointing that way. There is no reason to vote "no." Opposition is minimal or non-existent. Conflict exists neither in the House nor in the member's force field.

The campaign promise mode bases decisions on policy commitments made during the campaign. The rationale for the vote is more the campaign commitment than the policy assessment.

The compromise mode involves an assessment on the member's part that a bill constitutes a balanced or unbalanced approach. The member decides to either ratify or reject a compromise forged either in committee or on the floor. The appropriateness of the compromise is the focus of the decision.

Constituency representation is decision-making on the basis of the member's assessment of what is best for constituency interests. In some rare instances where there is an outpouring of sentiment from the district concerning a bill, constituency representation as a decision-mode will involve the member attempting to get his position in line with constituency demands.

Thus, decisions may be the result of the application of an abstraction (policy assessment, philosophical conviction, campaign promise), the use of cue-taking, an act of representation, or a perception of

situational factors (compromise, consensus). It is not that cue-taking or situational voting are devoid of ideology. On the contrary, as Norpoth,<sup>35</sup> Kingdon,<sup>37</sup> and Matthews and Stimson<sup>38</sup> argue, cue-taking does invoke an ideological context. In fact, the data here indicate that when members mention an actor or situational factor as a determinant, they will relate it to a policy assessment. The difference between cue-taking or situational voting and voting in a policy or philosophical mode is that, in the latter, decisions are made solely on the basis of an abstract doctrine, while, for the former, a trusted actor or a perception of the situation becomes the shortcut and is cited in the interview as the voting determinant, perhaps in addition to a policy assessment. Most voting involves a "policy goal" of some sort. As Kingdon argues, under certain circumstances members must rely on various means (colleagues, staff, perception of constituency interests, perception of balance and compromise, etc.) to realize their goals.<sup>39</sup> Here it has been shown that members will cite the "means" as well as the "goals" as the determining factor. Clearly, the difference reflects different decision-making modes. Citing "goals only" is policy or philosophical voting; citing means and goals involves other modes.

In conclusion, the interviews confirm the existence of the various congressional decision modes described in both Jackson<sup>40</sup> and Matthews and Stimson.<sup>41</sup> The task at hand is to test the conditional theory of legislative decision-making. If the positions of Lowi, Price, and Cobb and Elder are correct, no one model should completely describe the decision-making of an individual member. The remainder of this chapter will test proposition 9 by examining the variability of decision rules across votes, issue characteristics, and actor responses. To confirm the

-contextual theory, data should reveal a) that members are likely to cite certain determinants under certain circumstances and different determinants under others and b) that each member employs various modes depending on varicus circumstances. These variations, moreover, should occur in a patterned fashion according to a hot/low profile distinction.

By Vote

Table 6.6--a display of decision by vote--does reveal variable citation of decision determinants. For example, policy assessments, the most frequently cited determinant overall, are mentioned by one-hundred percent of the interviewees on the foreign aid vote, while no interviewee mentioned policy reasons on the FAA vote. Committee members are mentioned by no interviewees on Rhodesian Chrome but by forty-two percent on the Marine Mammal vote. Mention of philosophical convictions ranged from no mention on NASA and FAA to mention by fifty percent on the Hyde Amendment.

Members tend to mention certain determinants more often than others on different types of bills.

Policy assessments were mentioned most as a determinant on some of the hottest issues--Rhodesian Chrome, Common situs, Strip Mining, Energy Department, the Pay Raise, and Saccharin--and on several non-controversial votes--House Assassinations, Romanian Earthquake, Foreign Aid, and School Lunch. Policy assessments were infrequently mentioned on Ethics, Goldwater Amendment, Government Reorganization, FAA, EPA, Arab Boycott, Public Works, and Marine Mammal. On these votes, situational considerations seemed to eclipse pure policy voting. Cue-taking and philosophical convictions also prevailed on these votes.

**Table 6.6**  
**Decision Determinants by Vote: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members  
Mentioned Various Decision Determinants on Different Votes**

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Goldwater</u>	<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>FAA</u>
Committee Chairman	14%	0%	20%	10%	0%	0%	0%	13%
Committee Members	7	27	30	10	0	0	10	25
Constituency	21	0	20	20	9	9	10	0
White House	7	36	30	10	9	9	0	0
Compromise	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Policy Assessment	43	55	70	50	73	73	60	0
Consensus	7	0	0	0	9	9	10	50
Philosophical Conviction	7	27	10	10	46	46	0	0
Consistency	7	9	0	0	18	18	10	0
Personal Staff	7	9	10	10	0	0	10	0
Other Members	7	36	0	30	9	9	10	0
State Delegation	7	0	0	10	0	0	0	13
Party Leader	14	0	0	10	0	0	0	13
Campaign Promise	7	0	10	0	0	0	10	0

Table 6.6--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Energy Dept.</u>	<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Counter-Cyclical</u>	<u>HUD</u>	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>
Committee Chairman	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	9%
Committee Members	0	9	11	0	25	42	9	
Constituency	6	0	11	31	17	0	18	
White House	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0
Compromise	6	0	0	8	0	67	0	
Policy Assessment	94	64	44	62	58	33	73	
Consensus	13	0	11	8	33	8	0	
Philosophical Conviction	13	0	0	0	8	0	9	
Consistency	0	0	22	0	8	0	0	
Personal Staff	6	0	0	23	8	8	0	
Other Members	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	
State Delegation	6	0	0	0	8	8	0	
Party Leader	6	0	0	0	0	0	9	
Campaign Promise	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Table 6.6--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Common Status</u>	<u>Govt. Reorg.</u>	<u>House Assn.</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>
Committee Chairman	0%	39%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	23%
Committee Members	8	8	23	20	0	27	6	8
Constituency	39	15	8	0	0	0	10	8
White House	0	31	0	0	0	0	10	8
Compromise	0	8	0	0	0	0	30	8
Policy Assessment	69	39	85	80	20	64	40	92
Consensus	0	8	0	30	0	18	0	0
Philosophical Conviction	15	15	8	10	0	9	50	8
Consistency	8	8	0	0	20	9	20	31
Personal Staff	8	0	0	0	40	0	0	0
Other Members	0	0	0	0	0	9	10	0
State Delegation	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	8
Party Leader	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Campaign Promise	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	10

Table 6.6--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Foreign Aid</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde</u>	<u>Hatch</u>	<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
Committee Chairman	0%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	9%	6%	0%
Committee Members	0	0	7	0	0	0	13	0	6
Constituents	13	0	20	0	23	25	46	6	22
White House	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Compromise	25	0	27	0	15	13	0	0	0
Policy Assessment	63	100	73	57	62	88	89	65	90
Consensus	0	0	7	0	0	25	9	0	0
Philosophical Convictions	0	0	0	50	23	0	0	6	0
Consistency	0	0	13	29	0	0	0	0	0
Personal Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
Other Members	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
State Delegation	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
Party Leader	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Campaign Promise	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	6	6

Chairmen were cited most on Government Reorganization, Strip Mining, and Tax: votes where the chairman played a highly visible role and became associated with a particular position.

Committee members were mentioned by over twenty-five percent on votes that were minor (FAA), constituency relevant (HUD), complex (Tax and Debt Collection), and that involved a committee fight (Marine Mammal and Nuclear Navy). Committee members were not mentioned at all on many of the major policy questions: Rhodesian Chrome, Arab Boycott, Energy Department, Budget, Foreign Aid, the Hyde Amendment, Hatch, and Saccharin.

Constituency was cited most on three votes: Common Situs which was very controversial, Countercyclical Aid which was perceived to be important to constituency, and Saccharin which was the subject of much constituency mail. Constituency as a determinant was not cited on minor or non-visible votes (Nuclear Navy, FAA, Romanian Earthquake, EPA, Debt Collection, Marine Mammal, and Foreign Aid) nor on the Hyde Amendment on abortion, on which members had presumably already staked a position.

The White House was mentioned as a voting determinant on the four votes on which it was a combatant: Nuclear Navy, Tax, Government Reorganization, and the Water Projects.

Compromise was cited at a significantly high rate on Arab Boycott, and Marine Mammal Protection, two bills that were considered to be compromises.

Consensus decision-making was prevalent on Romanian Earthquake, the HUD vote, and School Lunch--bills that passed by high margins.

Philosophical convictions were most prevalent on votes that invoked questions of human rights--Rhodesian Chrome, Arab Boycott, Hyde, Hatch--and the Nuclear Navy vote that invoked national defense concerns.

Consistency was cited most on three votes that had loomed as major matters in the preceding Congress--Strip Mining and the Hyde Amendment--and the Public Works bill, which was a conference report and presumably involved members' attempts to be consistent with their position on House engrossment of the bill.

Personal staff was a perceived determinant on two votes: EPA and Countercyclical. The EPA vote involve a routine authorization and may have been a delegated decision for many members. Countercyclical involved extensive staff work to ascertain impacts on constituency. Several members deferred to that staff work.

Non-committee members were used as a decision determinant on two votes where those not on the committee attempted to amend a bill over the committee's objection: Nuclear Navy and Goldwater. On more than two-thirds of the sampled votes, no interviewee mentioned other members as a determinant.

State delegation was mentioned by a significant proportion on only the Debt Collection Practices vote.

Party leaders received noteworthy mention (fourteen percent) on only the Ethics vote--a vote on which the Democratic leadership had staked its prestige. Significantly, no member listed leaders as a determinant of the Pay Raise vote, although this is another instance of where leaders had invested their reputation.

Campaign promises were listed as a determinant by a sizable proportion only on the Hyde Amendment. The significance of this seems to lie in the success with which a single issue interest group is able to obtain legislative support through campaign commitments.

These findings indicate that on different kinds of votes, members' decisions will likely be based more on certain determinants than on others. In a general sense, the findings confirm the suppositions of the conditional authors. On many hot votes--Tax, Rhodesian Chrome, Common Situs, Strip Mining, Energy Department, the Budget, Clean Air, Hyde, Hatch, Saccharin, Water Projects, and the Pay Raise--decisions were based on policy assessments and philosophical convictions. Evidently, these issues appeared to be important enough for members to develop a policy or philosophical position. Certain low grade votes such as the Nuclear Navy, Goldwater Amendment, FAA, EPA, Public Works, and Marine Mammal involved fewer policy assessments and more cue-taking from other actors. Four qualifications to the conditional theory of decision-making emerge, however, from the data in Table 6.4. First, certain minor votes also involve policy voting (House Assassinations, NASA, Snow Removal, Foreign Aid). This indicates that low grade votes often are policy votes, as members attempt to cope by placing routine votes in the context of ideological predispositions. Second, low profile votes are based on situational considerations such as assessments of compromise and consensus as well as cue-taking. Third, a hot vote such as Government Reorganization can witness small margins of policy voting and, in fact, can be determined on the basis of cue-taking and/or situational concerns. Fourth, certain hot votes are based on constituency as well as policy assessments.

#### By Issue Characteristics

Arraying decision determinants by issue characteristics reveals only some variation in determinants. Appendix I displays determinants by issue characteristics. Overall, these tables present 504 distributions.

Of these, only fifty-four (eleven percent) evince meaningful variation, i.e., variation of nine percent or more.

In comparison to perceptual and subjective indicators, objective indicators are associated with the greatest number of significant variations. Thirteen percent of the distributions by objective indicators are meaningful, while only nine percent of the perceptual distributions and five percent of the subjective distributions are significant. Some specific indicators are associated with more variation than others. Thought, policy role and presidential involvement are the indicators according to which there is the highest level of variation in the mention of determinants. It is interesting that conflict, which according to Kingdon's consensus model is a major conditioning force in congressional voting,<sup>42</sup> is associated with only one of fourteen possible significant variations. Also associated with few variations in determinants are index of likeness, margin of committee vote, existance of a minority report, Washington Post box score, amendment over committee objection, Republican party endorsements, and newness.

The few significant variations do permit the specification of some issue characteristic correlates for each determinant. These are presented in Table 6.7. In general, these distributions, although few in number, do conform to the expectations of proposition 9. Cue-taking from other members and from staff usually occurs under low profile conditions. Members engage in policy and philosophical voting under mostly hot, controversial conditions, when they have strong feelings and employ a lot of thought. Evidently, on low profile votes, members will use the position of others as a decision shortcut. On high profile votes, due to

**Table 6.7**  
**Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Decision Determinants (Correlates are Based on Variations of Nine Percent or More)**

<u>Committee Chairman</u>	<u>Compromise</u>	<u>White House</u>	<u>Policy Assessment (Ideology)</u>
No thought (LP)	Thought (H)	Congress ratifies (LP) Presidential involvement (H)	Feelings (H)
Committee Members	Wide margin of passage (LP)		Not tough (LP)
No mail (LP)	CQ box score (H)		Thought (H)
No feelings (LP)	Congress modifies (H)		Below average rule margin (H)
No thought (LP)	Specific (LP)	No thought (LP)	Close vote (H)
Congress as modifier and ratifier (LP)	Congress promises (H)	Wide margin of final passage (LP)	Defeat (H)
Presidential involvement (H)	Campaign Promise	Above average Democratic unity (LP)	Below average Democratic unity (H)
Constituency	Renomination effect (H)	No Washington Post story (LP)	Below average Republican unity (H)
Salient (H)	Reelection effect (H)		Committee dissensus (H)
Constituency aware (H)	Presidential effect (H)		Minority report (H)
Mail (H)	Presidential involvement (H)		CQ story (H)
Tough (H)	Consistency	Feelings (H)	Washington Post story (H)
Thought (H)	Above average policy time (H)	Close final passage (H)	Congress initiates and modifies (H)
Below average rule margin (H)		Below average likeness (H)	Democratic endorsement (H)
CQ story (H)		Above average policy time (H)	Mention in the polls (H)
Republican endorsement (H)		Presidential involvement (H)	No presidential involvement (LP)
Presidential involvement (H)			Specificity (LP)

H = Presumed hot value  
 LP = Presumed low profile value  
 . = Variation of twenty percent or greater

campaign considerations and issue visibility, members will stake out an ideological or philosophical position. In addition, various situational forces shape member reliance on certain decision rules. For example, both the White House and constituents are mentioned more when they are involved in the legislative process. Consensus decision-making takes place under relatively non-controversial circumstances. Campaign promises are a policy determinant when the issue is salient to constituents and members perceive that constituents are aware of it.

Further situational effects are illustrated by tables 6.8 and 6.9.

Table 6.8 tests a commonly heard congressional axiom that "People influence the legislator simply by their involvement." A corollary to this is that "If you're not involved, you won't influence." In the table, determinants are arrayed by presence in the force field and by mention as an information source. It clearly shows that an actor's involvement in the force field or as an information source is associated with a much higher rate of mention as a determinant. Evidently, if, for example, committee members are heard from and if they are utilized for information, they are much more likely to be relied on (at a rate of forty-seven percent to four percent) than if they are not involved.

Table 6.9 affords a test of the notion that the more people a member hears from, the more likely the decisions would be based on an assessment of the adequacy of compromise, and the less likely the decision would be based on the consensus mode. The Table shows a slight tendency in this direction. For most determinants, meaningful variation does not exist. Consensus decision-making, however, is slightly more likely to occur when the volume of force field is below average. Compromise is cited more when information volume is above average. It is interesting

Table 6.8

**Meaningful Distributions of Determinants by Force Field and Information Input: the Percentage of Interviews in which Various Determinants were Significantly Mentioned under Different Control Conditions**

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Present in Force Field</u>		<u>Mention as Information Source</u>	
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>
Chairman	2%	21%	4%	47%
Committee Members	7	16	8	26
State Delegation	2	6	2	29
Other Members	2	8	2	21
Personal Staff	2	7	0	12
Individual Constituents	7	24	---	---
Inspired Mail	12	24	---	---
Group Constituents	9	25	---	---
Constituency	---	---	12	26
Interest Groups	0	3	1	0
White House	2	36	7	10

Table 6.9

**Meaningful Distributions of Determinants by Force Field and Information Volume: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Significantly Mentioned Different Information Sources when Force Field Volume and Information Volume are Above and Below Average**

	<u>Force Field Volume</u>	
	<u>Below Average Force Field Volume</u>	<u>Above Average Force Field Volume</u>
Constituency	10%	19%
White House	5	9
Consensus	9	5

	<u>Information Volume</u>	
	<u>Below Average Information Volume</u>	<u>Above Average Information Volume</u>
Compromise	5%	11%

that constituency is cited more when force field volume is above average. If constituency makes an input along with many others, there is a tendency for the member to defer to constituency.

By Actor

Final tests of proposition 9 are afforded by both the general remarks of members concerning decision approaches and by decision patterns of those members for whom multiple decision cases are available. Both tests support proposition 9.

Many interviewees were asked to describe how they generally made decisions. Although these general responses were not systematically collected but, instead, obtained as time allowed, they provide evidence of both contextual decision-making and a single process orientation among members.

Among those having a single process orientation, some stressed cue-taking, others policy assessments, some consensus rule, some compromise, some representation, while yet others described an idiosyncratic process.

Examples of how members describe universal process with various forms of cue-taking (deference to others) are the following statements:  
I always follow the advice of my elaborate staff network.

It's an invariant process for me--I look at how others are voting and who is saying what.

My rule is look at who supports it.

If it's not on your committee, then go to your friends and follow their judgment.

I vote for or against the committee on the basis of who said what.

I usually go with the committee report. The committee system is the way we work here. There are adversary groups that must compromise.

I vote to ratify the committee. I listen to those who serve on the committee.

Examples of universal constituency representation are:

I used the same procedure: how will it affect my district?

I vote the image of my district--what people are saying and feeling back home.

I ask--does it help or hurt my constituency? I base my votes on the constituent principle. I won't run a risk. I'll vote to satisfy constituents.

How will it affect my constituency? How will constituents interpret, feel, reflect on it? It's cold and calculating. I look at everything from the point of view of the district.

Examples of universal policy assessments are:

I always try to understand what the bill proports to do--in other words, where does it fit in?--and, then I vote by concept.

Reflective of general consensus voting is the statement: "Every member is affected by colleagues, supporters, constituents, and self. When they are lined up, it is easy. When there is conflict, you must accommodate and compromise."

Compromise, as a total approach, is captured by the following:

As LBJ said, 'Politics is the art of the possible.' You have to settle for the best you can get. I use the fifty-one percent rule. Vote for bills as long as you oppose no more than forty-nine percent of it.

Some members described general decision processes that are hard to classify. One southern conservative reconstructed a multi-dimensional process:

First, 'What is the issue?' Then, 'Is there a position? Who put it up? Who is voting yea and nay? How is my state voting? What is best for my constituency? What have I done on it before?!"

A Republican conservative also provided a detailed process that he claimed universally guided all of his decisions,

I vote against anything in excess of a balanced budget, anything inflationary, and anything local government can handle. I'm for anything furthering balanced budgets, national security, personal freedoms, and free markets.

A liberal Republican described a multiple entree formula; "I always think of three things--What's the impact on my state? What priorities are served? and, Is there controversy?"

Most members, however, acknowledged the variability of decision-making. They state that they make up their minds in different ways, depending on the circumstances involved. Examples of conditional voting are:

Unless it is controversial, or district relevant, I follow the California Democrat on the committee.

I vote the district unless the party has a strong position.

If there is not a lot of mail, my own past record is the determining factor.

I vote my convictions if they apply and then my colleagues. If there is conflict, I follow staff.

On major matters, I follow constituency. On esoteric issues I follow members I trust.

I know what I want. If I'm confused, I put staff to work and get my vote from them.

I follow my Democratic President and Democratic party leaders, unless my own convictions or district interests get in the way.

Unless I'm on the committee or it is a very important thing, I'll go to committee members to find out how to vote the district.

If it's not controversial, I go with the herd, the party, the sponsor or the state delegation.

I usually follow my convictions, my basic thrust. But there are different dynamics. There are committee and party votes; there is cue-taking on obscure things; and then there are the unanimous things.

I always ask--'What will it do for my district?' If it doesn't affect the district, I base the decision on ideology. If it does apply, I base the decision on staff research and the sentiment in the state delegation.

If there is strong opinion in the district, I follow that. If not I go with DSG, the committee, or the state delegation.

I usually base decisions on my beliefs. If I'm in the dark, I go to a sponsor or a committee member and rely on them.

In addition to showing a rich diversity of contextual approaches, the above statements reveal that many members recognize that they often rely on different decision modes.

An inspection of the questionnaires of the fifty-one respondents for whom four or more decision cases are available also supports a contextual model. Forty-two (eighty-two percent) cited different determinants and manifested different decision modes on the various bills for which interviews were obtained. Only nine members (eighteen percent) appeared to have employed the same decision process in each decision case.

### Controls

Various control variables were employed to determine if they exerted independent influence on the citation of determinants. Although many interesting relationships were uncovered, these controls indicate that most variation in decision determinants occurs according to vote and not background factors.

Table 6.10 presents the more meaningful control results when determinants are arrayed by length of service, election results, switch status, and yea or nay vote.

Several members speculated that more junior members, who have not had the opportunity to develop policy positions on all major issues, may engage in cue-taking more frequently than their senior counterparts. One very senior member pointed out that by virtue of seniority he no longer has to agonize as he once did: "Unlike the early days, I know where I'm coming from. Most senior guys call them as they see them. You don't need anybody's help." The control by length of service, as seen in Table 6.10a, only partially validates the supposition. Those with twelve or more years

Table 6.10

Meaningful Background Controls of Determinants: the Percentage of Interviews in which Different Determinants were Significantly Mentioned Under Various Control Categories

a) Length of Service

	<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>	<u>12+ years</u>
Chairman	3%	6%	2%	16%
Personal Staff	7	5	2	2
Constituency	13	13	17	8
Interest Groups	3	1	0	0
White House	12	4	7	10
Compromise	12	7	6	6
Policy Assessments	64	63	64	76
Campaign Promise	16	1	0	0
Consensus	10	6	5	12
Philosophical Convictions	5	10	22	2

b) Election Results

	<u>Members from Close Districts*</u>	<u>Members from Marginal Districts/</u>	<u>Members from Safe Districts+</u>
Chairman	10%	3%	6%
Committee Members	5	8	11
Personal Staff	0	8	4
Constituency	0	14	14
White House	15	3	7
Policy Assessments	85	53	65
Campaign Promise	10	3	3
Consensus	10	17	6
Philosophical Convictions	15	7	11
Consistency	0	6	7

\* 50.1% to 51.9%

/ 52% to 55.9%

+ 56% to 98%

Table 6.10--Continued

c) District Party Switch Status

	<u>Member from Switch District</u>	<u>Member not from Switch District</u>
Chairman	0%	6%
Committee Members	5	11
Personal Staff	10	4
Policy Assessments	57	65
Campaign Promises	14	3
Consensus	19	7

d) Yes or No Vote

<u>Actors</u>	<u>Members Voting</u>	<u>Members Voting</u>
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>
Chairman	4%	7%
Other Members	6	3
Personal Staff	1	6
White House	3	9
Compromise	3	11
Policy Assessments	75	59
Campaign Promise	9	5
Consensus	2	10
Philosophical Convictions	16	9

of service cite policy assessments as a determinant more frequently than those in more junior categories. But, the more senior members, perhaps on the basis of friendship and House power relationships, are also more likely to base a decision on a committee chairman's position. There is no difference in the mention of committee members among seniority categories. Junior members rely more on personal staff, constituency, compromise, and campaign promises than more experienced legislators. Other interesting findings are: a) legislators with six to eleven years of seniority are more likely, by a wide margin, to mention philosophical convictions than any other category, b) the White House and consensus are mentioned most by those with the least and with the most experience, and c) no legislator with experience exceeding six years mentioned interest groups as a decision determinant.

The relationship between election results and constituency influences in congressional decision-making has long been the subject of debate among students of the legislative process.<sup>43</sup> As Jewell and Patterson note, "The most common theory advanced by political scientists about electoral margins has been that members representing marginal seats have to be very sensitive to demands of constituents . . ."<sup>44</sup> Empirical research, however, has failed to show this. Studies by Huntington<sup>45</sup> and Miller<sup>46</sup> argue that, in Miller's words,

. . . congressmen from marginal districts are more likely to translate their policy preferences into roll call behavior than are congressmen from safe districts. . . Legislative acts of Congressmen from competitive districts are associated almost exclusively with their own policy preferences rather than their perceptions of district preferences.<sup>47</sup>

The findings here, as found in Table 6.10b and c corroborate Miller's findings. Those from safe districts are less likely to cite policy assessments and philosophical convictions and more likely to mention constituency

than those elected by a close margin. Those with close results are more likely to mention the chairman, the White House, and campaign promises and less likely to mention consistency, personal staff, and committee members. Likewise switch of party control of the district (an additional indicator of electoral insecurity) is related to slightly less policy voting and more mention of consensus, campaign promises, and personal staff as determinants.

A reasonable supposition is that yea or nay voting may be associated with different decision rules. The data in Table 6.8d show some slight variation. It is interesting that a nay vote is associated with policy assessment, philosophical convictions, campaign promises and cue-taking from members not on the committee. Yea voting is correlated with mention of the chairman, staff, the White House, compromise, and consensus voting.

#### Summary and Conclusions

As is the case with all decision-makers who function in an environment of complexity and high volume decision-making, the legislator devises strategic shortcuts that reduce decision tasks to a routine.

Many of the major studies of congressional decision-making employ a holistic view of congressional decision routines. It is presumed that Congressmen reduce floor voting to a single routine; therefore, decision-making is best understood as the result of a single determinant or normal process such as party or cue-taking or consensus mode.

This chapter has demonstrated that Congressmen rely not on a single decision routine but on various routines. Thus, attempts to describe congressional decision-making by referring to a single

determinant, in the manner of many famous research projects in legislative behavior, greatly oversimplify a highly variable and contextual process. Although policy voting is the determinant most commonly cited by members (thus reaffirming Clausen and countering Matthews and Stimson), interviews reveal that various decision modes are utilized. Congressmen arrive at decisions in various ways. Specifically, seven different ways of making floor voting decisions were identified: cue-taking, policy assessments, philosophical convictions, consensus, campaign promise, compromise, and constituency representation. Each constitutes a very different decision mode or shortcut.

The determinants that members mention vary greatly by kind of vote. In general conversations, many members stated that they used a conditional approach to decision-making. They stated that under certain conditions they made a decision in one way, and under other conditions they employed different decision rules. Of the fifty-one respondents from whom four or more questionnaires were obtained, eighty-two percent cited different determinants on the various bills for which questions were asked. When determinants were displayed by vote, it was revealed that certain determinants were more likely to be mentioned on certain kinds of votes than on others. Some votes were predominantly policy votes, while others were dominated by cue-taking, philosophical convictions, constituency representation, or by situational considerations. The distributions of determinants by issue characteristics, although not revealing as much variation as distributions by vote, provide support for the contextual theory. One out of ten distributions involve meaningful variations in the mention of determinants. Although there is some relationship between control variables and determinants, the relationship between vote and determinants is strong and independent.

The variation of determinants conforms to the configurations predicted by the conditional theory. On many hot, visible bills and under some controversial conditions, members base decisions on policy assessments and philosophical convictions. Evidently, these issues provide sufficient political incentives for members to develop an abstract position to guide their decisions. On low grade issues and under non-visible, non-controversial, low profile conditions, members (not feeling compelled to develop personal stands) base their decisions on the position of other members or staff.

Several qualifications to the conditional theory appear warranted by these findings. First, some minor votes, as well as major questions, invoke policy voting. Evidently, on recurring, non-visible votes (especially those considered not tough and those not involving the President), members stake out a position that they consistently adopt. These predispositions serve as categories within which members can place a vote and easily reach a decision based on policy assessments and consistency with past positions. Second, a high profile vote can be based on something other than policy positions or convictions. Sometimes, due to the involvement of prominent participants, positions become personalized. Members, in siding with a participant, make a decision in a cue-taking mode or base a decision on their assessment of the adequacy of the compromise hammered out by the participants. Third, under conditions indicating extreme political heat and visibility, members will attempt to vote their perceptions of constituency sentiment or interests. Fourth, under low grade conditions, members will base decisions on assessments of consensus or compromise as well as cue-taking. Finally, congressional decision-making is shaped by situational factors pertaining to actor involvement and the configuration of interests on any given issue. Actors who are in

the member's force field on an issue or provide information are more likely to be mentioned as a determinant. Multiple, above average information volume is associated with compromise voting, while low force field volume is associated with consensus decision-making.

The predominance of policy voting raises two concluding questions.

First, although the interviews reveal minimal influence on the part of party leaders, party as an operational concept may make a viable contribution to congressional decision-making in the form of policy assessments. Froman concluded that each party controls districts which are distinctive in terms of social and economic characteristics and that these distinctions are related to different positions on the issues.<sup>48</sup> If these conclusions still hold true, constituency differences between the parties may provide the basis for very real differences in policy voting. In other words, Democrats, responding to very different constituency pressures than Republicans, have policy positions quite different from those of Republicans.<sup>49</sup> Hence, since members often base their positions on party affiliation, policy assessments may be a latent form of the party voting suggested by Turner's study.

Second, although policy voting predominates, and relatively few mention other members, cue-taking may be much stronger, in an indirect sense, than the data indicate. As noted above, the mechanisms of policy voting are ideological predispositions that members develop concerning various categories of public policy. The immediate problem a member in a policy voting mode faces, however, is an informational one: What policy category does it fit into?" "What normative premise applies?" Sources which provide this information--committee and state delegation

members, party leaders, and party publications--may exert considerable influence on the decision, although the member may conclude that his decision was primarily based on ideology. By defining the issue one way rather than another, information sources may determine not only the cognitive category in which a member places a vote, but also, ultimately, how the member votes.<sup>50</sup>

This chapter focused solely on determinants. Members were asked to identify the major force, factor, or actor that determined their vote. Due to the constraint of time in the interview setting, members were not asked to reconstruct the total decision process nor to make a relative rank ordering of influences. Conclusions concerning decision modes, thus, are based solely on extrapolations from citations of determinants. Future congressional research on the determinant stage of member floor voting should attempt to obtain member reconstruction of all cognitive procedures leading up to the decision. Such in-depth probing would provide a more comprehensive view of decision-making.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF ROLE ORIENTATIONS; THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF TIME OF DECISION

Role orientations are very broad perspectives with which legislators view their job. They refer to the member's definition of his task as a legislator as he engages in the act of decision-making. As such, "role is the most basic of the decision components.

Role studies by Wahlke, Eulau, and Davidson and others have provided valuable insights into legislative decision-making. They have identified various categories of orientations--e.g., representative, purposive, group focus--and formulated taxonomies corresponding to various expressions of role that are manifested with regard to each orientation. They have demonstrated that representative role orientations involve two distinct concepts: styles of representation (different ways of reaching a decision such as through a delegate, trustee, or broker mode) and representative foci (nation, district, or nation-district orientation).<sup>1</sup>

As with the literature's treatment of determinants, research concerning role orientations has presumed that a legislator's conception of role will dominate all of his decisions. Jewell and Patterson state, a specific role orientation means a predisposition or inclination to act in a particular way. . . .with enough information about the legislator's role orientations, it should be possible to predict more accurately how he will respond.<sup>2</sup>

Role orientations have been researched in two ways. Both reflect a static conception of legislative behavior.

One way involves questions that ask a legislators to choose an orientation--trustee (self-referrent), delegate (district referrent) or

politico (both) that, in the abstract, best summarizes his overall approach. An example of this approach is Davidson's procedure of having members indicate their degree of agreement with a series of statements that reflect different orientations.<sup>3</sup>

The second involves open ended questions that ask legislators to define their style of representation. An example of this is Wahlke et al.'s question: "First of all, how would you describe the job of being a legislator--What are the most important things you should do here?"<sup>4</sup> Responses to this question are coded in such a way that members are typed as falling in one category. As Wahlke et al. write,

Each legislator has some purposive or factional conception of the ultimate aim of his activities which will be embodied in certain types of norms for his relations with his fellows in the day-to-day legislative operations.<sup>5</sup>

In their study, members are classified on the basis of what the member considers to be his ultimate aim.

The politico orientation allows for contextual behavior, but role researchers do not stress this aspect. In describing the politico role, Wahlke et al. state,

In particular, it would seem to be possible for a representative to act in line with both criteria. For roles and role orientations need not be mutually exclusive. Depending on circumstances, a representative may hold the role orientation of trustee at one time, and the role orientation of delegate at another time. Or he might even seek to reconcile both orientations in terms of a third.<sup>6</sup>

Davidson also acknowledges a mixture of pure styles. As one of the members in his sample stated, "By and large, principle is the criterion. On minor votes I can go along with the constituency."<sup>7</sup> But, as Davidson emphasizes, contextual role playing is only one of many "varied permutations" of the politico role.<sup>8</sup> To both Wahlke et al. and Davidson, the essence of the politico role is balance between constituency and independent judgment.

Davidson states that "many congressmen observe that their problem is one of balancing. . .one role against the other."<sup>9</sup> As Davidson stresses with a quote from a member,

the Congressman must also vote as he reasonably sees fit on an issue. There is a balance which each Congressman works out between two factors. . .<sup>10</sup>

Members who exhibited this conception are typed as politicos, but no effort is made to determine the conditions under which they stress different orientations.

In sum, role research designs assume that role conceptions do not vary across different types of issues. Most role researchers emphasize, as Davidson states, that role is an ". . .expected pattern of behaviors associated with an actor. . ."<sup>11</sup> Role researchers have not attempted to systematically study the conditions under which members exhibit different behaviors.<sup>12</sup> Throughout all role research is the presumption that for the individual legislator the chosen conception of role persists regardless of the issue involved.

The conditional theory, however, posits an opposite notion. From the writings of conditional theorists, especially Miller and Stokes,<sup>13</sup> one gets the impression that the style and focus a Congressman employs has a variable rather than a persistent quality--i.e., role conceptions vary according to different kinds of vote. Low key decisions, which lack electoral incentives and political pressure, will involve a vague national focus and a trustee style. Hot issues, which entail political pressure and have potential electoral consequences, will reflect both a local and a national orientation as well as a delegate style.

This chapter will explore for conditional role orientations. Specifically, the following proposition, derived from the conditional

theory, will be tested: Proposition 10: The role orientations of a member vary according to the kind of issue at hand. On low-grade issues, he tends to have a national focus and a trustee style. On hot issues, due to political relevance, he tends to have a local focus and a delegate style.

Additionally, interviews revealed that many members view the actual time of decision as crucial to the decision process. For this reason, a second proposition will be included in this chapter. It is as follows:

Proposition 11: The time at which a member makes up his mind varies according to the kind of issue at hand. On low-grade issues, members will make a late decision. On high profile issues, commitments will be made far in advance. The rationale for this proposition is derived from economic investment theory. On low-grade issues, due to the lack of both general public and member concern, decisions will be made late. On hot issues, decisions will be made relatively early, reflecting the member's concern and eagerness to develop a commitment on a publicly visible issue.

PROPOSITION 10: The Representative Role Orientations of Members Vary According to the Kind of Issue at Hand.

Generalizations

This study asked members two questions concerning role conceptions. The first concerned style: "What did you rely on when making this decision--constituency, yourself, both?" The second pertained to focus: "What was your focus--national, local, or both?" Initially, a question concerning purposive roles (a member's view of which aspects of the legislative job were involved in the decision) was asked. It was subsequently dropped, however, when answers seemed to be redundant to those obtained with the question on determinants.

The responses to the questions on role conceptions support several generalizations concerning style and focus.

### Style

Three major generalizations concerning style are warranted by the interviews: (1) members articulate the same philosophical dichotomy identified by Edmund Burke, (2) members cite styles other than the two pure types identified by Burke, and (3) Congressmen couch most decisions in terms of a trustee orientation or a combination of a trustee/delegate role and only rarely reflect a pure delegate role.

(1) Members articulate the Same Philosophical Dichotomy of Representation that Burke identified.

In his famous "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" Edmund Burke identified two distinctive styles of representation: (1) the trustee style of basing decisions on the representative's judgment and (2) the delegate style of basing decisions on the position of constituents. Burke, of course, preferred the first style. Both found expression in the interviews.

The trustee orientation is represented with the following statements:

I follow Edmund Burke--I vote for what I think is best.

I am a Burkean--I don't read my mail.

We are sent here to use our judgment.

I'm elected to vote.

I don't take a poll--the people elect me.

You must use your own judgment. There are too many special interest groups pushing selfish programs.

I vote my convictions.

I relied on my deep convictions.

I voted the merits of the issue.

I based the decision on my education and experience.

I voted on the basis of the information provided and my research and personal study.

I was voting my expertise and direct knowledge.

The essence of the trustee position is that, when a conflict develops between constituency and the representative's judgment, the member's judgment will prevail. Indicative are the following statements:

I vote for the House Assassinations Committee, though my constituents oppose it--I always follow my own judgment.

I'll not budge on abortion, gun control. I'll take a position against the district if necessary. The same with Rhodesian Chrome and the Panama Canal.

I vote against my constituency if my convictions lean me that way. For example, I voted against the Nuclear Navy though my district is defense oriented.

I don't like deficit spending. It's inflationary. I vote against these pump priming things even though my district has high unemployment.

The constituency is opposed to Common Situs Picketing, but I'm going against them. I'm for Common Situs Picketing.

Many of those who subscribed to a trustee model emphasized the futility of relying on constituency opinion:

Most people don't have an opinion on the issues.

People don't usually have feelings when it doesn't affect them.

There is no way to know what people want. You can only guess. An election doesn't tell you much.

You just have to rely on your own judgment. What can you do if you don't hear from anyone?

No more than thirty percent are ever interested. What do you do about those you don't hear from. What if the thirty percent are equally divided?

The delegate model was also reflected in the interviews. Examples are:

House members are expected to be district representatives.

I'm the only voice my constituents have in Washington.

I try to respond to the desires of my constituents.

I'm the only person the people in my district can rely on to vote their interests.

The House is the people's place--I vote the district.

I speak my constituency.

The constituency tempers my opinion--constituents shape my decision-making.

My decision is the result of my interpretation of constituency wishes.

Basically, constituency and constituents become a decision referent in four ways: (1) response to (even solicitation of) constituency sentiment, (2) role playing and empathy with constituents, (3) anticipation of constituency reaction, and (4) perceptions of constituency interests.

Examples of the first--active response to constituency sentiments--are:

"I base my decision-making on the majority of correspondence from the district" and "I usually defer to constituents--my sentiment is that's what I'm here for. That's my job isn't it?" Examples of the second--empathetic role playing--are: "I always try to do what they would do if they were me," "I vote the same way I think the folks back home would if they had the same information," and

You have to know your district and the people's feelings and the way they think. Put yourself in their position. What would be in their best interests. What would I want my Congressman to do if I was back there.

The third--anticipation of constituency reaction--is illustrated by the following: "You must consider district interests--it's unpopular and unwise to vote against," "It's a sorry way to legislate if you can't explain your vote to your constituents and get their support," and

"Constituents always enter into your decisions even if you don't hear

from them, because you anticipate how they will receive it." The fourth--perception of constituency interests--is illustrated by the following: "I serve a rural district--I'm here to articulate the farmer's point of view and to serve dairy interests" and

My job is to look out for the constituency. On this energy issue--out here gasoline is a necessity not a luxury. We need gas for tractors. Hell, there isn't a busline in the state.

The essence of the delegate model is preference for constituency input over the representative's position when there is conflict between the two. Examples are:

I defer to pressure on things like tariffs, though I believe they're bad.

I voted for Common Situs, not for me, but for constituents. To survive politically, you must follow the constituency on this and things such as Clean Air or Saccharin.

People delegate to you. If there is conflict between you and them, follow them.

I will not go against the district if the vote is controversial and important to the district--no quicker way to get targeted than that.

(2) Members Cite Styles Other than the Two Pure Types Identified by Burke.

In many instances, when members were asked to identify the role conception that guided their decision, they would cite several factors other than those identified by Burke. This contradicts Burke's notion that members choose from between two pure role types: self and constituency.

Some of the other factors mentioned are: supporters, expertise, the President, staff, and pressure. Typically, when a member would identify another factor, he/she would simply state, "I based my decision neither on myself nor on my constituency." Instead, the member would argue that he relied on a colleague's expertise, on the presidency, or on one of the other factors.

More important, many members maintained that they relied on both constituency and self. Those who claimed that both were involved noted that philosophy and constituency "often coincided" and that their decision was a combination of both. A common response was "Both were a factor," "It was my own opinion as reinforced by my constituency," or "my position plus support of my constituency." Several attempted to account for the reasons why members frequently experienced convergence of personal position and constituency position. Some argued that campaign promises by members account for the absence of perceived conflict. If a member took a stand on an issue and was elected or reelected, he might conclude that there is accord between himself and his constituents. Others emphasized that the widespread practice of polling the district contributed to a convergence of member and district opinion by showing the member where most constituents stand on the major bills of the session.

(3) Congressmen Couch Most Decisions in Terms of a Trustee Orientation or a Combination of a Trustee/Delegate (the Politico) Role.

Table 7.1 displays major responses to the question concerning styles of representation. As can be seen there, most members took a trustee role. The next most frequent orientation was that of politico, which combines the trustee and delegate roles. It is surprising that only two percent cited a pure delegate orientation. Constituency was cited as the base of a role orientation as infrequently as several of the additional factors. These findings are fairly well in line with Davidson who found that most members choose a trustee orientation rather than that of a delegate. The only difference is that Davidson found the politico or combination orientation to be the most frequently cited, while here it was found to be the second most frequent.<sup>14</sup>

Table 7.1

Frequency Distribution of Role Conceptions in Response to the Question,  
"On What Did You Base Your Decision: 'Constituency, Self,  
A Combination of Both?'"

Constituency (Delegate)	2%
Self (Trustee)	74%
Both Self and Constituents (Politico)	19%
President	2%
Staff	1%

N = 352

Focus

Responses to the question concerning foci of representation support one major generalization: For most of the decisions covered by this study, members had a national focus. Table 7.2 displays a frequency distribution of the foci of representation. It shows that a national focus was employed at a rate of more than three to one over the next most frequently cited focus: a combination of national and local orientation. It is surprising that in only six percent of the cases was a purely local focus employed. This is in contrast to Davidson's findings that most members have a district-dominant focus.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the generic questions employed by Davidson are more likely to tap a district orientation than the issue-by-issue questioning employed here.

Examples of a national focus are: "I have a water project in the district, but we need to cut back national spending" and "I voted for that version of the grant formula, though my district will receive slightly less--I believe we should target those areas in need."

Illustrative of a local orientation are the following: "I always ask, 'What's the impact on the district?'," "It's one of those provincial political things," and "It's a parochial issue--you must ask, how will my decision affect me politically?"

A focus involving both foci is illustrated by the following statement: "You can't separate national from local considerations. You must look at not only how it affects your district, but also what it does in a policy sense."

A final generalization supported by the role questions corroborates the Eulau-Wahlke contention that a distinction can be made between focus and style of representation.<sup>16</sup> Table 7.3 shows the interrelationship of

Table 7.2

Frequency Distributions of Foci of Representation in Response to the Question, "What was Your Focus: Nation, Local Constituency, or Both?"

<u>Focus</u>	
National	59%
Local	6%
Both	18%

N = 210

style and focus. It shows that, contrary to Burke's inferences, there are not strong relationships between delegate style and district focus nor between trustee style and national focus.

By Vote

To search for variation in role conceptions, role is arrayed by vote, by issue characteristics, and by actor. All three strongly support the conditional approach.

Table 7.4 arrays style by vote. It clearly shows that on certain votes members are more likely to take a trustee role, while on other votes a combination role is more prevalent. Mention of a trustee style varied from mention by as few as thirty-six percent of the interviewees on Saccharin to mention by as many as one-hundred percent on School Lunch. Mention of a politico style varied from no mention on FAA and other votes to mention by sixty-four percent of the interviewees on the Saccharin vote.

Only one vote--the pork barrel Snow Removal vote--associated with any meaningful mention of constituency. Although most votes involved a trustee role, two types of votes are most associated with self referent voting: hot votes (Rhodesian Chrome, Government Reorganization, Arab Boycott, Strip Mining, the Energy Department, the Hyde Amendment, and the Water Projects) and votes that are relatively low profile (the Nuclear Navy, FAA, House Assassinations, Romanian Earthquake, Debt Collection, Snow Removal, Foreign Aid, and School Lunch). Evidently, members define their role in trustee terms on both the big issues and on many of the votes thought to constitute the routine business of the House. Votes receiving the fewest mention of the trustee role are: (a) those associated

Table 7.4

Role Conception by Vote: the Percentage of Members Mentioning  
Different Role Orientations on Different Votes

<u>Ethics</u>	<u>Nuclear Navy</u>			<u>Tax</u>			<u>Vote</u>			<u>Goldwater</u>			<u>Rhodesian Chrome</u>			<u>NASA</u>			<u>FAA</u>		
	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>
<u>Delegate</u> (Constituency)	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<u>Trustee</u> (Self)	57	91	9	60	60	30	60	91	30	100	100	0	89	18	100	90	10	67	33	17	83
<u>Politico</u> (Both)	29	9	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	0	0	0	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Vote</u>																					
<u>Common Situs</u>	<u>Govt. Reorg.</u>	<u>House Asn.</u>	<u>Romanian Earthquake</u>	<u>EPA*</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>														
<u>Delegate</u> (Constituency)	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<u>Trustee</u> (Self)	58	85	92	100	100	40	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	90	90	83
<u>Politico</u> (Both)	42	8	8	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	17

\* Also 40% staff

Table 7.4--Continued

with significant constituency pressure (Ethics, Common Situs, Saccharin), (b) those grant programs perceived as involving constituency interests (Public Works, Countercyclical, HUD), and (c) votes that involved reliance on staff (EPA).

A combination of the delegate/trustee model (politico role), where the decision is held to rest on both self and constituency, is most prevalently mentioned on (a) those votes that involved considerable correspondence from the constituency (Common Situs and Saccharin) and (b) the second Budget resolution that raised the symbolic issue of government spending. Two types of issues were associated with infrequent mention of a politico orientation: certain hot issues (Government Reorganization, Arab Boycott, Energy Department, and Hyde) and routine, low profile votes (Nuclear Navy, FAA, House Assassinations, Romanian Earthquake, Debt Collection, Snow Removal, Marine Mammal, Foreign Aid, and School Lunch). Both of these, as already mentioned, involved mostly trustee decision-making.

Although the focus question was not asked until the last half of the study and thus covers only half as many votes as the style question, it also reveals variation in role conception among various votes. Table 7.5 shows that the areal focus of members varies according to issues. On votes such as Marine Mammal, Budget I, Foreign Aid, Hyde, and Hatch, members reveal a preponderantly high percentage of national oriented votes. Conversely, grant votes (Public Works, Countercyclical, HUD), pet projects (Snow Removal) and hot votes involving constituency communications (Clean Air, Saccharin) are associated with lower than average national focus. Snow Removal involves a predominantly local focus. Votes

Table 7.5

**Representative Focus by Vote: the Percentage of Members Mentioning Different Foci on Different Votes**

	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>	<u>Energy Dept.</u>	<u>Snow Removal</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Counter Cyclical</u>	<u>HUD</u>	<u>Marine Mammal</u>	<u>Budget I</u>
National	70%	70%	73%	40%	11%	18%	18%	83%	75%
Local	10	0	0	60	22	18	18	0	0
Both	10	30	27	0	67	64	64	17	25
	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Foreign Aid</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde</u>	<u>Hatch</u>	<u>School Lunch</u>	<u>Saccharin</u>	<u>Water Projects</u>	<u>Pay Raise</u>
National	38%	100%	40%	85%	77%	71%	30%	65%	72%
Local	0	0	7	7	7	14	10	0	11
Both	63	0	53	7	15	14	60	35	11

involving frequent mention of both national and local criteria are the grant programs (Public Works, Countercyclical, and HUD) and votes thought to be locally visible (Clean Air, Saccharin, Budget II). Foreign policy votes (Arab Boycott and Foreign Aid) involve little local or mixed focus.

The discussion of style and focus by vote only partially confirms proposition 10. Although there is variation, it does not occur solely in the direction predicted by proposition 10. Basically, in accordance with the prediction, low profile votes do involve a trustee role, while votes that entail considerable constituency pressure are made with a delegate style. The distribution of focus also conforms to the prediction. Contrary to prediction, however, is the fact that many of the hot votes, on which there is minimal constituency input, produce a trustee model of decision-making. Moreover, the data do provide one qualification of proposition 10: Grant programs as well as locally important hot issues involve delegate decision-making and a local/national focus.

#### By Issue Characteristics

The distribution of role orientations by issue characteristics reveals much variation in the mention of styles and foci. Appendix J displays role orientations by indicators of issue characteristics. Of the 216 distributions, thirty-three percent involve variations of nine percent or more from one value of an indicator to another.

Thirty-three percent of the perceptual indicators are associated with meaningful variation, while thirty-five percent of the objective indicator distributions and twenty-two percent of the subjective distributions are significant. The specific indicators associated with the most variation are technicality, salience, type of rule, party endorsements,

amount of money involved, presidential involvement, and the policy role of Congress. The indicators associated with the least amount of variation are conflict, renomination and reelection effects, routineness, toughness, thought, Republican party unity, index of likeness amendment over committee objection, mention in the polls, margin of committee vote, CQ box score and story, Washington Post box score, policy time, and newness.

The array of role by issue characteristics permits the identification of issue characteristic correlates of various role conceptions, as seen in Table 7.6. By and large, these correlates support the directional predictions of proposition 10. A trustee role and a national orientation are associated with characteristics that indicate a lack of political heat from the district but sufficient controversy within Congress. A politico role (which allows for a delegate factor) and a national/local focus are correlated with political salience. On votes that offer the prospects of political heat in the district, the member will use a delegate style and have a local focus more often than if this were not the case. On votes where no heat is likely, members will play the role of a trustee and have a national focus. It should be emphasized, however, that all orientations were associated with both hot and low profile characteristics.

#### By Interviews

Many members expressly addressed contextual role taking. Many acknowledged that they play one role under certain conditions and another role under other conditions:

When constituents have strong opinions, they must be in your equation. That's the job of a representative. However, when they don't have an opinion, you rely on yourself. That's what you must do.

Table 7.6

Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Areal Foci (Correlates are Based on Variation of Nine Percent or more)

National	Local	Both
Non-technical (H)	Salience (H)	Complexity (LP)
Conflict (H)	Open and modified rule (LP)	Technicality (LP)
Not major (LP)	No Democratic endorsements (LP)	Major status (H)
Not salient (LP)	No <u>Washington Post</u> story (LP)	Salience (H)
Constituency not aware (LP)	Congress ratifies (LP)	No strong feeling (LP)
Feeling (H)	Specificity (LP)	Closed rule (H)
Below average rule margin (H)	No change (LP)	Above average rule margin (LP)
Defeated (H)		Wide margin of final passage (LP)
Below average Democratic unity (H)		Above average
Above average Republican unity (LP)		Democratic unity (LP)
Amendment over committee objection (H)		Above average likeness (LP)
Republican endorsement (H)		Democratic endorsement (H)
Below average money (LP)		Republican endorsement (H)
No presidential involvement (LP)		Mention in rolls (H)
No minority report (LP)		Above average money (H)
<u>Washington Post</u> story (H)		Presidential involvement (H)
Congress initiates (H)		Minority report (H)
Non-specific (H)		Congress ratifies (LP)
Change (H)		No change (LP)

Table 7.6--Continued

**Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Representative Role Orientations (Correlates are based on Variations of Nine Percent or More)**

<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>
No Correlates noted	Non-complex (H) Non-technical (H) Not major (LP) Not salient (LP) Constituency not aware (LP) No mail (LP) No renomination effects (LP) No reelection effects (LP) Open rule (LP) Above average rule margin (LP) No Democratic endorsement (LP) No Republican endorsement (LP) Below average money (LP) Presidential involvement (H) <u>No Washington Post box (LP)</u> Congress ratifies (LP)	Complex (LP) Technical (LP) Salient (H) Constituency aware (H) Mail (H) Thought (H) Closed rule (H) Democratic endorsement (H) Republican endorsement (H) Above average money (H) Minority report (H) CQ story (H) Congress modifies (H)

H = Presumed Hot value

LP= Presumed Low Profile value

\* = Variation of twenty percent or more

I usually vote my own opinion, but I can get my mind changed by constituents.

I'll go against my own judgment only if it's something on which I don't have strong feelings--like daylight savings time. Folks back home want it, but my own judgment leads me to oppose it. But I gave in. I would never vote the popular way against my convictions. On major things, constituents are only one of several factors.

A vote should be compatible with the district. A representative must adapt to the prevailing philosophy in the district. Every member should have a general idea of where his district stands. I know what I can and can't explain. I'll deviate from the district only on moral issues such as civil rights. For example, I followed constituency sentiment on Common Situs. People want to have that right. I personally believe it will cause unemployment and inflation.

I vote my personal judgment on the majority of issues. In a few instances, I'll go with the constituency, but it has to involve a vast majority. In the main, you have a tougher time trying to find out what people want than in trying to get them to understand. You're better off taking a stand and supporting it.

I always try to do what constituents would do. I want to reflect the views of the people. I deviate from this process only about ten percent of the time.

Others, however, insisted that they persistently played the same role.

Examples: "I'm a Burkean through and through" and "I always reference constituency views and interests."

An examination of the role responses of the fifty-one interviewees for whom there are four or more questionnaires supports the contextual model. With regards to the style question, thirty (sixty percent) of these respondents employed different role orientations on different votes. Almost all shift focus. Significantly, though, as many as twenty (forty percent) use the same style orientation for all of their decisions. Evidently, some members use different orientations in different contexts, while others use the same one. The important point to bear in mind, however, is that to capture the contextual role playing displayed by a majority

of the respondents, one must utilize a conditional model and not one that classifies legislators as falling under one or the other of the styles.

### Controls

Davidson suggests some very rich hypotheses linking role orientations and various background variables.<sup>17</sup> They are of interest here in that they constitute potential alternative explanations.

Tables 7.7 and 7.8 exhibit the more meaningful cross-tabulations of role orientations and background variables. Some very interesting relationships do occur, many not in conformity with Davidson's findings. In the main, relationships between vote and role and issue characteristics and role are more important than those between role and background factors.

Length of service is related to role in that junior members have their ears to the district more than others. Freshmen and those with 2-5 years of seniority mention "self" less and "both" more than more senior representatives do. Also, freshmen mention a national/local focus more than more experienced members. It is surprising that fewer freshmen have a purely local focus than those in other categories, although the percentages are too low to discern any pattern.

Relationships between election results and role are completely opposite to those found in Davidson. Davidson found that members from marginal districts subscribed to the delegate model and had a district orientation, while those from safe districts tended to be trustees and to have a national focus.<sup>18</sup> The findings of this study are in sharp contrast. Those members from "close" districts have a higher proportion of "self" responses and more of a national focus. Those from safe districts define their role as combination trustee/delegate at a higher rate than those

Table 7.7

Meaningful Distributions of Role Controlled by Background Factors: the Percentage of Members Having Different Role Orientations Under Various Control Conditions

<u>Role Orientation</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>			
	<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>	<u>12+ years</u>
Trustee Politico	69% 20	70% 21	82% 16	82% 14
<u>Election Results/</u>				
	<u>Members from Close Districts</u>	<u>Members from Marginal Districts</u>	<u>Members from Safe Districts</u>	
Trustee Politico	85% 10	69% 14	74% 20	
<u>Switch Status</u>				
	<u>Members from Switch District</u>	<u>Members not from Switch Districts</u>		
Trustee	62%	/	75%	
<u>Force Field Volume</u>				
	<u>Members with Below Average Force Field</u>	<u>Members with Above Average Force Field</u>		
Trustee Politico	80% 12	67% 27		

/ Computed on the basis of 1976 Election Returns and based on the following divisions:  
 Close = 50% to 52%  
 Marginal = 53% to 55%  
 Safe = 55%+

Table 7.8

**Meaningful Distributions of Focus Controlled by Background Factors: the Percentage of Members Having Different Foci Under Various Control Conditions**

<u>Focus</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>			
	<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>	<u>12+ years</u>
Nation	50%	64%	55%	57%
Local	6	11	14	0
Both	44	24	29	33

Election Results<sup>1</sup>

	<u>Members from Close Districts</u>	<u>Members from Marginal Districts</u>	<u>Members from Safe Districts</u>
Nation	85%	63%	57%
Local	0	11	10
Both	15	21	32

Information Volume

	<u>Members with Below Average Information</u>	<u>Members with Above Average Information</u>
Local	13%	5%
Both	25	36

Force Field Volume

	<u>Members with Below Average Force Field</u>	<u>Members with Above Average Force Field</u>
Local	13%	6%

<sup>1</sup> Computed on the basis of 1976 Election Returns and based on the following Divisions: Close = 50% to 52%  
Marginal = 53% to 55%  
Safe = 55%+

from marginal or close districts. Also, those from safe districts cite both a national/local focus at a higher rate, indicating heightened sensitivity to constituency. The only confirmation for Davidson is the relationship between role and district switch status. Those from a district that did not switch rely on self more than the switchers. The switchers, however, do not have a higher rate of either "both" or "constituency" responses.

In addition to the background variables suggested by Davidson, controls were employed for force field and information volume, determinants, and ideological views. A reasonable hypothesis seems to be that a trustee style and a national focus would most likely be mentioned when the volume of communications and information is low, when policy assessments and other non cue-taking determinants are cited, and when the legislator is above average in ideological avidness.

There are some relationships between role and both volume of force field and volume of information. When the member's force field is below average, he is more likely to rely on "self," and less likely to consider "both." Seemingly contradictory, however, those with below average force field have a local orientation.

There are also interrelationships between role conceptions and determinants as presented in Table 7.9. Those having a delegate orientation are more likely to cite as determinants staff, constituency, and compromise. A trustee orientation is associated with committee members, policy assessments, consensus, philosophical convictions, and consistency. A national focus is associated with the determinants of committee members, compromise, policy assessments, and philosophical convictions. A local orientation is associated with constituency and consistency.

Table 7.9

**Interrelationships Between Role/Focus and Determinants: the Percentage of Members with Different Role Orientations and Foci Citing Different Decision Determinants**

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Delegate</u>	<u>Role</u> <u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>
Chairman	0%	5%	5%
Committee Members	0	11	3
Other Members	0	5	3
Personal Staff	13	4	5
Constituency	50	7	38
White House	0	7	3
Compromise	25	7	5
Policy Assessments	50	69	64
Consensus	0	8	3
Philosophical Convictions	0	13	3
Consistency	0	7	5

Table 7.9--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Focus</u>
			<u>Both</u>
Chairman	2%	0%	8%
Committee Members	9	5	3
Personal Staff	2	5	6
Constituency	6	55	21
White House	6	0	3
Compromise	13	5	8
Policy Assessments	75	35	68
Campaign Promises	0	3	6
Consensus	4	0	8
Philosophical Convictions	14	5	3
Consistency	7	10	3

Relationships between ideological avidness and role are scant.

Members were classified as falling above or below the mean on ADA, ACA, CORE, CCUS, party unity, and Conservative Coalition ratings. Table 7.10 presents the few meaningful relationships. In some instances, they support the original supposition. Some contradict it (e.g., a national orientation associated with below mean scores). The low number of relationships, however, rules out an ideological control factor.

#### Conclusions to Proposition 10

A member's representative role orientation is a highly variable construct. As the arrays of role by vote, issue characteristics, and actor conclusively show, most members do not choose one orientation and then consistently apply it to all decisions. One role is more prevalently mentioned on certain votes, while on other votes another role is cited more frequently. Numerous variations occur with regard to issue characteristics. Most members for whom multiple decision cases (four) are available exhibit variable role orientations. More variations occur across votes and issue characteristics than according to background factors. In the main, proposition 10 is confirmed. There is meaningful variation, and it does conform to the hot/low profile distinction. Hot votes are associated with a delegate role and a local orientation. On low profile decisions, a perceived trustee role and national orientation dominate. The exception is that several hot votes also involve a perceived pure trustee role. In sum, it seems that constituency heat and constituency relevance may be the dividing line between a member's use of a trustee or delegate style. When input is received from constituents (Common Situs, Saccharin) or constituency interests are on the line (grant programs), the legislator

Table 7.10

**Meaningful Relationships Between Role Conception and Voting Scores: the  
Percentage of Members Mentioning Different Roles and Foci  
Under Various Control Conditions**

<u>Orientation</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>	
		<u>Members with Below Mean Party Unity</u>	<u>Members with Above Mean Party Unity</u>
Self		68%	78%
<u>Focus</u>			
<u>Orientation</u>	<u>Rating</u>	<u>Members with Below Mean</u>	<u>Members with Above Mean</u>
Nation	ACA	65%	55%
Nation	CCUS	67	53
Both	CCUs	25	35
Nation	Party Unity	47	67
Both	Party Unity	37	26
Nation	Conservative Coalition	67	55
Both	Conservative Coalition	24	34

is more apt to be a delegate. When these factors are absent for the individual member--even though there may be controversy within the Congress--there is a greater likelihood that the member will be a trustee.

PROPOSITION 11: The Time at which a Member Makes Up His Mind Varies According to Different Kinds of Issues

Members often mentioned time of decision as an important variable for understanding the dynamics of congressional decision-making. At the suggestion of several members, a "time of decision" question was employed late in the study, rendering a total of only 141 responses.

Generalizations

Table 7.11 lists the various times of decision mentioned by members. Two generalizations are supported by these data: (1) members mention various decision times and (2) the most frequently mentioned times are "on the floor" and "last time the bill was up."

(1) Members Mention Various Decision Times

The time at which a member makes a decision on a floor vote can occur at any of several points in the legislative process. In all, twelve different temporal decision points were noted. They range in time from when the member first entered politics to "very late," quite possibly right up to the time for casting the vote.

Some of the decision times listed in Table 7.11 require further elaboration. An automatic decision is one that was made, in the words of a member, "when I first heard about." Some decisions were said to be made as a result of the committee service of members: "I made up my mind when it cleared our committee." Some stated that they decided when they

Table 7.11

Frequency Distribution of Responses to the Question:  
"When Did You Reach a Decision on This Vote?"

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Percent</u>
When Member First Entered Politics	7%
Last Time Vote Was Up	18
During Campaign	9
Automatic (When Heard It Was Up)	6
On Committee	5
Week Before	3
Day Before	3
When Read About It	6
When Heard From Constituents	4
On the Floor	25
When Change Was Made	5
Late	9

N = 141

heard from constituents on a bill or "realized the constituency's interests were involved." Finally, many decisions were made on the floor. In some cases, these were acknowledged to be snap decisions. Amendments, especially, fit in this category. In the words of a member, "Hell, in the committee of the whole, you only have 10 minutes of debate to make up your mind. If it's an amendment to an amendment, chances are it hasn't been published yet."<sup>19</sup> Others are not snap judgments but, instead, are settled on the basis of debate or amendments. For example, many members noted that on the Budget resolution they ". . . wanted to hear the final arguments and see the finished product." One member hedged on the Hyde Amendment ". . . to see if it became workable as a result of the amendment process."

(2) The Most Frequently Mentioned Times of Decision Are 'On the Floor' and 'Last Time the Bill was up.'

Table 7.11 reveals that most members stated that they made up their minds on the floor. The next most frequently mentioned time, reinforcing the Sundquist/Polsby concept of policy incubation,<sup>20</sup> is "last time up," followed by "during the campaign" and "late."

By Vote

To test for variations, time of decision is arrayed by vote and by issue characteristics. Due to the limited number of responses to the question, there is no array by interviewees.

Table 7.12 displays time of decision by vote. Complete data was available on only twelve votes. These data, as incomplete as they are, show considerable variation in the time of decision. Although "on the floor" is, generally, the most frequently mentioned decision time (overall a twenty-five percent mention), no interviewee mentioned it on

Table 7.12

**When Decided by Vote: the Percentage of Members Mentioning Different Times of Decision by Vote**

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>NASA</u>	<u>Common Situs</u>	<u>Debt Collection</u>	<u>EPA</u>	<u>Arab Boycott</u>	<u>Strip Mining</u>	<u>Snow Removal</u>
When Member First in Politics	0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	0%	0%
Last Time Vote Was Up	20	29	13	0	11	50	0
During Campaign	20	14	0	0	11	0	0
Automatic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
On Committee	0	0	13	33	0	0	0
Week Before	0	14	0	0	0	25	0
Day Before	0	0	0	0	11	13	0
When Read About It	0	0	13	67	11	0	0
When Heard From Constituents	0	14	0	0	11	0	100
On the Floor	40	14	38	0	33	13	0
When Change Made Late	0	0	13	0	0	0	0
	20	14	13	0	0	0	0

Table 7.12--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Public Works</u>	<u>Budget I</u>	<u>Budget II</u>	<u>Clean Air</u>	<u>Hyde</u>
When Member First Entered Politics	0%	0%	20%	0%	39%
Last Time Up	33	0	20	50	23
During Campaign	0	0	40	0	23
Automatic	0	10	0	13	8
On Committee	33	0	0	0	0
Week Before	0	0	0	0	0
Day Before	0	0	0	0	0
When Read About It	17	0	0	0	0
When Heard from Constituents	0	0	0	0	0
On the Floor	17	60	0	13	8
When Change Made Late	0	10	20	0	0
	0	20	0	25	0

the EPA, Snow Removal, and Budget II votes and less than ten percent cited it on the Hyde Amendment, while sixty percent classified the Budget resolution as an "on the floor" decision.

Many interesting patterns are reflected in Table 7.12. Significant proportions cited "when first entered politics" on Budget II and the Hyde Amendment. Last time up was the decision time most mentioned on Strip Mining and Clean Air. "The campaign" was most frequently mentioned on the Budget vote. "A week before" was most prevalently mentioned on Strip Mining. "When read about it (heard it was coming up)" was mentioned by a significant proportion on the EPA vote. "When heard from constituency" was mentioned most on Snow Removal. Floor decisions were likely to occur most on two kinds of votes: (a) routine votes (NASA, Debt Collection) when the member first realized on the floor that the vote was up and (b) important decisions (Arab Boycott, Budget I) where many members hedged pending the vote on several amendments. "When change made" was mentioned most on Budget II. Late decisions were most recorded on Budget I, Clean Air, and NASA. In sum, the various decision times are mentioned with more and less frequency across different votes.

The array of decision times by vote does not confirm the directions of proposition 11. True to expectations, some hot issues (especially votes like Common Situs and Strip Mining which had been up before) are decided well before the vote. But, other hot votes (Budget, Arab Boycott) are decided on the floor. Some low profile votes (Debt Collection, NASA) are determined at the last moment, but others (EPA, Public Works) are resolved automatically or on the basis of the member's past experience. Evidently, hot issues are resolved depending on situational considerations--e.g., amendments. If important amendments loom, members will await the outcome

before deciding. The time of decision on low profile issues depends on when the member receives information that the issues are coming up. If the member knows a routine issue is coming up a week or day before, he has an opportunity, based on past positions, to make a decision automatically. If he does not hear about it until he reaches the floor, the decision may not be made until late. It should be added that the precise time when a member learns that a low profile vote is coming up seems to be a function of the information systems of individual members. Members who are briefed far in advance of a vote or who read the schedule a week ahead are probably more likely to make an earlier decision than those who play it day-by-day or hour-by-hour.<sup>21</sup>

#### By Issue Characteristics

There are significant variations in the mention of the different decision points according to issue characteristics. Appendix K displays time of decision by issue characteristics indicators. Of the 432 distributions contained within these tables, ninety (twenty-one percent) involve meaningful variation across categories of issue characteristics indicators.

The various categories of indicators exhibit relatively uniform variation. Twenty-one percent of the perceptual distributions, twenty percent of the objective distributions, and twenty-two percent of the subjective distributions are significant. The specific indicators most associated with variation are feelings, renomination and reelection effects, margin of passage, CQ story, and presidential involvement. The least amount of variation is associated with technicality, constituency awareness, margin of the committee vote, Republican endorsements, amount

of money, and specificity. These variables do not distinguish between different decision times.

The variations do provide a list of correlates for most decision times. These are displayed in Table 7.13.

The correlates offer mixed support for proposition 11. Decisions made "when first in politics," "automatically," "the last time up," and "during the campaign" are associated with hot characteristics. Decisions made "when read about it" are associated with mostly low profile characteristics. But, decisions made "on the floor" and "late" involve both low profile and hot characteristics. Evidently, in line with arrays by vote, qualifications to proposition 11 are in order. Decisions on hot issues are made both early and late. Decisions on low profile issues are made both early and late.

#### Controls

Time of decision was correlated with six variables in an effort to uncover alternative relationships. They are: nay/yea vote, election results, seniority, force field and information volume, ideological scores, and determinants.

Overall, there are few meaningful relationships between time of decision and control variables. Table 7.14 presents the few meaningful results produced by cross-tabulation.

With regard to nay/yea voting, it was hypothesized that a late vote is associated with nay voting. Table 7.14 shows a slight trend in this direction. Also, automatic ("knee jerk") voting is slightly more associated with a yea position.

Election results were expected to be related to decision time, with close votes associated with constituency-oriented decisions, and

Table 7.13

Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Decision Times (Correlates are based on Variation of Nine Percent or More)

<u>When First Entered Politics</u>	<u>Last Time Up</u>	<u>During Campaign</u>	<u>Week Before</u>	<u>When Heard From Constituents</u>
Conflict (H)	Major (H)	Complex (LP)	Thought (H)	Thought (H)
Non-routine (H)	Renomination effects (H)	Major (H)	Where Read	Congress modifies (H)
No feelings (LP)	Re-election effects (H)	Salient (H)	About	
Above average Republican party unity (LP)	Routine (LP)	Constituency Aware (H)		
Close vote (H)	Not tough (LP)	Renomination effects (H)	Not complex (H)	
No CQ box score (LP)	No thought (LP)	Re-election effects (H)	No feelings (LP)	
Congress initiates (H)	Open rule (LP)	Feeling (H)	Open rule (LP)	
No presidential involvement (H):	Close vote (H)	Closed rule (H)	Modified rule (LP)	
Automatic	Minority report (H)	Close vote (H)	Wide margin of passage (LP)	
Mail (H)	CQ box score (H)	Congress ratifies (LP)	No CQ story (LP)	
Feeling (H)	CQ story (H)	No presidential involvement (LP)	No Washington Post story (LP)	
Below average rule margin (H)	Above average policy time (H)	Democratic endorsements (H)	No Democratic endorsement (LP)	
Defeated (H)	Democratic	Presidential involvement (H)	No change (LP)	
Washington Post box score (H)	On the Committee	Below average		
Washington Post story (H)	Not new (LP)	Republican unity (H)		
Democratic endorsement (H)	Change (H)	Congress ratifies (LP)		
New (H)		No change (LP)		

Table 7.13--Continued  
**Values of Issue Characteristics Associated with Mention of Different Decision Times**  
 (These correlates are based on variations of nine percent or more)

On The Floor	When Changes Made		Late
	No Washington Post box (LP)	Non-routine (H) New (H)	Tough (H) Closed rule (H)
Non-technical (H)	No Washington Post story (LP)	Below average	Below average
Non-major (H)	No Washington Post story (LP)	Democratic unity (H)	Congress ratifies (LP)
Non-salient (LP)	Below average policy time (LP)	No presidential involvement (H)	No presidential
No mail (LP)	Below average money (LP)	Non-specific (H)	involvement (LP)
No renomination effects (LP)	Presidential involvement (H)		
No reelection effects (LP)	Non-specific (H)		
No strong feelings (LP)			
Tough (H)			Change (H)
No thought (LP)			
Closed rule (H)			
Above average rule margin (!!).			
Defeated (H).			
Above average			
Republican unity (LP)			
Above average likeness (LP)			
No minority report (LP)			
No CQ box score (LP)			
No CQ story (LP)			

H = Presumed hot value

LP = Presumed low profile value

. = Variation of twenty percent or more

Table 7.14

**Meaningful Distributions of "When Decided" Controlled by Background Factors: the Percentage of Members Citing Different Decision Times Under Various Control Conditions**

a)

Time of DecisionAutomatic  
Late

<u>No/Yes Vote</u>	
<u>Members Voting</u>	<u>Members Voting</u>
<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>

2%	9%
19	4

b)

Election Results/When First Entered Politics  
Automatic  
When Read  
Change Made

<u>Close</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Safe</u>
20%	7%	6%
0	13	6
0	13	6
10	0	5

c)

SeniorityWhen First Entered Politics  
Last Time  
Campaign  
Automatic  
On Committee  
When Read  
On Floor  
Late

<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>2-5 years</u>	<u>6-11 years</u>	<u>12+ years</u>
7%	2%	17%	0%
0	17	31	29
33	3	0	0
7	2	11	7
10	3	6	0
7	2	17	0
20	34	22	7
3	14	3	21

Table 7.14--Continued

d)

Force Field and Information VolumeForce Field VolumeMembers with  
Below AverageMembers with  
Above Average

When Read

9%

1%

Information VolumeMembers with  
Below AverageMembers with  
Above Average

Last Time

15%

22%

e)

Ideological ScoresRatingMembers with  
Below AverageMembers with  
Above Average

Campaign	ADA	1%	12%
Last Time	ACA	23	14
Campaign	ACA	5	11
When Read	ACA	3	9
Last Time	CORE	23	14
Campaign	CORE	2	13
Automatic	CORE	4	8
When Read	CORE	9	5
Campaign	CCUS	5	12
When Read	CCUS	3	9
Automatic	Party Unity	2	9
First in Politics	Cons. Coal. 94th	10	5
Last Time	Cons. Coal. 94th	23	14
Campaign	Cons. Coal. 94th	5	11
When Read	Cons. Coal. 94th	3	9
Campaign	Cons. Coal. 95th	11	5
Day Before	Cons. Coal. 95th	0	7
When Read	Cons. Coal. 95th	3	12
On Floor	Cons. Coal. 95th	29	20
Campaigning	Party Unity 95th	2	14
When Read	Party Unity 95th	13	1

Table 7.14--Continued

f)

<u>Determinants Cited</u>	<u>Time of Decision</u>					<u>Week Before</u>
	<u>When First Entered Politics</u>	<u>Last Time</u>	<u>Campaign</u>	<u>Automatic</u>	<u>On Committee</u>	
Committee Members	0%	0%	8%	0%	14%	0%
Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0
Policy Assessment	60	84	42	78	29	75
Philosophical Conviction	40	28	17	33	0	0
Campaign Promise	0	0	67	11	0	0
Consensus	0	8	8	0	0	0
<u>Day Before</u>						
	<u>When Read</u>	<u>Heard from Constituents</u>	<u>On Floor</u>	<u>Change Made</u>	<u>Late</u>	
Committee Members	0%	0%	20%	0%	15%	
Staff	25	22	40	0	0	0
Policy Assessment	75	55	20	54	71	69
Philosophical Conviction	0	22	20	6	0	8
Campaign Promise	0	0	0	0	0	0
Consensus	0	0	0	6	0	15

/ Computed on the basis of the 1976 elections. Divisions are based as follows:  
 Close: 50% to 52% of the vote  
 Marginal: 52% to 55%  
 Safe: 55%+

safe votes associated with decisions made "automatically" and "when first entered politics." Table 7.14b does not support this. Contrary to the hypothesis, close results are associated with a "when first entered politics" decision time. Electorally secure legislators, however, tend to make automatic decisions.

Seniority was expected to relate to time of decision, with freshmen more sensitive to electoral inputs and senior legislators making more "automatic" decisions. Several relationships in Table 7.14c confirm this. Freshmen cite the campaign as the time of decision at a rate of ten to one times greater than more senior members. "The last time it was up" is cited at a much higher rate by more senior representatives. Many relationships, however, are not linear. Although there are differences among the categories of seniority, they do not occur in one direction.

It was felt that force field and information volume were related in that the more actors a legislator hears from and the more information he consulted, the more likely he is to make a late decision. Table 7.14d does not support this. No significant relationships exist in this direction. Below average contacts (force field volume) is associated with "when read about it" responses. Above average information volume is associated only with "last time up" responses.

It was hypothesized that there might be a tendency for ideological extremity and early or automatic decision-making to be related. Table 7.14e shows some tendency in this direction. Above the mean scores are associated with campaign, automatic, and day before decision-making. Below average scores are related to "on the floor" decisions. Contrary to the expectations, below average scores are also related to "last time" and "when first entered politics" responses. For some scores (ACA, CCUS, Conservative Coalition 94th and 95th) above average scores are related

to "when read about it" responses. For other scores (CORE, party unity for the first session of the 95th Congress) below average scores are related to "when read about it" time of decision.

Determinants, it was felt, might be related to time of decision with policy assessments, and philosophical convictions associated with early decisions, and cue-taking associated with late decisions. Table 7.14f shows such a tendency. Committee members tend to be mentioned most when the decision is "on the floor" and "late." The times at which staff is cited most correspond to the occasions at which they are most likely to have an input: "day before" (staff briefing), "when read about it" (staff summary sheets), and "when heard from constituents" (member directed staff work). Policy assessments are mentioned most on "last time" and "automatic" responses. Philosophical convictions are mentioned most for "when first entered politics" and "automatic" decisions. Campaign promises as a decision rule tend to be associated with decisions made during the campaign. Consensus decisions are "late" ones.

#### Conclusions to Proposition 11

Members may reach a decision at any number of times in the legislative process. Although the most frequently mentioned decision times are "on the floor" and "the last time the bill was up," the time at which a member makes up his mind varies greatly from vote-to-vote and under various issue characteristics. Moreover, the configurations by issue characteristics conform to proposition 11. Decisions made "when first entered politics" and "during the campaign" or which are "automatic" or based on "the last time up" tend to be hot. Decisions made on the floor tend to be low profile and non-controversial. Several qualifications are

warranted. Some low profile decisions are made at a time when the member "first read about it." Some hot characteristics are associated with late decisions. The distributions of time of decision by vote and issue characteristics reveal that both hot and low profile votes are associated with both early and late decision-making.

In sum, the interviews support the notion that time of decision is a highly variable phenomenon. Associations between decision time and vote and decision time and issue characteristics are stronger than relationships between decision time and the control variables. But, only partial support is provided for the expectation that hot decisions are made early, while low profile decisions are made late. The findings here argue that decisions on some hot bills get made early as a result of past legislative experience or campaign activity. Other hot decisions are made as members await the outcome of the amending process. Many low profile decisions are associated with floor and late voting, perhaps reflecting members' lack of concern and information. Other low profile votes are handled routinely, with the time of decision hinging on precisely when the member hears that the bill is coming up. Proposition 11 is thus accepted with the qualification that major variations in decision times are governed by parliamentary events and floor wrangling and the member's own information system.

#### Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has identified two additional benchmarks at which variations in legislative decision behavior can be observed: role orientations and time of decision.

Contrary to the assumptions that underlie role research designs, the evidence of this study argues that the role conception with which a member approaches decision-making varies among different kinds of votes and under various issue characteristics.

Time of decision, a component of voting held to be important by many interviewees, also reveals vote-by-vote, issue-by-issue variation.

The results reported here thus argue for a contextual theory with which to grasp the dynamics of decision-making.

Several afterthoughts concerning the generalizations offered here provide an appropriate way to conclude this chapter.

First, when members cite a delegate or politico style and a local or national/local mixture, they often hold a segmental view of constituency interests. Subsequent questioning of several members revealed that on decisions such as the Hatch Act revisions and Clean Air, "the constituency" was defined solely in terms of who the member heard from back in the district: postal employees or auto dealers. The problem, of course, is that members might not give consideration to the latent, unmobilized groups. Decisions made as a delegate and with a local focus might be responses to the claims of very narrow, particularistic interests that, in themselves, are detrimental to commonweal concerns or to the district's interests broadly construed. This of course raises a central dilemma of representation: does the legislator place more emphasis on the interests of intense minorities--interests that though narrow are politically strong--or should he show favor to an amorphous general interest--a broader but politically passive interest. In other words, does the member vote the constituents he hears from or his perception of broad constituency interests?

Second, conversations with several members indicate that a heterogeneous district facilitates a trustee style. In the words of one of the most articulate members, "You have a lot of leeway on a vote if your district is heterogeneous. You can mobilize different groups to compensate for a loss of support by others. This situation really reinforces your independence." In contrast, members from homogeneous districts do not enjoy such latitude. They lack the ability to play one group against another or to build a coalition out of a diversity of interest.

Finally, the findings that most members are trustees and that they usually reserve judgment until the floor stage may be the result of interviewee attempts to cater to their perceptions of researchers' expectations. There are expectations in some quarters that members should utilize independent judgment and should suspend judgment until all the facts are in. The possibility looms that members' replies to questions pertaining to these topics may be more of an effort to conform to these expectations, and less of an attempt to validly reconstruct the decision process. It will be argued in the next chapter that such a risk, however, is one of the tradeoffs of the interviewing approach to congressional decision-making.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion of this research is that Congressmen do not make up their minds in a set way or in the same fashion on each and every floor vote. Their decision behavior is highly variable. Who Congressmen hear from, where they get their information and how and when they make a decision vary from vote-to-vote and according to issue characteristics. These variations are patterned in that differences in legislative behavior are associated with different kinds of votes. How members behave and reach decisions clearly depends on the type of vote at hand.

Although contextual decision-making seems obvious, it has neither been systematically examined nor emphasized in major studies of legislative behavior. Typically, research has sought to formulate general propositions and models with which to understand legislative decision-making. This has resulted in a number of conflicting interpretations. This study has revealed that no one model provides an adequate explanation. The findings do not call for the rejection of a number of interpretations in favor of one interpretation. Instead, major generalizations and models are shown to have partial, contextual applicability.

Specifically, this study tested eleven previously unsubstantiated propositions derived from the literature of the conditional school of legislative behavior. The first three are implied corollaries of the contextual approach concerning members' views of issue characteristics. The remaining eleven are reasonable, substantive deductions from the

writings of Lowi,<sup>1</sup> Ripley and Franklin,<sup>2</sup> Price<sup>3</sup> and others who stress a variable, dynamic model. These propositions pertain to variations in legislative behavior with regard to four components of members' decision-making map: (a) force field inputs and communications, (b) information sources, (c) determinants and decision rules, and (d) roles. In addition, "time of decision" was studied. The eleven propositions are:

- Proposition 1: Legislators perceive different kinds of decisions;
- Proposition 2: Legislators perceive different kinds of decisions similarly;
- Proposition 3: Issue characteristics factor together along a hot/low profile dimension;
- Proposition 4: The volume of communications a member receives varies according to the kind of issue at hand;
- Proposition 5: The actors from whom a member hears vary according to the kind of decision at hand;
- Proposition 6: Information sources vary according to the kind of issue at hand;
- Proposition 7: The volume of information a Congressman consults (How many sources) varies according to the kind of issue involved;
- Proposition 8: The member's perception of the adequacy of his information varies according to the kind of issue at hand;
- Proposition 9: The basis on which a representative casts a vote varies according to the kind of issue at hand;
- Proposition 10: The role orientations of a member vary according to the kind of issue at hand;
- Proposition 11: The time at which a member makes up his mind varies according to the kind of issue at hand.

With the exception of proposition 3, the data strongly verify all propositions. As noted in chapter 3, lack of support for proposition 3 does not detract from the conditional theme. Its rejection merely means that each of the issue characteristics studied here must be considered

independently. Issue characteristics do not neatly factor together along the lines of a hot/low profile continuum.

The validation of propositions 1 and 2, and 4 through 11 provides the first systematic verification among members themselves for the basic metronomic design that underlies the works of Lowi,<sup>4</sup> Ripley and Franklin,<sup>5</sup> and Price.<sup>6</sup> These results demonstrate that, in line with these authors, decision-making is highly variable and dynamic; it varies according to kinds of votes in a patterned way. Moreover, these results support their argument that to study and grasp the essence of contextual variability, congressional scholars should shun single, static models in favor of an approach that features multiple, contextual models.

The research described here permits additional generalizations and conclusions. For clarity's sake, they will be presented according to the following sub-topics: conditional theory, issue characteristics, actors involved in legislative decision-making, components of cognitive map, floor voting, decision settings, interviewing legislators, and legislative decision-making and democracy. Finally, a number of prescriptions will be offered on the basis of this research.

#### Conclusions Concerning the Conditional Theory

The works of Lowi,<sup>7</sup> Ripley and Franklin,<sup>8</sup> Price,<sup>9</sup> Cobb and Elder,<sup>10</sup> and others<sup>11</sup> postulate that distinctions in legislative behavior do not occur randomly. Instead, it is argued that major differences in the decision behavior of members occur on the basis of a distinction between "hot" (visible, controversial, major) votes and "low profile" (non-visible, non-controversial, major, complex, technical) votes. It

is expected that low profile votes will be associated with few lobbying attempts, input from only those affected, narrow information sources, perfunctory scan, low levels of information, cue-taking decision-making, a national/trustee role orientation, and a "late" decision. Hot votes are expected to involve many lobbying attempts, broad input, multiple information sources, extraordinary scan, adequate levels of information, policy and philosophical voting, a local/delegate role conception, and relatively "early" decision-making. The rationale for these patterns is an investment theory of incentives. Hot issues involve sufficient resources and political stakes to provide the member with incentives for greater interest and involvement. Low profile votes, lacking intense lobbying and competing information sources, do not comparably motivate the member. Members make decisions without an extended search and by deferring to others.

In the main, this research substantiates these postulations. Generally, communication inputs, volume of input, search processes, adequacy of information, decision rules, role orientations, and time of decision conform to these expectations. Volume of input (arrayed by vote), information search, information adequacy, and time of decision best conform. Only information sources seem to significantly stray from the expectations of the conditional authors. Thus, although there are deviations and exceptions, the hot/low profile distinction does seem to accurately capture major behavioral differentials in congressional voting.

More important, the hot/low profile distinction provides a baseline on which to build subsequent refinements. The study here of each of the major components of member decision-making revealed a number of

exceptions to the theory of the conditional actors. When these exceptions are closely examined, they often suggest patterns that add to or modify the original conditional theory. In other words, the hot/low profile distribution is not the only dividing line in legislative behavior. It is not the only force driving variations in legislative decision-making.

For example, sources of congressional input vary not just according to hot and low profile votes but along the following lines: routine votes, grant bills, hot votes, and specialized, hot bills. When members confront a routine issue, they rely primarily on staff and committee input. Grant programs and public works programs involve staff and state delegation input. Grant programs and public works programs involve staff and state delegation input, plus contacts with specific clientele within the district. Hot issues involve communications from a variety of forces including private interest groups, constituents, party leaders, and the White House. Specialized hot issues are complex or technical as well as controversial. They usually affect a specific constituency. They involve expanded input and communications from committee members and constituent groups.

Use of information sources varies more by the member's knowledge and information needs. If a member is unfamiliar with a vote, but it is important to him, he will consult normal sources such as staff and congressional publications. Special contextual circumstances cause him to turn to other sources for various reasons.

Information volume (an indicator of search procedures) varies according to complexity and technicality, parliamentary suspense, and a hot/low profile distinction. Members search for more information when the issue is hot, when there is not a short parliamentary suspense, and

when there are low grade issues that are hard to understand.

Decision rules were found to vary in such a way that hot votes involve situational considerations (such as assessments of the adequacy of a compromise) as well as policy assessments, philosophical convictions, and constituency representation. Low profile votes involve policy assessments, as well as cue-taking, and compromise and consensus voting.

Variations in role seem to be best captured by the following distinctions: hot, hot with no constituency relevance, grant programs, and low profile decisions. Hot decisions with constituency relevance are made primarily with a delegate style and a district orientation. Hot votes that lack constituency relevance are made primarily as a nationally oriented trustee. Grant programs are also handled with a delegate style. Low profile votes are handled primarily on a nation-trustee basis.

In addition to a hot/low profile distinction, variations in "when decided" are best captured by the following variables: parliamentary suspense, floor wrangling, and members' information sources. A relatively early decision is made when there is ample scheduling notice that the vote is coming up, when floor controversy is minimal, and when the vote involves a major issue. Late decision occurs when the vote is low profile, when there is little advanced scheduling, and when there is doubt concerning the outcome of the amending process. Throughout, these distinctions are affected by the idiosyncratic nature of each member's own information system.

The point to be emphasized is that the original basic hot/low profile distinction, although overly simplistic, affords the opportunity for these refinements. At the very least, the metronomic theory of Lowi points the way to further elaborations of a conditional model.

### Conclusions Concerning Issue Characteristics

A major feature of this research was the use of the nomothetic issue characteristics of Cobb and Elder,<sup>12</sup> Price,<sup>13</sup> and Froman and Ripley<sup>14</sup> as independent variables in a test for variations in legislative behavior.

Overall, the use of issue characteristics met with mixed results. There appear to be four advantages to using issue characteristics.

First, issue characteristics reveal variations in legislative behavior. Many variations occur across different values of issue characteristics. By way of summary, Table 8.1 displays the percent of meaningful variations associated with issue characteristics for each of the components of the member's cognitive map. As seen there, issue characteristics are associated with numerous variations of nine percent or more in the mention of actors, sources, decision rules, role orientations, or time of decision.

Second, issue characteristics permit the identification of the correlates of various decision-making forces and factors--i.e., the issue conditions under which a decision force or factor is more likely to be mentioned.

Third, issue characteristics allow the identification of the major indicators of legislative dynamism. The array of decision factors by issue characteristics reveals that some characteristics are associated with more variation than others. Such characteristics are the best indicators of legislative dynamism, for they are the conditions most associated with variation. Table 8.2 presents the issue characteristics most associated with variations in different aspects of cognitive map. Specifically, the table shows that the role of Congress on a particular bill and

Table 8.1  
Summary of Variations\* by Issue Characteristics

<u>Component of Cognitive Map</u>	<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Overall % of Variations</u>	<u>By Indicator Type</u>		
			<u>Perceptual</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Subjective</u>
<u>Force field</u>	Volume	74%	-	-	-
	Source	33%	33%	38%	22%
<u>Information</u>	Source	11%	9%	6%	6%
	Volume	50%	-	-	80%
<u>Level</u>	Level	65%	-	-	-
	Determinants	11%	9%	13%	5%
<u>Decision rule</u>	Style	27%	36%	25%	82%
	Focus	40%	31%	45%	36%
<u>Role orientation</u>	When decided	21%	20%	44%	40%
				22%	

\* Variations are defined as deviations of nine percent or more in the mention of decision factors among different values of an issue characteristic.

Table 8.2

Issue Characteristics Most Associated with Variations\* as Arrayed by Different Aspects of Members' Cognitive Map

<u>Force Field</u>	<u>Information Source</u>	<u>Determinants</u>	<u>When Decided</u>
Role of Congress	Presidential involvement	Thought	Margin of passage
Presidential involvement	Type of rule	Presidential involvement	Feelings
Conflict	Mail	Role of Congress	Presidential involvement
Amount of money	Rule margin	Margin of passage	Role of Congress
Toughness	Role of Congress	Thought	Thought
Thought	Rule margin	CQ story	CQ story
Rule margin	CQ visibility	Washington Post box score	
CQ visibility	Washington Post box score	Amendment over committee objection	
Amendment over committee objection			

(Issue characteristics are arranged from the top down in order of declining magnitude.)

\* Variations are defined as deviations of nine percent or more in the mention of decision factors among different values of an issue characteristic.

presidential involvement are the two indicators most associated with variation in congressional input. When Congress ratifies or modifies a policy and the President is not involved, the issue tends to be quiet, and members hear from relatively few. When Congress initiates and when the President is involved, communications to members are more numerous and diverse. Information sources are most affected by presidential involvement and type of rule. When a bill is debated under a closed rule (i.e., no amendments are allowed) and the White House is involved in the issue, members are more likely to refer to atypical information sources. When the rule is open and the White House is not involved, normal sources are consulted. The indicator most associated with variation in determinants is thought. Those votes that entail member thought are usually based on constituency, conviction, and policy assessment. Votes lacking thought are more likely to be settled on the basis of cue-taking and with the consensus and compromise modes. The time of decision varies most by intensity of member feelings and margin of passage. Decisions concerning votes that are eventually defeated are made late, usually on the floor. Decisions concerning bills passed by a comfortable margin are made comparatively earlier. Members usually make early decisions on bills that involve their personal feelings. Decisions on bills that do not involve intense feelings are made late.

As seen in Table 8.1, the category of indicator associated with the highest percentage of correlates varies. For force field source, decision determinant, and role orientations, objective characteristics have a higher percentage of variation. For information source, and time of decision, perceptual indicators have a higher percentage of variation.

A fourth benefit stemming from the use of issue characteristics is that they constitute a method of studying variations in legislative behavior that is less cumbersome than working with individual votes. Both votes and issue characteristics were used here as independent variables affecting legislative behavior. The use of votes tended to be anecdotal and unsystematic. In contrast, issue characteristics proved to be more general, direct, and concise and less unwieldy. Unlike votes that involve multiple issues and facets, issue characteristics afforded the opportunity for simplified, single dimensional analysis.

Despite these advantages, three factors greatly detract from the utility of issue characteristics.

First, as the rejection of proposition 3 emphasizes, the various indicators of issue characteristics do not neatly cluster together along the lines of a hot/low profile continuum. There is a lack of synoptic indicators. Each issue characteristic must be treated separately. Although issue characteristics are more general than votes and do permit the discussion of variation without reference to individual cases, the use of thirty-six different indicators still proved confusing and unwieldy.

Second, meaningful variation is frequently concluded on the basis of small numbers. The criteria used here of nine percent, although commonly used in many empirical studies, frequently leads to the identification of correlates on the basis of small figures and differences.

Third, the breakdown of responses by issue characteristics does not reveal legislative behavior variations as impressively as a breakdown of responses by interviewee. Another look at Table 8.1 (especially the column on the far right) shows that the variations observed in the responses of interviewees (for whom four or more questionnaires are

available) are considerably more supportive of a contextual model than arrays by issue characteristics. Fully eighty percent of those for whom such multiple interviews exist indicate varying force fields, information sources, search procedures, and decision rules.

Issue characteristics are thus helpful, but limited, concepts for exploring for legislative behavior variations. Although they do not indicate variation as directly as multiple responses from the same actor, they are more general and less cumbersome than a vote-by-vote study. Most relevant here is the fact that issue characteristics permit the best test of the directional, hot/low profile hypothesis of conditional theory.

#### Conclusions Concerning Actor Involvement and Influence

The involvement and influence of various actors within the legislative process varies by a) type of vote, b) conditions of issue characteristics, and c) component of cognitive map. This can be seen in Tables 8.3a through i which present a summary of the vote and issue characteristics correlates of each of the major actors involved in legislative decision-making, as arrayed by component of cognitive map. These tables show that, in contrast to Kingdon's model, the contributions of major actors is best presented with a conditional rather than a general format.<sup>15</sup> Committee chairmen contribute most as an input when they are a visible competitor, i.e., when one of the major parties in a floor fight is the chairman. Committee members contribute as input, information source, and determinant under a variety of conditions that are both hot and low profile. State delegation primarily serves as an input on hot and local oriented votes. Other members primarily make input on hot votes. Party leaders provide a

Table 8.3a

Correlates\* of Committee Chairman Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>		
			<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	20%	Chairman visible and dominant as competitor	Thought Constituency unaware No reelection effects	Closed rule Below average committee unanimity Mention in CQ box score. CQ story Congress as ratifier No amendment over committee objection. Democratic and Republican policy endorsements Presidential involvement	Change
Information source	5%	No patterns detected	No correlates		
Determinant	6%	Chairman a visible combatant	No thought		

Table 8.3b

## Correlates of Committee Member Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (heard from/ paid attention to	36%	Hot but technical Low grade	Complex Technical Conflict	Closed rule* Washington Post box score Above average Index of likeness	
			Non-routine	Amendment over committee objection. Tough Mail	Mention in polls Above average money No presidential involvement Congress as Modifier.
Information source	13%	Committee members are major combatants	Complex Technical	Congress as modifier Closed rule	No CQ story Congress as ratifier Presidential involvement
Determinant	10%	Minor Constituency relevant	Complex Committee fight	No mail	No feelings No thought

Table 8.3c

## Correlates of State Delegation Members' Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>		
			<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	31%	Hot, Grant, and Pork	Confidential Major Non-routine. Tough. Mail Renomination and reelection Constituency awareness Thought	Closed rule. Below average rule margin. Defeated status. Below average committee vote Minority report CQ story. <u>Washington Post</u> story. <u>Washington Post</u> box score Congress as modifier Below average Republican and Democratic unity. Amendment over committee objection Below average index of likeness Party endorsements Above average money Presidential involvement	
Information Source	5%		No patterns detected	No correlates	
Determinants	3%		No patterns detected	No correlates	

**Correlates of Other Member Influence in Member Decision-Making**

**Table 8.3d**

<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>					
<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	36%	Hot	Conflict Major status Constituency awareness. Mail Renomination effects Reelection effects Non-routineness Thought Toughness	Below average rule margin Modified open rule Defeat. CQ story <u>Washington Post</u> box score <u>Washington Post</u> story Congress as initiator. Below average time Democratic and Republican endorsements	Specificity
Information source	9%	Attempts to override committee from floor	No correlates	Above average rule margin No Republican endorsement	Policy change
Determinants	4%	Attempts to override committee from floor	No correlates		

Table 8.3e  
Correlates of Party Leader Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>		
			<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	13%	Majority party prestige at stake	Conflictual Major Constituency awareness Renomination effects Reelection effects Strong feelings	Closed rule. Below average rule margin. Defeated status. CQ story Washington Post box score Washington Post story Below average time frame Below average Democratic unity. Above average Republican unity. Below average index of likeness Amendment over committee objection No Democratic endorsement. Presidential involvement. Congress as initiator	Closed rule.
Information sources	4%	Majority party prestige at stake			Closed rule.
Determinants	21			No correlates	

Correlates of White House Influence in Member Decision-Making

Table 8.3f

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	14%	Presidential emphasis	No mail Tough Thought	Open rule. CQ story <u>Washington Post</u> story and modifier Below average Republican unity Amendment over committee objection Presidential involvement	Specificity Policy change.
Information source	3%			No patterns detected	
Determinants	6%			White House is major combatant	Presidential involvement

Table 8.3g  
Correlates of Staff Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>		
			<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	42%	Hot but complicated Low profile which are hard to understand District relevant	Complex. Technical Conflict No strong feeling Thought.	Closed rule. Below av. comm. cohesion Minority report. CQ story Washington Post box score Congress as modifier Democratic and Republican endorsements Mention in the polls. Above average money.	Non-specificity
Information source	33%	Non-visible Member not familiar	Complex Constituency awareness No strong feelings Thought	Open rule Above average rule margin Congress as modifier No presidential involvement	
Determinant	4%	Routine Constituency relevant	No correlates		

Table 8.3h  
Correlates of Constituents (Constituency) Influence in Member Decision-Making

<u>Component</u>	<u>% General Mention</u>	<u>Type of Vote</u>	<u>Issue Characteristic Correlates</u>		
			<u>Perceptual Characteristics</u>	<u>Objective Characteristics</u>	<u>Subjective Characteristics</u>
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	42%	Certain hot issues	Conflict. Salience Constituency awareness.	Modified open rule. Below average rule margin Defeat. CQ box score.	Change
			Mail Renomination effects Reelection effects	Washington Post box score Washington Post story Congress as initiator Above average time coverage	
			Non-routineness Toughness Thought Strong feelings.	Above average money No mention in the polls Presidential involvement.	
Information source	5%	Certain hot issues	Constituency awareness Mail Thought	No correlates	Below average rule margin CQ story Congress as initiator Congress as initiator Republican party endorsement Presidential involvement
Determinant	13%	Controversy constituency relevant High mail	Salience Constituency awareness Mail Tough Thought		

**Correlates of Interest Group Influence in Member Decision-Making**

**Table 8.31**

Component	% General Mention	Type of Vote	Issue Characteristic Correlates		
			Perceptual Characteristics	Objective Characteristics	Subjective Characteristics
Input (Heard from/ paid attention to)	22%	Hot Interest relevant	Complex: Technical Conflict Salience Constituency awareness	Open Rule Closeness Below av. comm. Minority report CQ Box score Washington Post box score Washington Post story Congressional modification. Above average time frame: Amendment over committee objection	New issue Non-specificity Policy change
Information source	5%	Hot Interest relevant	No correlates	CQ box score	No correlates
Determinant	0%		No correlates		

\* Correlates are based on variations of nine percent or more  
 . Indicates a variation of twenty percent or more.

small amount of input, primarily on those votes on which the majority party stakes its prestige. The President is mentioned most as an input primarily on those votes on which he stakes his prestige. Staff constitutes both a factor "paid attention to" and an information source when the vote is politically relevant but hard to understand. Evidently, members feel a need for additional staff investigation and briefing on votes that are not open and shut for them. Constituents are mentioned both as an input and a determinant under hot conditions. Interest groups contribute to members' decision-making processes as an input factor when the vote is hot or constituency relevant.

Due perhaps to the predominance of policy assessments as a voting determinant, four major actors commonly presumed to be combatants in the legislative process--committee chairmen, party leaders, the Administration, and interest groups--were not frequently mentioned as the basis of decision-making by interviewees. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that they are inconsequential. It may be argued that each has an impact in ways not likely to register in the cognitive map of members.

#### Chairmen

Although their powers have been substantially reduced in recent years,<sup>16</sup> contemporary chairmen still retain awesome influence over the future of bills that emanate from their committees.

The chairman is a major hurdle that must be cleared if a bill is to receive a hearing on the committee's agenda. As the presiding officer and, frequently, the broker of his panel, the chairman often structures debate, thus having enormous influence on the

accommodative language that constitutes the language of the law. If legislation is the result of bargains struck in the legislative arena, it is more often than not the chairmen who strikes the bargain. Also, as a member with obvious expertise and prestige, the chairman will be a major input in bill drafting. At the floor stage, it is the chairman who serves as floor manager and tactician. He selects speakers and tends to the problems of coalition-building.

The chairman's avid support may not be critical to the life and death of a bill, but it is imperative that he not be opposed to it. Moreover, it is extremely helpful if he is at least a tacit supporter. Thus, although members may not see the chairman as a cue-giver, he has influence over legislative outcomes if for no other reason than that proponents of legislation will attempt to anticipate his reaction, solicit his support, and avoid his wrath.

For all of the sampled bills, interviews with informed committee staffers indicated the importance of the chairmen in initiating the issue, securing hearings, presiding over hearings, calling witnesses, structuring markup, scheduling the legislation on the floor, managing debate, and negotiating with the Senate. Specifically mentioned for their significant contributions were Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, on Rhodesian Chrome; Jack Brooks, Chairman of Government Operations, on Countercyclical Aid, the Energy Department, and Government Reorganization Authority; Al Ullman, chairman of Ways and Means, on the Tax bill; Robert Giaimo, chairman of the House Budget Committee, on the Budget resolutions; Henry Reuss, chairman of Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, on Supplemental Housing; and Olin Teague, chairman of Science and Technology, on EPA, NASA, and FAA.

### Party Leaders

Party leaders contribute most to legislative decision-making in ways that are indirect, latent, and not easily recognized.

The formal and informal powers of party floor leaders have been well documented.<sup>17</sup> It is obvious that, due to these powers, leaders hold sway over the flow of legislation. Because of their centrality in the legislative process, leaders can have a detrimental effect on legislation they oppose, providing their position is supported by a procedural majority.<sup>18</sup> The tacit approval of leaders, in addition, is necessary for "greasing the skids" in the legislative process. This study provides speculation that party leaders also influence legislative decision making through the dissemination of information and the activation of party-associated policy positions. By defining an issue in a certain way in the Whip Notice or in policy committee pronouncements, party leaders may be able to deliver blocs of support, particularly if the issue is defined in such a way as to raise the core policy differences between the parties. Such indirect influences are not recorded in the members' cognitive map.

### The Administration

In both this and Kingdon's study,<sup>19</sup> the President and his administration only infrequently were singled out by members as a decision factor. This finding may reveal a declining White House influence in Congress. Or, it may reflect an atypical time period during which both researches were undertaken. This research began in 1977 at the beginning of the Carter administration. Kingdon began his research in 1969 during the early years of the Nixon administration. It is quite possible that in both

periods the new President's legislative liaison machinery had not jelled. As a key Democratic leader stated during the early days of the Carter administration,

The President is just getting started. It's early in the game for him. That's also the case with our new party leaders. We've got a new Speaker and floor leader and they are just getting organized. Both the President and leadership have complicated constituencies that have yet to jell together. They have to pay attention to what the demands are in the Congressmen's districts. Nobody of their party really wants to displease any of them. Yet, this is the most independent lot I've seen up here, especially since the 93rd and 94th Congresses and their confrontations with Nixon and Ford, the reform movement, and the anti-war thing.

When a President has been on the job for awhile and has an established whip system, he likely will be a formidable contestant in legislative affairs. The thesis of Chamberlain<sup>20</sup> and others argues that, in fact, the Presidency has come to dominate the Congress. Certainly, all can agree that, although the President may not be prominent as a decision premise in the cognitive map of members, he is influential in initiating issues, bargaining with committee leaders, aiding supportive congressional leaders in the construction of coalitions, providing information, working key bloc leaders, and exercising the veto power.

The President's involvement and influence, of course, vary according to contexts. Generally, involvement is the greatest when key elements of the President's program are at stake. His influence is likely to be the greatest when, as Ripley shows, a majoritarian alignment<sup>21</sup> is present and when the President enjoys (a) at least modest success in accomplishing his objectives<sup>22</sup> and (b) continued popular support after a sizable victory at the polls.<sup>23</sup> Under these conditions and once the President's liaison has developed, it seems reasonable to expect that the President will be mentioned more by members as an input, information source, and decision determinant.

Background interviews revealed many instances where the President was a behind-the-scenes contributor. White House involvement was noted on major bills that the President featured as part of his program and on the Nuclear Navy vote and votes on the Arab Boycott, Housing and Community Development, the Supplemental Appropriation for Housing, and Rhodesian Chrome. For each, the Administration was identified as a major driving force behind the legislation.

Interviews with committee staffers provide anecdotal support for Wildavsky's "Two Presidencies Theory."<sup>24</sup> Wildavsky argues that the President's involvement and success in Congress is much higher in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. In domestic affairs, the President is constrained by many competitors. In foreign affairs, the President has a relatively free hand due to his information, centrality, and leadership. Although the contemporary Congress has shown that it is not willing to defer carte blanche to the President, it appears that issues in Congress concerning foreign affairs and defense policy still automatically involve the President. In contrast, presidential participation in domestic issues before Congress is not a certainty.

#### Interest Groups

Interest groups and their lobbyists normally pursue low key strategies that often are not apparent to the ordinary floor-voting member. Among these strategies are the following: providing information to committee, working members' districts, obtaining campaign pledges and commitments, focusing on committee members and other key legislators, focusing on the committee stage of decision-making, focusing on the uncommitted and wavering, intensifying lobbying efforts on close votes and on technical "private regarding" amendments, using a member of the Congressman's

"personal" constituency<sup>25</sup> as a link to the member, and, infrequently, employing "classical"<sup>26</sup> techniques such as hosting banquets to gain access to members.<sup>26</sup> In the latter case, there is a possibility that lobbyists may "pull a fast one." According to a concerned staffer, "The problem is that most of these receptions revolve around a very specific bill or highly technical amendment on which there may not be any significant countervailing opposition." The problem is compounded, the staffer noted, when, as commonly occurs, members either send or allow staffers to be their replacements at these banquets. If a member defers to staff on low grade issues, there is a possibility that these decisions will be based not on an assessment of an issue but on staff's gratitude to a hospitable group.

Interest group activity and influence are minimal in floor voting in any of three situations: (a) when issues are initiated-dominated by the President (e.g., Presidential Reorganization Authority and the creation of the Department of Energy), (b) when issues are viewed as internal congressional matters (e.g., the Pay Raise and the Budget Resolution), and (c) when there is an ideological vote that pits Republican against Democrat, majority against minority, and liberal against conservative. For other, more specific votes, private interests may be important participants at low level, strategic points, significantly structuring conflict and limiting the range of alternatives.

Thus, various actors make various contributions to legislative decision-making but not all actors are involved on each issue. As Eidenberg and Morey note, "Only those individuals and groups that have fundamental interests or associated interests in particular issues will attempt to gain access to influence legislative decisions."<sup>27</sup> Although

several prominent actors (chairmen, party leaders, the President, and interest groups) are not significantly mentioned as decision determinants relative to policy (ideological) voting, they may nonetheless be influential in non-visible and less direct ways. At a minimum, all are important powers, with whom all advocates of legislation must contend.<sup>28</sup> This is well illustrated by the background interviews on the Arab Boycott vote. Although these prominent actors were not mentioned frequently by members, committee staffers argued that the bill was thrashed out behind the scenes by the Administration, Chairman Zablocki, various interest groups (pro and con), and floor leaders. Also, it may be the case that the influence of these prominent actors is "carried" into the legislative arena. For instance, the chairman's influence may be carried by the committee report while the position of interest groups may be communicated through party publications.

#### Conclusions Concerning the Four Components of Member's Cognitive Map

This study was predicated on the assumption that previous studies, too often, erroneously have confused different aspects of the micro decision process. Congressional input, information sources, decision rules, and roles are not equivalent considerations. Each refers to different activities of decision behavior that are best captured by four different concepts: force field (relevant inputs and communications), information search, decision determinants and role orientations.

This study has demonstrated that there are indeed different components of a member's decision-making behavior. Not only does each component reveal a different side of decision-making, but each is

associated with different inputs and influences. As seen in Table 8.3 and throughout the analysis chapters, the influences that are most prominently mentioned by members vary considerably among the components. With regard to communications, staff and constituents are most frequently mentioned. With regard to information sources, DSG, Whip materials, staff and committee reports are most prominent. The most frequently mentioned determinants are policy assessments, philosophical conviction, and constituency.

The relationship between the various components seems best captured by a simple three-step, conflict-based model of successive decision stages, as depicted in Table 8.4. Force field inputs initiate the decision process. They are comprised of all communications, pressures, and attempts to influence that a member receives and pays attention to on a scheduled bill. Through inputs, the member learns that a bill is coming up for a vote. The extent of conflict in the force field affects the members' search for information. If there is no conflict among the various inputs and if the vote is not defined as hot, normal sources and a perfunctory scan are utilized. If, however, conflict is present and the issue is perceived as hot, abnormal sources and extraordinary search procedures are employed. Under conditions of conflict and controversy, voting can be based on any of the following decision rules: assessment of compromise, policy voting, constituency representation, philosophical convictions, or cue-taking. Under low profile conditions, decisions usually are made on the basis of consensus, constituency, ideology, or cue-taking. Which decision rule a member employs seems as much a function of his basic role orientation as it does the situation. If a representative is primarily a trustee, he is more likely to employ policy positions or philosophy. If he is a delegate, he

**Three Step Model of Relationships among a Member's Cognitive Map Components**

**Table 8.4**





Table 8.5

**Concentric Circles Model of Narrowing Influences  
in Micro Congressional Decision-Making**



is probably more likely to represent constituents or at least base his decision on his perception of constituency interests. Moreover, a congressman's view of his staff will affect his propensity to defer to staff input.

Although policy voting is the major mode of congressional decision-making, various actors are mentioned in the cue-taking mode and their influence is best reconstructed by a model of cognitive components based on concentric circles. As Tables 6.8 and 8.3 show, an actor's mention as a determinant of a member's decision is contingent upon that actor's presence in the force field and use as an information source. In other words, the probability that an actor will be cited as a decision determinant is greatly increased if that actor is mentioned in the force field of influences and/or as an information source. Few actors are mentioned as a determinant if they are not present in the force field. Table 8.5 illustrates this model of narrowing influences.

Lastly, determinants are not the only forces that are decisive in decision-making, especially in those instances of policy voting. As argued in chapter six, policy voting occurs when the member views an issue in ideological terms. The process requires two ingredients: (1) an ideological predisposition and (2) an information source that defines the issue in terms of ideology so that the decision-maker knows which predisposition applies. Under conditions of pure policy voting, it seems reasonable to conclude that information sources are extremely influential in shaping the decision.

The four components of this study are by no means exhaustive. Subsequent studies may add to this list, especially by differentiating among inputs on the basis of whether they were solicited by the member or passively received by him and whether they were relevant to his decision or simply ignored.

### Conclusions Concerning Floor Voting

Nearly 1,500 times a session the House bells sound twice for a recorded vote. On the basis of a sample of House votes, this study has sketched a profile of floor voting that features a great variety of decision contexts that shape legislators' behavior.

As the member goes to the floor, he faces an infinite variety of issues: hot votes, low profile votes, grant programs, routine and recurring votes, esoteric votes, technical votes, insignificant votes, landmark votes, party votes, and so on.

The time and place of decision vary considerably. For some votes, a member has a long standing commitment--perhaps developed when he first entered politics, when he first came to Congress, or when the issue was last considered. These usually are the important, milestone issues. For others, members are prepared to cast the vote on the basis of the briefing they receive from their information system. These tend to be the recurring authorizations and appropriations. In such cases, decisions are made a week before, several days before, or even the day of the vote, depending on the time of the member's briefing. Finally, some decisions are made late, perhaps on the floor, right up to the time of the vote. These tend to be either low-key, obscure votes that do not merit early attention or hot votes that are resolved only at the conclusion of the amendment process.

The vote that a member casts is frequently the object of intense lobbying activity by actors both external and internal to the Congress. Not all communications are relevant to the decision. When members pay attention to them, they become decision inputs. Some inputs are received at a time relatively distant from the vote, while others are more

proximate. Some issues are predominantly inside controversies; others involve considerable pressure from outside Congress.

Congressmen receive and solicit information from numerous sources. Information is provided by sources that are direct and personal and those that are indirect and impersonal. Sources may be proximate or distal from the vote. There are normal sources--DSG publications, the committee report, whip advisories and staff--and atypical ones. Some decisions are based on only normal sources. Others are based on a combination of normal and atypical sources. On some votes, mainly high profile ones, members feel well informed. On others--usually the more obscure and routine ones--members are relatively uninformed and unfamiliar with the facts of a bill.

The decision itself can be based on "automatic" policy assessments or philosophical convictions, on constituency representation, on situational considerations such as consensus or compromise, or on cue-taking. These latter modes constitute rational shortcuts that are employed when the member, for various reasons, lacks a policy position. The forces that determine a vote can be either proximate or antecedent to the vote or internal or external to the legislature.

The role orientation that a member employs can involve a trustee (self referent) style or a delegate (constituency referent) style or a combination of both (politico style). Focus can be either national, local or both.

In sum, floor voting is best thought of, not as a uniform activity, but, as a multiple-patterned phenomenon. The best, most accurate and most applicable description of legislative behavior comes not from the mean nor mode but from the identification of different patterns. The most accurate answer to the question "How do Congressmen decide?" quite clearly is "it depends." It depends upon the situation and circumstances within which the member finds himself.

### Conclusions Concerning Decision Settings

Thus far in reporting the results of this research, legislators have been portrayed as passive decision-makers--i.e., they have been depicted as actors merely responding to stimuli. There seems to be some utility, however, in emphasizing the legislator as an active decision-maker--i.e., as a decision-maker who actively confronts different decision settings.

Although there was no attempt here to formally interrelate different patterns of behavior with regard to the various components of cognitive map, this research provides the opportunity to speculate about such relationships.

A summary of these speculations is presented in Table 8.6, an informal summary of the various decision settings in which each legislator can expect to find himself throughout a legislative session. There it can be seen that members face at least five different, recurring decision settings on the House floor: 1) non-visible bills (e.g., Romanian earthquake relief), 2) complicated bills (e.g., the Clean Air Act), 3) grant aid programs (e.g., public works, housing, and countercyclical aid bills), 4) routine bills (e.g., NASA, FAA, EPA) and 5) hot bills (the Hyde Anti-Abortion and pay raise votes). The behavior of members is not universal in all settings. Rather, differences in decision setting drive differences in input pattern, time of decision, information search, information level, decision rules, and role orientations. A member who finds himself in a hot setting will experience a demand pattern much different from what he experiences in a complicated setting. Moreover, the behavior of the member will be much different in a hot setting in contrast to a complicated one: i.e., there will be differences in when he makes the decision, how he acquires the information, how informed he is, which decision rule he envoques, and which role he plays. The way a member behaves, the routines he employs, and the shortcuts he follows vary in different decision settings. Congressmen make up their minds in different ways on different kinds of issues.

Table 8.6: Different Configurations of Legislators' Cognitive Map Associated with Different Decision Settings\*

<u>Decision Setting</u>	<u>Input Pattern</u>	<u>Time of Decision</u>	<u>Information Search</u>	<u>Level of Information</u>	<u>Decision Rule</u>	<u>Role Orientation</u>
Non-visible	None	Floor	Atypically low due to lack of concern	Low	Consensus	Trustee
Complicated	Low	Late	Extended	Medium	Cue-taking: members	Trustee
Grant Aid	Low	Day Before	Extended	Medium	Cue-taking: staff or Constituency Representation	Delegate
Routine	Low	When Briefed	Normal	Low	Ideology	Trustee
Hot	High	Early (except when crucial amendments are pending)	Atypically low due to familiarity	High	Philosophy and/or Constituency Representation	Delegate or Trustee

\*This table summarizes suppositions, based on the research, concerning how each decision setting is associated with a distinctive input pattern, time of decision, information search procedure, level of information, decision rule, and role orientation.

### Conclusions Concerning Interviewing.

Data for this study have been obtained through the interviewing procedures pioneered by John Kingdon. This method of data gathering has shown obvious strengths and weaknesses.

The strengths of this method rest on its direct approach. Prior to the use of interviewing, the major approach to the study of Legislative behavior was roll-call analysis. As many analysts have argued, roll-call analysis is based on long distance, secondhand supposition. Researchers attempt to discern patterns among voting data and then, in Peabody's words,

. . . turn to other independent variables--party, state delegation, committee, characteristics of constituency, and so on--to try to account for variation in the dependent variable, . . . the roll call vote.<sup>29</sup>

The approach, although based on "hard data," does not ". . . get at motivations behind voting . . ."<sup>30</sup> The strength of interviewing as a source of data collection is that it goes beyond supposition with a more direct instrument. It provides reconstruction of the decision process in the words of the decision-making actor. Decision-makers are afforded the opportunity to state why they voted as they did.<sup>31</sup>

The weaknesses and drawbacks to interviewing seem threefold:

First, there is the problem of equivalence. Consider the question concerning determinative factors. This question meant different things to different members. For some members, the question "Why did you vote as you did?" elicited a reconstruction of the decision process. For others, it led to an ex post facto rationalization or a "campaign explanation." Although adequate pretesting for instrument reliability can minimize un-equivalent meaning, the problem seems to be endemic to the interviewing approach.

Second, there is the problem of candor. Some respondents were more candid than others. Some members obviously desired to portray the image of a philosophical, public interest-oriented statesman who votes on the basis of a careful assessment of the facts. The member's concern for his image may have inflated the response rate for both policy voting and the trustee role orientation. Other members, however, were extremely candid, revealing such practices as cue-taking, herd instinct, vote changing, "staying out late to observe the trend" before casting the vote, voting "by the seat of the pants," watching the tally board, avoiding membership in a small minority, and so on. Members who recounted their decision in such terms were trying to give an accurate description of some of the routines and shortcut practices that are natural to any large, complex organization.

A third problem of the interviewing approach is its limited perspective. Interviewing does not readily reveal the behind the scenes machinations that are crucial to shaping a bill and moving it through the Congress. Obviously, not all tacit influence wielded in Congress meets the eye. To focus exclusively on the member's perspectives on floor voting necessarily ignores much relevant behavior.

These limitations by no means rule out the use of interviewing. The weaknesses of this approach seem offset by its strengths. What this survey of limitations reveals is that, in Peabody's words, ". . . all techniques have built-in limitations."<sup>32</sup> Choosing interviewing over roll calls or the case study method carries disadvantages as well as advantages.

Interviewing offers a method of data gathering that provides the interviewee's reconstruction, with varying degrees of candor, of his decision behavior. The data are his words--no more, no less. His memory

and truthfulness are critical. To gain information on the legislative process that surrounds floor decision behavior on one bill, researchers must supplement interviews with macro case studies.

#### Conclusions Concerning the Democratic Process

A major question to be asked of this research is: How compatible are the findings with the tenets of democracy? To adequately answer we should attempt to integrate these findings with previous efforts to assess the democratic contributions of Congress.

Various works written from a party reform perspective have attempted to specify the criteria by which Congress can be judged as a democratic institution.<sup>33</sup> Three conditions are identified: (1) that there are meaningful choices in congressional elections, (2) that the masses vote for the candidate who is closest to their preferences, and (3) that those leaders elected will base their decisions and actions on the positions they offered in the campaign.

Several research projects have been devoted to examining the extent to which the current congressional system meets these conditions. They find that conditions one and three, but not two, are generally met..

With regard to the first condition, Sullivan and O'Connor have found that ". . . the electorate in the aggregate was offered a substantially significant choice in the congressional election of 1966."<sup>34</sup>

Concerning the third condition, Sullivan and O'Connor contend: winning candidates in that election generally voted as their pre-election positions predicted, and. . .the Democratic candidates were almost invariably more liberal than their intradistrict Republican competitors.<sup>35</sup>

Miller and Stokes argue that the position taken by Congressmen converges with mass preferences on hot, visible issues (civil rights).<sup>36</sup>

The second condition appears not to be met. Stokes and Miller have shown that voters are not familiar with the positions and records of either the parties or of individual congressional candidates.<sup>37</sup> Their findings have also recently been reconfirmed by Freedman.<sup>38</sup> In addition, recent findings of an "incumbency factor" in congressional voting detract from a democratic image of Congress.<sup>39</sup> These argue that the electorate casts a vote for Congressmen on the basis of an incumbent's efficiency, success, standing, rapport, and case work activities and not ideological record.

It can be argued that the conclusions of our research--especially the finding that members base most decisions on policy assessments--provide further evidence that the congressional system satisfies the first and third criteria. (No data relevant to the second condition was collected.) In his "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," Jones argues that congressional elections are not issue mandates but contests among "issue-involved" candidates "... that provide clues as to what to expect by way of policy-making behavior from the Congressman."<sup>40</sup> If our findings are correct concerning the primacy of policy voting in Congress, a democratic interpretation of the U.S. Congress seems to be warranted, since voters are offered the opportunity in Congressional campaigns to choose among broad approaches in public policy. Which approach people select does make a difference in terms of the positions Congressmen will have on the issues. The member's basic approach to public problems becomes manifest not only in policy-voting but also in those cases in which he utilizes shortcut strategies, such as cue-taking, consensus voting and compromise voting.

In cue-taking, as was seen, a member's deference to another is often based on ideological agreement.

If policy voting is the norm, the masses are provided the opportunity to influence congressional decision-making through a massive defeat of incumbents. As several studies have argued, a massive turnover in Congress can lead to major changes in the direction of public policy.<sup>71</sup> Through congressional elections, the masses can shape a broad course of policy by putting into office new members with new positions.

Finally, the findings here of contextual decision-making argue that, although highly particularistic interests can obtain favorable, private-regarding concessions from Congress, through the potential of issue expansion a broader perspective can result. Interest groups may win significant, particularistic gains on low-key, non-visible bills, when members, because of a lack of interest, information, and involvement, defer to those involved. But this does not have to be the state of affairs. As shown in Chapter VI, in those few cases where constituents are aroused, most members will attempt to align their position with mass preferences. If an issue develops, controversy erupts, and the issue is defined as conflictual, members have sufficient motivation to expand their information search and to develop a defensible, political position. The result will almost always be a broader approach and a more balanced law. In fact, just the very threat and anticipation of such dynamic escalation may very well moderate and restrain excessive interest group demands.

Thus, our findings contribute to an interpretation of the U.S. Congress that stresses Congress's contributions to a democratic process in America. Contrary to these findings, however, are trends toward (a) incumbent retention, (b) elections as referenda on incumbent case work

skills and successes, and (c) a self-serving sense of "shared fates" among all incumbents that encourages institutionalized symbolism and protectionism.<sup>42</sup> Should these trends continue and accelerate, they may undermine the potential for mass-elite linkage in the congressional system.

#### Implications

The findings of this study contain a number of practical implications. They can be grouped as follows: (a) implications for those attempting to influence the legislative process (President, party leaders, interest groups, other members), (b) implications for Congress as an institution, and (c) implications for voters who participate in congressional elections.

For those bent on influencing congressional outcomes, the results of this research argue for the following strategies: (a) work the committee, the subcommittee, and key bloc leaders, (b) if the issue is relatively low-key, an effort must be made to cultivate committee consensus since floor voting usually serves to merely ratify committee consensus, (c) if the issue is comparably hot and high profile, still cultivate committee consensus (since the unconcerned will take cues) plus, anticipating a floor fight, attempt to secure an ideological majority coalition on the floor, d) constantly strive to have the issue defined in congressional publications and on the congressional grapevine in such a way that the preferred position is favored and supported by the prevailing ideological majority. In the contemporary era, this most certainly would mean defining desired goals as contributing to governmental economy, efficiency and streamlining.

A recent text argues that Congress is in "crisis."<sup>43</sup> The nature of the crisis is one of public standing. People lack confidence, respect and trust in the U.S. Congress.<sup>44</sup> Although they like their own Congressmen, people doubt the integrity of the Congress and its ability to contribute to the political system.<sup>45</sup> Some of the cynicism is no doubt the result of recent scandals and, more important, a general lack of appreciation by the public for Congress's role as a deliberative forum. But, many of the difficulties of Congress's contemporary public image can be attributed to Congress's failure to rectify many perceived shortcomings of the congressional decision structure. Some strides have been made recently, such as reducing the influence of obstructionistic forces on Capitol Hill--chairmen chosen on the basis of the seniority system, the filibuster, the House Rules Committee, and an unaccountable Committee of the Whole. However, many more improvements need to be made.

A specific suggestion is offered here in the spirit of the Whig model<sup>46</sup>--i.e., in an effort to strengthen Congress as an institution, to improve its contribution to public policy, to add to its public standing, and to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the presidency. Following Froman,<sup>47</sup> and Davidson<sup>48</sup> it is: diversify committees and subcommittees to a maximum extent in an effort to promote a scheme of countervailing interests. This does not have to be accomplished through rotating committee assignments with maximum time limits for service on any one committee. In fact, because of resulting reduction in committee expertise and experience, such rotations would probably weaken Congress by impairing its ability to oversee the executive. Rather, the proposal here for diversifying committees would best be implemented as a goal to be pursued by party leaders when they make committee assignments and fill committee vacancies.

Diversification would better equip Congress to serve as a representative assembly. It would also insure that multiple policy approaches are at the very least raised and considered on most issues. This would provide some guarantee within the Congress for a "multiple advocacy network," a reform strongly urged by decision theorists for avoiding policy fiascos.<sup>48</sup> Although multiple advocacy is usually recommended for the presidency, Congress can benefit from it in a policy and public image sense.

Obviously, such a change will not occur until members, and leaders in particular, understand that a good balance on committee will lead to good public policy and this, in turn, will enhance the image of Congress.

Another recommendation applies to individual members. Given the crucial significance of issue definition, each member should periodically evaluate his/her information network to ascertain what distortion and biases might exist, whether it be a committee, a member, staff, or party or ideological bloc publications.

Finally, all constituents who want to have an impact should carefully examine the policy predispositions of congressional candidates. Basic to a member's behavior is his liberalism or conservatism. Better than any other factor, these positions provide a guide to how a successful candidate will vote on major and recurring policy questions and to whom he turns to for counsel on other votes.

#### Concluding Observations

This study has provided the first systematic, empirical evidence of contextual behavior in Congress. It has demonstrated conclusively that legislative behavior is best captured by a metronomic rather than a static construct. Although one model (e.g., limited scan or ideological

voting) may provide a better explanation of congressional decision behavior than others, this research argues that there is no one best model. A sophisticated description of legislative behavior requires the use of several models and generalizations and knowledge of the contexts in which each is likely to apply.

It should be acknowledged that the findings may be time bound and skewed by an unrepresentative selection of issues. Subsequent studies may find different patterns and configurations; but, all in depth studies will surely encounter contextual patterns of behavior and decision-making.

This work has benefited immensely from the seminal contributions of both Lowi and Kingdon. Lowi alerts all legislative scholars to the fact that they need several models, not one, to understand the business of Congress. Kingdon provides us with a method of data collection that renders a rich source of interview data. Although this study offers refinements in the conclusions of both Lowi and Kingdon, it owes an enormous debt of gratitude to their pioneering efforts.

Finally, this work provides strong verification of Roland Young's sagacious writing of decades ago: "Legislative theories do not develop by themselves, as if wishing would make them so. . . . Unfortunately for those who want a general or easy answer, the dynamics of the legislative process do not relinquish their secrets readily." 50

**NOTES**

NOTES: CHAPTER I

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<sup>3</sup> Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle: A Study in Social Combat (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953).

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<sup>86</sup> See footnote 15 for a list of the Lowi works which employ a conditional approach. In "American Business and Public Policy" he emphasizes that distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies have distinctive decision processes that conform to different theories of democracy. Distributive policies reflect a pluralistic model, regulatory a coalition model, and redistributive an elite model. See "American Business and Public Policy," pp. 700-12.

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<sup>96</sup> See Figure I.

<sup>97</sup> Jones, An Introduction, p. 220.

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- 84 1973] This information was obtained from Congressional District Data Book, 93rd Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) and its supplements for California, New York and Texas.
- 85 3147-54. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 34 (Nov. 6, 1976), pp. 3147-54.
- 86 See Norman Ornstein, "What Makes Congress Run," Washington Monthly, Dec., 1973, pp. 47-49 for an excellent description of how Congressmen have become busier since the 1970 Congressional Reorganization Act. As Ornstein noted in a conversation with this author, "The Congressman of today is much busier than the one interviewed by Clapp or Matthews or Kingdon." Also see document listed in footnote 50.
- 87 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 285.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable counsel given to him with regard to interviewing by Professors Holbart Carroll, Charles O. Jones, John W. Kingdon, Morris S. Ogul, Bert A. Rockman and James A. Stimson, and Walter Beach of the American Political Science Association.
- 90 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 278.
- 91 The south is defined as the eleven States of the Confederacy.
- 92 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 277.
- 93 The exclusive committees are Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means. For our purposes "major" committees are Armed Services, Budget, Banking, International Relations, and Judiciary.
- 94 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 278.
- 95 Ibid., p. 284, footnote 1.
- 96 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies," American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 883-917 (see especially p. 884).
- 97 Barbara Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion," Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 199-222 (see especially p. 201).
- 98 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 28.
- 99 Ibid., p. 280.

## NOTES: CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Boston: Allyn, 1972), pp. 96-102. For each issue dimension identified, he recommends perceptual as well as "objective" indicators.

<sup>2</sup> This implication seems to lie in their prescription for understanding an issue by adding up perceptions. Adding up perceptions, in this author's mind, seems to assume a uniform or at least "typical" definition of the issue.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965], 63.

<sup>4</sup> Cobb and Elder, Participation, pp. 112-24. See especially Propositions.

<sup>5</sup> David E. Price, "Policy-Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental' Factors, American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 568, 572.

<sup>6</sup> Norman H. Nie, C. H. Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, SPSS, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975], p. 225.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Judith A. Strain as cited in William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 318-19.

<sup>10</sup> Keefe and Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 4th ed., pp. 305-07.

<sup>11</sup> Morris P. Fiorina, "Electoral Margins, Constituency Influence, and Policy Moderation: A Critical Assessment," American Politics Quarterly, 1 (1973), 479-98 and Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).

<sup>12</sup> David W. Brady and Naomi B. Lynn, "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effects on Party Voting and Public Policy," American Journal of Political Science, 17 (1973), 528-43.

<sup>13</sup> Fiorina, Representatives, p. 106.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 106-07.

<sup>15</sup> John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973], p. 54.

<sup>16</sup> Froman and Ripley, "Conditions," p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in Pluralistic Systems (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969), Chapter 5.

## NOTES: CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>This list parallels the one found in John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Lewis Anthony Dexter, The Sociology and Politics of Congress (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 159. Also see Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Job of the Congressman," Readings on Congress, ed. by R. E. Wolfinger (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 81.

<sup>3</sup>Kingdon, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup>See A. R. Clausen, "State Party Influences on Congressional Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (1972), 77-101; B. Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U. S. House of Representatives: A Comparative Study of Group Cycles," Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 199-222; A. Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions," Journal of Politics, 14 (1962), 72-91; J. H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 (1964), 1-21; and David B. Truman, "The State Delegation and the Structure of Voting in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 50 (1956), 1023-45.

<sup>5</sup>Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Random, 1977), p. 30.

<sup>6</sup>This corroborates a finding by Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Washington: Brookings, 1963), p. 189.

<sup>7</sup>William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 334.

<sup>8</sup>S. Farkas, Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1971).

<sup>9</sup>Donald Haider, When Governments Come to Washington (New York: Free Press, 1974).

<sup>10</sup>See Abraham Holtzman, Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).

<sup>11</sup>See Lawrence Chamberlain, The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1946) and Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in The Congress and America's Future, 2nd ed. ed by David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

<sup>12</sup> See Delmer D. Dunn, Public Officials and the Press (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969); Douglas Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton, 1959); Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); Dan D. Nimmo, News Gathering in Washington (New York: Atherton, 1964); and Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Presidency and the Press," Commentary, 51 (1971), 41-52.

<sup>13</sup> See Lowi Table, chapter I of this work.

## NOTES: CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> John S. Saloma, III, Congress and the New Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> Barbara Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion," Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 199-222.

<sup>3</sup> Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 125.

<sup>4</sup> Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-1970: The Democratic Study Group," American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), p. 668.

<sup>5</sup> Saloma, Congress, pp. 209-11.

<sup>6</sup> Norman J. Ornstein, "Information Resources and Legislative Decision-Making: Some Comparative Perspectives on the U.S. Congress," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972, Chapter 3.

<sup>7</sup> Kovenock as quoted in Saloma, Congress, p. 218.

<sup>8</sup> Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 437.

<sup>9</sup> John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 227.

<sup>10</sup> Rodger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael D. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 75-78.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Kenneth Janda, "Information Systems for Congress," in Congress: The First Branch of Government (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1966), p. 415.

<sup>13</sup> Saloma, Congress, pp. 212-18.

<sup>14</sup> David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 334.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> David Kovenock, "Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Statistical Analysis of Communications," American Politics Quarterly, 1 (1973), 410-13.

- <sup>17</sup> Saloma, Congress, p. 215.
- <sup>18</sup> C. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1963), p. 126.
- <sup>19</sup> Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 227.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 20.
- <sup>21</sup> Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, Yea's and Nays (New York: Wiley, 1975), 102-10.
- <sup>22</sup> Charles R. Dechert, "Availability of Information for Congressional Operations," in Congress: The First Branch of Government, p. 173.
- <sup>23</sup> Tacheron and Udall, Job, p. 125.
- <sup>24</sup> Saloma, Congress, p. 218.
- <sup>25</sup> Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 223-25.
- <sup>26</sup> Edward Schneier, "The Intelligence of Congress: Information and Public Policy Patterns," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 388 (1970), 16.
- <sup>27</sup> See Deckard, "State Party Delegations."
- <sup>28</sup> Clapp, Congressman, p. 141.
- <sup>29</sup> Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 246.
- <sup>30</sup> Charles J. Zinn, How Our Laws are Made, rev. by E. F. Willett (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 16.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Stevens, "Mobilization."
- <sup>33</sup> Mark F. Ferber, "The Formation of the Democratic Study Group," in Congressional Behavior, ed. by N. W. Polsby (New York: Random, 1971), pp. 249-69.
- <sup>34</sup> Stevens, "Mobilization."
- <sup>35</sup> Clapp, Congressman, pp. 188-89.
- <sup>36</sup> Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Random, 1977), p. 289.
- <sup>37</sup> Lester W. Milbrath, "Lobbying as a Communications Process," Public Opinion Quarterly, 19 (1955-56), 32-53; The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

38 Tacheron and Udall, The Job, pp. 140-43.

39 Bauer et al., "American Business," 351. Also see Lewis A. Dexter, How Organizations are Represented in Washington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 73.

40 Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 27-29.

41 This researcher's fragmentary investigations of the sources for Whip Notices, DSG, and staff input would support the conclusion that most of the information input of these sources is based on committee sources.

42 Ornstein, Abstract of "Information Resources."

43 Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 227.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 A member was considered to have a diversified search process if he exhibited an information process on two or more bills which is different from his search procedures on other votes.

48 Schneier, "Intelligence," p. 18.

49 Ibid., p. 17.

50 Ibid.

51 For a compelling argument for maximum cross-sectioning of committees, see Lewis A. Froman, The Congressional Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 193-205.

## NOTES: CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup> John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> See James W. Dyson and John W. Soule, "Congressional Committee Behavior on Roll Call Votes: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1955-1964," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (1970), 626-47.

<sup>3</sup> For member reliance on fellow members, see Kingdon, Congressmen's pp. 69-104; Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "Decision-Making by U.S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model," in Political Decision-Making, ed. by S. Sidney Ulmer (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), pp. 14-43; and Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, Yea and Nays (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975). For ideological groups as a voting influence, see Mark F. Ferber, "The Formation of the Democratic Study Group," in Congressional Behavior, ed. by Nelson W. Polsby (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 249-69 and Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-70: The Democratic Study Group," American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 667-81. For a discussion of state delegation, see Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions," Journal of Politics, 24 (1962), 72-91; Barbara Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U.S. House of Representatives," Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 199-222; John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 (1964), 1-24; Arthur Stevens, "Informal Groups and Decision-Making in the U.S. House of Representatives," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970; and David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 50 (1956), 1023-45.

<sup>4</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 105-38 and David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959).

<sup>5</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 192-97.

<sup>6</sup> See Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958); David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966); W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968); David B. Truman, Congressional Party; and Julius Turner and Edward V. Schneier, Jr., Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

<sup>7</sup> See Aage R. Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973) and Cleo H. Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro, Representatives and Roll Calls (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

<sup>8</sup> See Charles F. Andrain, "A Scale Analysis of Senators' Attitudes Toward Civil Rights," Western Political Quarterly, 17 (1964), 488-503 and Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 577-88.

<sup>9</sup> See Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) and Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978).

<sup>10</sup> See Herbert B. Asher, "The Learning of Legislative Norms," American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 499-513 and Donald R. Matthews, "The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness," American Political Science Review, 53 (1959), 1064-89.

<sup>11</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, 29-68.

<sup>12</sup> See Truman, Congressional Party and Kingdon, Congressmen's pp. 169-91.

<sup>13</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 169-91.

<sup>14</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 139-68 and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971).

<sup>15</sup> See Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974); Lewis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), 1046-55.

<sup>16</sup> See Kingdon, Congressmen's, 198-211.

<sup>17</sup> See David W. Brady and Naomi B. Lynn, "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy," American Journal of Political Science, 17 (1973), 528-43; Fiorina, "Electoral Margins, Constituency Influence, and Policy Moderation: A Critical Assessment," American Politics Quarterly, 1 (1973), 479-98; Fiorina, Representatives; Samuel Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," American Political Science Review, 44 (1950), 669-77; and Judith A. Strain, "The Nature of Political Representation in Legislative Districts of Intense Party Competition" (B.A. Thesis, Chatham College, 1963).

<sup>18</sup> Robert S. Erickson and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), Chapter 9 and Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 214-24.

<sup>19</sup> Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 34.

<sup>20</sup> Matthews and Stimson, Yea and Nays, The Subtitle is Normal Decision-Making In The U.S. House.

<sup>21</sup> Clausen, Congressmen, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> Kingdon, Congressmen's, p. 230.

<sup>23</sup> See Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1976), p. 17.

<sup>24</sup> See Matthews and Stimson, Yea and Nays, pp. 97-99, 104-05 and Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 85-88.

<sup>25</sup> This conforms to the findings of Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 52-63.

<sup>26</sup> This confirms Polsby's position. See Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 146.

<sup>27</sup> Nelson W. Polsby and A. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New York: Scribner's, 1976), pp. xvi-xiv.

<sup>28</sup> William J. Keefe and Morris J. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 245.

<sup>29</sup> This corroborates a key point made in Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), Chapter 4.

<sup>30</sup> Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, Chapter 9.

<sup>31</sup> Two compelling arguments concerning the ideological basis of cue-taking are: Helmut Norpoth, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes," American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 1156-71 and John D. Macartney, "Political Staffing: A View from the District," (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, 1975).

<sup>32</sup> John W. Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," Journal of Politics, 36 (1977), 563-95.

<sup>33</sup> Matthews and Stimson, Yea and Nays.

<sup>34</sup> Kingdon, Congressmen's.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., Chapter 10.

<sup>36</sup> Norpoth, "Explaining Party Cohesion."

- 37 Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting."
- 38 Matthews and Stimson, Yea and Nays.
- 39 Kingdon, "Models of Voting."
- 40 John F. Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), Chapter 1.
- 41 Matthews and Stimson, "Decision-Making by U.S. Representatives."
- 42 Kingdon, Congressmen's, Chapter 10.
- 43 For a thorough synopsis of major works on the topic of constituency influence as related to marginality see Fiorina, Representatives, Chapter 1.
- 44 Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1977) p. 407.
- 45 Huntington, "Revised Theory."
- 46 Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in Mass Politics ed. by E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 284-311.
- 47 Miller as quoted in Fiorina, Representatives, p. 7.
- 48 Froman, Congressmen, pp. 122-24.
- 49 Recent CQ tabulations of party cohesion indicate that the two parties are indeed associated with opposing policy assessments. See, for example, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Jan. 14, 1968), 79-83.
- 50 The author wishes to acknowledge and thank George Gibson, Associate Professor of Political Science at USAF Academy for emphasizing this point in personal conversations.

## NOTES: CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup> Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American Political Science Review, 53 (1959), 742-56.

<sup>2</sup> Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: Random, 1977), p. 372.

<sup>3</sup> Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 197-200.

<sup>4</sup> John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explanations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 494.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>7</sup> Davidson, The Role, p. 119.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> See Wahlke, et al., Legislative System, Appendix 6; Davidson, The Role, Appendix; Ronald D. Hedlund and H. Paul Friesema, "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion," Journal of Politics, 34 (1972), 730-52; H. Paul Friesema and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Reality of Representative Roles," in Public Opinion and Public Policy, 2nd ed., ed. by Norman R. Luttbeg (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1974), pp. 413-17; and Bryan D. Jones, "Competitiveness, Role Orientations, and Legislative Responsiveness," Journal of Politics, 36 (1973), 924-47.

<sup>13</sup> Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 45-56.

<sup>14</sup> Davidson, The Role, p. 117.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>16</sup> Eulau, "The Role," 742.

<sup>17</sup> Davidson, The Role, pp. 126-39.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>19</sup> For a description of the amendment process, see Charles J. Zinn, How Our Laws are Made (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 27.

<sup>20</sup> The argument of both Sundquist and Polsby is that major policy changes are usually ideas that have been around Washington and before Congress for years. See: James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy (Washington: Brookings, 1968) and Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Analysis and Congress," Public Policy, 17 (1969), 61-74.

<sup>21</sup> That some do play it hour by hour is indicated by the Cloak Room recordings maintained by both parties. Members need only call the phone number to hear what is immediately up and what the issues are.

## NOTES: CHAPTER VIII

<sup>1</sup>Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics, 16 (1964), 677-715; T. J. Lowi, Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government, in Public Policies and Their Politics, ed. by R. Ripley (New York: Norton, 1966), pp. 27-40; and T. J. Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," Public Administration Review, 32 (1972), 298-301.

<sup>2</sup>Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1976).

<sup>3</sup>David E. Price, "Policy-Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of Environmental Factors," American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 548-74.

<sup>4</sup>See footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup>Ripley and Franklin, Congress.

<sup>6</sup>Price, "Policy-Making."

<sup>7</sup>See footnote 1.

<sup>8</sup>Ripley and Franklin, Congress.

<sup>9</sup>Price, "Policy-Making."

<sup>10</sup>Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Boston: Allyn 1972).

<sup>11</sup>Also see James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973); C. O. Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Pollution Policy-Making," Journal of Politics, 3 (1974), 438-64; and C. O. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, 2nd ed. (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury, 1977), p. 218.

<sup>12</sup>Cobb and Elder, Participation.

<sup>13</sup>Price, "Policy-Making."

<sup>14</sup>Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 52-63.

<sup>15</sup>For an example of a "general format," see John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

<sup>16</sup> For a review of recent reforms which have decreased the power of the chairman in both the House and Senate, see: Norman J. Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, "The Changing Senate from the 1950's to the 1970's," Congress Reconsidered, ed. by L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 3-20; and Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. by L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 3-53.

<sup>17</sup> For a review of the authority and powers of party floor leaders, see Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967); Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. Martin's, 1969); and David B. Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959).

<sup>18</sup> For an elaboration of the concept of procedural majority, see Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith, "An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives," Journal of Politics, 30 (1968), 617-46.

<sup>19</sup> Kingdom, Congressmen's.

<sup>20</sup> Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1946).

<sup>21</sup> Randall B. Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 11-12.

<sup>22</sup> This argument is the thrust of the Neustadt thesis found in Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon) (New York: Wiley, 1976), Chapter 4.

<sup>23</sup> For empirical proof of this proposition, see George C. Edwards, III, "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power," American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 101-13.

<sup>24</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," Trans-Action, 4 (1966), 7-14. For a critical assessment of the "Two Presidencies Theory" in light of contemporary developments, see Donald A. Peppers, "The Two Presidencies: Eight Years Later," in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. by A. Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 462-71.

<sup>25</sup> For an elaboration of this term, see Richard F. Fenno, "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies," American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), p. 889.

<sup>26</sup> For elaboration of the concept of "Classical" techniques, see Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 195-97.

<sup>27</sup> Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 241.

<sup>28</sup> An interesting case study which dramatizes these necessary policy relationships is Eric Redman, The Dance of Legislation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

<sup>29</sup> Robert L. Peabody, "Research on Congress: A Coming of Age," in Congress: Two Decades of Analysis, ed. by R. K. Huitt and R. L. Peabody (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 53.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>31</sup> The fact that ". . . roll calls cannot tell us why legislators vote . . ." is the major limitation of roll call analysis. See: Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random, 1968), p. 416.

<sup>32</sup> Peabody, "Research," p. 54.

<sup>33</sup> For example, see: Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System (New York: Holt, 1950), p. 1 and John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections," American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 1256-65.

<sup>34</sup> Sullivan and O'Connor, "Electoral Choice," 1264.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 55-56.

<sup>37</sup> Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (1962), 531-46.

<sup>38</sup> Stanley R. Freedman, "The Salience of Party and Candidacy in Congressional Elections: A Comparison of 1958 and 1970," in Public Opinion and Public Policy, rev. ed., ed. by Norman R. Luttbeg (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1974), pp. 126-31.

<sup>39</sup> See Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections and the Decline of Competitive Elections," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. by L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 54-79; Robert Erickson, "The Advantages of Inc incumbency in Congressional Elections," Polity, 3 (1971), 395-405; Warren L. Kostrowski, "Party and Inc incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections," American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 1213-34; and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," Polity, 6 (1974), 215-317.

<sup>40</sup> Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by M. K. Jennings and L. H. Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 37.

<sup>41</sup> For a statement of this argument, see David W. Brady and Naomi B. Lynn, "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy," American Journal of Political Science, 17 (1973), 528-43; Thomas P. Murphy, The New Politics Congress (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974); and Marvin G. Weinbaum and Dennis R. Judd, "In Search of the Mandated Congress," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14 (1970), 276-302.

<sup>42</sup> This last trend is convincingly documented by David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1974).

<sup>43</sup> Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (New York: Wadsworth, 1966).

<sup>44</sup> See Samuel C. Patterson, Roger H. Davidson, and Randall B. Ripley, A More Perfect Union (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dorsey, 1979), p. 452.

<sup>45</sup> This is the thesis of Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "If as Ralph Nader Says, Congress is 'The Broken Branch,' How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?" in Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, ed. by Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 277-87.

<sup>46</sup> For a specific explication of the Whig Model as a reform model, see Davidson, et al., Congress, pp. 90-91, 113-15.

<sup>47</sup> Lewis A. Froman, The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 193-205.

<sup>48</sup> Roger H. Davidson, "Representation and Congressional Committees," in "Changing Congress: The Committee System" The Annals, 411 (Jan. 1974), pp. 48-62.

<sup>49</sup> For an elaboration of the Multiple Advocacy Model, see Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 751-85; and Irving L. Janis, Victims of Group Think (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972).

<sup>50</sup> Roland Young, The American Congress (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. viii.

**APPENDIX A**

**STRATIFIED DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLES  
FOR EACH SAMPLED VOTE**

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON ETHICS VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	43%		14%
6-11	14%	7%	7%
12+	7%	7%	N = 14

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON NUCLEAR NAVY VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	36%		9%
6-11	18%	9%	9%
12+	9%	9%	N = 11

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON TAX VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	50%		20%
6-11		10%	
12+		10%	10%

N = 10

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON SUPPLEMENTAL  
HOUSING (GOLDWATER AMENDMENT) VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	50%		20%
6-11		10%	
12+		10%	10%
<b>N = 10</b>			

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON RHODESIAN CHROME VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	45%	9%	9%
6-11	9%	9%	9%
12+	9%		
<b>N = 11</b>			

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON NASA VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	50%		10%
6-11	10%	10%	10%
12+			10%
<b>N = 10</b>			

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON FAA VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	10%		10%
6-11	10%	20%	10%
12+	30%	10%	

N = 10

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON COMMON SITUS VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	18%	9%	9%
6-11	9%	9%	18%
12+	18%		9%

N = 11

## DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	38%	8%	15%
6-11	8%	8%	8%
12+		15%	

N = 13

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON HOUSE  
ASSASSINATION COMMITTEE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	38%	8%	15%
6-11	8%	8%	8%
12+		15%	

N = 13

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
ROMANIAN EARTHQUAKE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	33%		22%
6-11	11%	11%	
12+		11%	11%

N = 9

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON THE EPA VOTE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	50%		33%
6-11		16%	
12+			

N = 6

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON DEBT  
COLLECTION PRACTICES VOTE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	36%		27%
6-11	9%	9%	
12+		9%	9%

N = 11

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
ARAB BOYCOTT VOTE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	20%	10%	10%
6-11	10%	10%	30%
12+	10%		

N = 10

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
STRIP MINING VOTE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	31%	8%	8%
6-11		8%	15%
12+	15%		15%

N = 13

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
ENERGY DEPARTMENT VOTE**

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	19%	13%	31%
6-11	6%	6%	13%
12+	13%		

**N = 16%**

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
SNOW REMOVAL VOTE**

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	64%		18%
6-11		9%	9%
12+			

**N = 11**

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON PUBLIC  
WORKS CONFERENCE VOTE**

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	44%	11%	
6-11	11%		22%
12+		11%	

**N = 9**

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
COUNTERCYCLICAL VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	33%	8%	17%
6-11	8%	8%	8%
12+		8%	8%

**N = 13**

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON HUD VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	25%	8%	17%
6-11	8%	8%	8%
12+	8%	8%	8%

**N = 12**

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON MARINE  
MAMMAL PROTECTION VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	17%	17%	11%
6-11	9%	9%	9%
12+	9%		

**N = 12**

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON BUDGET  
RESOLUTION (1st VOTE)**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	33%	8%	17%
6-11		8%	17%
12+	8%		8%

N = 12

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON BUDGET  
RESOLUTION (2nd VOTE)**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	43%	14%	
6-11	14%		
12+		29%	

N = 7

**DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON FOREIGN  
AID (MILLER AMENDMENT) VOTE**

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	36%	9%	27%
6-11		9%	
12+	18%		

N = 11

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
CLEAN AIR ACT VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	67%		13%
6-11		7%	7%
12+	7%		
<b>N = 15</b>			

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
HYDE AMENDMENT VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	50%	7%	29%
6-11			14%
12+			
<b>N = 14</b>			

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON DEHATCHING VOTE

Length of Service	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	25%	8%	
6-11	17%	8%	33%
12+	8%		
<b>N = 12</b>			

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
SCHOOL LUNCH VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	66%		22%
6-11			11%
12+			

N = 9

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
SACCHARIN VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	25%	8%	25%
6-11	8%	25%	8%
12+			

N = 12

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON WATER  
PROJECTS (CONTE AMENDMENT) VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	44%	13%	25%
6-11	6%	6%	6%
12+			

N = 16

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE ON  
PAY PRICE VOTE

<u>Length of Service</u>	<u>Northern Democrat</u>	<u>Southern Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>
1-5	35%	6%	24%
6-11		12%	6%
12+	18%		

N = 18

One is unknown

APPENDIX B

THE MEANING OF VARIOUS  
PERCEPTUAL ISSUE DIMENSIONS

Basically, perceptual issue dimensions can be divided into three broad groups: a) dimensions pertaining to the members' general perceptions of the issue as a bill before the legislature--e.g., complexity, technicality, controversiality and major status; b) dimensions that relate to presumed political salience and "heat"--e.g., mail, constituency importance, constituency awareness, renomination and re-election effects; and c) dimensions concerning how the member himself processes and reacts to the bill--e.g., member feelings, routineness, toughness and thought. What follows is a dimension by dimension presentation of the meanings various members imputed to each dimension.

Dimensions Concerning General Perceptions  
of the Issue as a Bill Before the Legislature

a. Complexity

Of those members who responded to the question on complexity, only thirty-seven percent felt that the decision on which they were interviewed was complex.

A review of comments made during interview sessions reveals that a "complex" vote is one that is considered "complicated," "hard to zero in on," "multifaceted," "not clear," "hard to handle," "not easily understood," and "hard to come to grips with." Conversely, a non-complex issue is one which is "clear" and "simple." Votes that members felt to be extremely complex are: the Dingell Amendment (that, as one member noted, involved eight or nine issues), the Budget, Snow Removal (which a

member pointed to as the kind of amendment that complicates the appropriation process), and Water Projects ("too many individual projects that you can't separate in your own mind," one member noted).

Most of those interviewed alluded to some procedure they had devised for coming to grips with a "complex" issue. In most cases, this involved some sort of ideological reductionism. As one Southern Democrat with a moderate length of service noted with regard to the NASA vote, "Honestly, very few issues are complex for me. I make a snap judgment. I get familiar with the basic issue and try to reduce it to a philosophical question."

Another member echoed an ideological approach in his discussion of his decision on Rhodesian Chrome: "My convictions simplify things. I make a habit of learning about the bill and what it will do, etc., and its key, root amendments, and then simplify it by making it a straight up or down kind of decision." Perhaps this procedure is what leads members to differentiate a complex vote from a "substantive" one: a complex vote is perhaps one that cannot be neatly put into "substantive" categories.

Another "simplifying" aid that members mention is parliamentary process in the House. Such things as the rule under which a bill gets debated and processed and the procedure of having a vote on final passage encourage, in the words of one member, ". . . things to get simplified." As that member noted in reference to tax legislation, "These are complicated issues, but the rule and vote simplify it. Complex issues become simplified yea or nay votes."

Thus, according to those interviewed, the legislative process and a member's philosophical or ideological inclinations help to counteract the complexity of issues. In fact, it is perhaps the case that

members devise these inclinations in response to the yes/no nature of parliamentary decisions. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the decisions studied here are considered non-complex. There are problems with this simplification however. As one Republican member noted,

There is a feeling around here that any bill can become too complex if you let it.<sup>1</sup> As a result things often get oversimplified. Legislation gets handled by the average floor member in a very superficial way.

Or as another member noted, "They all are complex and if you do your homework they should be."

Finally, several members mentioned the complex potential of all bills. "They can start off simple," he noted, "and end up terribly complex."

#### b. Technicality

The contemporary era is often referred to as a "technological" one. Several major works have called attention to the threats technology and the increasing technicality of policy pose to democratic political processes and governmental responsiveness.<sup>2</sup> They warn of a coming technocracy of experts and specialists who feel politically accountable to no one. Given this emphasis, it is somewhat surprising to discover that only thirty-seven percent of the decisions were defined as technical.

At first, taking the lead of Cobb and Elder,<sup>3</sup> technicality and complexity were considered synonymous in this study and were used together in one question. After several interview sessions, however, it became obvious that these terms had separate meanings for most members and should be considered different dimensions.

Technical decisions are, in the words of members, "ununderstandable," "confusing," "detailed," "difficult," "jargon laddened," and

"unclear." This is in contrast to the "complicated," "multifaceted" nature of "complexity." Examples of technical matters highlighted by members are: votes such as HUD and Countercyclical Aid that involve formulae, quotas on the Neighborhood Councils abolished by the Goldwater Amendment, Alluvial Valleys section of the Strip Mining Bill, the Hyde "Anti-abortion" Amendment, all fiscal matters, the "Miller Amendment" reducing foreign aid ("it was not understood by everyone--too technical"), the Hatch Act revisions and its amendment process, and the Water Projects fight that involved "detailed cost/benefit analysis and zero based budgeting." All in all, members consider "amendments" to involve more technical considerations than "final passage." Conversely, "up or down votes" like the Pay Raise are considered "not technical" because they are "clear cut."

Again as with complexity, members have invented means for coping with legislation perceived to be technical, the most common means being ideological reduction. Members constantly note that the degree to which a vote is considered technical depends on how much time the member wants to devote to it. As a member noted with regard to the Tax Vote, "It wasn't technical for me. I didn't get into it." As one extremely articulate New York Republican stated, "We all develop approaches to issues." (With regard to the Saccharin issue), "If I want to get into it I could, but I keep them basic. For instance, in general the energy issue is extremely technical, but the vote on the Energy Department isn't." Another member concurs, "All votes can be technical. I don't let them with my method. I just need to know the implications of my choice. Then, I reduce them. Take the Saccharin issue, if it's not supported, don't jump." Finally, a member who was explaining his vote on the Water

Projects and Dams acknowledges that he did not and could not vote on the merits. "Too technical--I voted my hunches. On this kind of thing you must rely on your general impressions."

Another simplifying factor that members allude to is the repetitive nature of policy questions. As one member stated in a discussion of the Dingell Amendment to the Clean Air Act,

The first time you confront this kind of stuff, it does seem awfully technical. But after you've seen it a few times, it becomes familiar. So maybe to outsiders the stuff is technical, but not here. Almost everything we do has been seen by almost everyone as either a past vote or campaign issue. After awhile the technicality doesn't bother you.

One member noted a final source of simplification, at least with regard to tax legislation. "If you don't simplify it, the constituents will."

Members detect at least two problems with highly technical legislation. First, as the Saccharin issue dramatizes, there often is a shortage of or inconclusiveness of evidence and understanding. As a freshman Democrat noted, "you just wish someone would get the facts straight." The other problem is a carryover from complexity. It pertains to the superficiality of the legislative process. As one perceptive member stated,

Sometimes I swear as few as ten members know what the hell is going on. The Budget is a good example. It is highly technical. But most take the approach that all I need to understand is what they are trying to do. Nonsense. In this era of limitations we must pay close attention. That's why I hate to see a breakdown in the appropriations process. There are a lot of people with opinions and positions, but few with real understanding.

In sum, technical and complex decisions are those that members feel are "hard to understand."

c. Conflict

"Conflict," as a political concept, has received considerable attention by political analysts. James Coleman has attempted to identify the sources of political conflict.<sup>4</sup> Kingdon argues that the amount of conflict an issue entails will be decisive in determining how the issue is handled in Congress, how individual Congressmen respond to it, and how they reach a decision on it.<sup>5</sup>

Students of Congress have long maintained that roll call votes are "conflictual" because they a) are not passed by the voice vote, the procedure used for widely supported legislation, b) involve disagreement sufficient to the point that the Constitutionally prescribed 20 percent request a recorded vote and c) are highly visible, public records. Therefore, it is surprising to discover that of all the interviews conducted, only fifty-three percent felt that the decision at hand was one that involved significant "conflict."

Although one Congressman did state that all issues involve conflict and "If there is no controversy, you have a non-issue," the overwhelming majority were able to differentiate a normal situation from one involving an intense amount of conflict. As another member elucidated, "All surely do have conflict to some degree, but some bills--such as the HUD vote this time--have more than usual." A highly conflictual issue is defined by members as one that is "hot," "extremely hot," "hard to handle," "emotional," "close," "controversial," "heavily and heatedly discussed," "not anywhere near unanimously supported," and "hard fought." Although some members were confused as to whether the decision was controversial for them or with their constituents, most viewed a conflictual issue as one involving "lots of heat," "extreme positions," "deeply felt sentiments," "lots of discussion," "major, often regional, divisions," "determined

"lobbying," and "personal attacks and animosity." Conversely, a non-conflictual decision was seen as "ordinary" (involving the "usual hawk vs. dove, liberal vs. conservative divisions"), "'old ones' like Rhodesian Chrome that are not as emotional as race and abortion because they get old," and those "not hot." Also listed as non-conflictual were "those involving nominal ideological conflict such as School Lunch," "those that everybody is for," "those not heavily discussed," and "those involving only little groups" or "small elements" or "few advocates" such as Marine Mammal Protection that many perceived to be a contest between only those affected by and proximate to the policy. Examples of votes considered to be highly conflictual are: Tax bills, Dehatching, Regional Allocation Formulae, Clean Air (that saw "heavy pressure on Congressmen through auto dealers out in the district"), social programs, "anything involving the regulatory, police or welfare functions of government," the Budget "where everything came to a head," and the Hyde Amendment of which one member said: "few are that emotional."

Many members alerted us to the contextual nature of legislative conflict. Basically, what members contend is that controversy can be defused from committee to floor and vice versa, that conflict often becomes very specific, and that there is less conflict on recurring issues that become more familiar.

It was pointed out that many highly controversial issues become defused at the time of voting as the result of compromises in committee. Examples covered by this study are Government Reorganization Authority, and the Arab Boycott and HUD votes. With regard to the Arab Boycott vote, one member pointed out that although there was a lot of publicity the bill was actually ". . . not controversial on the floor. It was

neither is hot nor as politically dangerous as before because they worked it out." In the same vein, the HUD vote was described as involving sharp regional divisions in committee but only mild divisions on the floor. Conversely, bills like School Lunch illustrate that questions get raised on the floor about how a bill is written. As one member noted, "If there are no amendments it's a 'committee bill'. If a sizable portion of the membership doesn't like the bill, there will be intense conflict on the floor." A good example of this phenomenon occurred on the Budget votes. As one member noted, "At first there was controversy. But, we sent it back to committee; they improved it, and the second time out things weren't nearly as hot."

It was also pointed out that only parts of a bill generate conflict. In a member's words, "Some sections are controversial and some aren't." Illustrative of this notion that conflict tends to center on specific sections are: a freshman Congressman's statement that only the part of the NASA authorization involving SST funding was controversial; a member mentioning that only the sunset portion of the Energy Department Authorization and several other amendments were controversial; and the comment that "the only real item of conflict in Marine Mammal Protection concerned the fine on tuna men who caught porpoise."

Many members emphasized that the degree of an issue's controversiality is a function of its recurringness. Members noted that Common Situs Picketing, which had been before the Congress on several occasions, was not nearly as controversial as before. One member said of the Strip Mining bill: "There is far less controversy on it now than when it first came up." Concerning Dehatching, a member felt there was comparatively little conflict because prior attempts provided a "cutting edge." Perhaps

this is a reflection of the Polsby maxim that significant, new policy overtures go through an incubation period. Past conflict may indicate unsuccessful attempts to build a majority coalition while low conflict on a subsequent try may indicate a "ripe policy climate."<sup>6</sup> Perhaps, too, the recurring cleavages come to be viewed by members as normal. As one very senior Republican member noted, in reflecting Wildavsky's notion of patterned role playing,<sup>7</sup> "Certain kinds of bills require a fight. The School Lunch bill will always involve strife between those who see them as giveaways and those who favor human policies." This kind of controversy may be perceived by members as usual. Regardless of the explanation, though, there seems to be strong concurrence among interviewees that the more times an issue comes up, the less "hot" it is.

Although not receiving quite the emphasis of the three preceding qualifications pertaining to legislative conflict, two other situational relationships alluded to by members should be mentioned. First, echoing Polsby, the honeymoon period of a new President and new Congress was thought to be relatively free of intense conflict.<sup>8</sup> Second, the time frame within which an issue develops is alleged to affect the amount of controversy surrounding it. As one member noted, "If it comes up quick, as an amendment can, there isn't enough time for it to become extremely controversial."

As with complexity and technicality, members claim that they have devised strategies for dealing with supposedly "controversial" votes. As one member put it, "Few pose conflict to me. I'm no agonizer. I know where I want to go and what I want to do and do it."

Finally, members call attention to the fact that serious policy disagreements may exist among members but not in the general public.

This is indicated by the following quote: "The Budget is a hot one among the membership, but this does not seem to be the case among the general public. They don't know or understand it."

d. Major Status

Throughout early interviews, members constantly differentiated among "major" or "minor" votes. Therefore, on the presumption that this is a meaningful distinction that legislators themselves employ, it was included in subsequent questionnaires as an issue dimension.

As seen in Table 3.2, fully sixty-seven percent of the decisions studied were considered "major." Members define a "major" bill or vote as one that entails "new directions," "new concepts," "great importance," "comprehensiveness," and "significant ramifications." Also considered major are bills that involve "substantial sums of money," or "affect a sizable segment of society" or can be considered "part of the President's legislative package."

Although a member said that "all recorded votes are major," votes that some members singled out as significantly major are: the Water Project question (it involved a "test of the Administration" and was a "tug of war between the public interest and the politics of pork"); the Hatch Act Repeal ("because of the emphasis of the President"); the Saccharin vote (because "people don't want the Delaney Amendment but instead favor repeal of the ban"); the Dingell Amendment (defined as a watershed conflict between energy, needs, environment, and jobs); and the Pay Raise ("due to its political heat, this vote will separate the men from the boys").

As with all dimensions, however, there is some disagreement among members concerning the actual classification of issues as major. For instance, some members did contend that neither Saccharin nor De-hatching were major in that the Saccharin vote "signifies growing resentment but not bold policy overtures," while Hatch Act Revisions "don't hit everyone." But, in the main, members seem to acknowledge that votes such as the HUD authorizations and Marine Mammal Protection are not major. The HUD vote was considered not major (but certainly not "minor"), because it did not involve a "new direction" but merely "refinements" of existing policy. Marine Mammal was viewed as "material only to those in California."

Finally, members allude to the dynamics of issue expansion in their discussions of "major status." As one Congressman noted, "A non-major bill can become major due to amendments that are tacked on." He went on to argue that it is very hard to predict what will be a major vote in a policy or political sense. "Many are sleepers and they give you fits subsequently."

In sum, those votes which are classified by members as major seem to acquire that status from policy, rather than political, considerations. A bill achieves major status either from its policy change, innovativeness and costs, or from Presidential involvement.

#### Dimensions Concerning Perceived Political Salience and "Heat"

##### e. Importance

When members were asked if they felt the decision in question was "important" to their constituents, their responses varied evenly. In fifty percent of the interviews they said yes, while in fifty percent they said no.

An issue is usually considered "important" to constituents if it "affects" them. Generally, this means, as one Representative emphasized, "anytime money that might be put to use in the constituency--like grants--is involved." Conversely, members seem to reply in the negative to the question on importance when it is felt that constituents are "not directly affected," "only indirectly impacted on," or if the constituency's interests are "not relevant to the question."

Members make three main points when discussing "constituency salience."

First, most votes are usually important to some but not all constituents.<sup>9</sup>

Second, few votes are directly important to constituents. Some are important "in general" such as the Ethics vote. Most frequently, however, votes are important only in an indirect fashion. For example, members from non-coal mining districts define Strip Mining legislation as important to their constituents as "an energy matter." The NASA vote is seen as important perhaps as an issue of "national pride, leadership, and technological superiority." The Budget is seen to be important as "an issue of fiscal responsibility." Likewise, members feel that the EPA vote could be important to constituents "as part of the environmental debate;" the Energy Department vote could be a vote "against red tape, duplication, and bureaucratic overlap;" and the Public Works vote relates to issues of "unemployment." The implication of this form of generalized issue definition--where specific questions of limited importance to constituents are perceived by members as indirectly relevant to salient concerns--is that members make an attempt to relate specific, seemingly unimportant matters to matters of general concern to their constituents.

queries were made, members did not feel there was constituency awareness. The reasons for this, many members contend, is that constituents don't follow most issues and therefore don't know when most votes are up ("My people aren't aware of the Rhodesian Chrome vote because they never knew it was up"). Also, as interviews on the Budget reveal, Congressmen feel that many issues are not understood by the general public. As one Congressman noted with regard to constituency awareness of the Budget, "Many things up here aren't actual issues in the public. Only we are aware of them!"

Yet, on forty-three percent of the decisions there was a perception of constituency awareness. As one member noted with regard to the Clean Air Act Amendment, "When they are affected, when it affects the way people live, they will be aware." As another acknowledged on Government Reorganization, "Folks are generally aware of this vote because they are hot on efficiency and frugality in government." Still some did allow that even when constituents are "stirred up" and "affected," they often do not realize that the vote at hand is pertinent to their concerns.

Members make three points concerning constituency awareness.

First, it is very difficult to predict constituency awareness.

"Sometimes they'll completely surprise you by getting interested and involved in the darndest things."

Second, the media plays a crucial role in determining constituency awareness. As a member noted, "It's difficult to say about awareness . It completely depends on news coverage." Others felt that constituents would be aware "if the papers play it up," "if any vote is publicized as well as recorded," and "if there is plenty in the newspaper." In a

derogatory fashion, one member stated with regard to the Pay Raise, "If they aren't aware now, the Press will make them so."

Finally, and most important, Congressmen acknowledge that often only those affected are aware. In recording answers to the awareness question, "affected only" responses were coded. Although the result is that on only 4% of all decisions "affected only" were felt to be aware, members in their conversations do emphasize the awareness on those on whom the policy will impact. On the Clean Air Amendments, it was reported frequently that "only affected groups" were aware. As one member stressed,

On most issues most individuals aren't aware. Only some individuals are, and they usually have a stake in the outcome. This is especially true on grant programs where all you hear from are public officials from affected jurisdictions.

Others allow, however, that there are interested voters who are aware but not affected. In sum, what these comments reflect is an acknowledgement on the part of members that there are at least three levels of political strata in the American public: mass, attentive, and affected. On most issues, only attentive and affected publics evince awareness.<sup>10</sup>

#### g. Mail

The mail that members receive from constituents has received continuing attention by political analysts. Studies have emphasized kinds, contents, processing, influence,<sup>11</sup> member reactions,<sup>12</sup> and member perceptions and distortions.<sup>13</sup>

Although several studies have emphasized the heavy volume of mail members receive from constituents,<sup>14</sup> and the fact that legislative matters ". . . make up the largest volume of requests . . .,"<sup>15</sup> it is surprising to note in Table 3.2 that on only thirteen percent of the cases did members

receive heavy mail. Perhaps typifying most members is a statement by a senior, Southern Democrat: "On most issues my constituents tend to remain silent."

For members, "a lot of mail" on a given vote means that they received a "heavy," "high volume," "significant" or "substantial" amount or volume as opposed to a "light" or "small" mail.

With regard to the mail, members made three important points. First, there is little of what might be called "average citizen mail." Most is either from other public officials or in the form of what members alternatively call "generated," "concerted," "inspired," "instigated," "synthetic," or "organized" mail. Second, and this coincides with member perceptions on awareness, constituents link specific issues to general policy concerns. As a member pointed out with regard to the vote on Presidential Reorganization Authority, "The content of most letters on this did not relate to the specifics of the issue but were in the form of a general reaction to government inefficiency." Third, certain issues generate a very high volume of mail. A freshman legislator acknowledged that the Saccharin issue and the Common Situs vote were associated with an inordinately large volume of mail.

#### h. Renomination Effects

To ascertain political "heat," members were asked if they thought the issue at hand could affect their renomination or reelection. With regard to renomination, on only twenty-four percent of the decisions was there a belief that the vote would be of consequence. Many felt that many bills could have a "minor impact," but most agreed that few single votes could significantly affect a member's chances for nomination.

This corroborates the commonly accepted proposition that incumbents are fairly confident concerning the prospects for renomination.<sup>16</sup>

Members perceive two ways in which a vote could affect renomination. First, a vote could affect renomination by provoking and supporting a primary challenge. As a freshman Democrat confided about his decision concerning the Hatch Act Revisions, "My vote could very well be a factor in labor's support for a candidate against me in a primary." The second way in which members perceived a renomination effect was in "the positive." The vote itself will probably not cause renomination problems but could have, had the member voted the other way. As a member noted, "This could have caused me severe problems if I went the other way. As it stands now, it is a plus vote." The point to be emphasized is that both conceptions do tap a perceived political effect in the renomination arena. Making the "right vote" in a political sense or worrying about one that was made shows political salience.

An important finding with regard to renomination effects is a reaffirmation of Fenno's notion that "In thinking about their political condition, House members make distinctions within their reelection constituency . . ."<sup>17</sup> Several members noted that if they would vote in a certain way on votes like Common Situs Picketing or the Ethics vote, it would "really disappoint those close supporters and followers within the party who have been with us since the beginning."

#### i. Reelection

A recent emphasis in legislative behavior literature concerns the power of incumbency as a reelection factor. Reflective of this emphasis are Cover and Mayhew's "Congressional Elections and the Decline of

Competitive Elections,"<sup>18</sup> Robert Erickson's "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections,"<sup>19</sup> Warren Kostroski's "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections,"<sup>20</sup> and Mayhew's "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals."<sup>21</sup> Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to find that no more than twenty-five percent of the interviewees felt that the issue at hand could affect their reelection fortunes. Obviously, this seems to indicate that most incumbents feel rather secure in an electoral sense.

Examples of the kinds of decisions members perceived as having a reelection impact are those considered to be "politically dangerous," "emotional--not your usual nuts and bolts issue," and "real issues--like Hyde."

As with renomination effects, when members respond in the affirmative concerning reelection effects, they do so in both a negative and positive fashion.

The negative conception usually refers to an advantage that can be used by an opponent. Reflective of this are statements that "Yes, it could very well defeat me," "The Public Works bill can be seized on by an opponent to show I'm a big spender," and "The Budget is a possible election issue if it's linked to deficit spending and inflation." Specific examples of situations where members did allow a negative reelection effect are a Democratic freshman legislator's fear that his vote against Common Situs Picketing could be a big reelection factor because "it shows my independence from unions," a member's concern about "going against the state delegation on a 'pork' vote," a Congresswoman's apprehension that her vote on the Hyde Amendment "might jeopardize the passage of the HEW Appropriation triggering opposition from all quarters," and the relief

of a member that the Saccharin Ban vote was not recorded—"Since I favor the ban, if it had been recorded I'd have been in trouble."

The positive connotation of reelection effects is reflected in the statements "That vote will help," "it will affect favorably," and "a definite plus factor."

Conversely, the many votes considered not to entail reelection consequences are described as "unlikely influence," and "inconceivable effects." Examples singled out were the Hatch Act Revisions ("They have too little impact to be a reelection issue") and the Dingell Amendment ("No, it's not the kind of thing that catches on"). Another interesting statement reveals the highly individualized setting of reelection effects. As a member noted concerning the Water Projects vote: "This will not be a reelection issue with me because I had nothing on the President's hit list."

In discussing reelection effects, members stress the extreme uncertainty involved in predicting the electoral consequences of a given vote. Again and again comments were made to the effect that "any one vote can," "you can't tell," and "more people have been surprised by what votes pop up in a campaign." One prominent Republican elaborated on the Dingell Amendment: "Who knows. Normally something like this doesn't, but there is no guarantee. That vote may have campaign repercussions. It certainly will if it helps you make the 'dirty dozen' [a blacklisting by Environmentalists of members perceived to be hostile]." Or as a Southerner mentioned in discussing the Energy Department Act,

Whether or not this becomes an issue for me depends on what the new agency will do. If its performance is bad, I'll take my lumps for the vote. That's what happened to me on OSHA. It's a vote that got played up after OSHA's activities received negative publicity.

Finally, the uncertainty of reelection issues was illustrated with one member's anecdote concerning another Congressman: " \_\_\_\_\_ of Texas agonized over Clean Air, but now he tells me it's the Hatch vote that's giving him fits back home. You just can never tell."

Members also insist that it is very unlikely that one issue will affect the actual outcome of a reelection campaign. In language remarkably similar to interviews gathered by Clapp in his pioneering work,<sup>22</sup> members note that "rarely can a single issue tube you," "It's hard to imagine any one bill getting you beat," and "even a big vote won't do it." What will affect a reelection effort, many note, is a series of votes. In language that strongly corroborates Kingdon's notion of "A String of Votes,"<sup>23</sup> a member stressed that "No one vote will affect a reelection, but in concert, several will jeopardize." What happens, in the absence of issue mandates from constituents, is that, as one senior Democrat described, "Members create an image and hold it. One issue can't do it to you. An opponent must attack an 'area of votes' in order to muster any kind of support."

Finally, with regard to reelection, members relate the importance of being able to "explain" a vote that may potentially be a reelection issue. In the words of one member, "Issues are not and do not become significant if you can make a good argument. You're in trouble if you can't."

Thus, in confirmation of Erickson's "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll-Call Voting,"<sup>24</sup> roll call votes are perceived as having an impact on electoral outcomes, but the precise nature and extent of this influence remains vague.

Dimensions Concerning How the Member  
Himself Processes and Reacts to a Bill

j. Feelings

As the interviews progressed, it was noticed that members would constantly differentiate legislation on the basis of whether or not a bill elicited strong feelings on their part. After about one-fifth of the interviews were completed, the "feelings" question was included in the study.

Of the decisions examined, forty-seven percent were perceived as involving the strong, personal feelings of members. An issue involving strong feelings was defined as "anything that goes to the heart of a basic philosophy, strong commitments, or our personal morality and beliefs," issues involving "strong advocacy" or "strong convictions," and issues that elicit "intense involvement by a member." Examples of votes described in interview sessions as involving "strong feelings" are the EPA vote because the EPA is ". . . wrapped up in some severe issues in my state," parochial or pork issues ("I always have strong feelings over anything that involves my state"), portions of the School Lunch Program that a freshman Democrat felt obliged to "really get into," the Budget that one Republican said "waves the flag at all of us concerned about over-spending," and Saccharin that one conservative member noted "dramatized the danger of government regulation without a factual base." Several noted, though, that few current issues could rival the Southeast Asian votes during the Viet Nam War. As one junior Democrat noted, "From what they tell me and from what I personally saw, there were some physical altercations during some of those late night sessions."

Issues thought not to involve strong, personal feelings were described as "low attention," "low advocacy," or "low emotion" ones. Constantly, when members replied in the negative, they would say that, although they were concerned with a vote, they "did not have convictions at stake." Examples cited were School Lunch ("For me and most colleagues, it's just not that kind of issue) and all "routine appropriations and authorizations." With regard to this latter category, one member noted: "These things don't usually incite personal feelings. If you aren't a big advocate and funds wouldn't come to a halt and if the vote's not close, you are asked to be kind of a machine: either accept or reject."

A point that one member mentioned concerning personal feelings deserves a closing comment. He noted that "strong feelings can change." He pointed out that he felt strongly that the Congress should reinvestigate the Kennedy and King assassinations, "But when the committee screwed it up, I backed away."

#### k. Routineness

In Chapter II, it was mentioned that a prevalent notion among social scientists is that all decision-making actors develop decision "short cuts," "rules," "aids," and "routines" in order to cope with a complex, high volume decision milieu. Given this, it comes as no surprise that in only thirty-one percent of the studied decisions did legislators define the issue at hand as "not routine." In other words, for sixty-nine percent of the decisions, "routineness" was perceived. This finding reflects the belief of members that most issues, especially most of the ones studied, are routine and can be programmed by them.

Members consider a routine issue as something that is "typical" and involves the "same basic process" and "the normal way of doing things." It is referred to commonly as "no big deal," "not politically charged," "not a real issue," and "not earthshaking." Although some members considered "routineness" to be a characteristic of the way the bill was handled by the House, most used it to refer to their own basic decision process. Accordingly, routine decisions are, in the words of one eloquent member, "decisions made within the framework you develop. A decision made in this way is 'routine' for me. In that manner, I feel my decision on Strip Mining was 'routine'." Examples of routine decisions are what members consider "committee decisions," where the House floor ratifies decisions "ironed out" in committee. Specifics cited as routine are the HUD vote ("This is no big issue back home") and the Hyde Amendment (I've voted on this damn thing three times now.").

"Non-routine" decisions are called "atypical" and "extraordinary." The situations most likely to be associated with non-routineness are those where, for the member, "more time was taken" in making the decision and there was a lot of work, where the bill "was studied more," where there was "real involvement and preparation," and where there were "strong commitments," perhaps involving "campaign promises you can't compromise." Cited examples of non-routine votes are: the Water Projects issue ("It took a lot of time for me"), the Public Works Conference ("Although I normally don't do it, here I looked at the conference information"), the House Assassinations Committee ("This was anything but routine"), the HUD vote ("This affected our state and I therefore put more into it and paid more attention to it"), the Hatch Act ("It was of higher priority and concerned many people") and the Saccharin vote ("I took a lot of time

Because of the obvious divergence of facts"). One member's disquisition on non-routineness is helpful here:

There are about ten bills a year that generate interest beyond relevant publics. This time they are Right to Work, Situs Picketing, Farm Legislation, EPA, OSHA, Trade, and Water and Land Use. These must be considered non-routine because they generate concern across the board.

Thus, it seems that a "non-routine" decision is one that involves "a highly serious matter," exceptional member investments, and "substantial public attention."

Members make several other points concerning routineness that should be mentioned. First, the lead time available for a vote affects the routineness with which members handle the bill. Short time frames, for example, do not allow issues to be handled routinely, while issues can be processed normally by members "as long as enough time exists." Second, a member's standing in the legislature and his involvement in the legislative process will condition his view of an issue's routineness. For instance, several freshmen noted that "hardly anything is routine," but a senior Republican stressed that "the longer you've been around here the more they are routine and the more you react to them routinely." Likewise, several Congressmen emphasized that issues are not routine if a member is a sponsor of a bill or on the committee that handled it. In those cases a member is "better informed and more involved than most." Finally, members call attention to the fact, and perhaps the danger, that many votes presumed to be routine end up being handled non-routinely by Congress and have non-routine impacts. One member singled out the Debt Collection Practices bill as exemplary of this. "I thought it would be routine, but look at the closeness of the vote." A staff member of the House International Relations Committee focused on the dangers in

discussing Romanian Earthquake Relief. "That was on the suspension calendar that is reserved for rather routine, non-controversial legislation. Yet it is anything but routine. It marks the first time in history that we've given aid to a Communist block nation. That wasn't even brought up."

### I. Thought

As the study progressed, it was noticed that members would frequently differentiate issues on the basis of how much thought they put into them. Unfortunately, the question was not inserted in the study until very late. Thus, for only eighty-four interviews is there available data. Still, the question seems to provide a meaningful categorization of issues.

Of the small number who were asked the question on "thought," forty-four percent acknowledged that, for the issue at hand, they "had put a lot of thought into it." A vote that was given a lot of thought was said to involve "a little extra emphasis," "close study," "in depth study," and a consideration of "how will it affect my state." As one extremely articulate northern Republican noted, "For me, a vote which involves a lot of thought is one that is not snap, knee jerk, hip shooting, gut reaction, off-the-cuff, or flying by the seat of my pants. It's one on which I feel most comfortable."

### III. Toughness

This last issue characteristic for which a question was asked concerned the "toughness" of the decision.

Less than twenty-five percent of the interview sessions yielded a response concerning "toughness." A tough decision is one considered to be "very difficult," "more difficult than most," "not easy," and "a very close call" where the member feels "uneasy," "uncertain," "sitting on the fence," and "with mixed emotions, tearing in two directions." Although several members noted that all decisions can be tough, especially in trying to second guess the folks back home, votes specified as tough were the Pay Raise ("I'm affected by it"), Abortion ("They don't come any tougher--you must commit yourself"), Hatch Deregulation ("I can foresee abuse"), and the Water Projects vote ("I had to vote against the state delegation" and "These things have been funded for many years and I hate to say no to others' demands on pork because maybe someday I'll need something").

A non-tough decision is described as "uncomplicated," "easy," "no trouble," and "no decision." A decision is considered non-tough when a member "knows where he stands," ("I already knew"), when it "does not involve much time or agonizing nor much time self justifying," and when it does involve "basic convictions and commitments" that allow you "to walk in and walk out."

Members emphasized that "The more you see them, the less tough they are." One member stressed that nothing is tough "the second time through." Another stated that he faced real tough decisions "only in my early days here."

NOTES: APPENDIX B

<sup>1</sup>Corroborating this is the statement by a member that "You can let a bill like NASA become complex for you. I don't by not getting into them in detail. Keep them basic."

<sup>2</sup>Zbigniew Brezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: Viking Press, 1970); Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); and Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random, 1970).

<sup>3</sup>Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 120.

<sup>4</sup>James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1957).

<sup>5</sup>For Kingdon, the controversiality of an issue seems to govern the consensus decision mode. See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 231.

<sup>6</sup>Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Analysis and Congress," Public Policy 17 (1969), 61-67.

<sup>7</sup>Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 24-26.

<sup>8</sup>Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and Presidency, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 146.

<sup>9</sup>A decision was coded as "important" if the member felt it was important only to his constituency in general. In other words, segmental salience was coded as "nonimportant." As one member noted on a bill, "This is not important. Only a small population will benefit."

<sup>10</sup>This perception of politically stratified society is in line with the position of Gabriel Almond's, The American People and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1950), p. 139; Cobb and Elder, Participation, pp. 102-08; and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Chapters 13, 14, 19, and 24.

<sup>11</sup>Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1963), pp. 77-94.

<sup>12</sup>Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman (Columbus, Ohio: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 71-79.

<sup>13</sup>Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Job of the Congressman," in Readings on Congress, ed. Raymond E. Wolfinger (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 76-81.

<sup>14</sup> The most impressive work on this topic is Kenneth G. Olson, "The Service Function of the United States Congress," in Congress: The First Branch of Government, ed. Alfred de Grazia (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1966). See especially pp. 343-54.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 347.

<sup>16</sup> For an elaboration of this proposition, see William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 94-94, and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 3rd. ed. (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 88-89.

<sup>17</sup> Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies," American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), p. 887.

<sup>18</sup> Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections and the Decline of Competitive Elections," in Congress Reconsidered, ed. L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 54-79.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Erickson, "The Advantage of Inc incumbency in Congressional Elections," Polity, 3 (1971), 395-405.

<sup>20</sup> Warren L. Kostroski, "Party and Inc incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections," American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 1213-34.

<sup>21</sup> David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," Polity, 6 (1974), 215-317.

<sup>22</sup> Clapp, Congressman, pp. 420-28.

<sup>23</sup> Kingdon, Congressmen's, pp. 41-42.

<sup>24</sup> Robert S. Erickson, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting," American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), p. 1032.

**APPENDIX C**

**CODING OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE INDICATORS**

The use of objective and subjective issue characteristic indicators required elaborate coding procedures. The following shows the coded entries for each of the thirty-one sampled votes. The twenty objective indicators were coded on the basis of date obtained from government publications. The three subjective indicators--newness, specificity, and change--were coded on the basis of this researcher's subjective judgment after interviews with committee staff.

Rule, status, and role of Congress involve multiple responses and their coding is not self-explanatory. Rule was coded as either open (unrestricted amendments), closed (no amendments) or modified open (amendment by committee members and/or amendment by title only). Status was coded as bill, House resolution, amendment, and conference report. Role of Congress was coded as Congress as ratifier, Congress as modifier, and Congress as initiator.

The procedures with which party unity and index of difference scores were computed are detailed in Footnotes #2 and 4 in Appendix D.

"Hot" values for all variables are as follows: rule = closed; rule margin, margin of passage, Democratic unity, Republican unity, committee vote, index of likeness, time frame, and money = below the mean; minority report, CQ box score, CQ story, Washington Post box score, Washington Post story, presidential involvement, Steering and Policy endorsement, Republican Policy endorsement, standing in polls = yes; change = yes; specificity = no; and newness = yes.

## BUDGET I

Rule -- Closed

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Resolution

Margin of Passage -- 21%

Democratic Party Unity -- .38

Republican Party Unity -- .98

Index of Likeness -- .70

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 62%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- 398.1 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

**BULLET II**

Rule -- Closed

Margin of Rule -- 96%

Status -- Resolution

Margin of Passage -- 54%

Democratic Party Unity -- .56

Republican Party Unity -- .90

Index of Likeness -- .27

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$398 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

## ARAB BOYCOTT

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 89%

Democratic Party Unity -- .88

Republican Party Unity -- .60

Index of Likeness -- .86

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$15 million

Time Frame -- N/A

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

CLEAN AIR (DINGELL)

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 65%

Democratic Party Unity -- .12

Republican Party Unity -- .66

Index of Likeness -- .73

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 6 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**COMMON SITUS PICKETING**

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 73%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 49%

Democratic Party Unity -- .36

Republican Party Unity -- .80

Index of Likeness -- .41

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee passage -- 65%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- N/A

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

**COUNTERCYCICAL**

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 72%

Democratic Party Unity -- .70

Republican Party Unity -- .06

Index of Likeness -- .62

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 55%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$2 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 89%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 50%

Democratic Party Unity -- .20

Republican Party Unity -- .38

Index of Likeness -- .71

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 81%

Minority Report -- Yes

### Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- N/A

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## DEHATCHING

Rule — Open

Margin of Rule — 85%

Status — Final passage

Margin of Passage — 60%

Democratic Party Unity — .66

Republican Party Unity — .68

Index of Likeness — .33

Amendment over Committee Objection — Yes

Margin of Committee Passage — 72%

Minority Report — No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score — No

CQ Story — Yes

Washington Post Box Score — Yes

Washington Post Story — Yes

Role of Congress — Initiator

Amount of Money — N/A

Time Frame — N/A

Newness — Yes

Specificity — Yes

Presidential Involvement — Yes

Change — Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement — Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement — Yes

## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 94%

Democratic Party Unity -- .96

Republican Party Unity -- .72

Index of Likeness -- .88

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 95%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 5 years

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

EPA

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 92%

Democratic Party Unity -- .90

Republican Party Unity -- .74

Index of Likeness -- .92

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$313 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## ETHICS

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 64%

Status -- Resolution

Margin of Committee Passage--95%

Democratic Party Unity -- .98

Republican Party Unity -- .74

Index of Likeness -- .88

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Committee Vote -- N/A

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

FMA

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 98%

Democratic Party Unity -- .97

Republican Party Unity -- .98

Index of Likeness -- .98

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$85 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## FOREIGN AID

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 89%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 56%

Democratic Party Unity -- .20

Republican Party Unity -- .76

Index of Likeness -- .52

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$35 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- No

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 95%

Democratic Party Unity -- .92

Republican Party Unity -- .84

Index of Likeness -- .96

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Ratifier

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 3 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**HOUSE ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTEE**

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 70%

Status -- Resolution

Margin of Passage -- 56%

Democratic Party Unity -- .32

Republican Party Unity -- .08

Index of Likeness -- .80

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 70%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

HUD

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 95%

Democratic Party Unity -- .96

Republican Party Unity -- .76

Index of Likeness -- .90

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 91%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- \$14 billion

Time Frame -- 3 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

**HYDE AMENDMENT**

Rule -- No rule

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 56%

Democratic Party Unity -- .14

Republican Party Unity -- .64

Index of Likeness -- .39

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- N/A

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION**

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 94%

Democratic Party Unity -- .86

Republican Party Unity -- .92

Index of Likeness -- .97

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- \$21 million

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

NASA

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 88%

Democratic Party Unity -- .68

Republican Party Unity -- .92

Index of Likeness -- .88

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 93%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- \$4 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

NUCLEAR NAVY

Rule -- No rule

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 61%

Democratic Party Unity -- .46

Republican Party Unity -- .26

Index of Likeness -- .64

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 50%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Ratifier

Amount of Money -- \$81 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**PAY RAISE**

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 67%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 43%

Democratic Party Unity -- .36

Republican Party Unity -- .28

Index of Likeness -- .68

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$30 million

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**PUBLIC WORKS CONFERENCE**

Rule -- No rule

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Conference Report

Margin of Passage -- 81%

Democratic Party Unity -- .92

Republican Party Unity -- .06

Index of Likeness -- .57

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Ratifier

Amount of Money -- \$4 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

## RHODESIAN CHROME

Rule — Open

Margin of Rule — N/A

Status — Final Passage

Margin of Passage — 63%

Democratic Party Unity — .60

Republican Party Unity — .40

Index of Likeness — .49

Amendment over Committee Objection — No

Margin of Committee Passage — 92%

Minority Report — Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score — No

CQ Story — Yes

Washington Post Box Score — Yes

Washington Post Story — Yes

Role of Congress — Modifier

Amount of Money — N/A

Time Frame — N/A

Neatness — No

Specificity — Yes

Presidential Involvement — Yes

Change — Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement — No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement — No

## ROMANIAN EARTHQUAKE

Rule -- Suspension calendar

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 78%

Democratic Party Unity -- .76

Republican Party Unity -- .18

Index of Likeness -- .72

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Ratifier

Amount of Money -- \$20 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## SACCHARIN

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 56%

Democratic Party Unity -- N/A

Republican Party Unity -- N/A

Index of Likeness -- N/A

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- N/A

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**SCHOOL LUNCH**

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 97%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 95%

Democratic Party Unity -- .96

Republican Party Unity -- .78

Index of Likeness -- .91

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 93%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$690 million

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

SNOW REMOVAL

Rule -- No rule

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 31%

Democratic Party Unity -- .26

Republican Party Unity -- .62

Index of Likeness -- .82

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- N/A

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- No

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$20 million

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**STRIP MINING**

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 85%

Status -- Final passage

Margin of Passage -- 79%

Democratic Party Unity -- .70

Republican Party Unity - .32

Index of Likeness -- .81

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 73%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$543 million

Time Frame -- 5 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

SUPPLEMENTAL HOUSING  
(GOLDWATER AMENDMENT)

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- 98%

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 59%

Democratic Party Unity -- .06

Republican Party Unity -- .68

Index of Likeness -- .63

Amendment over Committee Objection -- Yes

Margin of Committee Passage -- 94%

Minority Report -- No

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- No

Washington Post Story -- No

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- \$408 million

Time Frame -- 6 years

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- No

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

## TAX LAW

Rule -- Modified open

Margin of Rule -- 54%

Status -- Final Passage

Margin of Passage -- 68%

Democratic Party Unity -- .74

Republican Party Unity -- .36

Index of Likeness -- .45

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 75%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- Yes

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Modifier

Amount of Money -- \$30 billion

Time Frame -- 2 years

Newness -- Yes

Specificity -- No

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- Yes

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- Yes

**WATER PROJECTS**

Rule -- Open

Margin of Rule -- N/A

Status -- Amendment

Margin of Passage -- 47%

Democratic Party Unity -- .06

Republican Party Unity -- .06

Index of Likeness -- 100

Amendment over Committee Objection -- No

Margin of Committee Passage -- 98%

Minority Report -- Yes

Visibility:

CQ Box Score -- No

CQ Story -- Yes

Washington Post Box Score -- Yes

Washington Post Story -- Yes

Role of Congress -- Initiator

Amount of Money -- \$2.2 billion

Time Frame -- 1 year

Newness -- No

Specificity -- Yes

Presidential Involvement -- Yes

Change -- Yes

Republican Policy Endorsement -- No

Democratic Steering and Policy Endorsement -- No

**APPENDIX D**

**INTERCORRELATIONS OF ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

This appendix describes the procedures through which issue characteristics were intercorrelated in an effort to test the third proposition. The appendix also displays the data resulting from this test.

Tables D.1 through D.6 present the correlations. Exhibited in Table D.1 are intercorrelations of the thirteen perceptual indicators of issue characteristics based on the statistic Phi.<sup>1</sup> Phi is most appropriate here for two reasons. First, it measures bivariate relationships among the kind of data these variables constitute: dichotomous, nominal distributions. Second, it primarily reflects "diagonal" rather than "curvilinear" association--i.e., "yes" responses on one variable are correlated with "yes" on the other.

To prove the validity of proposition 3, the Phi in Table D.1 should be configured in such a way that a) answers "yes" to the presumed low profile questions of complexity, technicality, and routineness are highly intercorrelated, b) the answers to the high profile questions are highly intercorrelated, and c) complexity, technicality and routineness are inversely related to the "hot" characteristics. It should be emphasized that routineness was coded as "routine" and "nonroutine" and matched diagonally in a presumed hot/low profile direction. Thus, correlations were run with routine against "yes" on complex and technical and non-routine with "yes" on salience.

Table D.2 presents the intercorrelations among objective indicators based on a variety of coefficients. Because of the advantage of using a higher level statistic whenever possible, relationships among data in interval form (e.g.: the margin of the rules adoption, the margin of a bill's passage, the unity of the Democratic Party,<sup>2</sup> the unity of the Republican

Party,<sup>3</sup> the Index of Likeness,<sup>4</sup> the margin of a bill's passage in committee, the time frame in years encompassed by a bill, and the amount of money involved] were measured with Pearson's ( $r$ ) product moment coefficient of correlation. Association among dichotomous, nominal variables, as in the case of perceptual indicators, were tapped with Phi. When comparing interval level scores with nominal scores, interval level variables were reduced to nominal data through mean-based dichotomization. In associating these dichotomizations with nominal variables, Phi was also used. There were two exceptions. First, type of rule was coded according to the trichotomous distinction used in Congress: closed (no amendments allowed), modified open (only committee members can offer amendments or only entire sections, not provisions, can be substituted), and open (no restrictions on source or object of amendment). Secondly, margin of passage was coded into three values: defeated (0-49% of the vote), close (50% to 68% of the vote), and comfortable (69% plus). For correlations involving these trichotomizations matched with dichotomizations, the statistic Gamma was used. Gamma was preferred over other coefficients because it does measure, in a -1.00 to +1.00 scale, relationships among trichotomized data.<sup>5</sup> Its only drawback, for our purposes, is that it is sensitive to curvilinear association and thus the association it does measure may be exaggerated. In sum, Table D.2 is comprised of three different, but appropriate, correlations coefficients.

The expectation was that if the third proposition is valid there will be strong intercorrelations among the objective indicators (in D.2). The conditional approach posits the notion that there are both "hot" and "low profile" decision tracks or decision arenas. If they are correct, a degree of high visibility in an issue should be associated with high levels of

political heat. An issue covered in CQ and the Washington Post and followed in their respective "box scores" and listed in polls as a major problem should be associated with political activity on the part of political parties in Congress, and the Presidency. Also, it should involve a close vote, rule adoption, and final passage margin, and a lot of money, and cover an extended time period.

Categorizations of variables were correlated in such a way that the coefficients were assessing the relationships among the values presumed to be "hot" for each variable. For example, a closed rule was presumed to be related to low margin of passage, closeness of passage was presumed to be related to visibility in the Washington Post, low party unity on close votes, etc. Thus, coefficients should be in the positive direction if proposition 3 is correct. Exceptions were correlations among interval level scores which were computed linearly. These must be interpreted individually.

Correlations in Tables D.3 to D.6 were based on Phi and Gamma. Correlations were computed in the same manner as those in Tables D.1 and D.2. For each indicator, responses to the presumed hot category were matched against the presumed hot category for all other indicators.

## NOTES: APPENDIX D

<sup>1</sup>For a good discussion of Phi, see Norman Nie et al., SPSS, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 224.

<sup>2</sup>To measure party unity the Rice Index of Cohesion was used. This is computed by subtracting the percent against a bill (or those in a minority position) from the percent for a bill (or those in a majority position). The higher the cohesion the higher the index. See Lee F. Anderson, Meredith H. Watts, Jr. and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern, 1966), p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The Index of Party Likeness (or "Difference" as it is commonly called) is computed by ". . . calculating the percentage of members of each group that voted in favor of the measure, subtracting the smaller percentage from the larger, and subtracting the remainder that operation produces from 100." Thus the higher the index the more the likeness, while the lower the Index the more the difference, Anderson, et.al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup>For more information about Gamma see Nie, SPSS, p. 228.

**Table D.1**  
**Intercorrelations of "Perceptual" Issue Characteristics**  
**As Measured by Phi Coefficients**

	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Saltence</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Salience</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>Complex</u>
<u>Complex</u>	—											
<u>Technical</u>	.77	—										
<u>Conflict</u>	.24	.19	—									
<u>Major</u>	.21	.18	.30	—								
<u>Saltence</u>	.21	.16	.19	.39	—							
<u>Aware</u>	.05	.00	.27	.13	.20	—						
<u>Mail</u>	.07	.00	.19	.05	.21	.32	—					
<u>Renomination</u>	.01	.02	.17	.24	.25	.33	.31	—				
<u>Reelection</u>	.01	.01	.18	.22	.55	.36	.30		—			
<u>Routine</u>	-.24	-.10	.26	.14	.19	.18	.23			—		
<u>Feeling</u>	.04	.07	.14	.14	.18	.20	.20				—	
<u>Tough</u>	.19	.10	.31	.06	.03	.17	.14					—
<u>Thought</u>	.31	.18	.21	.12	.17	.42	.31					

Table D.1-Continued

	<u>Renomination</u>	<u>Reelection</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>Thought</u>
Complex	-	-	-	-	-	-
Technical	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conflict	-	-	-	-	-	-
Major	-	-	-	-	-	-
Salience	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aware	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nail	-	-	-	-	-	-
Renomination						
Reelection	.95					
Routine	.16	.21				
Feeling	.27	.29	.18			
Tough	.22	.25	.28	.13		
Thought	.38	.42	.36	.22	.42	

Table D.2

Intercorrelations of "Objective" Issue Characteristics as  
Measured by Correlation Coefficients Along Diagonals  
of Values Presumed to be "Hot"

<u>Rule</u>	<u>Rule Margin</u>	<u>Margin of Passage</u>	<u>Margin of Democratic Unity</u>	<u>Republican Unity</u>	<u>Index of Likeness</u>	<u>Amendment over Committee</u>
—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Rule Margin	.53*	—	—	—	—	—
Margin of Passage	.36*	.12x	—	—	—	—
Democratic Unity	.47*	-.05x	.82x	—	—	—
Republican Unity	-.63*	.39x	.15x	.13x	—	—
Index of Difference	.24*	.11x	.48x	.35x	.18x	—
Amendment over Committee	.18*	-.14	.00*	.03	-.62	-.16
Committee Vote	-.29*	.39x	.56x	.37x	.29x	.57x
Minority Report	-.06*	-.02	.08*	.14	.17	.23
CQ Box Score	-.16*	.25	-.51*	-.22	-.20	-.34
CQ Story	-.30*	.23	.62*	.25	.11	.13
Washington Post Box Score	-.17*	.34	.23*	-.01	-.07	-.02
Washington Post Story	-.31*	.26	.74*	.19	.04	.01
Time Frame	-.74*	.46x	.12x	-.13x	.15x	.03x

Table D.2--Continued

<u>Committee Vote</u>	<u>Minority Report</u>	<u>CQ Box Score</u>	<u>CQ Story</u>	<u>Washington Post Box Score</u>	<u>Washington Post Story</u>
Rule					
Rule Margin					
Margin of Passage					
Democratic Unity					
Republican Unity					
Index of Likeness					
Amendment over Committee Committee Vote					
Minority Report	.14				
CQ Box Score	.04	.27			
CQ Story	.31	.36	.12		
Washington Post Box Score	.02	.25	.30	.39	
Washington Post Story	.20	.30	.35	.85	.88
Time Frame	.19x	.24	.31	.26	.09
					.50

Table D.2--Continued

	<u>Presidential Involvement</u>	<u>Steering and Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Republican Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Polls</u>
<u>Money</u>	-.22*	-.56	.48*	.54*
<u>Rule</u>	.24x	.08	.23	.36*
<u>Rule Margin</u>	-.46x	-.55*	.11*	-.07
<u>Margin of Passage</u>	-.17x	-.46	.00	-.12*
<u>Democratic Unity</u>	.41x	.34	-.23	-.04
<u>Republican Unity</u>	-.37x	-.23	.02	.05
<u>Index of Likeness</u>	.16	-.41	.15	.35
<u>Amendment over Committee</u>	-.38x	.25	.31	.00
<u>Committee Vote</u>	.49	-.17	.44	.18
<u>Minority Report</u>	.14	.22	.60	.48
<u>CQ Box Score</u>	.45	-.12	.30	.06
<u>CQ Story</u>	.56	.34	.33	.10
<u>Washington Post Box Score</u>	.27	-.05	.35	.15
<u>Washington Post Story</u>	-.06x	.31	.25	.00
<u>Time Frame</u>				-.22

Table D.2--Continued

	<u>Presidential Involvement</u>	<u>Steering and Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Republican Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Polls</u>
<u>Money</u>	—	—	—	—
<b>Presidential Involvement</b>	.34	—	—	—
<b>Steering and Policy Endorsement</b>	.34	.21	—	—
<b>Republican Policy Endorsement</b>	.39	.13	.55	—
<b>Polls</b>	.23	-.36	.31	.29

\* = Gamma Coefficients

x = Pearsonian r

Unmarked = Phi

a "Hot" values for each variable are as follows: Rule = closed; Rule Margin, Margin of Passage, Democratic Unity, Republican Unity, Committee Vote, Index of Likeness, Ties Frame, and Money = below the mean; Minority Report, CQ Box Score, CQ Story, Washington Post Box Score, Washington Post Story. Presidential Involvement, Steering and Policy Endorsement, Republican Policy Endorsement and Standing in Polls = yes.

Table D.3  
Intercorrelations of "Subjective" Issue Characteristics  
As Measured by Phi Coefficients

	<u>Newness</u>	<u>Specificity</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>Newness</u>	—	—	—
<u>Specificity</u>	.08	—	—
<u>Change</u>	.28	.05	—

**Table D.4**  
**Intercorrelations Between "Perceptual" and "Subjective"  
 Issue Characteristics as Measured by Phi Coefficients**

	<u>Newness</u>	<u>Specificity*</u>	<u>Change</u>
Complex	.03	-.06	-.07
Technical	-.03	-.03	-.05
Conflict	-.03	-.05	.12
Major	-.03	-.06	.02
Salience	.01	.10	-.05
Aware	-.02	-.17	-.06
Mail	.16	.08	.18
Renationalization	.01	-.06	.02
Reelection	.00	-.07	.00
Routine	.07	-.02	.02
Feeling	.00	.03	.06
Tough	-.15	-.17	.13
Thought	-.15	-.14	.21

\*"Non-specificity" is considered "hot." Correlations here are in the diagonal direction of "hot."

Table D.5

**Intercorrelations Between "Objective" and  
"Subjective" Issue Characteristics as  
Measured by Phi Coefficients**

	<u>Newness</u>	<u>Specificity</u>	<u>Change</u>
Rule	.20*	.67*	.00*
Rule Margin	.16	.18	.07
Margin of Passage	-.49*	-.34*	.11*
Democratic Unity	-.47	-.15	-.05
Republican Unity	-.17	-.15	-.15
Index of Likeness	-.11	-.10	-.04
Amendment over Committee	.11	.03	.16
Committee Vote	-.04	.25	.05
Minority Report	-.02	.09	.29
<u>CQ Box Score</u>	-.23	.30	.51
<u>CQ Story</u>	.07	.23	.31
<u>Washington Post Box</u>	-.03	.00	.27
<u>Washington Post Story</u>	.00	-.25	.45
Time Frame	-.08	-.09	.17
Money	.20	-.04	.26
Presidential Involvement	.21	.11	-.13
Steering and Policy Endorsement	.40	.34	.43
Republican Policy Endorsement	.25	.34	.08
Polls	.13	.03	.02

\* = Gamma Coefficient

Unmarked = Phi

Table D.6  
Intercorrelations of "Perceptual" and  
"Objective" Issue Characteristics

	<u>Margin of Passage</u>	<u>Margin of Rule</u>	<u>Democratic Unity</u>	<u>Republican Unity</u>	<u>Index of Likeness</u>	<u>Amendment over Committee</u>	<u>Committee Vote</u>
Complex	-.03*	.21	.11*	.06	.10	.14	-.15
Technical	.03*	.21	.16*	.05	.03	.07	-.05
Conflict	.01*	.22	.53*	.30	.09	.07	.05
Major	.04*	.04	.15*	.15	.15	.21	.03
Salience	.44*	.02	.01*	.01	.14	.02	.16
Aware	.10*	.38	.40*	.11	.16	.08	.07
Mail	.31*	.14	.59*	.09	.17	.10	.22
Renomination	.29*	.16	.29*	.07	.03	.08	.01
Reelection	.33*	.17	.36*	.10	.03	.11	.01
Routine	.20*	.14	.29*	.10	-.05	-.01	-.14
Feeling	.28*	.12	.30*	.13	-.03	.11	.05
Tough	.16*	.21	.69*	.40	.10	.05	.01
Thought	.21*	-.04	.04*	.21	.02	.02	.08

Table D.6--Continued

	<u>Minority Report</u>	<u>CQ Box Score</u>	<u>CQ Story</u>	<u>Washington Post Box</u>	<u>Washington Post Story</u>	<u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Money</u>
Complex	-.18	-.10	.02	-.10	-.05	-.12	-.14
Technical	-.15	-.09	.03	.01	.01	-.08	-.06
Conflict	.20	.08	.28	.32	.34	.03	.18
Major	.39	.06	.22	.27	.17	.24	.36
Salience	.23	.06	.11	.15	.02	-.11	.26
Aware	-.06	-.16	.15	.10	.09	-.05	.13
Mail	-.03	-.01	.17	.10	.18	.12	.14
Renomination	.09	-.07	.11	.16	.15	.01	.12
Relection	.09	-.09	.12	.17	.15	.01	.12
Routine	-.09	.03	-.12	-.19	-.09	-.03	-.19
Feeling	-.01	-.10	.21	.03	.17	.06	.08
Tough	.08	.03	.16	.25	.18	.05	.10
Thought	.29	-.07	.31	.14	.24	.22	.24

Table D.6--Continued

<u>Presidental Involvement</u>	<u>Steering and Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Republican Policy Endorsement</u>	<u>Polls</u>
Complex	-.13	-.18	-.09
Technical	-.12	-.14	-.09
Conflict	.16	.26	.08
Major	.33	.34	.28
Salience	.10	.22	.21
Aware	.10	-.15	.04
Mail	.00	.15	.15
Renomination	.07	.02	.16
Reelection	.07	.00	.15
Routine	.04	.16	.14
Feeling	-.03	.09	.12
Tough	.06	.03	.11
Thought	N/A	.18	.07

\* = Gamma Coefficient

Unmarked = Phi

**APPENDIX E**

**CONGRESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARRAYED  
BY ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

**(Abbreviations appearing in these tables  
are explained in Table 3.6, Chapter III)**

Table E.1

Congressional Communications Arrayed by Perceptual Indicators of Issue Characteristics:  
The Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Actors under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Not Complex</u>	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Not Technical</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>No Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Not Major</u>	<u>Major</u>
Committee Chairman	19%	24%	18%	26%	20%	21%	16%	17%
Ranking Minority Committee Members	4	2	4	2	1	5	1	4
State Delegation	(30)	(48)*	(33)	(43)*	(29)	(44)	36	44
Party Leader	16	11	16	10	(7)	(20)	9	18
Other Congressmen	37	39	38	35	(27)	(46)	(33)	44
Committee Staff	5	5	5	5	6	5	0	7
Personal Staff	(35)	(58)*	(36)	(54)	38	47*	39	47
Individual Constituents	38	39	41	35	(25)	(50)*	39	46
Inspired Mail	9	7	10	6	6	11	7	8
Group Constituents	(18)	(41)*	(19)	(39)*	(17)	(34)	(25)	37
Private Groups	(16)	(33)*	19	28*	(14)	(30)	20	26
Public Interest Groups	5	7	5	7	3	8	3	6
Public Groups	2	4	2	4	3	3	1	5
Bureaucrats	3	4	3	4	4	3	0	1
White House	13	17	12	18	12	16	12	11
The Media	19	15	19	17	15	20	10	15

Table E.1--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Not Salient</u>	<u>Salient</u>	<u>Constituency Not Aware</u>	<u>Constituency Aware</u>	<u>No Mail</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>No Re-election Effects</u>	<u>Re-election Effects</u>	<u>No Re-election Effects</u>	<u>Re-election Effects</u>
Committee Chairman	22*	20*	(24)	13(X)	20*	20*	22*	16*	(23)	13(X)
Ranking Minority Committee Member	3	3	3	0	3	2	4	2	4	1
State Delegation	28	36	(25)	43)	(36	48)	38	37	38	37
Party Leader	15	13	(9)	20)	12	17	(11	22)	(11	23)
Other Congressmen	34	40	(29)	50)	(35	48)	(34	50)	(34	50)
Committee Staff	5	6	6	6	6	2	4	8	4	8
Personal Staff	39	47	45	43	41	48	43	43	43	41
Individual Constituents	(29	46)	(18	65)	(30	85)	(32	57)	(32	58)
Inspired Mail	6	10	6	13	(13	43)	7	15	7	14
Group Constituents	(12	39)	(22	36)	(23	46)	(21	40)	(21	40)
Private Groups	(13	31)	(18	30)	(18	57)	(18	38)	(17	40)
Public Interest Groups	4	7	4	4	5	4	5	7	5	7
Public Groups	1	4	3	2	2	7	3	2	3	2
Bureaucrats	4	3	0	1	3	4	3	2	3	2
White House	16	12	9	13	15	6	14	16	15	14
Media	17	19	(8	19)	16	22	16	22	17	20

Table E.1--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>Not Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
Committee Chairmen	20*	20*	19*	17*	16*	(19*	36x)
Ranking Minority	3	3	2	2	4	2	0
Committee Members	(33)	(47)	41	38	(39)	36	38
State Delegation	(26)	(54)*	32	31	(28)	38*	(17)
Party Leader	13	16	(6	29)*	13	17	49)*
Other Congressmen	(34)	(44)	37	40	(34)	33)	13
Committee Staff	6	5	4	4	6	0	35)
Personal Staff	43	43	(50)	(38)	41	49	(45)
Individual Constituents	(31)	(52)*	(27)	(51)*	(39)	55)	(19)
Inspired Mail	5	14/	6	12	8	17/	5)
Group Constituents	23	34/	30	26	(28)	49)*	(19)
Private Groups	(16)	(37)*	20	27	(24)	40)	(10)
Public Interest Groups	4	8	3	4	3	11	4
Public Groups	2	4	2	4	4	2	3
Bureaucrats	4	3	1	1	2	4	0
White House	15	11	11	12	10	19/	(4
Media	15	23	14	16	13	21	15
							22

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater.

/Figures in brackets noted with a period indicate a variation of twenty percent or more.

/Figures checked indicate a variation of nine percent.

Table E.2

Congressional Communications Arrayed by Objective Indicators of Issue Characteristics;  
The Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Actors under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Type of Rule</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Rule Margin</u>	<u>Defeated</u>	<u>Margin of Passage</u>	<u>Close</u>	<u>Uncomfortable</u>
Committee Chairman	(22%)	16%	37%	23%	19%	13%	18%	24%)*		
Ranking Minority	3	3	10	6	2	4	2	3		
Committee Members	(39)	37	63)*	36	36	39	33	32		
State Delegate	(26)	36	47)*	(56)	25)*	(51)	31	22)*		
Party Leader	(3)	22	47)*	(44)	7)*	(39)	7	8)*		
Other Congressmen	(34)	45	37)	(59)	31)*	(63)	36	24)*		
Committee Staff	7	4	0	9	4	1	4	8		
Personal Staff	(43)	41	68)*	42	42	45	41	42		
Individual Constituents	(36)	47	5)*	(60)	31)*	(52)	41	27)*		
Inspired Mail	6	10	5	(17)	6)	13	12	2)		
Group Constituents	(26)	29	5)*	19	27	27	27	24		
Private Groups	(26)	22	10)	25	21	(20)	30	15)		
Public Interest Groups	3	10	5	(14)	3)	4	4	7		
Public Groups	5	1	0	0	3	0	2	4		
Bureaucrats	3	3	0	2	4	1	6	2		
White House	(22)	5	0)*	9	15	(21)	15	10)		
Media	(14)	21	10)	(33)	14)	18	20	15		

Table E.2--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Margin of Committee Vote Below Average</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Minority Report No.</u>	<u>CQ Visibility No. Box Score</u>	<u>No. Story Box Score</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>
			<u>Minority Report Yes</u>	<u>CQ Visibility Yes Box Score</u>	<u>No. Story Box Score</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>
Committee Chairman	26%	17%	17%	22%	(14)	36%	(12)	22%	
Ranking Minority	6	2	1	5	2	6	1	3	
Committee Members	36	35	35	38	36	37	29	37	
State Delegation	(39)	27	(22)	(38)	29	35	(12)	(35)	
Party Leader	15	13	12	14	13	14	{ 3	{ 16	
Other Congressmen	(28)	39	37	37	38	30	49	40	/
Committee Staff	8	4	5	6	5	5	7	5	
Personal Staff	(53)	36	(30)	(52)	41	43	(32)	(44)	
Individual Constituents	36	38	30	37	34	43	(20)	(40)	
Inspired Mail	(15)	5	6	9	7	12	4	9	
Group Constituents	21	25	(15)	(35)	24	29	18	27	/
Private Groups	(30)	18	(15)	(29)	(16)	37	18	22	
Public Interest Groups	3	7	0	9	(2	15)	0	6	
Bureaucrats	6	1	3	2	3	2	0	3	
White House	16	13	11	17	12	19	{ 1	{ 17	
Media	17	18	16	19	(14	26	{ 7	{ 19	

Table E.2--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Visibility in Washington Post (WP)</u>				<u>Congressional Policy Role</u>			<u>Policy Time</u>		
	<u>No WP Box Score</u>	<u>Yes WP Box Score</u>	<u>No WP Story</u>	<u>Yes WP Story</u>	<u>Initiate</u>	<u>Modify</u>	<u>Satisfy</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Time</u>
Committee Chairman	16%	22%	13%	20%	(18)	17%	38X)*	17%	24%	
Ranking Minority	0	5	0	4	3	5	0	3	3	
Committee Members	(26)	(41)	29	38/	(38)	42	14)*	39	31	
State Delegate	(19)	(37)	(15)	35)*	(34)	21	29)	32	29	
Party Leader	(5)	(17)	(2)	17)	(16)	5	12)	(19)	5)	
Other Congressmen	(27)	(41)	(21)	40)	(42)	27	19)*	(41)	29)	
Committee Staff	4	6	6	5	4	7	7	6	3	
Personal Staff	(34)	(46)	36	43	(44)	43	29)	43	39	
Individual Constituents	(29)	(41)	(22)	41)	(42)	31	19)	32	43/	
Inspired Mail	3	11	2	10	10	2	5	(4	14)	
Group Constituents	(17)	(30)	21	27	(28)	25	12)	(18	36)	
Private Groups	(14)	(26)	(12)	24)	(24)	28	0)*	(10	38)*	
Public Interest Groups	2	7	0	7	8	0	0	6	5	
Public Groups	2	3	1	3	3	2	2	1	4	
Bureaucrats	5	3	2	4	2	5	9	4	3	
White House	10	16	(2	17)	(8	20	38)*	13	15	
Media	11	20/	(7	20)	(15	17	31)	16	19	

Table E.2--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>				<u>Index of Likeness</u>			
	<u>Above Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Democratic Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Republican Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Republican Unity</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>
Committee Chairman	20%	20%	17%	22%	23%	16%	23%	23%
Ranking Minority	2	4	2	3	4	4	2	2
Committee Members	40	33	33	38	(30)	(30)	41)	41)
State Delegate	(38)	25)	(40)	25)	(38)	(38)	24)	24)
Party Leader	(21)	8)	(18)	90)	(23)	(23)	5)	5)
Other Congressmen	(46)	(28)	(43)	31)	36	36	35	35
Committee Staff	2	8	7	4	4	4	6	6
Personal Staff	41	42	47	38	43	40	40	40
Individual Constituents	40	34	41	34	39	39	35	35
Inspired Mail	11	6	3	11	(14	(14	3)	3)
Group Constituents	29	23	20	29/	23	25	27	27
Private Groups	25	19	18	25	25	19	19	19
Public Interest Groups	5	5	6	4	1	1	9	9
Public Groups	0	4	2	3	3	3	8	8
Bureaucrats	3	3	6	2	-5	-5	2	2
White House	15	13	(25	7)	14	14	14	14
Media	16	18	21	15	18	18	16	16

Table E.2--Continued

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u>				<u>Party Endorsements</u>				<u>Mention in Polls</u>				<u>Amount of Money</u>				<u>Presidential Involvement</u>			
	<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>		
	(81)	(19)	(15)	(32)	(18)	(27)	(21)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(22)	(22)	(0)	(0)	(22)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Committee Chairman	(81)	(19)	(15)	(32)	(18)	(27)	(21)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(22)	(22)	(0)	(0)	(22)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Ranking Minority	3	3	1	8	1	8	2	6	1	4	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0		
Committee Members	(26)	(46)	33	42	36	37	(34)	(44)	(27)	(41)	(42)	(41)	(42)	(31)	(31)	(31)	(31)	(31)		
State Delegation	(36)	(26)	(25)	(44)	(25)	(47)	(29)	(36)	(21)	(36)	(36)	(36)	(36)	(31)	(31)	(31)	(31)	(31)		
Party Leader	(19)	(7)	(90)	(20)	9	6	12	19	17	11	(17)	(17)	(17)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)		
Other Congressmen	40	32	37	33	35	37	(38)	(28)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)		
Committee Staff	5	5	6	4	4	4	4	4	10	2	7	7	0	0	6	6	6	6		
Personal Staff	45	38	(39)	(49)	(39)	(51)	(37)	(58)	(29)	(49)	(49)	(49)	(49)	(44)	(44)	(44)	(44)	(44)		
Individual Constituents	34	40	35	40	37	37	(42)	(19)	31	40	40	40	40	(36)	(36)	(36)	(36)	(36)		
Inspired Mail	(3)	(13)	(4)	(16)	(4)	(20)	9	3	2	11	0	0	0	6	6	6	6	6		
Group Constituents	21	30	24	29	23	31	26	23	(13)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(32)	(23)	(23)	(23)	(23)	(23)		
Private Groups	(14)	(30)	(15)	(35)	29	29	(25)	(13)	16	25	(25)	(25)	(25)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)		
Public Interest Groups	8	2	(1)	(15)	4	10	6	1	3	6	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	4		
Public Groups	3	2	2	4	2	4	2	4	2	3	2	3	2	5	5	5	5	5		
Bureaucrats	5	2	4	1	4	1	4	1	4	1	4	1	4	0	0	0	0	0		
White House	(23)	(5)	15	12	15	10	13	15	9	16	16	16	16	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)		
Media	21	13	15	23	16	21	18	14	(11)	(80)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(22)	(22)	(22)	(22)	(22)		

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater

/Figures in brackets noted with a period indicate a variation of twenty percent or more

/Figures checked indicate a variation of nine percent.

Table E.3

Congressional Communications Arrayed by Subjective Indicators of Issue Characteristics:  
The Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Actors under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Actor</u>	<u>Not New</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>Not Specific</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Change</u>
Committee Chairman	21%	19%	17%	25%	(13%)	24%*
Ranking Minority	2	6	2	6	1	4
Committee Members	36	37	36	36	36	36
State Delegate	30	33	31	29	28	32
Party Leader	14	12	11	17	15	12
Other Congressmen	36	33	39	30/	36	35
Committee Staff	5	6	5	5	9	3
Personal Staff	43	39	(38)	48)	41	42
Individual Constituents	35	43	38	35	(28	(42)
Inspirec Mail	7	12	7	5	3	11
Group Constituents	(28	15)	(31	15)	28	24
Private Groups	(23	81)	(17	30)	(12	28)
Public Interest Groups	4	9	3	9	1	8
Public Groups	2	4	3	1	3	2
Bureaucrats	4	1	4	2	1	4
White House	14	14	(18	6)	(1	22)
Media	15	23	18	16	(9	22)

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater

/Figures in brackets noted with a period indicate a variation of twenty percent or more

/Figures checked indicate a variation of nine percent

**APPENDIX F**

**INFORMATION SOURCE IS ARRANGED BY  
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

Table F.1

Information Sources by Perceptual Indicators: The Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Sources under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Source</u>	<u>Not Complex</u>	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Not Technical</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>No Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Not Major</u>	<u>Major</u>
Committee Chairman	4%	7%	3%	8%	3%	7	0%	5%
Committee Members	(10)	(20)*	(10)	(20)	12	15	16	13
State Delegation	4	5	2	7	3	5	3	6
Party Leader	5	3	7	2	1	7	1	3
Whip Notice	22	26	23	24	25	21	26	28
Debate	20	17	18	21	20	18	17	21
Committee Report	12	20	12	21	16	14	19	18
Other Member	10	10	9	11	11	9	12	10
Personal Staff	(28)	(43)	31	39	33	34	42	35
Constituents	6	6	7	4	3	7	10	7
Interest Groups	5	6	5	5	3	7	7	6
Media/Reading	18	14	19	13	13	20	28	19
DSG	(25)	(39)	(25)	(39)	26	33	32	35
Personal Experience	6	5	6	5	3	8	4	8
Dear Colleague	4	8	5	7	5	6	10	6
Last Time						9	6	11

**Table F.1--Continued**

<u>Source</u>	<u>Not Salient</u>	<u>Salient</u>	<u>Constituency Not Aware</u>	<u>Constituency Aware</u>	<u>No Mail</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>No Re-election Effects</u>	<u>Re-election Effects</u>	<u>Romantic nation Effects</u>	<u>No Romantic nation Effects</u>
Committee Chairman	6%	4%	4%	3%	5%	2%	1%	0%	6%	8%
Committee Members	15	13	15	12	14	9	15	15	8	8
State Delegation	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	4	6	6
Party Leader	4	5	3	3	4	4	6	4	5	5
Whip Notice	18	27 <sup>/</sup>	29	20 <sup>/</sup>	24	22	(27)	16 <sup>/</sup>	26	17 <sup>/</sup>
Debate	21	17	19	15	18	17	21	12 <sup>/</sup>	20	13
Committee Report	12	16	18	13	14	17	16	13	16	13
Other Member	9	11	14	7	10	7	9	11	10	10
Personal Staff	34	34	37	28 <sup>/</sup>	33	39	35	31	35	32
Constituents	3	9	(1)	13)	(3)	20)	6	5	6	5
Interest Groups	2	8	5	6	4	9	6	4	6	4
Media/Reading	17	15	(10	26)	(14	35)	16	20	15	20
DSG	34	26	(35	24)	29	37 <sup>/</sup>	33	24 <sup>/</sup>	33	24 <sup>/</sup>
Personal Experience	4	7	4	7	4	13 <sup>/</sup>	4	10	4	10
Dear Colleague	7	4	8	5	5	7	5	7	6	6
Last	6	11	8	9	8	11	7	7	8	13

Table F.1--Continued

<u>Source</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>No Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
Committee Chairman	5%	4%	1%	5%	4%	0%	6%	5%	5%
Committee Members	14	12	15	10	14	9	17	8	
State Delegation	4	4	5	3	4	4	0	5	
Party Leader	5	4	3	2	3	2	2	0	
Whip Notice	23	23	26	23	25	19	19	19	
Debate	(23)	(13)	21	15	19	13	21	19	
Committee Report	13	20	17	15	15	19	9	16	
Other Member	10	9	12	7	7	7	11	14	
Personal Staff	33	36	(44)	25)	36	40	(36	46)	
Constituents	4	8	6	7	7	8	(0	11)	
Interest Groups	5	6	5	7	5	9	2	3	
Media/Reading	13	22	16	21	17	26	9	5	
DSG	29	32	31	28	(29	49)	32	41	
Personal Experience	5	5	5	7	7	8	0	3	
Dear Colleague	6	3	7	4	7	6	4	3	
Last Time		7	8	11	9	13	9	16	

\*Figures in brackets show variation of ten percent or greater  
 () = Twenty percent variation or greater  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table F.2

Information Sources by Objective Indicators: The Percentage of Interviews in which  
Members Mentioned Different Sources under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Type of Rule</u>			<u>Rule Margin</u>			<u>Margin of Passage</u>		
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Defeated</u>	<u>Close</u>	<u>Comfortable</u>	
Committee Chairman	3%	6%	11%	9%	4%	4%	3%	3%	7%
Committee Members	16	12	21/	13	13	8	16	14	
State Delegation	4	4	5	5	4	3	3	3	5
Party Leader	(3	4	16)*	9	3	6	4	3	
Whip Notice	(24	16	57)	(14	24)	22	24	21	
Debate	21	9	21	(3	21)	19	22	14	
Committee Report	16	13	21	9	16	9	15	17	
Other Member	11	8	5	2	11/	10	14	5	
Personal Staff	(38	35	26)	(19	36)	31	31	35	
Constituents	4	8	0	5	5	6	7	4	
Interest Groups	5	7	0	5	5	3	5	5	
Media/Reading	(16	19	0)	20	16	(22	18	11)	
DSG	27	30	32	22	30	29	32	26	
Personal Experience	7	4	0	8	5	8	7	3	
Dear Colleague	5	5	11	0	6	6	10	1	
Last Time			7	5	6	5	12	6	

Table F.2--Continued

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Margin of Committee Vote</u>	<u>Minority Report</u>	<u>Co-Visibility</u>		<u>Yes Story</u>	
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Box Score</u>	<u>Box Score</u>
Committee Chairman	4%	6%	3%	7%	3%	10%
Committee Members	13	13	13	13	12	16
State Delegation	2	5	2	6	4	3
Party Leader	7	3	3	6	3	7
Whip Notice	27	21	17	26 <sup>1</sup>	22	24
Debate	19	18	20	17	19	15
Committee Report	15	14	13	16	12	10
Other Member	7	11	9	10	9	12
Personal Staff	33	33	29	36	35	29
Constituents	2	7	7	4	5	6
Interest Groups	5	5	6	4	2	11 <sup>1</sup>
Media/Reading	(7)	20 <sup>1</sup> )	18	15	16	17
DSG	28	29	(22)	35 <sup>1</sup> )	27	33
Personal Experience	6	5	4	6	6	4
Dear Colleague	6	5	5	6	6	3
Last Time	13	6	(3)	13 <sup>1</sup> )	7	10

Table F.2--Continued

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>			<u>Index of Likeness</u>		
	<u>Below Democratic Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Democratic Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Republican Unity</u>	<u>Above Republican Unity</u>	<u>Below Average of Likeness</u>	<u>Above Average of Likeness</u>
Committee Chairman	41	51	4%	5%	3%	6%
Committee Members	10	15	15	12	11	15
State Delegation	3	4	4	4	4	4
Party Leader	5	4	4	4	4	4
Whip Notice	25	21	22	23	26	20
Debate	22	15	12	22	21	15
Committee Report	13	16	9	18 <sup>1</sup>	11	13
Other Members	14	6	10	9	9	10
Personal Staff	31	35	30	35	33	33
Constituents	5	6	3	7	3	7
Interest Groups	3	6	1	7	2	7
Media/Reading	16	16	17	15	13	19
DSG	34	25 <sup>1</sup>	28	29	29	29
Personal Experience	7	4	5	5	8	3
Dear Colleague	9	2	4	6	6	5
Last Time	10	7	10	7	11	5

Table F.2--Continued

Sources	Visibility in Washington Post (WP)			Congressional Policy Role			Policy Time		
	No WP Box Score	Yes WP Box Score	No WP Story	Yes WP Story	Initiate	Modify	Ratify	Below Average	Above Average
Committee Chairman	4%	5%	4%	5%	5%	3%	7%	6%	3%
Committee Members	10	15	14	13	(12)	20	7)	14	12
State Delegation	1	6	2	4	5	4	0	4	3
Party Leader	3	5	1	5	5	4	2	5	3
Whip Notice	21	23	25	22	22	25	21	20	26
Debate	21	16	20	17	16	25	19	(14)	24)
Committee Report	13	15	18	13	12	21	14)	(13)	20)
Other Members	10	9	6	11	8	10	14	8	12
Personal Staff	28	36	32	33	(33)	44	12)	33	33
Constituents	6	5	1	7	7	4	0	6	4
Interest Groups	4	5	2	5	6	5	0	4	6
Media/Reading	13	17	(6	19)	17	15	12	17	14
DSG	27	30	29	29	30	25	31	26	33
Personal Experience	2	7	1	7	6	6	0	4	8
Dear Colleague	7	4	4	4	6	6	3	5	5
Last Time	9	8	7	8	11	4	0/	(2	16)

Table F.2--Continued

Sources	Amendment over Committee Objection	Party Endorsements				Mention in Polls				Amount of Money				Presidential Involvement			
		No		Yes		No		Yes		Below Average		Average		Above Average		No	
		No	Dem.	No	Rep.	No	Dem.	No	Rep.	No	5%	10%	No	3%	6%	0%	4%
Committee Chairman	7x	2x	2x	2x	10%	3x	10%	5x	4%	3x	6%	3x	6%	0%	0%	4%	
Committee Members	12	14	12	16	14	11	12	15	13	13	13	13	8	8	13		
State Delegate	6	2	4	4	3	6	4	4	4	2	5	0	0	0	0	3	
Party Leader	5	3	2	9	3	9	4	4	5	3	5	0	0	0	0	3	
Whip Notice	21	24	(19)	29	21	26	(19)	33	21	23	17	26					
Debate	14	22	18	19	18	18	17	21	18	18	18	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)	19	
Committee Report	(9)	20	12	20	12	21	13	19	12	16	17	17	13				
Other Members	9	10	10	8	(12)	2	11	4	10	9	0	0	1				
Personal Staff	29	37	34	31	34	30	32	37	31	34	(50)	(33)					
Constituents	4	7	5	5	6	2	6	4	4	6	0	4					
Interest Groups	2	8	2	10	4	7	6	1	4	5	0	3					
Media/Reading	16	16	17	13	18	9	16	15	11	18	17	17					
DSG	29	29	(26)	36	28	32	28	31	27	30	42	33					
Personal Experience	4	7	6	5	5	6	6	4	4	6	8	5					
Dear Colleague	4	7	5	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	(17)	5					
Last Time	8	8	9	8	8	8	5	7	9	8	10						

\*Figures in brackets indicate variation of ten percent or greater

;Figures in brackets noted with a period indicate a variation of twenty percent or greater

/Figures checked indicate a variation of nine percent.

**Table F.3**  
**Information Sources by Subjective Indicators:**  
**The Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Sources under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>Source</u>	<u>Not New</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>Not Specific</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Change</u>
Committee Chairman	4*	7*	3*	9*	2*	6*
Committee Members	13	14	11	17	14	12
State Delegate	4	2	4	3	6	3
Party Leader	4	6	3	7	2	5
Whip Notice	23	20	20	27	22	23
Debate	18	17	21	13	17	19
Committee Report	15	12	12	18	13	16
Other Members	11	4	12	5	4	13
Personal Staff	34	29	35	30	31	34
Constituents	1	0	1	0	1	0
Interest Groups	4	11	7	2	4	6
Media/Reading	(13)	25)*	(21)	6)	11	19
DSG	29	27	29	29	23	33)
Personal Experience	6	4	7	2	4	6
Dear Colleague	5	5	6	3	4	6
Last Time	10	17	6	12	6	9

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 /Figures checked indicate a variation of nine percent

**APPENDIX G**

**PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEVEL OF  
INFORMATION ARRANGED BY ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

Table 6.1

**Level of Information by Perceptual Indicators: The Percentage of Interviews  
in which Members Mentioned Different Levels of Information Under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>Level</u>		<u>Not Complex</u>	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Not Technical</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>No Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Major</u>	
Not Much	11%	10%	9%	13%	(17%)	5%	9%	7%		
Somewhat	(43)	53)	44	50	(53)	41)	(57)	40)		
Very Well	(47)	37)*	47	38/	(30	54)*	(35	53)		
<u>Level</u>		<u>Constituency</u>	<u>Constituency</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Re-</u>	<u>Re-</u>	<u>No Re-</u>	<u>No Re-</u>	
		<u>Not Aware</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>nation</u>	<u>nation</u>	<u>election</u>	<u>election</u>	
						<u>Effects</u>	<u>Effects</u>	<u>Effects</u>	<u>Effects</u>	
<u>Level</u>		<u>Not Salient</u>	<u>Salient</u>							
Not Much	15%	8%	14%	5%	(14%)	0%	12%	6%	12%	
Somewhat	50	44	(55	39)	(49	33)	(53	27)	(53	26)
Very Well	(36)	48)	(31	56)	(38	67)	(36	67)	(35	70)

Table 6.1--Continued

<u>Level</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>No Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
Not Much	14%	53%	15%	7%	11%	6%	(46%)	8%
Somewhat	(50)	(38)	(57)	(32)	45	42	44	43
Very Well	(36)	(57)	(28)	(62)	45	53	(11)	49

\*Brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or more  
 ( ) = variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = variation of nine percent

Table 62

Level of Information by Objective Indicators: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Levels of Information under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Type of Rule</u>	<u>Rule Margin</u>			<u>Margin of Passage</u>		
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Modified</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Defeated</u>
Not Much	(10%)	12%	0%)*	8%	12%	(3%)
Somewhat	53	42	47	(28)	50%*	(38)
Very Well	(38)	46	53)	(64)	38%*	(60)
						42
						35%.

<u>Level</u>	<u>Margin of Committee Vote</u>			<u>Minority Report</u>			<u>CQ Visibility</u>		
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Box Score</u>	<u>Yes Box Score</u>	<u>No Story</u>	<u>Yes Story</u>	
Not Much	9%	13%	13%	8%	12%	11%	(23%)	9%)	
Somewhat	(54)	43)	(52	42)	45	48	52	45	
Very Well	37	45	(35	50)	43	41	(25	46).	

Table G.2--Continued

Visibility in Washington Post (WP)		Congressional Policy Role				Policy Time		Index of Likeness	
No WP	Yes WP	No WP	Yes WP	Story	Initiate	Modify	Rateify	Below Likeness	Above Likeness
Box Score	Box Score	Score	Score					Average	Average
Not Much	16%	9%	(25%)	7x)	( 8x	15x	24x)	14x	8x
Somewhat	52	43/	51	45	44	51	48	44	49
Very Well	(32	48)	(24	(48)	(48	33	29)	42	43
Party Unity		Party Unity				Party Unity		Index of Likeness	
Below Dem. Party Unity	Above Dem. Party Unity	Below Rep. Unity	Above Rep. Unity	Below Likeness	Above Likeness	Below Likeness	Above Likeness	Below Likeness	Above Likeness
Not Much	( 4x	17x)	14x	10x	8x	15x	15x	8x	15x
Somewhat	45	47	43	48	43	43	43	43	49
Very Well	(51	36)	44	42	(49	(49	(49	(49	37)

Table 6.2--Continued

<u>Level</u>	<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u>			<u>Party Endorsements</u>			<u>Mention in Polls</u>			<u>Amount of Money</u>			<u>Presidential Involvement</u>				
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Dem.</u>	<u>Yes Dem.</u>	<u>No Rep.</u>	<u>Yes Rep.</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	
Not Much	12%	11%	14%	7%	12%	9%	12%	8%	14%	10%	9%	9%	10%	11%	11%	11%	
Somewhat	44	49	47	43	(49	37)	46	47	51	44	(36	55)					
Very Well	44	41	(39	50)	(39	54)	42	45	(35	47)	(55	35)					

\*Brackets indicate variation of ten percent or more  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent or doubling

Table G.3

Level	Not Much			Somewhat			Very Well		
	Not New	New	No Specific	Not New	New	No Specific	Not New	New	No Specific
Not Much	11%	13%	11%	11%	13%	13%	13%	13%	10%
Somewhat	47	42	44	50	50	46	46	47	43
Very Well	42	45	45	38	38	41	41	41	43

**APPENDIX H**

**MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROBLEMS OF THE  
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM**

Several members brought attention to six separate problems of the congressional information process. These problems provide an interesting perspective on Congressional information.

First, in satisfying the search for information, too often members show an unwillingness to consider new or additional information. Several members noted that "Once my mind's made up, don't confuse me with more facts. I don't need any more information." Another acknowledged that "The shorter things are, the more they get read," indicating a preference for non-involved, perhaps superficial analyses.

A second problem is the relatively low priority treatment of floor voting by some members. This frequently leads to a very casual search process. One member described his low information investments: "Normally, I spend only two hours a week thinking about all legislative matters. For the real big ones, I'll spend only 20 minutes." Another member expounded on how his feelings of helplessness and inefficacy lead to casual search:

There often is no reason to get informed. Except on a few votes, the fight's over. They are simply up or down matters. I can't have an effect. There is nothing left to do--no more amendments, no sending it back. It has sufficient support and approval. There is no reason to get into it. The time to affect has passed.

The potential problems raised by general unpreparedness are reflected upon by another member:

There is a broad spectrum of interest and information on issues here. We are required to vote on all kinds of issues. But, generally, you find yourself delving into committee work and major bills. Most of the time you're lucky if you know what is up. There is simply not enough time to get into it. I really question our scheme of checks and balances.

A third problem is the information deficiencies of Congress in comparison with the President. As one member emphasized, "In an information sense, it is easier to be President than a member. He has an elaborate staff set up. We don't. We must scrape. As a result, we find it difficult to countervail."

A fourth problem is the lack of time to grasp and to think about available information. Many argued that the lack of information is not, as commonly thought, the major problem of congressional information processes. What is lacking is the capacity to synthesize and interpret it. Consistent with positions taken by Tidavsky,<sup>1</sup> Peabody,<sup>2</sup> and Eulau,<sup>3</sup> members emphasize the difficulty of assimilating and judging what is presented to them on any given issue. As one member noted, "The only time I really have to reflect and read is on flights back to the district, and that's just not enough."

A fifth is the relatively narrow circles of advocacy that exist within the House. As a member described, "All you hear from usually are those you already agree with. But, you don't learn much from talking to people who agree with you. You need everybody's view and that's tough to get around here."

A sixth is the lack of information. One information deficiency pertains to policy consequences within the district. As a member argued, "We aren't always well informed on how things affect our jurisdictions. And we should be. People expect us to know." Another deficiency relates to highly technical questions. Many members said that the Saccharin issue posed a policy question for which there is a lack of real information, knowledge, and understanding within or outside of the Congress.

These six problems illustrate the quandary of the legislative information process, for to solve one will complicate others. More information will not solve the problem, for in many instances more than enough information is available. The problem is time and ability to digest that which is available. The basic deficiencies in the congressional information processes are ones of incentives and investments. But, changing them to make Congress more informed may overlook the fact that Congress "does politics"<sup>4</sup> and that to do well its functions of debate and deliberation it need not have a "rational" information system. In Polsby's words, "Technical competence and intellectual excellence. . .are not. . .strictly necessary for Congress to be important in the American system of government."<sup>5</sup>

NOTES: APPENDIX H

- <sup>1</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 231.
- <sup>2</sup> Robert Peabody, "Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U.S. House of Representatives," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, Sept., 1963, p. 5 (quoted in Saloma, Congress, p. 217).
- <sup>3</sup> Heinz Eulau, "The Committees in a Revitalized Congress," in Congress: The First Branch of Government, ed. by C. Cotter (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1966), p. 253.
- <sup>4</sup> Charles O. Jones, "Why Can't Congress Do Policy Analysis," Policy Analysis, 2 (Spring, 1976), p. 263.
- <sup>5</sup> Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Analysis and Congress," Public Policy, 17 (Fall, 1969), p. 74.

**APPENDIX I**

**DECISION DETERMINANTS ARRANGED BY  
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

Table 1.1

### **Decision Determinants by Perceptual Indicators: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Determinants under Various Issue Conditions**

Table I.1--Continued

Decision Determinant	Constituency		No Aware		No Mail		Renom. Effects		Effects		Effects	
	Not Salient	Salient	Not Aware	Aware	Mail	Mail	Effects	Effects	Effects	Effects	Effects	Effects
Committee Chairman	6%	7%	8%	3%	7%	0%	6%	4%	7%	2%		
Committee Member	13	8	13	6	(12)	0	11	4	11	4	1	4
State Delegate	4	2	5	2	4	0	4	1	2	1	2	1
Party Leader	3	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Other Member	7	2	4	2	5	2	5	2	5	2	5	2
Personal Staff	3	6	4	5	5	0	4	5	4	4	5	5
Constituency	(6	25)*	(10	20)	(12	24)	14	15	14	14	14	14
White House	9	5	4	6	8	0	8	5	2	1	1	1
Compromise	9	6	9	7	7	11	7	7	8	7	7	7
Campaign Promise	1	6	1	7	3	4	(1	11)	(1	11)		
Policy Assessment	67	62	67	68	64	72	64	67	64	68		
Consensus	9	6	10	3	7	7	8	4	8	4		
Philosophical Conviction	8	12	7	9	9	17	9	17	9	17	9	17
Consistency	6	8	6	7	7	4	5	12	6	12	6	12

Table I.1--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
Committee Chairman	7%	3%	5%	7%	5%	2%	(13%)	3%
Committee Member	11	7	13	4/	8	6	(17)	5
State Delegate	4	2	6	1	4	4	6	0
Other Member	5	4	3	1	2	2	4	3
Personal Staff	5	4	6	1	4	2	4	3
Constituency	13	13	13	12	(13)	13	22/	
White House	7	6	6	7	3	9	0	8
Compromise	5	12	12	4	6	13	(4)	14)
Campaign Promise	2	7	1	6	4	4	2	3
Policy Assessment	63	69	(63)	74)	(74)	60)	(48)	70)
Consensus	9	4	10	4	11	4	(19)	3)
Philosophical Conviction	11	10	(3	19)	11	9	6	14
Consistency	8	6	5	8	8	8	6	8
Party Leader	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	0

\* Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table I.2

**Decision Determinants by Objective Indicators: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Determinants under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Type of Rule</u>			<u>Rule Margin</u>			<u>Margin of Passage</u>		
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Modified</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Defeated</u>	<u>Close</u>	<u>Comfortable</u>	<u>8%</u>
Committee Chairman	8%	6%	5%	8%	5%	5%	3%	5%	8%
Committee Member	12	8	5	11	10	5	10	13	
State Delegate	5	3	0	2	4	3	2	5	
Party Leader	1	2	5	3	1	2	1	3	
Other Member	5	3	0	2	5	2	7	3	
Personal Staff	5	4	0	3	4	2	2	7	
Constituency	11	19	16	(23)	11)*	13	13	11	
White House	9	4	0	6	7	6	7	7	
Compromise	10	7	11	2	8	(0	7	11)	
Campaign Promise	3	4	0	5	3	3	3	4	
Policy Assessment	65	66	68	(73)	63)	(75	69	57)	
Consensus	8	7	0	2	8	(0	4	13)	
Philosophical Conviction	11	7	5	6	12	(5	17	8)	
Consistency	6	6	0	3	7	2	7	8	

Table 1.2--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>			<u>Index of Likeness</u>		
	<u>Below Dem. Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Dem. Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Rep. Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Rep. Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Average Likeness</u>	<u>Above Average Likeness</u>
Committee Chairman	4%	7%	5%	6%	2%	9%
Committee Member	7	13	12	9	8	12
State Delegate	3	3	3	4	1	5
Party Leader	1	2	0	3	2	2
Other Member	6	3	5	4	3	3
Personal Staff	2	6	4	4	4	5
Constituency	13	14	11	15	15	12
White House	6	7	10	4	6	7
Compromise	5	9	2	10	4	10
Campaign Promise	3	3	2	4	3	4
Policy Assessment	(72)	60)	(72	61)	69	62
Consensus	2	11/	6	8	5	9
Philosophical Conviction	11	11	10	12	16	7/
Consistency	6	7	7	6	7	7

Table 1.2--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Margin of Committee Vote</u>		<u>Minority Report</u>		<u>CQ Visibility</u>	
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Box Score</u>	<u>Yes Box Score</u>
Committee Chairman	7%	6%	6%	( 2%	15%)	3%
Committee Member	12	9	13	8	9	7%
State Delegate	2	4	3	4	3	( 9 8)
Party Leader	1	2	1	2	1	4 3
Other Member	5	4	7	2	5	2 2
Personal Staff	5	4	4	4	4	3 4
Constituency	17	12	14	13	12	4 15)
White House	8	6	6	7	5	3 8
Compromise	5	8	10	6	( 4 16)	16 5
Campaign Promise	1	4	3	4	3	2 4
Policy Assessment	71	62	(58	70)	64	(43 70)
Consensus	3	9	6	7	8	6 13 6
Philosophical Conviction	12	10	10	12	12	9 9 11
Consistency	7	7	4	9	6	9 7 7

Table I.2--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Visibility in Washington Post (WP)</u>			<u>Congressional Policy Role</u>			<u>Policy Time</u>		
	No WP Box Score	Yes WP Box Score	No WP Story	Yes WP Story	Initiate	Modify	Ratify	Below Average	Above Average
Committee Chairman	5%	6%	2%	7%	5%	5%	12%	5%	8%
Committee Member	12	9	14	9	(7	17	17)	13	7
State Delegate	3	3	5	3	3	5	0	3	4
Party Leader	2	2	2	1	2	3	0	2	1
Other Member	8	2	7	3	2	7	10	4	4
Personal Staff	2	5	6	4	3	7	2	6	2
Constituency	10	15	8	15	16	10	7/	13	14
White House	6	7	4	7	(3	10	21)	6	8
Compromise	5	9	6	7	7	11	2/	6	9
Campaign Promise	1	5	2	4	3	4	5	2	5
Policy Assessment	65	65	(52	69)	(67	64	52)	64	66
Consensus	10	6	(15	5)	5	11	12	7	8
Philosophical Conviction	11	11	11	11	10	12	14	(4	21)
Consistency	8	6	8	6	7	5	10	3	12/

Table 1.2--Continued

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u>				<u>Party Endorsements</u>				<u>Mention in Polls</u>				<u>Amount of Money</u>				<u>Presidential Involvement</u>				
	<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>		<u>No</u>		<u>Yes</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	
Committee Chairman	7%	4%	4%	9%	6%	6%	6%	6%	4%	4%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	0%	0%	8%	8%	
Committee Member	10	11	12	7	10	10	11	8	14	9	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	9/	0	9/
State Delegate	3	3	3	4	4	4	2	4	1	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	0	0	3	0	3
Party Leader	1	2	1	4	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	0	0	1	0	1
Other Member	4	4	6	1	5	1	5	0	7	3	0	7	3	0	7	3	0	0	5	0	5
Personal Staff	5	3	5	3	4	3	4	3	4	6	4	6	4	4	4	4	4	0	0	5	5
Constituency	13	14	11	18	(11)	(21)	13	13	9	16	9	16	9	16	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(11)	(0)	(11)
White House	11	3	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	9	6	7	6	7	6	7	(0)	(0)	(16)	(0)	(16)
Compromise	4	10	6	10	8	6	8	6	8	5	10	6	10	6	10	6	0	0	7	0	7
Campaign Promise	3	3	4	3	4	2	4	3	2	4	3	2	4	3	2	4	(8)	(8)	(50)	(8)	(50)
Policy Assessment	65	65	(62)	73	66	62	62	(62)	74	65	65	65	65	65	(100)	(100)	(66)	(66)	(66)	(66)	(66)
Consensus	7	8	9	4	7	7	8	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	0	0	6	0	6
Philosophical Conviction	9	13	11	11	11	10	12	5	9	12	5	9	12	5	9	12	(0)	(0)	17)	(0)	17)
Consistency	7	6	7	6	6	8	9	3	6	7	6	7	6	7	6	7	0	0	8	0	8

\* Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table I.3

Decision Determinants by Subjective Indicators; the Percent of Interviews in which  
Members Mentioned Different Determinants under Various Issue Conditions

<u>Decision Determinant</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Not New</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Not Specific</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Change</u>
Committee Chairman	5%	7%	5%	5%	8%	2%	8%
Committee Member	10	12	8	14	12	9	3
State Delegate	3	4	3	5	4	4	2
Party Leader	1	5	1	3	1	2	2
Other Member	5	2	4	4	4	4	5
Personal Staff	4	5	3	6	6	6	3
Constituency	13	16	14	13	14	13	13
White House Compromise	6	8	8	5	5	2	10
Campaign Promise	8	5	4	13/	6	6	8
Policy Assessment	3	4	3	3	1	1	5
Consensus	65	63	(70)	(56)*	60	68	
Philosophical Conviction Consistency	5	13	7	7	10	6	
	11	11	11	10	6	14	
	8	1	6	9	5	8	

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
/Variation of nine percent

**APPENDIX J**

**ROLE ORIENTATIONS ARRANGED BY  
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

Table J.1

Role by Perceptual Indicators: the Percent of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Role Orientations under Various Issue Conditions

	<u>Not Complex</u>	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Not Technical</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>No Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Not Major</u>	<u>Major</u>
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>								
Delegate	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%
Trustee	(79)	(67)*	(79)	(67)	77	72	(80)	70)
Politico	(15)	(26)	(15)	(26)	16	21	15	23
<u>Areal Focus</u>								
National	63	55	(70)	49)	(52	64)	(67	55)
Local	11	8	9	11	12	8	8	8
Both	(25)	(36)	(23)	(40)	35	28	(25	36)

Table J.1--Continued

	<u>Not Salient</u>	<u>Salient</u>	<u>Constituency Awareness</u>		<u>No Mail</u>		<u>Non-Effects</u>		<u>Reelected Effects</u>	
			<u>Not Aware</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Nonom.</u>	<u>Reelected.</u>	<u>Reelected.</u>	<u>Effects</u>
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>										
Delegate	24	3%	2%	4%	1%	4%	2%	4%	2%	4%
Trustee	(83	65)	(84	63)	(77	59)	(77	67)	(77	67)
Politico	(10	27)	(11	29)	(16	37)	18	23	17	24
<u>Areal Focus</u>										
National	(79	44)	(63	53)	58	64	59	63	59	63
Local	(4	14)	7	11	10	8	9	8	9	9
Both	(15	42)	23	35	31	28	30	30	31	28

Table J.1--Continued

	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>							
Delegate	2%	4%	3%	2%	1%	6%	0%
Trustee	75	72	73	75	76	70	72
Politico	19	19	18	20	19	21	(15) 25)
<u>Areal Focus</u>							
National	58	61	(50) 69)	59	62	45	40
Local	10	9	12	4	8	7	13
Both	32	28	(37) 26)	32	29	40	43

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater

( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table J.2

**Role by Objective Indicators: the Percent of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Role Orientations under Various Issue Conditions**

	<u>Type of Rule</u>			<u>Rule Margin</u>			<u>Margin of Passage</u>		
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Modified</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Defeated</u>	<u>Close</u>	<u>Comfortable</u>	
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>									
Delegate	2%	2%	0%	5%	2%	6%	2%	1%	
Trustee	(78)	69	58)*	67	76/	72	77	74	
Politico	(15)	24	37)	23	18	19	21	17	
<u>Areal Focus</u>									
National	52	63	56	(74	58)	(65	64	53)	
Local	9	8	0/	11	9	10	9	9	
Both	(33)	26	44)	(11	32)	(23	27	37)	

Table J.2--Continued

	<u>Party Unity</u>				<u>Index of Likeness</u>		
	<u>Below Dem.</u>	<u>Above Dem.</u>	<u>Below Rep.</u>	<u>Above Rep.</u>	<u>Below Average Likeness</u>	<u>Average Likeness</u>	<u>Above Average Likeness</u>
	<u>Party Unity</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>			
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>							
Delegate	3%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Trustee	77	72	78	72	74	74	74
Politico	18	19	17	20	19	18	18
<u>Area Focus</u>							
National	(67)	54)	(52	(63)	62	57	
Local	8	11	11	9	12	8	
Both	(24	35)	35	27	25	34/	

Table J.2--Continued

<u>Margin of Committee Vote</u>	<u>Minority Report</u>			<u>CQ Visibility</u>		
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Box Score</u>	<u>Yes Box Score</u>
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>						
Delegate	2%	2%	5%	1%	2%	2%
Trustee	76	74	76	72	75	72
Politico	19	19	14	23/	18	21
<u>Areal Focus</u>						
National	62	59	(68	54)	58	65
Local	7	10	12	8	12	2
Both	31	30	(17	38)*	29	33
						25
						31

Table J.2--Continued

	Visibility in Washington Post (WP)			Congressional Policy Role			Policy Time		
	No WP Box Score	Yes WP Box Score	No WP Story	Yes WP Story	Initiate	Modify	Satisfy	Below Average	Above Average
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>									
Delegate	22	3%	0%	3%	3%	1%	0%	3%	1%
Trustee	80	71/	78	73	(75	71	81)	72	78
Politico	15	21	15	20	19	21	12/	19	18
<u>Areal Focus</u>									
National	58	60	(48	61)	(62	58	27)*	58	61
Local	14	7	17	8/	( 8	12	18)	9	10
Both	27	31	31	30	(28	30	55)*	32	28

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater.

( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more

/ = Variation of nine percent or doubling

Table J.2--Continued

	<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u>	<u>Party Endorsements</u>	<u>Mention in Polls</u>			<u>Amount of Money</u>			<u>Presidential Involvement</u>			
			No	Yes	Dem.	No	Yes	Rep.	No	Yes	Rep.	
			<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	
Delegate	3%	2%	2	3%	2%	3%	3%	0%	4%	1%	0%	2%
Trustee	75	74	77	68/	(30	58)	76	69	(81	71)	91	82/
Politico	17	20	15	26/	(15	30)	17	24	(9	24)	9	15
<u>Areal Focus</u>												
National	(52	65)	58	63	(63	47)	62	54	(74	52)	(100	63)
Local	14	7	(13	3)	9	10	11	7	11	9	0	7
Both	34	27	(28	34)	(26	43)	(26	39)	(13	40)	(0	28)

Table J.3

**Role by Subjective Indicators: the Percent of Interviews in Which Members Mentioned Different Role Orientations under Various Issue Conditions**

	<u>New</u>	<u>Not New</u>	<u>Not Specific</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Change</u>
			2%	4%	3%	2%
<u>Representative Role Orientations</u>						
Delegate	75	72	77	70	72	76
Trustee	18	20	17	22	18	20
Politico						
<u>Areal Focus</u>						
National	58	66	(57)	69)	(44	69)
Local	11	5	(12	2)	(17	5)
Both	30	29	31	27	(36	26)

\*Figures in Brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more

**APPENDIX K**

**TIME OF DECISION ARRAYED BY  
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS**

Table K.1

**Time of Decision by Perceptual Indicators: the Percent of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Decision Times under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Not Complex</u>	<u>Complex</u>	<u>Not Technical</u>	<u>Technical</u>	<u>No Conflict</u>	<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Not Major</u>	<u>Major</u>
When First in Politics	11%	3%	10%	3%	( 2%	12%)	11%	10%
Last Time Up	20	16	17	20	15	21	( 7	25)
During Campaign	5	13	5	13	7	10	0	9
Automatic	8	5	8	5	3	9	7	10
On Committee	1	8	1	8	7	3	7	5
Week Before	4	2	4	2	5	1	7	2
Day Before	1	5	3	2	3	3	7	3
When Read About	11	2	8	5	11	3	11	5
Heard from Constituency	1	6	3	5	3	3	0	5
On the Floor	28	22	29	20 <sup>f</sup>	29	22	(29	16)
When Change Made	3	8	4	7	3	7	4	5
Late	8	11	10	8	11	7	6	7

Table K.1--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Not Salient</u>	<u>Salient</u>	<u>Constituency Not Aware</u>	<u>Constituency Aware</u>	<u>No Mail</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Renom. Effects</u>	<u>No Reelec. Effects</u>	<u>Reelec. Effects</u>
When First In Politics	2%	9%	6%	9%	7%	10%	7%	8%	6%
Last Time Up	21	16	21	14	18	20	(14)	29	(15)
During Campaign (2)	14	(3)	(14)	14	7	15	(4)	21	(4)
Automatic	6	6	4	9	(4)	20	5	11	20
On Committee	6	5	3	7	6	0	4	5	10
Week Before	4	1	2	2	3	5	2	3	5
Day Before	4	3	3	5	3	6	4	0	2
When Read About	6	8	10	5	7	0	8	3	0
Heard from Constituency	0	5	3	5	3	5	3	5	5
On the Floor	(38)	18)	28	21	(28)	10)	(31)	8)	(30)
When Change Made	4	6	4	2	5	5	7	0	7
Late	9	9	12	7	9	10	10	5	11

Table K.1--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Routine</u>	<u>Not Routine</u>	<u>No Strong Feeling</u>	<u>Feeling</u>	<u>Not Tough</u>	<u>Tough</u>	<u>No Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>	<u>Thought</u>
When First in Politics	( 4%	14%)	( 0%	16%)	8%	14%	4%	(21	0%
Last Time Up	(22	9)	15	21	(24	14)	(21	11)	
During Campaign	7	11	( 0	11)	9	5	4		5
Automatic	8	2	( 2	13)	8	9	0		5
On Committee	5	5	7	3	5	5	4		11
Mr. Before	4	0	5	2	4	5	( 0		11)
Before	3	2	5	2	5	0	4		5
W.n Read About	5	9	12	3/	6	0	8		0
Heard from Constituency	3	5	2	5	5	0	( 0		11)
On the Floor	27	21	(39	13)	(15	32)	(38		21)
When Change Made	2	11/	2	8	5	0	13		21
Late	8	11	12	5	( 6	18)	4		0

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table K.2

**Time of Decision by Objective Indicators: the Percentage of Interviews in which Members Mentioned Different Decision Times under Various Issue Conditions**

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Type of Rule</u>			<u>Rule Margin</u>			<u>Margin of Passage</u>		
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Modified</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Defeated</u>	<u>Close</u>	<u>Wide</u>	<u>3%</u>
When First in Politics	2%	6%	8%	0%	8%	(0%)	15%	3%	
Last Time Up	(23)	17	7	15	13	(11)	21	18	
During Campaign	4	8	13	15	8	(4)	14	7	
Automatic	6	8	7	(23)	5	(15)	8	2	
On Committee	9	2	0	0	6	(0)	2	10	
Week Before	4	4	0	8	2	4	0	5	
Day Before	6	2	0	0	3	0	0	7	
When Read About	9	8	0	0	7	(0)	4	11	
Heard from Constituency	6	4	0	0	4	0	2	7	
On the Floor	(17)	23	40	(15)	26	(52)	12	24	
When Change Made	6	4	14	8	5	4	8	3	
Late	4	13	13	15	9	11	15	3	

Table K.2--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Party Unity</u>			<u>Index of Likeness</u>		
	<u>Below Dem. Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Dem. Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Rep. Party Unity</u>	<u>Above Rep. Party Unity</u>	<u>Below Average Likeness</u>	<u>Above Average Likeness</u>
When First in Politics	10%	4%	( 0%	11%)*	10%	3%
Last Time Up	16	19	23	15	18	18
During Campaign	10	7	4	11	10	6
Automatic	9	4	6	6	9	3
On Committee	1	8	11	2/	6	3
Week Before	1	4	4	2	1	5
Day Before	0	6	4	2	1	5
When Read About	3	10	9	5	5	8
Heard From Constituency	0	7	2	4	1	6
On the Floor	29	21	19	28/	21	30/
When Change Made	6	4	6	4	5	5
Late	(15	4)	11	9	12	6

Table K.2--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Margin of Committee Vote</u>	<u>Minority Report</u>	<u>CQ Visibility</u>		
	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Box Score</u>
			<u>No Box Score</u>	<u>Box Score</u>	<u>No Story</u>
When First in Politics	2%	10%	6%	8%	0%
Last Time Up	22	16	( 6	26)	(14
During Campaign	6	10	10	8	30)
Automatic	6	7	10	5	( 9
On Committee	6	4	4	6	21)
Week Before	6	1	2	4	12
Day Before	4	2	4	2	3
When Read About	6	7	8	6	10
Heard from Constituency	0	6	4	4	8
On the Floor	22	27	(37	16)	12
When Change Made	8	3	4	6	3
Late	14	7	8	9	7

Table K.2--Continued

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Visibility in Washington Post (WP)</u>			<u>Congressional Policy Role</u>			<u>Policy Time</u>			
	<u>No WP</u>	<u>Yes WP</u>	<u>No WP Box Score</u>	<u>Yes WP Story</u>	<u>No Story</u>	<u>Initiate</u>	<u>Modify</u>	<u>Ratify</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>
	<u>Box Score</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Box Score</u>	<u>Story</u>	<u>Story</u>	<u>Initiate</u>	<u>Modify</u>	<u>Ratify</u>	<u>Box Score</u>	<u>Score</u>
<u>When First in Politics</u>	6%	8%	5%	8x	(10x)	0%	0%	0%	4x	10x
<u>Last Time Up</u>	15	20	12	20	18	18	13	(9)	(9)	27)
<u>During Campaign</u>	4	12	5	10	(7)	9	19)	7	7	10
<u>Automatic</u>	(0)	10)	0	9/	8	5	0	6	6	7
<u>On Committee</u>	6	5	9	3	4	5	13/	9	9	1
<u>Week Before</u>	6	1	2	3	4	0	0	1	1	4
<u>Day Before</u>	4	2	2	3	3	4	0	3	3	3
<u>When Read About</u>	9	5	(16	2)	7	5	6	7	7	6
<u>Heard from Constituency</u>	4	3	5	3	(2	14	0)	1	1	6
<u>On the Floor</u>	(33	20)	(33	21)	24	23	31	(34	(16)	
<u>Change Made</u>	4	6	5	5	5	9	0	7	3	
<u>Late</u>	11	8	7	10	(9	5	19)	13	6	

Table K.2--Continued

<u>Amendment over Committee Objection</u>	<u>Party Endorsements</u>				<u>Mention in Polls</u>				<u>Amount of Money</u>				<u>Presidential Involvement</u>			
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No Dem.</u>	<u>Yes Rep.</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Below Average</u>	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>
<u>When Decided</u>																
When First in Politics	3*	11*	8%	5%	5%	8%	5%	8%	6%	6%	8%	8%	(25%)	(4%)		
Last Time Up	17	18	(14)	25	17	20	19	15	10	22	(0)	(0)	22	(22)		
During Campaign	9	8	8	9	8	10	8	9	4	11			(25)	(11)		
Automatic	5	8	3	14/	6	8	7	6	6	7			0	0	7	
On Committee	9	1	7	0	5	5	3	12	4	6			6	0	4	
Week Before	5	1	1	7	3	3	4	0	6	1			1	0	4	
Day Before	3	3	4	0	3	3	3	3	6	6			1	0	4	
When Read About	9	4	9	0/	7	5	7	6	6	7			1	0	7	
Heard from Constituency	2	5	5	0	3	5	5	0	2	4			0	0	4	
On the Floor	26	24	27	21	27	20	26	21	(38)	(18)*			(0)	(20)		
When Change Made Late	6	4	3	9	4	8	3	12	2	7			7	0	4	
	6	12	8	11	10	8	8	12	10	9			9	(50)	7*	

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
 ( ) = Variation of twenty percent or more  
 / = Variation of nine percent

Table K.3

Time of Decision by Subjective Indicators: the Percent of Interviews in Which Members Mentioned Different Decision Times under Various Issue Conditions

<u>When Decided</u>	<u>Not New</u>	<u>New</u>	<u>Specific</u>	<u>No Specific</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Change</u>
When First in Politics	7%	7%	10%	3%	5%	9%	
Last Time Up	(19	7)*	20	16	(11	23)	
During Campaign	9	7	8	9	5	11	
Automatic	( 5	21)	10	2	5	7	
On Committee	6	0	5	5	10	1/	
Week Before	3	0	1	5	1	4	
Day Before	3	0	1	5	3	3	
When Read About	6	7	4	9	(15	0)	
Heard from Constituency	3	7	4	3	7	1	
On the Floor	25	21	21	30/	27	23	
Change Made	( 4	14)	4	6	7	4	
Late	9	7	10	8	( 3	14)	

\*Figures in brackets indicate a variation of ten percent or greater  
/variation of nine percent or doubling

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